Western Philosophy and emptiness

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natusake
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by natusake »

“Bhikkhus, though someone might say: ‘Apart from form, apart from feeling, apart from perception, apart from volitional formations, I will make known the coming and going of consciousness, its passing away and rebirth, its growth, increase, and expansion’—that is impossible.

“Bhikkhus, if a bhikkhu has abandoned lust for the form element, with the abandoning of lust the basis is cut off: there is no support for the establishing of consciousness. If he has abandoned lust for the feeling element … for the perception element … for the volitional formations element … for the consciousness element, with the abandoning of lust the basis is cut off: there is no support for the establishing of consciousness.
https://suttacentral.net/sn22.53/en/bod ... ight=false
Malcolm
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by Malcolm »

Sādhaka wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 3:25 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 3:00 pm
stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 2:39 pm

This also feels to be like a bit of a cop out to me (I mean, what is any argument, including yours, but a series of assertions?
Can you explain to me which of the eighteen dhatus this “ awareness” belongs to? Can you point me to a place where the Buddha taught an instrument of knowledge outside of aggregates, sense bases, and sense elements?

Well a mental body (such as during physical sleep or the bardos after physical death) has its own aggregates, sense bases & elements; yet it is generally hidden from ordinary people. Therefore the answer to that question seems to be “yes and no”.
You just contradicted yourself: has its own aggregates, sense bases & elements. That means there is no instrument of knowledge outside the eighteen dhātus.
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Sādhaka
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by Sādhaka »

Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 4:15 pm
Sādhaka wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 3:25 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 3:00 pm

Can you explain to me which of the eighteen dhatus this “ awareness” belongs to? Can you point me to a place where the Buddha taught an instrument of knowledge outside of aggregates, sense bases, and sense elements?

Well a mental body (such as during physical sleep or the bardos after physical death) has its own aggregates, sense bases & elements; yet it is generally hidden from ordinary people. Therefore the answer to that question seems to be “yes and no”.
You just contradicted yourself: has its own aggregates, sense bases & elements. That means there is no instrument of knowledge outside the eighteen dhātus.

Okay, I may have to reformulate what I’m trying to get at here. But am not in a state to do that now. Kind of having an rough day for whatever reason
Last edited by Sādhaka on Sun May 28, 2023 4:23 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Kai lord
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by Kai lord »

Sādhaka wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 3:25 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 3:00 pm
stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 2:39 pm

This also feels to be like a bit of a cop out to me (I mean, what is any argument, including yours, but a series of assertions?
Can you explain to me which of the eighteen dhatus this “ awareness” belongs to? Can you point me to a place where the Buddha taught an instrument of knowledge outside of aggregates, sense bases, and sense elements?

Well a mental body (such as during physical sleep or the bardos after physical death) has its own aggregates, sense bases & elements; yet it is generally hidden from ordinary people. Therefore the answer to that question seems to be “yes and no”.
The ever changing alaya consciousness serves as a continuum for all the situations listed above like sleep, death, etc. It will only cease when all the obstacles are removed allowing the manifestation of wisdom(s).
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stong gzugs
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by stong gzugs »

Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 3:29 pm So, now you are taking awareness as an object. Which means one’s sense of being aware is relative and conditioned.

...

Which means “awareness” is a mental factor, which is part of the dharmadhatu, the object of the element of mental consciousness and the mental organ, thus conditioned and not a separate instrument of knowledge.
Unsure if Duckworth and I aren't being clear, or if you're not able to step outside of your worldview, but I'll give it one final attempt. The whole point is that when you take awareness as an object (as Madhyamaka does), it appears relative and conditioned and thus refutable. But as awareness is actually experienced, it's always the subjective witnessing, not the witnessed object, including awareness witnessing the realization caused by the Madhyamaka argumentation. And with the appropriate practices, the notion of subjects and objects can dissolve into awareness altogether. So, yes, I get that you're repeating the Madhyamaka argument and attempting to box awareness into one or another dhatu, which I get, but I'm not sure if me/Duckworth are getting across to you how this is presupposing your own view in order to prove it. Now, you might respond and say, well view derived through analytical meditation has to trump experience during meditation, which is well and good, but that's yet another way of presupposing your own view in order to prove it. Not all Buddhists privilege conceptual analysis over nonconceptual meditative experience in the same way.

