Philosophical implications of the emptiness of the teachings themselves

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wei wu wei
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Philosophical implications of the emptiness of the teachings themselves

Post by wei wu wei »

One interesting meta-philosophical byway related to the emptiness teachings is the implications of their own emptiness. Since the teachings themselves must be empty, they can’t *actually* be describing how things really are, since the whole point of the teachings is that there is no way that things inherently are. The teachings themselves are empty.

But this raises a number of interesting questions:

1. If the above is true, then why do they “work”?
2. If the above is true, then the emptiness teachings are no closer to or further from describing reality than any other set of teachings (say, Advaita)–-that is, they have no privileged access to reality; as such, any path may lead to soteriological goals. (If it were argued otherwise–-that the emptiness teachings are actually an accurate description of reality--then this would lead to a contradiction of the teachings.)
3. If we were to argue that another set of teachings (say, Sufi) are only provisional and that one needed to eventually arrive at an emptiness view for liberation, then we again are in danger of asserting some type of privileged access or correspondence theory of truth.
4. If we say that there is no way things inherently are, then haven’t we asserted something about reality? To say that there is “no way things inherently are” is still an assertion about the way things are–-an assertion via negativa.

In short, the emptiness teachings can’t be read as objective descriptions of reality–-doing so would contradict them–-so they must be read as purely therapeutic, in which case, they are simply one of many paths that seem to work to alleviate suffering in the world.
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Re: Philosophical implications of the emptiness of the teachings themselves

Post by Astus »

One better not forget conditionality that goes hand in hand with emptiness. Emptiness is not causelessness. Therefore it's not the case that anything can come from anything.
1 Myriad dharmas are only mind.
Mind is unobtainable.
What is there to seek?

2 If the Buddha-Nature is seen,
there will be no seeing of a nature in any thing.

3 Neither cultivation nor seated meditation —
this is the pure Chan of Tathagata.

4 With sudden enlightenment to Tathagata Chan,
the six paramitas and myriad means
are complete within that essence.


1 Huangbo, T2012Ap381c1 2 Nirvana Sutra, T374p521b3; tr. Yamamoto 3 Mazu, X1321p3b23; tr. J. Jia 4 Yongjia, T2014p395c14; tr. from "The Sword of Wisdom"
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Re: Philosophical implications of the emptiness of the teachings themselves

Post by Tao »

1. If the above is true, then why do they “work”?

The relative truth is good enough to make a path of liberation.

2. If the above is true, then the emptiness teachings are no closer to or further from describing reality than any other set of teachings (say, Advaita)–-that is, they have no privileged access to reality; as such, any path may lead to soteriological goals. (If it were argued otherwise–-that the emptiness teachings are actually an accurate description of reality--then this would lead to a contradiction of the teachings.)

That's false. 2+2=4 is better than 2+1=5 even if both are relative truth. Better if you're trying to count something...

3. If we were to argue that another set of teachings (say, Sufi) are only provisional and that one needed to eventually arrive at an emptiness view for liberation, then we again are in danger of asserting some type of privileged access or correspondence theory of truth.

Yes, I do. There's a theory of not-so-true, like 2+2=4 it's better than 2+1=5.

4. If we say that there is no way things inherently are, then haven’t we asserted something about reality? To say that there is “no way things inherently are” is still an assertion about the way things are–-an assertion via negativa.

Yes it's, what's the problem? Is it an assertion about how things arent inherently. It's ok to me. What we're negating is essence or inherent identity, that's all.

>In short, the emptiness teachings can’t be read as objective descriptions of reality

No set words is an objective descriptions of reality. None of them. But "it's that teaching useful for liberation or not?".

See also UPAYA.

>so they must be read as purely therapeutic

That's false. I cant see how you make that jump.

When someone tries to teach you how to ride a bike, none of the instructions said are really "to ride a bike". They're words and they're not and objective description of the reality of riding a bike which is unknown to you at that point.

But it doesnt mean any instruction is OK because of that. That's a big and crazy jump.

Telling you that for a good ride you need to first shave your beard, maybe is not the best advice. Not every advice is ok or makes sense.

> in which case, they are simply one of many paths that seem to work to alleviate suffering in the world.

That could be. I cant see any problema about that. I'm not radical. But Buddhism does, and that's enough to me. The rest I dont know.
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Re: Philosophical implications of the emptiness of the teachings themselves

Post by Aemilius »

Here is one version of the Phylogenetic Tree of Life. From it we can see that most of the life forms on Earth are bacteria and other microbial beings. All animals (including us primates & humans) are in the branch of Eukaryotes.

