Western Philosophy and emptiness

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natusake
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by natusake »

stong gzugs wrote: Sat May 27, 2023 8:49 pm
That atman itself is not refuted experientially in this practice (but the self in the skandhas/koshas/etc. are refuted, which Vedanta agrees with).
Atman/Brahman/Awareness is included in the skhandhas. It is vijnana. Hindus exclude it, but Buddhists include it. Non-dual consciousness is refuted even in the Pali canon. The point of anatta is to refute exactly this notion found in the vedas.

Additionally, even realization is 'refuted experientially' in Mahayana, so a 'who' that 'realizes' is also refuted:
Teaching How All Phenomena Are without Origin wrote:“Just as someone who is dreaming
Dreams of awakening and a buddha taming beings,
But there is no true awakening and there are no beings,
Likewise, the entire Dharma is in fact like that.

Those who have set out for awakening found nothing at all.
They found nothing and will never find anything.
Knowledge and awareness are of a single principle.
Knowing this, they will be victorious.
And later:
The victors never awaken to buddhahood,
And they never liberate any beings.
The immature have imputed these nonexistent phenomena
And are far from a buddha’s awakening.
Another one just for you:
Those who yearn for buddha qualities
Remain far from a buddha’s awakening.
Because they yearn for things that do not exist
They further their experience of suffering.
https://read.84000.co/translation/toh180.html
Malcolm
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by Malcolm »

stong gzugs wrote: Sat May 27, 2023 8:49 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sat May 27, 2023 4:10 am Claiming something is beyond concepts, therefore it can’t be refuted is a fool’s argument.
That's not exactly the claim. Ultimately anything that we believe conceptually has to cash out in experience,
If it can experienced, it is necessarily experienced conceptually.
stong gzugs
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by stong gzugs »

Malcolm wrote: Sat May 27, 2023 10:27 pm If it can experienced, it is necessarily experienced conceptually.
You're stating your own assumptions as a fact. Not everyone shares your assumptions. As I've mentioned before, Kongtrul, following Taranatha and Dolpopa, recognizes that the forms of emptiness in sadangayoga are directly experienced by non-conceptual wisdom.
The ten signs (rtags bcu), specifically related to the sixfold yoga of the Kalachakra tantra, are empty images (stong gzugs) to be meditated upon for the actualization of the vajra body. These empty images are not produced by thoughts and are extremely clear. They are the manifestation of pristine awareness, free from subject-object dualism. They resemble space in that they are devoid of mental constructs, beyond existent and non-existent phenomena. They are the luminous clarity nature of one’s own mind and also the totality of the dimensions of awakening.
Malcolm
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by Malcolm »

stong gzugs wrote: Sat May 27, 2023 10:55 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sat May 27, 2023 10:27 pm If it can experienced, it is necessarily experienced conceptually.
You're stating your own assumptions as a fact. Not everyone shares your assumptions.
So you are equating the citta of Advaita with the ultimate truth in Buddhism? You think Advaita is defensible?

If there is an experiencing subject, there must be an object.

For example, what is the object of a nondual equipoise free from proliferation? Is there an object in emptiness which is free from extremes? Can emptiness free from extremes itself be an object of equipoise? How?

We conventionally term the wisdom (prajñā) that apprehends emptiness free from extremes a "yogic direct perception," but this merely a convention, since there is no object that is directly perceived, and thus, no actual direct perception as such. In this state the mind simply subsides through the exhaustion of analytical options and merges into the dharmadhātu. This is not an "experience" per se, since there is neither subject nor object—the mind has become the very image of the dharmadhātu free from all extremes, like the reflection of the blue sky in a still lake.

The fault of the Gelukpas is turning emptiness into a conceptual object.