And about the Cāndrakīrti stuff?
stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 4:57 am
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 4:34 am That’s because we have to use language, as, limited as it is.
Chalking this up to language use is a bit of a cop out here. I mean has Cāndrakīrti ever offered any account of what the (non)experience of jñana is, that you know of? If not, he's doing exactly what he's been accused of doing, positing something implicitly but then not giving a statement to it and hiding behind "I don't have a view so my view is best." He seems to think that some sort of experience is possible, if we read carefully enough, as I showed above. Is he saying that jñana's experience is something akin to nothingness? That seems to be edging close to nihilism.
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by Malcolm »

stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 4:10 am

But, even still, if you read Cāndrakīrti's Prasannapadā closely, he doesn't necessarily refrain from making positive statements about yogic perception. In commenting on MMK 25.6, he says that jñana has a form (rūpa) which he describes as transcending all multiplicity (sarvaprapañcātīta)...

I mean has Cāndrakīrti ever offered any account of what the (non)experience of jñana is, that you know of?
You meant MMK 25.16. You apparently have not seen the passage in question.

།ཡེ་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་སྤྱོད་པར་བྱེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཡེ་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་ནི་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་ལ་དམིགས་པར་འགྱུར་དགོས་ལ་དེ་ཡང་མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་རང་བཞིན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པས། ཇི་ལྟར་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་རང་བཞིན་དེས་མྱ་ངན་ལས་འདས་པ་དངོས་པོ་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང༌། དངོས་པོ་མེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་འཛིན་པར་བྱེད། ཡེ་ཤེས་ནི་སྤྲོས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལས་འདས་པའི་རང་བཞིན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ།

Gnosis also is not an experiencer. Since (1) gnosis necessarily perceives emptiness, and (2) that [emptiness] has nature of nonarising, as nirvana is not an existent through that nature not existing, and is also not held to be a nonexistent, therefore, the nature of gnosis is beyond all proliferation.


He never says gnosis has a form (rūpam, gzugs) in this passage. He also denies that gnosis is an experiencer.

Majya states:

Gnosis— the subject (viṣayin, yul can) [which apprehends] the ultimate—does not perceive any signs of proliferation because it does not apprehend [nirvana] to either exist or not exist.

But this gnosis is relative, like all gnosis. Otherwise, one has to theorize a) a separate instrument of knowledge for gnosis, which the Buddha never taught, or b) a transformation of the state of consciousness from being compounded to being uncompounded, as the cittamatrins suggst, which contains an internal contradiction or c) that consciousness itself is ultimate and truly established, contra the Buddha's teachings in their entirety.
natusake
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by natusake »

stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 5:14 pm But as awareness is actually experienced, it's always the subjective witnessing, not the witnessed object, including awareness witnessing the realization caused by the Madhyamaka argumentation. And with the appropriate practices, the notion of subjects and objects can dissolve into awareness altogether.

...

Not all Buddhists privilege conceptual analysis over nonconceptual meditative experience in the same way.
For an ordinary, ignorant person, everything as 'it is actually experienced' is real, tangible, made of a physical substance, and so on. Though, ask someone about this in South America 500 years ago, and you will get a different answer. Most people's so-called 'nonconceptual experience' daily proves both Buddhism and Advaita wrong. If one is going to say that these actual experiences do not count, one must necessarily have some sort of criteria for what counts and what doesn't count. That criteria is conceptual.

Of course, in Buddhism we recognize that such experiences are necessarily bound up in our concepts as well. The so-called 'actual experience' of an ordinary person is based on their delusions. Same goes for an Advaitan or Hindu who claims to have a non-conceptual experience of timeless, permanent awareness; such a thing is based on their delusions as well. Advaitans agree that normal, everyday experience, is produced by delusions but then have a different tune if it sounds like what was said in the Vedas or Upanishads. What one experiences depends on their view. If you direct someone to simply meditate without any instruction on view, they will simply find their most deeply held forms of clinging to be affirmed in the most subtle of objects like awareness, nothingness, and so on.

