Question about dependent origination

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Sherab
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Re: Question about dependent origination

Post by Sherab »

Malcolm wrote: Tue Nov 30, 2021 11:50 pm
Sherab wrote: Tue Nov 30, 2021 10:58 pm
Malcolm wrote: Mon Nov 29, 2021 9:38 pm

Conventionally, there are things out there. It's not a problem unless one wants to propose that things exist from their own side. That includes everything, both subject and objects, insides and outsides.
As I have argued previously, it is all mental representations based on your argument. Because of that kind of argument, whether things that are out there actually exist from their own side is not a knowledge accessible to such a mind which itself is also a convention.
Things can’t exist from their own side because if they did, that would require them to exist inherently. Further, no one at any time has ever beheld an inherently existing thing.
You missed my point.

If all things are only mental representations (as you have argued previously) to your mind which itself is also a mental representation (as you have argued previously), how can your mentally represented mind know the nature of things are are only known to your through your mental representations of those things?

Therefore, if you say that things do no exist inherently, that would only be your assertion. If you say that things exist inherently, that too would only be your assertion.
Malcolm
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Re: Question about dependent origination

Post by Malcolm »

Sherab wrote: Thu Dec 02, 2021 7:07 am
Malcolm wrote: Tue Nov 30, 2021 11:50 pm
Sherab wrote: Tue Nov 30, 2021 10:58 pm
As I have argued previously, it is all mental representations based on your argument. Because of that kind of argument, whether things that are out there actually exist from their own side is not a knowledge accessible to such a mind which itself is also a convention.
Things can’t exist from their own side because if they did, that would require them to exist inherently. Further, no one at any time has ever beheld an inherently existing thing.
You missed my point.

If all things are only mental representations (as you have argued previously) to your mind which itself is also a mental representation (as you have argued previously), how can your mentally represented mind know the nature of things are are only known to your through your mental representations of those things?

Therefore, if you say that things do no exist inherently, that would only be your assertion. If you say that things exist inherently, that too would only be your assertion.
I never argued all things are merely mental representations, not once. That’s not what “conventional” means. A “convention” is a term for a dependent designation.
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PadmaVonSamba
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Re: Question about dependent origination

Post by PadmaVonSamba »

Sherab wrote: Thu Dec 02, 2021 7:07 am If all things are only mental representations (as you have argued previously) to your mind which itself is also a mental representation (as you have argued previously), how can your mentally represented mind know the nature of things are are only known to your through your mental representations of those things?
The premise that “mind is a mental representation” is faulty. You probably misunderstood.

Aside from that, the issue isn’t that
things are only mental representations
but rather, that the apparent thingness of phenomena (I.e. that a perceived object possesses some inherent identity) is only mental construct.

In other words, a “car” is never really more than a collection of functioning automotive parts. But “Car” as a unitary object (my car, your car) is what is created in the mind.

The mistake being made is in saying “here’s this thing, does it exist or not?”
…except that there’s no “thing” to begin with. Nothing to either confirm or refute the existence of.

The same applies to mind itself. “Mind” is an ongoing, ever-changing collection, an active process. There is no essential “mind-ness” to be found.

The argument that because there is no unitary object that’s “mind”, therefore there is no way to know, is like arguing that because a car is really only a collection of parts, that it can’t go anywhere.

Phenomena still function as phenomena, relatively.
In fact, that’s the whole basis of interdependent origination: phenomena only functions (arises, occurs) in a relative context, in relation to other phenomena. It’s like the reflection in a mirror, which itself only occurs as the interaction of a shiny glass surface and whatever is in front of it.