[I am putting aside the question of empty forms because it is not applicable, we were talking about madhyamaka, not completion stage practices].
OdeKirk
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by OdeKirk »

Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 12:53 am [I am putting aside the question of empty forms because it is not applicable, we were talking about madhyamaka, not completion stage practices].
Does the same logic not apply to completion stage practices?
Malcolm
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by Malcolm »

OdeKirk wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 1:01 am
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 12:53 am [I am putting aside the question of empty forms because it is not applicable, we were talking about madhyamaka, not completion stage practices].
Does the same logic not apply to completion stage practices?
Not precisely. The completion stage is not based on analysis, it’s based on generating nonconceptual gnosis on the basis of yogic practices.
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by stong gzugs »

Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 12:53 am So you are equating the citta of Advaita with the ultimate truth in Buddhism?
I thankfully found Duckworth basically making all the points I've been trying to make, and what he says merits close reading:
Awareness cannot be reduced to an object (in phenomenology not ontology) because it is fundamentally different in nature. It is not different in its nature in terms of what is absent (intrinsic reality understood as essence) but is different in terms of what is present (the lived or living dimension). In this sense, awareness has (or rather is) intrinsic nature, just not an intrinsic essence that can be adequately conceived; it must be lived in or through, as a contemporary phenomenologist, Evan Thompson, states: “Consciousness is something we live, not something we have.

Through the ontological analyses of Madhyamaka, all objects are determined to be empty, or stated otherwise, all phenomena are determined to be indeterminate. While this kind of ontological analysis is a powerful tool to undercut reification, the role of the subject, or awareness, in these kinds of analysis is treated in the same way as an object. This kind of impartiality—that treats all phenomena the same way—gives arguments explanatory power but also limits their import. It gives arguments power because the mind is not given a privileged place; everything without exception is subjected to a deconstructive analysis and is determined to be empty. However, awareness is not an object, or not just an object, and this presents a challenge to the universality of ontological analyses, for treating awareness as an object is arguably making a category mistake.

Mistaking the nature of the subject as an object is not simply a mistake that is on the order of mixing apples and oranges, but of taking infinity as a geometric object. Apples and oranges are both fruit, yet while infinity can be treated as a geometric object, it is not just a geometric object, and it also is not only that object. In the same way, subjectivity can be treated like an object (as in Madhyamaka ontological analyses), but it is not delimited solely by such analysis.
...

Mind-Only denies the reality of subject-object duality and asserts nondual cognition, which is the way things are (known) when reality is seen as it is. Since there is no real object, there is no real subject, either; and without a real subject, there is no real subject-object duality.
...
In certain ways the status attributed to awareness in the phenomenology of Mind-Only is not unlike the role of the “self” in the Advaita Vedānta tradition ... In this description of Advaita Vedānta, conscious experience is not an internal space as opposed to external objects, but is a non-thetic presence, the condition for the possibility of subjects and objects that cannot be adequately represented by objective description ... this “witness consciousness” is not an internal subject as opposed to an object, but is the pure horizon of experience and subject/object disclosure, “the pure ‘subject’ that underlies all subject/object distinctions” as Eliot Deutsch said, or “the ‘field’ of consciousness/being within which the knower/knowing/known arise.”
So, yeah, that's basically what I've been trying to explain all this time.
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 12:53 am If there is an experiencing subject, there must be an object.
An assumption being stated as a fact. I mentioned this above, that your claim here rests on whether one's assumed starting premise accept reflexivity or not. Cāndrakīrti doesn't, Dharmakīrti does, Śankara does. If you accept reflexivity, awareness can logically rest in itself, without any object. This is non-duality, beyond subject and object, and explains how you can start with a subject and move to non-dual awareness, as Duckworth explained above, and the Dṛg-Dṛśya-Vivek explains as well.