There are many experiences that can happen on the path. If someone has an experience of something that sounds like Brahman, so what? If someone says "I have had experience that I am God and I literally control everything that is happening right now, I always and forever had this power", then this is just an experience, and is no different from any other experience until one adopts a view that says it is real or unreal. But there is nothing that makes it special, and nothing that makes it nonconceptual either; the idea that awareness is not an object is manifestly exactly that, an idea. You have to have some criteria for what experience 'counts' as legitimate and real and what doesn't, and that criteria is necessarily conceptual. Advaitans count such so-called nonconceptual experiences of non-dual awareness as real. Madhyamikas, on the other hand, don't count any experience as real. That's not more conceptual, it's simply more restrictive, because Buddhism is not about experiences, it is about wisdom.

This is not contrasting one conceptual point of view with a nonconceptual one. It is contrasting one conceptual view with another conceptual view.
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by Malcolm »

natusake wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 7:12 pm Buddhism is not about experiences, it is about wisdom.
:applause:
stong gzugs
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by stong gzugs »

Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 5:39 pm Gnosis also is not an experiencer. Since (1) gnosis necessarily perceives emptiness, and (2) that [emptiness] has nature of nonarising, as nirvana is not an existent through that nature not existing, and is also not held to be a nonexistent, therefore, the nature of gnosis is beyond all proliferation.
I'm following Anne Macdonald's analysis, who translated Cāndrakīrti's Prasannapadā (from Sanskrit, I believe, rather than your Tibetan), who renders the verse as jñana “having a form that transcends all manifoldness” (sarvaprapañcātītarūpa) and comments on this term as follows:
With it, there is allusion to an awareness that surmounts all manifold conceptualization and designation, one which neither exists nor does not exist, and is as unfathomable as its so-called object, the thusness that is true reality, ontological nirvāna. Of course as an awareness that is diametrically opposed to ordinary consciousness, it will not be configured in a subject-object relationship with emptiness, expressed as its focus for conventional convenience; its functioning would rather be non-dual. Intimated by this and the third adjective is the idea that gnosis consists in a radical mystical experience. Elsewhere, Candrakirti states that the Buddhas abide in the objectless gnosis, far beyond the spiritually immature.
...
These descriptions of the awakened beings and their gnosis, limited to being made by way of modifiers indicating indescribability and inconceivability, merely point to the unfathomable state beyond the nothingness of worldly phenomena. It is probably not inappropriate to state that for the Mādhyamika as yogin the final goal, and the final state, is not nothingness, but transcendence. Although he is more often occupied with and thus associated with rigorously arguing an uncompromising denial of the world, it is in passages such as the ones examined here that we encounter Candrakirti, as he moves on from this to allude to the outcome and purpose of that denial, as a conveyer of spiritual, mystical experience.
More telling is the verse I noted below...
stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 4:10 am commenting on MMK 25.15-16 also says that he doesn't deny that the Tathāgatā exists in some way, but describes it as simply inexpressible and outside the domain of multiplicity (na ca vayaṃ sarvathaiva niṣprapañcānāṃ tathāgatānāṃ nāstitvaṃ brūmaḥ yadasmākaṃ tadapavādakṛto doṣaḥ syāt). So, who knows, Cāndrakīrti may allow for some sort of positive direct yogic experience in jñana, lest he be accused of sheer denialism (apavāda).
Which prompted me to ask.
stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 4:57 am Chalking this up to language use is a bit of a cop out here. I mean has Cāndrakīrti ever offered any account of what the (non)experience of jñana is, that you know of? If not, he's doing exactly what he's been accused of doing, positing something implicitly but then not giving a statement to it and hiding behind "I don't have a view so my view is best." He seems to think that some sort of experience is possible, if we read carefully enough, as I showed above. Is he saying that jñana's experience is something akin to nothingness? That seems to be edging close to nihilism.
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by Malcolm »

stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 8:31 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 5:39 pm Gnosis also is not an experiencer. Since (1) gnosis necessarily perceives emptiness, and (2) that [emptiness] has nature of nonarising, as nirvana is not an existent through that nature not existing, and is also not held to be a nonexistent, therefore, the nature of gnosis is beyond all proliferation.
I'm following Anne Macdonald's analysis, who translated Cāndrakīrti's Prasannapadā (from Sanskrit, I believe, rather than your Tibetan), who renders the verse as jñana “having a form that transcends all manifoldness” (sarvaprapañcātītarūpa) and comments on this term as follows:
And I will follow Patsab, who with Mahāmati, translated the text according to its meaning, where rūpa was in this case rendered rang bzhin. Translating things directly from Sanskrit is good, but there is a risk of ignoring what the pandita/translator teams understood the correct meaning to be and overruling them out of literalism.