It may be that all the millions of different life forms are trying to figure what it is out there and how does it work? And this has been going on since the beginning of this world cycle or kalpa. Whose explanation of the world and existence is best? These little guys have existed far longer here on Earth than animals, primates or humans.


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They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
Sarvē mānavāḥ svatantrāḥ samutpannāḥ vartantē api ca, gauravadr̥śā adhikāradr̥śā ca samānāḥ ēva vartantē. Ētē sarvē cētanā-tarka-śaktibhyāṁ susampannāḥ santi. Api ca, sarvē’pi bandhutva-bhāvanayā parasparaṁ vyavaharantu."
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 1. (in english and sanskrit)
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Re: Philosophical implications of the emptiness of the teachings themselves

Post by PadmaVonSamba »

wei wu wei wrote: Fri Jun 02, 2023 6:17 am Since the teachings themselves must be empty, they can’t *actually* be describing how things really are, since the whole point of the teachings is that there is no way that things inherently are. The teachings themselves are empty.
Just because the teachings arise from causes and are components themselves doesn’t mean they can’t describe how things actually are.

Your assumption is that there is no validity in composites. This equates validity with inherent arising, or inherent reality/existence. But that may be a false equivalency, thus a faulty premise.

All that the Buddhist teachings say is, don’t get attached to composite appearances by mistaking them for ultimate reality. Everything the Buddha taught was related to the appearances of things. The whole eightfold path is about dealing with things as they appear to us.

Ultimately, yeah, there are no teachings. The sutras are made of words, the words are made of syllables, the syllables are made of sounds. The sounds only arise through sense-contact and then only have meanings imputed to them by the mind.

When you get there, don’t forget to come back and tell us how it all ends! :hi:
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Re: Philosophical implications of the emptiness of the teachings themselves

Post by PadmaVonSamba »

wei wu wei wrote: Fri Jun 02, 2023 6:17 am If we say that there is no way things inherently are, then haven’t we asserted something about reality? To say that there is “no way things inherently are” is still an assertion about the way things are–-an assertion via negativa.
Are we saying that “ultimately, the way things are is that they are not, ultimately, things?”
Yes. That is exactly what is being said.

Is it contradictory to say that the ultimate nature of phenomena is that it has no ultimate nature?
No, because the first use of the term, “ultimate” describes the general nature of phenomena in its entirety, and the second use of the term, “ultimate” refers to any actual phenomenon itself.
EMPTIFUL.
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Re: Philosophical implications of the emptiness of the teachings themselves

Post by ThreeVows »

wei wu wei wrote: Fri Jun 02, 2023 6:17 am One interesting meta-philosophical byway related to the emptiness teachings is the implications of their own emptiness. Since the teachings themselves must be empty, they can’t *actually* be describing how things really are, since the whole point of the teachings is that there is no way that things inherently are. The teachings themselves are empty.
FWIW, this is a very intellectual position.

Basically speaking, the teachings on emptiness are an antidote against a particular type of (pervasive) illness.

One might consider it to be a bit like if you consumed some poison, you would take an emetic to purge your system of the poison, and then the emetic also makes you purge up the emetic.

But you kind of need that emetic to get rid of the poison. If one were to have swallowed the poison and then said, "Well, if I take this emetic, I'm just going to throw it up anyway, so it seems kind of pointless", then they die of the poisoning.

Buddhism is not simply an intellectual game, for one who contemplates the four thoughts substantially enough.
“Whoever wants to find the wisdom beyond intellect without praying to his guru is like someone waiting for the sun to shine in a cave facing the north. He will never realize appearances and his mind to be one.”
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Re: Philosophical implications of the emptiness of the teachings themselves

Post by SilenceMonkey »

wei wu wei wrote: Fri Jun 02, 2023 6:17 am One interesting meta-philosophical byway related to the emptiness teachings is the implications of their own emptiness. Since the teachings themselves must be empty, they can’t *actually* be describing how things really are, since the whole point of the teachings is that there is no way that things inherently are. The teachings themselves are empty.