As such, from within Vedanta's own terms (like I said, (a) favoring experience (or phenomenology to use Duckworth's terms) over conceptual arguments (or ontology, per Duckworth) and (b) accepting reflexivity of awareness), I think Śankara's refutation of Madhyamaka's no-self argument makes perfect sense. Madhyamaka's responses (and thus yours) are only acceptable if you already buy into the premise that favors ontology over phenomenology, which Vedanta doesn't. So, as I said, everyone's arguments only work from within their own starting premises, which are always assumed and never proven.
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 12:53 am You think Advaita is defensible?
My refutation of Advaita is its inability to provide a convincing ontological status for maya that isn't dualistic. (There are somewhat parallel problems in the way that some Buddhist accounts treat ignorance as a causal factor at the start of the chain of dependent origination, as it also is on murky grounds in terms of its ontological status.)
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 12:53 am We conventionally term the wisdom (prajñā) that apprehends emptiness free from extremes a "yogic direct perception," but this merely a convention, since there is no object that is directly perceived, and thus, no actual direct perception as such. In this state the mind simply subsides through the exhaustion of analytical options and merges into the dharmadhātu. This is not an "experience" per se, since there is neither subject nor object—the mind has become the very image of the dharmadhātu free from all extremes, like the reflection of the blue sky in a still lake.
Again, Cāndrakīrti's take on yogic direct perception differs from that of others and is a source of debate. I don't take him as definitive, nor do any gzhanstongpas that I know of. And, yes, I get that the canonical reading is that because emptiness as a supporting object (ālambana) has no signs (nimittas), the only consciousness that could be a subject is one that doesn't arise, and hence vijñana ceases and jñana arises. What this (non)experience is like in phenomenological terms is fairly hard to fathom and I don't know that Cāndrakīrti ever offers any detailed account.

But, even still, if you read Cāndrakīrti's Prasannapadā closely, he doesn't necessarily refrain from making positive statements about yogic perception. In commenting on MMK 25.6, he says that jñana has a form (rūpa) which he describes as transcending all multiplicity (sarvaprapañcātīta) and commenting on MMK 25.15-16 also says that he doesn't deny that the Tathāgatā exists in some way, but describes it as simply inexpressible and outside the domain of multiplicity (na ca vayaṃ sarvathaiva niṣprapañcānāṃ tathāgatānāṃ nāstitvaṃ brūmaḥ yadasmākaṃ tadapavādakṛto doṣaḥ syāt). So, who knows, Cāndrakīrti may allow for some sort of positive direct yogic experience in jñana, lest he be accused of sheer denialism (apavāda).
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 12:53 am The fault of the Gelukpas is turning emptiness into a conceptual object.
Agreed. "Emptiness cures all wrong views, but the view of emptiness is incurable."
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 12:53 am For example, what is the object of a nondual equipoise free from proliferation?
...
[I am putting aside the question of empty forms because it is not applicable, we were talking about madhyamaka, not completion stage practices].
Fair enough, but you know from our prior conversations that gzhanstong emphasizes these empty forms, because they initially appear as non-conceptual objects of meditation that take you beyond subject-object duality, as they are the nature of both subject and object; in so doing, they transcend the narrow understandings of how form and emptiness relate via Prajñāpāramitā that Cāndrakīrti and such tend to have, because it shows that emptiness has a form (see Tāranātha's commentary on the Heart Sutra, for instance). This, again, is why Dölpopa introduced Madhyamaka with Appearances as a category that transcends Prasangika and Yogacara, but synthesizes their best qualities. (I know you disagree, and think of it as a Frankenstein's monster, so obviously I'm not trying to convince you of this point and we don't need to rehash it).
Malcolm
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by Malcolm »

stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 4:10 am
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 12:53 am So you are equating the citta of Advaita with the ultimate truth in Buddhism?

So, yeah, that's basically what I've been trying to explain all this time.
It’s not compelling.
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 12:53 am If there is an experiencing subject, there must be an object.
An assumption being stated as a fact. I mentioned this above, that your claim here rests on whether one's assumed starting premise accept reflexivity or not. Cāndrakīrti doesn't, Dharmakīrti does, [/quote]

Dharmakirti nowhere states there is a subject in absence of an object. What he states is that objects of direct perceptions are disclosed to the mind through the intrinsic cognizance of the mind in second order perceptions. It is false to say Candrakirti does not accept reflexivity, he does, albeit as memory.
Śankara does.
It’s quite questionable that svaprakasha intends is the same thing svasamvitti intends.

As such, from within Vedanta's own terms (like I said, (a) favoring experience (or phenomenology to use Duckworth's terms) over conceptual arguments (or ontology, per Duckworth) and (b) accepting reflexivity of awareness), I think Śankara's refutation of Madhyamaka's no-self argument makes perfect sense. Madhyamaka's responses (and thus yours) are only acceptable if you already buy into the premise that favors ontology over phenomenology, which Vedanta doesn't. So, as I said, everyone's arguments only work from within their own starting premises, which are always assumed and never proven.
Well, there are those who would gladly toss rview in the garbage, who imagine that realization does not depend on view. But such people are mistaken.

Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 12:53 am You think Advaita is defensible?
My refutation of Advaita is its inability to provide a convincing ontological status for maya that isn't dualistic. (There are somewhat parallel problems in the way that some Buddhist accounts treat ignorance as a causal factor at the start of the chain of dependent origination, as it also is on murky grounds in terms of its ontological status.)
People who properly study abhidharma done make that error


Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 12:53 am We conventionally term the wisdom (prajñā) that apprehends emptiness free from extremes a "yogic direct perception," but this merely a convention, since there is no object that is directly perceived, and thus, no actual direct perception as such. In this state the mind simply subsides through the exhaustion of analytical options and merges into the dharmadhātu. This is not an "experience" per se, since there is neither subject nor object—the mind has become the very image of the dharmadhātu free from all extremes, like the reflection of the blue sky in a still lake.
Again, Cāndrakīrti's take on yogic direct perception differs from that of others and is a source of debate.
This is standard madhyamika. The difference between Candrakirti and others is only pedagogical, not substantive.

But, even still, if you read Cāndrakīrti's Prasannapadā closely, he doesn't necessarily refrain from making positive statements about yogic perception.
That’s because we have to use language, as, limited as it is.

Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 12:53 am The fault of the Gelukpas is turning emptiness into a conceptual object.
Agreed. "Emptiness cures all wrong views, but the view of emptiness is incurable."
emptiness has a form
Of course emptiness has a form. Everything that has form is empty. That’s why I want to bracket the discussion on shunyatabimba, so called wisdom appearances. Those forms you refer require yogic technique to expose.
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by stong gzugs »

Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 4:34 am
stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 4:10 am So, yeah, that's basically what I've been trying to explain all this time.
It’s not compelling.
This is basically the hinge upon which this entire argument rests. So, if you're trying to refute these arguments, you'll have to do better than to say it's not compelling. You'll have to explain why you think it isn't, because it is for Duckworth and is for me.
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 4:34 am
stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 4:10 am My refutation of Advaita is its inability to provide a convincing ontological status for maya that isn't dualistic. (There are somewhat parallel problems in the way that some Buddhist accounts treat ignorance as a causal factor at the start of the chain of dependent origination, as it also is on murky grounds in terms of its ontological status.)
People who properly study abhidharma done make that error
Then a lot of Buddhist teachers should do a better job studying abhidharma. I've heard lots of conversations that go like:
Q: Where does ignorance come from?
A: Well, ignorance doesn't come from anywhere because it doesn't really exist in the first place.
Q: Then how does it function to cause birth and becoming?
A: Well...
Q: And if ignorance precedes birth, to whom does ignorance occur?
A: Well...

The Kālacakra answer, which has to do with embryology and physiology of the elements, always made more sense to me and suggests a clear way that yoga can eliminate āvidya. But, fine, let's keep tantra out of this conversation.
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 4:34 am
stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 4:10 am ...What this (non)experience is like in phenomenological terms is fairly hard to fathom and I don't know that Cāndrakīrti ever offers any detailed account. But, even still, if you read Cāndrakīrti's Prasannapadā closely, he doesn't necessarily refrain from making positive statements about yogic perception. In commenting on MMK 25.6, he says that jñana has a form (rūpa) which he describes as transcending all multiplicity (sarvaprapañcātīta) and commenting on MMK 25.15-16 also says that he doesn't deny that the Tathāgatā exists in some way, but describes it as simply inexpressible and outside the domain of multiplicity (na ca vayaṃ sarvathaiva niṣprapañcānāṃ tathāgatānāṃ nāstitvaṃ brūmaḥ yadasmākaṃ tadapavādakṛto doṣaḥ syāt). So, who knows, Cāndrakīrti may allow for some sort of positive direct yogic experience in jñana, lest he be accused of sheer denialism (apavāda).
That’s because we have to use language, as, limited as it is.
Chalking this up to language use is a bit of a cop out here. I mean has Cāndrakīrti ever offered any account of what the (non)experience of jñana is, that you know of? If not, he's doing exactly what he's been accused of doing, positing something implicitly but then not giving a statement to it and hiding behind "I don't have a view so my view is best." He seems to think that some sort of experience is possible, if we read carefully enough, as I showed above. Is he saying that jñana's experience is something akin to nothingness? That seems to be edging close to nihilism.
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PadmaVonSamba
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by PadmaVonSamba »