Also, Majya, Patsab's student, summarizes the passage quite well.

In any case the term proliferation is quite well understood, it means there is no conceptual reification of ontological choices, being, nonbeing, and so on, since those choices are not valid.

She addresses your interest here:

https://www.academia.edu/5778953/Knowin ... Perception, especially pp. 156:

For him, at the time of perception of the ultimate, of the emptiness of things that were never really there in the first place, inasmuch as there is nothing whatsoever to be perceived, that is, since an object for consciousness does not exist, consciousness will simply not come into being; Candra-kī rti’s assertion that consciousness assumes the mode of non-arising translates into no consciousness at all. Yet in this way consciousness still fulfills the Sautrāntika demand that the consciousness resemble, conform to, its object: like its object, the non-arisen true nature of things, consciousness “takes,” so to speak, a non-arisen and non-existent form. In Candrakīrti’s words: If consciousness, like its object, has the form of non-arising, it is proper to maintain that it has proceeded by way of the object just as it is. And given its proceeding by way of its object, its conforming to its object, it is proper to designate it direct perception.

stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 4:57 am Chalking this up to language use is a bit of a cop out here. I mean has Cāndrakīrti ever offered any account of what the (non)experience of jñana is, that you know of?
Yes, in this verse he offers one account, there are others, of course. The Buddha expresses it best however in a sūtra you certainly regard as definitive since it is from the so-called third turning, the Samadhirāja: (84000 version):

33.120
The bodhisattvas in meditation
Do not long for any phenomenon.
When nothing is apprehended,
That is called enlightenment.
Last edited by Malcolm on Sun May 28, 2023 9:34 pm, edited 1 time in total.
krodha
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by krodha »

stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 3:16 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 3:00 pm Can you explain to me which of the eighteen dhatus this “ awareness” belongs to?
The part about phenomenology vs. ontology and Madhyamaka making a category error is what's crucial. In the conversation between Śankara and Madhyamaka, attempting to situate awareness within one of the dhatus is trying to win the argument by terminology, because by definition the dhatus are knowable things. So this rhetorical move has to be rejected a priori. So awareness, as Duckworth is describing it using a non-partisan term, is something we can all experience, is our subjective sense of being an active witness to experience rather than being a zombie. What's the difference between subjective experience when you're waking, vs. when you're put into a coma? A sense of awareness.

That sense of awareness can be treated both as subject (as it's the one who is witnessing events) and object (as we can talk about it, albeit imperfectly, like we're doing here). Attempts to refute it as an object through arguments are themselves witnessed by it as a subject. Whether you privilege the arguments that refute it as an object (ontology) vs. the experience where you are yourself aware of that argument (phenomenology) is a matter of starting assumptions. Fact is, perhaps aside from nirodha samapatti, the phenomenology of awareness always remains, no matter what sort of Madhyamaka analytical meditation you do. You can collapse the sense of self in the skandhas, but that collapsing appears within spacious awareness. Otherwise, there would be no actual recognition of no-self-in-skandhas.
This is why the soteriological catalyst for liberation in Madhyamaka, atiyoga and so on is rooted in epistemology, rather than this stringent division between phenomenology and ontology that you are continually proposing.

The phenomenological aspect of our experience is already corrupted by the deluded perception of ontological constructs. Madhyamaka, atiyoga and so on are stating that via accurate epistemic insight, ontologies are undermined and this releases the phenomenological, conscious aspect of our experience from the confines of all dualisms. Even beyond the limited species of nonduality you are advocating for which is an awareness devoid of subject and object. That too is refuted, as we see in Atiśas writings that are echoed by prominent atiyogins such as Longchenpa et al., dharmakāya does not even admit jñāna, and so on. Jñāna ceases to operate. The purpose of that clarification is to undermine attempts at reifying that phenomenological aspect, like you are doing.