But this raises a number of interesting questions:

1. If the above is true, then why do they “work”?
2. If the above is true, then the emptiness teachings are no closer to or further from describing reality than any other set of teachings (say, Advaita)–-that is, they have no privileged access to reality; as such, any path may lead to soteriological goals. (If it were argued otherwise–-that the emptiness teachings are actually an accurate description of reality--then this would lead to a contradiction of the teachings.)
3. If we were to argue that another set of teachings (say, Sufi) are only provisional and that one needed to eventually arrive at an emptiness view for liberation, then we again are in danger of asserting some type of privileged access or correspondence theory of truth.
4. If we say that there is no way things inherently are, then haven’t we asserted something about reality? To say that there is “no way things inherently are” is still an assertion about the way things are–-an assertion via negativa.

In short, the emptiness teachings can’t be read as objective descriptions of reality–-doing so would contradict them–-so they must be read as purely therapeutic, in which case, they are simply one of many paths that seem to work to alleviate suffering in the world.
Words can only point to the moon. Of course the word “moon” is not the real moon.

We go on the assumption that the Buddhist teachings can not only show us the moon, but also take us there… and that other traditions may think they’re going to the moon, but they are neither showing us the (same) moon, nor can they take us there. And if we need logic to prove this is true, we have mountains of scriptures for this.

But why do the teachings on emptiness “work”? Because they help our deluded and confused minds become less so. When our obscurations are finally gone, we will perceive and experience reality, just as it is. Basically… because they help us to see the illusory nature of our illusions, and perceive the emptiness directly.

Ultimately, there is nothing that “works…” and we are already Buddha. Relatively, our deluded minds go through this process of purification until we achieve this enlightenment.

Of course, there is no “I,” “achievement” or “enlightenment” in the ultimate space of phenomena… But that’s the two truths for you.
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Re: Philosophical implications of the emptiness of the teachings themselves

Post by Johnny Dangerous »

This is premised on the idea that relative reality is “false” and ultimate reality is “true”, thus is a deviation from Buddhist teaching and is a wrong view, as is the idea that that there are actually two static truths. The separation of ultimate and relative is it itself only provisional - a convention.
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Re: Philosophical implications of the emptiness of the teachings themselves

Post by SilenceMonkey »

wei wu wei wrote: Fri Jun 02, 2023 6:17 am One interesting meta-philosophical byway related to the emptiness teachings is the implications of their own emptiness. Since the teachings themselves must be empty, they can’t *actually* be describing how things really are, since the whole point of the teachings is that there is no way that things inherently are. The teachings themselves are empty.
The way things really are is that there is ultimately no way things really are. (As you said) So if you’re trying to find an essential way things “actually” are, you may be disappointed.

Relatively, things exist in a certain way. Ultimately, things are free of the four extremes.

The teachings of Dharma exist in the relative, and teach both about relative and ultimate reality. The true Dharma, which is beyond all relative analysis, perception and experience, is Nirvana, the Dharmakaya, etc… It is Buddha. It is compounded and free from conceptual elaborations.
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Re: Philosophical implications of the emptiness of the teachings themselves

Post by Kim O'Hara »

wei wu wei wrote: Fri Jun 02, 2023 6:17 am One interesting meta-philosophical byway related to the emptiness teachings is the implications of their own emptiness. Since the teachings themselves must be empty, they can’t *actually* be describing how things really are, since the whole point of the teachings is that there is no way that things inherently are. The teachings themselves are empty.

But this raises a number of interesting questions: ...
Indeed. And some of them were addressed in another recent thread, Western Philosophy and emptiness - start about here https://www.dharmawheel.net/viewtopic.p ... 29#p665629 for the relevant bit. It isn't very long, because the discussion shifted away from Western philosophy fairly quickly (sigh).

:coffee:
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Re: Philosophical implications of the emptiness of the teachings themselves

Post by wei wu wei »

Just because the teachings arise from causes and are components themselves doesn’t mean they can’t describe how things actually are.

Your assumption is that there is no validity in composites. This equates validity with inherent arising, or inherent reality/existence. But that may be a false equivalency, thus a faulty premise.
Once you have philosophically deconstructed the project of epistemic objectivity--which is what Madhyamaka accomplishes--then you have ipso facto severed the possibility to talk about the way things *actually* are.

The only thing you can say in the way of a description of reality would be that there is no way things actually are. We can't even say that things are *actually* empty, since it turns out that emptiness itself is unfindable.

You also write: "Your assumption is that there is no validity in composites. This equates validity with inherent arising, or inherent reality/existence. But that may be a false equivalency, thus a faulty premise."