Maybe better than saying non-experience
Would he to simply say no-experiencer.
EMPTIFUL.
An inward outlook produces outward insight.
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by muni »

Maybe better than saying non-experience
Would he to simply say no-experiencer.
I read: instead of cutting branches and prove how to cut and how not to cut, cut the trunk.
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by Kai lord »

OdeKirk wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 1:01 am
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 12:53 am [I am putting aside the question of empty forms because it is not applicable, we were talking about madhyamaka, not completion stage practices].
Does the same logic not apply to completion stage practices?
Well according to Yonten Cyamtso:
According to the argument of direct perception, the indivisible nature of the two truths is beyond the scope of intellect, for it is understood through the direct perception of self-cognizing awareness, by way of an objectless self-illumination. The self-cognizing awareness referred to here indicates self-cognizing primordial wisdom. The inseparability of the two superior truths is the fundamental nature of all phenomena, for the Noble Ones have perceived it so, just as a healthy person sees the whiteness of a white conch shell. The Ocean Tantra says:

With in the self-born, self-arising mind,
These two are not divided.
Clearly perceived, this cannot be denied
With in awareness, unborn, self-cognizing.
This is said to be the highest of all realizations.
This points to the final conclusion: the indivisibility of the two
truths is by definition beyond the ordinary intellect.



To practice the Mantrayana path after one has, by means of these four arguments, attained certainty in the inseparability of the two superior truths, is of the highest moment. The inseparability of the two truths, just as it is, cannot be assimilated through intellectual analysis alone. Nevertheless, it is through inferential investigation that one can come to a perfect certainty that such must be the case. Then, by dint of pursuing the path of meditation, it is possible to come to a direct realization of the fundamental nature of things.
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by Malcolm »

Kai lord wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 7:50 am
OdeKirk wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 1:01 am
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 12:53 am [I am putting aside the question of empty forms because it is not applicable, we were talking about madhyamaka, not completion stage practices].
Does the same logic not apply to completion stage practices?
Well according to Yonten Cyamtso:
According to the argument of direct perception, the indivisible nature of the two truths is beyond the scope of intellect, for it is understood through the direct perception of self-cognizing awareness, by way of an objectless self-illumination. The self-cognizing awareness referred to here indicates self-cognizing primordial wisdom. The inseparability of the two superior truths is the fundamental nature of all phenomena, for the Noble Ones have perceived it so, just as a healthy person sees the whiteness of a white conch shell. The Ocean Tantra says:

With in the self-born, self-arising mind,
These two are not divided.
Clearly perceived, this cannot be denied
With in awareness, unborn, self-cognizing.
This is said to be the highest of all realizations.
This points to the final conclusion: the indivisibility of the two
truths is by definition beyond the ordinary intellect.



To practice the Mantrayana path after one has, by means of these four arguments, attained certainty in the inseparability of the two superior truths, is of the highest moment. The inseparability of the two truths, just as it is, cannot be assimilated through intellectual analysis alone. Nevertheless, it is through inferential investigation that one can come to a perfect certainty that such must be the case. Then, by dint of pursuing the path of meditation, it is possible to come to a direct realization of the fundamental nature of things.
This translation contains many errors because the translator does not know the difference between Dzogchen and cittamatra. Basically, rang rig ye shes is a contraction of so sor rang gi rig pa’i ye shes, the gnosis that must be known personally. Longchenpa pa clearly explains thus on the lung gi gter mdzod.
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by Kai lord »

Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 1:00 pm
Kai lord wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 7:50 am
OdeKirk wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 1:01 am

Does the same logic not apply to completion stage practices?
Well according to Yonten Cyamtso:
According to the argument of direct perception, the indivisible nature of the two truths is beyond the scope of intellect, for it is understood through the direct perception of self-cognizing awareness, by way of an objectless self-illumination. The self-cognizing awareness referred to here indicates self-cognizing primordial wisdom. The inseparability of the two superior truths is the fundamental nature of all phenomena, for the Noble Ones have perceived it so, just as a healthy person sees the whiteness of a white conch shell. The Ocean Tantra says:

With in the self-born, self-arising mind,
These two are not divided.
Clearly perceived, this cannot be denied
With in awareness, unborn, self-cognizing.
This is said to be the highest of all realizations.
This points to the final conclusion: the indivisibility of the two
truths is by definition beyond the ordinary intellect.