You are an advocate of a substantial and reductive nonduality, which is a deviation. True nondual insight, is insubstantial and nonreductive. This is the meaning of the emptiness of emptiness and so on. Your view errs very close to the edge of tīrthika treatments of that phenomenological aspect.
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by Malcolm »

krodha wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 9:26 pm
stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 3:16 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 3:00 pm Can you explain to me which of the eighteen dhatus this “ awareness” belongs to?
The part about phenomenology vs. ontology and Madhyamaka making a category error is what's crucial. In the conversation between Śankara and Madhyamaka, attempting to situate awareness within one of the dhatus is trying to win the argument by terminology, because by definition the dhatus are knowable things. So this rhetorical move has to be rejected a priori. So awareness, as Duckworth is describing it using a non-partisan term, is something we can all experience, is our subjective sense of being an active witness to experience rather than being a zombie. What's the difference between subjective experience when you're waking, vs. when you're put into a coma? A sense of awareness.

That sense of awareness can be treated both as subject (as it's the one who is witnessing events) and object (as we can talk about it, albeit imperfectly, like we're doing here). Attempts to refute it as an object through arguments are themselves witnessed by it as a subject. Whether you privilege the arguments that refute it as an object (ontology) vs. the experience where you are yourself aware of that argument (phenomenology) is a matter of starting assumptions. Fact is, perhaps aside from nirodha samapatti, the phenomenology of awareness always remains, no matter what sort of Madhyamaka analytical meditation you do. You can collapse the sense of self in the skandhas, but that collapsing appears within spacious awareness. Otherwise, there would be no actual recognition of no-self-in-skandhas.
This is why the soteriological catalyst for liberation in Madhyamaka, atiyoga and so on is rooted in epistemology, rather than this stringent division between phenomenology and ontology that you are continually proposing.

The phenomenological aspect of our experience is already corrupted by the deluded perception of ontological constructs. Madhyamaka, atiyoga and so on are stating that via accurate epistemic insight, ontologies are undermined and this releases the phenomenological, conscious aspect of our experience from the confines of all dualisms. Even beyond the limited species of nonduality you are advocating for which is an awareness devoid of subject and object. That too is refuted, as we see in Atiśas writings that are echoed by prominent atiyogins such as Longchenpa et al., dharmakāya does not even admit jñāna, and so on. Jñāna ceases to operate. The purpose of that clarification is to undermine attempts at reifying that phenomenological aspect, like you are doing.

You are an advocate of a substantial and reductive nonduality, which is a deviation. True nondual insight, is insubstantial and nonreductive. This is the meaning of the emptiness of emptiness and so on. Your view errs very close to the edge of tīrthika treatments of that phenomenological aspect.
Well, Rendawa's criticism of certain so-called Tibetan Madhyamakas as being crypto hindus, might seem unfair, but after a while...
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by PadmaVonSamba »

Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 3:29 pm
Which means “awareness” is a mental factor, which is part of the dharmadhatu, the object of the element of mental consciousness and the mental organ, thus conditioned and not a separate instrument of knowledge.
So, let’s just replace the term “awareness” with the phrase, “mental condciousness”. If stong gzugs does that, his/her point remains the same, and your objection is satisfied.
EMPTIFUL.
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by stong gzugs »

Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 9:23 pm
stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 4:57 am I mean has Cāndrakīrti ever offered any account of what the (non)experience of jñana is, that you know of?
Yes, in this verse he offers one account, there are others, of course.
I'd be curious what other accounts Cāndrakīrti offers, if you're aware. From the brief, and rather vague, accounts of his I've seen and listed above, MacDonald's telling of it seems consistent, if not compelling. Do you disagree with her? If so, how would you in your own words, describe Cāndrakīrti's account? It seems like he's unwilling to say that jñana is a complete lack of experience, but is also unwilling to say much more about it, which is where the critiques about indirectly positing things but claiming not to be positing anything come from.
an awareness that surmounts all manifold conceptualization and designation, one which neither exists nor does not exist, and is as unfathomable as its so-called object, the thusness that is true reality, ontological nirvāna. Of course as an awareness that is diametrically opposed to ordinary consciousness, it will not be configured in a subject-object relationship with emptiness, expressed as its focus for conventional convenience; its functioning would rather be non-dual. Intimated by this and the third adjective is the idea that gnosis consists in a radical mystical experience.
krodha wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 9:26 pm Madhyamaka, atiyoga and so on are stating that via accurate epistemic insight, ontologies are undermined and this releases the phenomenological, conscious aspect of our experience from the confines of all dualisms. Even beyond the limited species of nonduality you are advocating for which is an awareness devoid of subject and object.
Yes, this point was already discussed a few pages back. Per KTGR and others, the gzhanstong claim is that the analytical meditations that prasangikas do to purportedly attain "accurate epistemic insight" basically leave behind a subtle form of conceptualization and habit for negation that gets in the way of actual nisprapañca. So, rather than freeing up phenomenological experience, they constrain it. When you get away from sutra and into tantra, i.e., into rangtong Ati vs. gzhanstong Kālacakra, this all has to do with how one relates to the visual appearances in these respective practices, which we've already agreed to bracket off from the current conversation, to not go down that whole rabbit hole again. If you use the search function, you can find the prior conversation between Malcolm and myself on that.
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 9:36 pm Well, Rendawa's criticism of certain so-called Tibetan Madhyamakas as being crypto hindus, might seem unfair, but after a while...
You realize you're relying on Rendawa's critiques when he was in his 20s, right? Toward his later years, as he matured and lived in semi-seclusion in a hermitage, he likely changed his tune, as illustrated by the gzhanstong statements in his major Kālacakra text Jewel Lamp Illuminating the Definitive Meaning of the Glorious Kalacakra. Maybe there's still hope for you? :stirthepot:
Rendawa's Jewel Lamp, 340-341 wrote:According to the tradition of this tantra, the classification of the two truths is like this: all the phenomena of the incidental stains that arise from the confusing circumstances of ignorance are relative truth, because they obscure the perception of thatness and are reference points for total affliction. Because that is also not established as the object of a perfect primordial awareness, it is empty of self-nature, a nihilistic emptiness, and an inanimate emptiness. All the phenomena of luminosity, the nature of original mind, are absolute truth. And not because it has been proven able to withstand reasoned analysis ... It is the absolute because it is a nonconceptual field of experience. Because the incidental stains are absent, it is empty of other, and because it is experienced through a discriminating self-awareness, it is not a nihilistic emptiness and an inanimate emptiness ...

Because the emptiness of self-nature falls into the extreme of nihilism, its realization is not the perfect path of liberation; only the emptiness of other, the true nature of mind, luminosity, an immutable inner pure awareness experienced through the force of meditation and through a discriminating self-awareness, is accepted as the perfect path
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by krodha »

stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 10:00 pm
krodha wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 9:26 pm Madhyamaka, atiyoga and so on are stating that via accurate epistemic insight, ontologies are undermined and this releases the phenomenological, conscious aspect of our experience from the confines of all dualisms. Even beyond the limited species of nonduality you are advocating for which is an awareness devoid of subject and object.
Yes, this point was already discussed a few pages back. Per KTGR and others, the gzhanstong claim is that the analytical meditations that prasangikas do to purportedly attain "accurate epistemic insight" basically leave behind a subtle form of conceptualization and habit for negation that gets in the way of actual nisprapañca.
Of course they do, they have to try and legitimize their advocacy of gzhan stong with some sort of polemical claim. Now, whether there is merit to said claim will be something gzhan stong pas will obviously confirm and non-gzhan stong pas will deny.
stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 10:00 pmSo, rather than freeing up phenomenological experience, they constrain it.
Clearly it is the claimants of the inferior substantial nonduality you are championing who constrain it.