I would say Tsongkhapa does a good job of showing how epistemic warrants can work without foundationalism, so I'm not trying to say that there's no way to say anything "true" about the world--only that whatever we say will never turn out to be ultimately true in some findable sense.
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Re: Philosophical implications of the emptiness of the teachings themselves

Post by wei wu wei »

Tao wrote: Fri Jun 02, 2023 7:58 am 1. If the above is true, then why do they “work”?

The relative truth is good enough to make a path of liberation.

2. If the above is true, then the emptiness teachings are no closer to or further from describing reality than any other set of teachings (say, Advaita)–-that is, they have no privileged access to reality; as such, any path may lead to soteriological goals. (If it were argued otherwise–-that the emptiness teachings are actually an accurate description of reality--then this would lead to a contradiction of the teachings.)

That's false. 2+2=4 is better than 2+1=5 even if both are relative truth. Better if you're trying to count something...

3. If we were to argue that another set of teachings (say, Sufi) are only provisional and that one needed to eventually arrive at an emptiness view for liberation, then we again are in danger of asserting some type of privileged access or correspondence theory of truth.

Yes, I do. There's a theory of not-so-true, like 2+2=4 it's better than 2+1=5.

4. If we say that there is no way things inherently are, then haven’t we asserted something about reality? To say that there is “no way things inherently are” is still an assertion about the way things are–-an assertion via negativa.

Yes it's, what's the problem? Is it an assertion about how things arent inherently. It's ok to me. What we're negating is essence or inherent identity, that's all.

>In short, the emptiness teachings can’t be read as objective descriptions of reality

No set words is an objective descriptions of reality. None of them. But "it's that teaching useful for liberation or not?".

See also UPAYA.

>so they must be read as purely therapeutic

That's false. I cant see how you make that jump.

When someone tries to teach you how to ride a bike, none of the instructions said are really "to ride a bike". They're words and they're not and objective description of the reality of riding a bike which is unknown to you at that point.

But it doesnt mean any instruction is OK because of that. That's a big and crazy jump.

Telling you that for a good ride you need to first shave your beard, maybe is not the best advice. Not every advice is ok or makes sense.

> in which case, they are simply one of many paths that seem to work to alleviate suffering in the world.

That could be. I cant see any problema about that. I'm not radical. But Buddhism does, and that's enough to me. The rest I dont know.
As I mentioned above to another poster: Once you have philosophically deconstructed the project of epistemic objectivity--which is what Madhyamaka accomplishes--then you have ipso facto severed the possibility to talk about the way things *actually* are.

The only thing you can say in the way of a description of reality would be that there is no way things actually are. We can't even say that things are *actually* empty, since it turns out that emptiness itself is unfindable.

So I have no dispute, in the context of discussing conventional reality, with asserting math facts or any other type of fact, but it turns out the even what we say about ultimate truths is just as unfindable as what we say about conventional truths.
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Re: Philosophical implications of the emptiness of the teachings themselves

Post by wei wu wei »

Johnny Dangerous wrote: Fri Jun 02, 2023 6:49 pm This is premised on the idea that relative reality is “false” and ultimate reality is “true”, thus is a deviation from Buddhist teaching and is a wrong view, as is the idea that that there are actually two static truths. The separation of ultimate and relative is it itself only provisional - a convention.
Rather, it's that neither conventional nor ultimate truth is ultimately true. We are initially snared by appearances; we are given a powerful type of medicine (emptiness)--which is always conventionally true--but if we look for emptiness we find it is equally unfindable.
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Re: Philosophical implications of the emptiness of the teachings themselves

Post by Johnny Dangerous »

wei wu wei wrote: Sat Jun 03, 2023 6:43 am
Johnny Dangerous wrote: Fri Jun 02, 2023 6:49 pm This is premised on the idea that relative reality is “false” and ultimate reality is “true”, thus is a deviation from Buddhist teaching and is a wrong view, as is the idea that that there are actually two static truths. The separation of ultimate and relative is it itself only provisional - a convention.
Rather, it's that neither conventional nor ultimate truth is ultimately true. We are initially snared by appearances; we are given a powerful type of medicine (emptiness)--which is always conventionally true--but if we look for emptiness we find it is equally unfindable.
Well, the way you are defining “truth” here is implicitly conditional, but in Buddhadharma the only thing “true” is beyond conditions, in fact conditions themselves are ultimately beyond conditions, illusory nature is itself an illusion, etc.
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Re: Philosophical implications of the emptiness of the teachings themselves

Post by PadmaVonSamba »

wei wu wei wrote: Fri Jun 02, 2023 6:17 am the whole point of the teachings is that there is no way that things inherently are.
That is almost correct.
More accurately, the teachings say that what we perceive as individual ‘things’ ”are” actually temporarily arising aggregates, and not individually arising. They don’t say that there is nothing at all is occurring.