You may be familiar with Indra’s Net, a concept which describes this perfectly. It’s all mirrors. Indra’s Net a grid, you might say, of perfectly reflective mirrored pearls, like rows and columns of chrome-plated ball bearings. Each one reflects all the ones next to it. In fact, each pearl is nothing except the reflection of all the other ones next to it. Without the others, each ceases.
EMPTIFUL.
An inward outlook produces outward insight.
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Matt J
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Re: Question about dependent origination

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Malcolm wrote: Wed Dec 01, 2021 10:58 pm He is just negating what Gorampa has already negated: in other words, the appearance of liquid in the human realm is invalid in the preta realm. Calling liquid a common perceptual object is merely a convention to conform to the fact that different beings perceive liquids. It does mean that one is asserting some really existing common perceptual object.
Not sure if Mipham even had access to Gorampa. Perhaps fitting him into such categories distorts what he writes. Mipham was not afraid to call scholars on their BS, even as he adopted similar media. He was clearly grounded not only in a rime approach, but also a practical, experiential one.
And of course, there are no degrees of existence or emptiness, nor is there a separation between appearance and emptiness. No one suggested there was.
It sounds like these posts grant special privilege to physical objects. To some extent, it is an academic point given emptiness.
It is a fools errand to try and prove that there are no outer objects. The very endeavor itself proves that there are, just as in absence of water there is no reflection of the moon, and in absence of the moon, there is no reflection either. As Chandra points out:
I don't defend ontological idealism either like neo-Advaitins. This is a category error. I'm simply forwarding epistemological idealism--- we don't really know what lies beyond mind. Failing to distinguish the two is problematic.
"The world is made of stories, not atoms."
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Malcolm
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Re: Question about dependent origination

Post by Malcolm »

Matt J wrote: Fri Dec 03, 2021 5:39 pm
Not sure if Mipham even had access to Gorampa.
Oh, yes. He most certainly did. He read him quite thoroughly.
Perhaps fitting him into such categories distorts what he writes. Mipham was not afraid to call scholars on their BS, even as he adopted similar media. He was clearly grounded not only in a rime approach, but also a practical, experiential one.
No. Mipham's commentaries are in the tradition of Gorampa. This is not even a question. It is just a fact.


And of course, there are no degrees of existence or emptiness, nor is there a separation between appearance and emptiness. No one suggested there was.
It sounds like these posts grant special privilege to physical objects. To some extent, it is an academic point given emptiness.
You have to understand, Mipham is responding to Gelukpas, since they indeed privilege the object-- for them the object is the truth, not the perception. Gorampa and Mipham both privilege the perception.
I don't defend ontological idealism either like neo-Advaitins. This is a category error. I'm simply forwarding epistemological idealism--- we don't really know what lies beyond mind. Failing to distinguish the two is problematic.
When it comes to the basis, the perception of ordinary beings, Madhyamaka in general does not forward epistemological idealism. Sapan summarizes this quite well:
With the intent of functioning in common with worldlings,
he that external objects exist,
but having in mind the reasoning
that investigates conventional reality,
he taught that phenomena are mind.
Again, having in mind ultimate reality,
he that that all phenomena are elaborationless.
So, it really all depends on whether what perspective you are addressing things from. The Gelug POV always takes into consideration common mundane convention as the baseline for discussion. But even they, when it comes to meditating the path in Vajrayāna, consider phenomena to be mind, and ultimately, free of proliferation.

What Gorampa, and later Mipham, are criticizing the Gelug point of view for, is granting an undue existential status that is not required at all to explain the conventional truth of ordinary persons, that is, the point of view of people who have not analyzed anything. Relative truth does not bear ultimate analysis, but on the other hand, claiming we cannot known anything of the world beyond our five senses is also not an argument that any Mādhyamika would seriously propose, since even Mādhyamikas admit that a sense consciousness will not arise in absence of a sense object, and that the two truths are objects of true and false cognitions. For example, Aryadeva clearly states:

Dependent on eye and form,
the mind arises like an illusion,
it is not reasonable to call
illusory that which has existence.


Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas, Sonam, Snow Lion, 1994, pg. 261.