But these arguments are old, we can see Ju Mipham addressing the same issue in his commentary on the Madhyamakālaṃkāra, the dbu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad 'jam dbyangs bla ma dgyes pa'i zhal lung:
  • Without finding certainty in primordial purity (ka dag), just mulling over some 'ground that is neither existent nor nonexistent' will get you nowhere. If you apprehend this basis of emptiness that is empty of both existence and nonexistence as something that is established by its essence separately [from everything else], no matter how you label it (such as an inconceivable self, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Īśvara, or wisdom) except for the mere name, the meaning is the same. Since the basic nature free from the reference points of the four extremes, that is, Dzogchen (the luminosity that is to be personally experienced) is not at all like that, it is important to rely on the correct path and teacher. Therefore, you may pronounce 'illusionlike,' 'nonentity,' 'freedom from reference points,' and the like as mere verbiage, but this is of no benefit whatsoever, if you do not know the [actual] way of being of the Tathāgata’s emptiness (which surpasses the limited [kinds of] emptiness [asserted] by the tīrthikas) through the decisive certainty that is induced by reasoning.
He continues to address the difference in Liquid Gold:
  • The Cittamatrins deconstruct both subject and object in a mere empty intrinsically knowing pristine consciousness (gnosis).
And like the Inlaid Jewels Tantra states:
  • Since intrinsic knowing [rang rig, svasaṃvedana] is devoid of actual signs of awakening, it is not at all the pristine consciousness of vidyā [rig pa'i ye shes].
stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 10:00 pmWhen you get away from sutra and into tantra,
Here, as seen above, we are discussing the distilled essence of tantra, which you gzhan stong pas arguably deviate from due to your preference for the mere substantially nondual svasaṃvedana (devoid of signs of awakening) you are promoting in this thread.
stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 10:00 pmi.e., into rangtong Ati vs. gzhanstong Kālacakra, this all has to do with how one relates to the visual appearances in these respective practices, which we've already agreed to bracket off from the current conversation, to not go down that whole rabbit hole again. If you use the search function, you can find the prior conversation between Malcolm and myself on that.
What it actually has to do with is your reification of that phenomenological aspect. Unbeknownst to you.
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by stong gzugs »

krodha wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 10:22 pm But these arguments are old ...
Unbeknownst to you.
Your first statement is absolutely right: these arguments are old, which is why your second statement is wrong: nothing you've said here is new or unbeknownst to me. Dölpopa preemptively dismantled the arguments you're repeating over 600 years ago in Mountain Dharma. But you do what works for you, and I'll do what works for me, and that's the point. 84,000 dharma doors, and all.
Malcolm
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by Malcolm »

stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 10:00 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 9:23 pm
stong gzugs wrote: Sun May 28, 2023 4:57 am I mean has Cāndrakīrti ever offered any account of what the (non)experience of jñana is, that you know of?
Yes, in this verse he offers one account, there are others, of course.
I'd be curious what other accounts Cāndrakīrti offers, if you're aware. From the brief, and rather vague, accounts of his I've seen and listed above, MacDonald's telling of it seems consistent, if not compelling. Do you disagree with her?


If you think that she is implying that Candra is hinting at an ineffable experience, I disagree with her. If you think she is implying that gnosis is ineffable, I agree with her.

The problem here is the lack of definition of “experience.” Is a direct perception an “experience?” We are generally unaware of the majority of direct perceptions we have. Generally, as I understand experience, direct perceptions are mediated by the apprehension and discursive identification of characteristics. What about all the other direct perceptions we have which never rise to the level of being identified? Are they experiences? How can an “object” which has no characteristics, unlike a blue vase, said to be experienced? A fundamental definition is that the ultimate is not a domain of mental experience. To compound the problem, since pramanas and prameyas are mutually dependent, a valid cognition cannot be established independent of a valid object, and a valid object cannot be established independent of a valid cognition. This mutual dependence renders the notion of establishing object-oriented cognitions as ultimately valid problematic,
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PadmaVonSamba
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by PadmaVonSamba »

Malcolm wrote: Mon May 29, 2023 1:55 am
The problem here is the lack of definition of “experience.” Is a direct perception an “experience?”
it is if it is experienced, but it’s not if it isn’t.

We are generally unaware of the majority of direct perceptions we have.
then they aren’t experienced and they aren’t experienced.


Generally, as I understand experience, direct perceptions are mediated by the apprehension and discursive identification of characteristics. What about all the other direct perceptions we have which never rise to the level of being identified? Are they experiences? How can an “object” which has no characteristics, unlike a blue vase, said to be experienced?
How do you know they have no characteristics I’d they aren’t experienced?