To practice the Mantrayana path after one has, by means of these four arguments, attained certainty in the inseparability of the two superior truths, is of the highest moment. The inseparability of the two truths, just as it is, cannot be assimilated through intellectual analysis alone. Nevertheless, it is through inferential investigation that one can come to a perfect certainty that such must be the case. Then, by dint of pursuing the path of meditation, it is possible to come to a direct realization of the fundamental nature of things.
This translation contains many errors because the translator does not know the difference between Dzogchen and cittamatra. Basically, rang rig ye shes is a contraction of so sor rang gi rig pa’i ye shes, the gnosis that must be known personally. Longchenpa pa clearly explains thus on the lung gi gter mdzod.
So your chief concerns revolve around incorrect translations like "self-arising mind", "self-cognizing awareness" and "self-cognizing primordial wisdom"?
Life is like a game, either you win or lose!
Life is like a fight, either you live or die!
Life is like a show, either you laugh or cry!
Life is like a dream, either you know or not!!!
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by Malcolm »

stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 4:57 am
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 4:34 am
stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 4:10 am So, yeah, that's basically what I've been trying to explain all this time.
It’s not compelling.
This is basically the hinge upon which this entire argument rests. So, if you're trying to refute these arguments, you'll have to do better than to say it's not compelling.
It’s not compelling from the first sentence. It’s basically a series of assertions, starting with an undefined assertion “awareness.”
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by stong gzugs »

Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 2:36 pm It’s not compelling from the first sentence. It’s basically a series of assertions, starting with an undefined assertion “awareness.”
This also feels to be like a bit of a cop out to me (I mean, what is any argument, including yours, but a series of assertions? And the point about ontology vs. phenomenology perfectly explains the differences in premises I was describing above). But fine, let's let this part rest, if you don't want to take it further. What about the below?
stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 4:57 am
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 4:34 am
stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 4:10 am ...What this (non)experience is like in phenomenological terms is fairly hard to fathom and I don't know that Cāndrakīrti ever offers any detailed account. But, even still, if you read Cāndrakīrti's Prasannapadā closely, he doesn't necessarily refrain from making positive statements about yogic perception. In commenting on MMK 25.6, he says that jñana has a form (rūpa) which he describes as transcending all multiplicity (sarvaprapañcātīta) and commenting on MMK 25.15-16 also says that he doesn't deny that the Tathāgatā exists in some way, but describes it as simply inexpressible and outside the domain of multiplicity (na ca vayaṃ sarvathaiva niṣprapañcānāṃ tathāgatānāṃ nāstitvaṃ brūmaḥ yadasmākaṃ tadapavādakṛto doṣaḥ syāt). So, who knows, Cāndrakīrti may allow for some sort of positive direct yogic experience in jñana, lest he be accused of sheer denialism (apavāda).
That’s because we have to use language, as, limited as it is.
Chalking this up to language use is a bit of a cop out here. I mean has Cāndrakīrti ever offered any account of what the (non)experience of jñana is, that you know of? If not, he's doing exactly what he's been accused of doing, positing something implicitly but then not giving a statement to it and hiding behind "I don't have a view so my view is best." He seems to think that some sort of experience is possible, if we read carefully enough, as I showed above. Is he saying that jñana's experience is something akin to nothingness? That seems to be edging close to nihilism.
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by Malcolm »

stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 2:39 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 2:36 pm It’s not compelling from the first sentence. It’s basically a series of assertions, starting with an undefined assertion “awareness.”
This also feels to be like a bit of a cop out to me (I mean, what is any argument, including yours, but a series of assertions?
Can you explain to me which of the eighteen dhatus this “ awareness” belongs to? Can you point me to a place where the Buddha taught an instrument of knowledge outside of aggregates, sense bases, and sense elements?
stong gzugs
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by stong gzugs »

Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 3:00 pm Can you explain to me which of the eighteen dhatus this “ awareness” belongs to?
The part about phenomenology vs. ontology and Madhyamaka making a category error is what's crucial. In the conversation between Śankara and Madhyamaka, attempting to situate awareness within one of the dhatus is trying to win the argument by terminology, because by definition the dhatus are knowable things. So this rhetorical move has to be rejected a priori. So awareness, as Duckworth is describing it using a non-partisan term, is something we can all experience, is our subjective sense of being an active witness to experience rather than being a zombie. What's the difference between subjective experience when you're waking, vs. when you're put into a coma? A sense of awareness.

That sense of awareness can be treated both as subject (as it's the one who is witnessing events) and object (as we can talk about it, albeit imperfectly, like we're doing here). Attempts to refute it as an object through arguments are themselves witnessed by it as a subject. Whether you privilege the arguments that refute it as an object (ontology) vs. the experience where you are yourself aware of that argument (phenomenology) is a matter of starting assumptions. Fact is, perhaps aside from nirodha samapatti, the phenomenology of awareness always remains, no matter what sort of Madhyamaka analytical meditation you do. You can collapse the sense of self in the skandhas, but that collapsing appears within spacious awareness. Otherwise, there would be no actual recognition of no-self-in-skandhas.

And any responses to the Cāndrakīrti stuff?
stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 4:57 am
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 4:34 am That’s because we have to use language, as, limited as it is.
Chalking this up to language use is a bit of a cop out here. I mean has Cāndrakīrti ever offered any account of what the (non)experience of jñana is, that you know of? If not, he's doing exactly what he's been accused of doing, positing something implicitly but then not giving a statement to it and hiding behind "I don't have a view so my view is best." He seems to think that some sort of experience is possible, if we read carefully enough, as I showed above. Is he saying that jñana's experience is something akin to nothingness? That seems to be edging close to nihilism.
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Sādhaka
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by Sādhaka »

Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 3:00 pm
stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 2:39 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 2:36 pm It’s not compelling from the first sentence. It’s basically a series of assertions, starting with an undefined assertion “awareness.”
This also feels to be like a bit of a cop out to me (I mean, what is any argument, including yours, but a series of assertions?
Can you explain to me which of the eighteen dhatus this “ awareness” belongs to? Can you point me to a place where the Buddha taught an instrument of knowledge outside of aggregates, sense bases, and sense elements?

Well a mental body (such as during physical sleep or the bardos after physical death) has its own aggregates, sense bases & elements; yet it is generally hidden from ordinary people. Therefore the answer to that question seems to be “yes and no”.
Malcolm
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by Malcolm »

stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 3:16 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 3:00 pm Can you explain to me which of the eighteen dhatus this “ awareness” belongs to?
The part about phenomenology vs. ontology and Madhyamaka making a category error is what's crucial. In the conversation between Śankara and Madhyamaka, attempting to situate awareness within one of the dhatus is trying to win the argument by terminology, because by definition the dhatus are knowable things.
If one cannot situate “awareness” among the dhatus, then it is a nonthing, and unknowable, other than as an erroneous imputation, that’s the point.
So this rhetorical move has to be rejected a priori. So awareness, as Duckworth is describing it using a non-partisan term, is something we can all experience, is our subjective sense of being an active witness to experience rather than being a zombie. What's the difference between subjective experience when you're waking, vs. when you're put into a coma? A sense of awareness.
So, now you are taking awareness as an object. Which means one’s sense of being aware is relative and conditioned.
That sense of awareness can be treated both as subject (as it's the one who is witnessing events) and object (as we can talk about it, albeit imperfectly, like we're doing here). Attempts to refute it as an object through arguments are themselves witnessed by it as a subject.
Which means “awareness” is a mental factor, which is part of the dharmadhatu, the object of the element of mental consciousness and the mental organ, thus conditioned and not a separate instrument of knowledge.
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