This verse itself is sufficient to show that Mādhyamikas accept outer objects conventionally.
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Matt J
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Re: Question about dependent origination

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Malcolm wrote: Fri Dec 03, 2021 6:33 pm No. Mipham's commentaries are in the tradition of Gorampa. This is not even a question. It is just a fact.
I don't know about Gorampa, but Mipham doesn't seem as polemical. Mipham is a synthesizer, but also a bit sectarian in that he promotes Nyingma teachings. In his synthesis, he tends to modify other strands, such as accepting Cittamatra conventionally but disputing that the mind is real, or in taking the Shentong view but disagreeing on the emptiness of Buddhanature (he says it is). Doesn't Gorampa reject Gelugpas as nihilists, and Jonangpas as eternalists? Not sure Mipham would go that far.
You have to understand, Mipham is responding to Gelukpas, since they indeed privilege the object-- for them the object is the truth, not the perception. Gorampa and Mipham both privilege the perception.
Mipham states that Cittamatra and Madhyamaka both agree that external objects don't really exist.
When it comes to the basis, the perception of ordinary beings, Madhyamaka in general does not forward epistemological idealism. Sapan summarizes this quite well:
I don't think that is correct. Per Mipham in the Adornment of the Middle Way (trans Padmakara):

Indeed, whatever appears and is cognized is none other than an experience of (or rather by) consciousness. And in the absence of such a clear experience by the selfilluminating mind, it would never be possible for other (nonmental) things to be known. If it were possible, this would necessarily mean that things are perceived in the absence of clarity and cognition; but without clarity and cognition, there is no consciousness. This being so, if there is no consciousness there can be no appearance of things. Thus whatever is experienced is established as consciousness itself; it is like a form seen in a dream, or a hallucination and so forth. Even if one believes that such a form exists as an outer object separate from consciousness, this same object cannot be established by perception, since there is no link connecting object and consciousness—whether they are simultaneous or not (as in the case of visual consciousness and a form and so on). Therefore, the experience of the color blue is an experience of something that is not different from consciousness; it is like the experience of a form seen in a dream.

It may be objected that, even granted that the experience of a mental aspect is necessarily consciousness, it can be inferred nevertheless that there must be an extramental object that is casting its aspect on the mind. But because the subtle particles and so on do not exist (even though they have been inferred), this is untenable. Even in those systems where the particle is considered to exist, the latter is not established by perception. It is hidden and that it exists is no more than an inference. Now, the fact that the nonexistent outer object is (only) inferred, whereas one experiences things clearly (in the mind) lends considerable force to the argument that phenomena are merely established by the mind itself. Indeed, this position cannot be invalidated by any other view. Such a conclusion is in harmony with the Ghanavyuha, Sandhinirmochana, Lankavatara, and other sutras. Thus, when analyzing experience in the postmeditation state, Madhyamikas either assert the existence of external objects on the conventional level or not. There is no third alternative.
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Malcolm
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Re: Question about dependent origination

Post by Malcolm »

Matt J wrote: Tue Dec 07, 2021 2:30 am
I don't think that is correct. Per Mipham in the Adornment of the Middle Way (trans Padmakara):
For you, Mipham seems to be the summum bonum of Madhyamaka, even though for me, he just another in a long line of Tibetans. The fact mainstream Madhyamakas accept outer objects conventionally is noncontroversial. It’s true that Shantaraksita, of whom Mipham is very fond, likes Yogacara for conventional truth. But as the passage from Sapan demonstrates, Madhyamakas tend to be content different presentations of conventional truth. Certainly, most Mainstream Madhyamakas accept the Sautrantika perpective. This again is noncontroversial. Also, Mipham defense of rang rig is uncertain. Candrakirti clearly understands rang rig as memory, not a self-illuminating mind, but that may simply be a fault in the translation,
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Matt J
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Re: Question about dependent origination

Post by Matt J »

Malcolm wrote: Fri Dec 03, 2021 6:33 pm So, it really all depends on whether what perspective you are addressing things from. The Gelug POV always takes into consideration common mundane convention as the baseline for discussion. But even they, when it comes to meditating the path in Vajrayāna, consider phenomena to be mind, and ultimately, free of proliferation.
Wait--- are you asserting that even Gelugs state all phenomenon are mind at the level of Tantra? So the whole objects thing only applies to the Sutra level? So this whole discussion is academic?
This verse itself is sufficient to show that Mādhyamikas accept outer objects conventionally.
Not sure what "accept outer objects conventionally" means. If it means that for purposes of communication, using language to refer to things, then sure. We can surely say that it appears there are outer objects, but this is not really different from a dream.
"The world is made of stories, not atoms."
--- Muriel Rukeyser
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