This implies then, that they aren’t really “things” to begin with (“thing” meaning an individual entity). I think that your position is basically that the dharma also is not a ‘thing’, and that’s true.

But “teachings” on emptiness or anything else is just a concept. If I ask someone what time it is, and they tell me, is that a ‘teaching’? It’s a label meaning the communication of knowledge, or of ideas. If such did not actually occur, then your theory likewise could not have been expressed.

That’s the tricky part, right? Whatever can be argued about the dharma teachings on emptiness also have to be applied to the argument itself.

So, I t’s not like “this is a teaching…
…and it doesn’t exist”

If anything, it could be said that since the teachings are also emptiness, they are therefore proof of the ideas they express.
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Re: Philosophical implications of the emptiness of the teachings themselves

Post by wei wu wei »


Well, the way you are defining “truth” here is implicitly conditional, but in Buddhadharma the only thing “true” is beyond conditions, in fact conditions themselves are ultimately beyond conditions, illusory nature is itself an illusion, etc.
When you say "beyond conditions," what do you mean? This sounds like you're positing a kind of noumena.
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Re: Philosophical implications of the emptiness of the teachings themselves

Post by wei wu wei »

PadmaVonSamba wrote: Sat Jun 03, 2023 12:59 pm
wei wu wei wrote: Fri Jun 02, 2023 6:17 am the whole point of the teachings is that there is no way that things inherently are.
That is almost correct.
More accurately, the teachings say that what we perceive as individual ‘things’ ”are” actually temporarily arising aggregates, and not individually arising. They don’t say that there is nothing at all is occurring.

This implies then, that they aren’t really “things” to begin with (“thing” meaning an individual entity). I think that your position is basically that the dharma also is not a ‘thing’, and that’s true.

But “teachings” on emptiness or anything else is just a concept. If I ask someone what time it is, and they tell me, is that a ‘teaching’? It’s a label meaning the communication of knowledge, or of ideas. If such did not actually occur, then your theory likewise could not have been expressed.

That’s the tricky part, right? Whatever can be argued about the dharma teachings on emptiness also have to be applied to the argument itself.

So, I t’s not like “this is a teaching…
…and it doesn’t exist”

If anything, it could be said that since the teachings are also emptiness, they are therefore proof of the ideas they express.

I don't think the teachings want us to swap a view of an inherently existing self for a view of the aggregates--Nagarjuna says as much. Of course we can say that conventionally all these things arise, but utlimately even dependent arising can't be found.

I agree with your other points.
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Re: Philosophical implications of the emptiness of the teachings themselves

Post by Johnny Dangerous »

wei wu wei wrote: Sat Jun 03, 2023 3:34 pm

Well, the way you are defining “truth” here is implicitly conditional, but in Buddhadharma the only thing “true” is beyond conditions, in fact conditions themselves are ultimately beyond conditions, illusory nature is itself an illusion, etc.
When you say "beyond conditions," what do you mean? This sounds like you're positing a kind of noumena.
I’m talking about the nature of phenomena too, as there is no difference.
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Re: Philosophical implications of the emptiness of the teachings themselves

Post by PadmaVonSamba »

wei wu wei wrote: Sat Jun 03, 2023 3:41 pm I don't think the teachings want us to swap a view of an inherently existing self for a view of the aggregates--Nagarjuna says as much.
I don’t think I suggested that.

I suggested that what we perceive as individual
things ”are” merely temporarily arising aggregates.

I was referring to the phrase you used:
“inherently are”
—in which I assume ‘are’ means ‘exist’.

Yes, it’s correct as you say, ‘there is no way that things inherently are’

—but they ‘are’ arising appearances.
They ‘are’ composites.

My point is, just because phenomena lack inherent existence doesn’t mean there’s no phenomena.

Likewise, just because dharna teachings on emptiness lack intrinsic reality themselves, this does not mean they are not valid teachings or that they are self-contradictory. If they were, then any argument to that effect would likewise be just as invalid for the very same reason.
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