It’s like in the Surangama sutra: if you cover your eyes so that you can’t see, then how do you know you can’t see, if you can’t see?

You know through eye consciousness.

It’s the same with directly experiencing that which has nothing to experience. To rely on has/hasn’t is still to dwell duality. At the level of consciousness being discussed here, that duality would have long been transcended.
EMPTIFUL.
An inward outlook produces outward insight.
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by stong gzugs »

Malcolm wrote: Mon May 29, 2023 1:55 am If you think that she is implying that Candra is hinting at an ineffable experience, I disagree with her. If you think she is implying that gnosis is ineffable, I agree with her.

The problem here is the lack of definition of “experience.”
Very helpful clarification, thanks. I think PadmaVonSamba below raises some good points, which I build upon.
PadmaVonSamba wrote: Mon May 29, 2023 3:47 pm How do you know they have no characteristics I’d they aren’t experienced?
This is a great point, PadmaVonSamba! Here are some questions that might clarify what's at stake here:

If jñana is defined in terms of a consciousness that doesn't arise because its support-object has no signs, per Cāndrakīrti, that's basically what happens in dreamless deep sleep. In deep sleep, there are no signs (unlike in waking life or during dreams) to serve as object-supports and no consciousness arises. But we are typically also unaware: there is no experience of deep sleep, which is why we only infer that we were in deep sleep after we wake up from it. In contrast, when we practice night yogas, we can maintain awareness even as we drift from waking life into the dream-world and the dream-world dissolves into deep sleep, such that deep sleep can be experienced. There still is no positive sign to serve as a support-object for consciousness, but one still remains aware and experiencing. So, which of these are more analogous to jñana as you and Cāndrakīrti define it?

Further, how does resting in the non-arising of consciousness cultivate positive qualities to benefit others? If the non-arising of consciousness, without being aware of it, was helpful in this way, couldn't you put people under a medically-induced coma and they'd come out as better people? If not, then doesn't this imply that one must maintain awareness and experience the non-arising of consciousness to produce benefits? Such that awareness and experience can persist in the absence of (dualistic) consciousness?
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Re: Western Philosophy and emptiness

Post by krodha »

PadmaVonSamba wrote: Mon May 29, 2023 3:47 pmHow do you know they have no characteristics I’d they aren’t experienced?

It’s like in the Surangama sutra: if you cover your eyes so that you can’t see, then how do you know you can’t see, if you can’t see?

You know through eye consciousness.
An absence of characteristics is a synonym for the realization of emptiness. If there is no core svabhāva or entity which objects are comprised of, then there is no entity to possess characteristics, and thus there are no characteristics.

Important insight, as Nāgārjuna states in his Lokātītastava:
  • You [the tathāgata] taught that those who do not realize that characteristics do not exist are not liberated.
This is why “perception,” the ascertaining of discrete objects, is rendered invalid.

The Āryātajñāna-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra:
  • Since all phenomena are naturally luminous, 
one should fully cultivate the perception of nonperception.
PadmaVonSamba wrote: Mon May 29, 2023 3:47 pmIt’s the same with directly experiencing that which has nothing to experience. To rely on has/hasn’t is still to dwell duality. At the level of consciousness being discussed here, that duality would have long been transcended.
Again, because entities are realized to be non-arisen, the basis of imputation which was previously mistaken to be an object endowed with specific characteristics is recognized to not actually constitute or create the entity it was previously misconstrued to characterize (through the lens of delusion). In the absence of an entity, existence and non-existence, having no substantial referent, are undone and as a result all views (and characteristics) are exhausted.

In his Mūlamadhyamakakārika, Nāgārjuna clarifies that the pacification of views and characteristics is contingent upon insight into emptiness whereby existent entities that are capable of existing and/or lacking existence are recognized to be unfounded. He likewise chastises those of “little intelligence” who assert otherwise:
  • Some of small intelligence, see existents in terms of “is” or “is not”; they do not perceive the pacification of views, or peace.
“Peace” here again is intended to illustrate an absence of characteristics, so again we come full circle with the importance of an absence of characteristics. The Ārya-tathāgatācintyaguhyanirdeśa-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra states:
  • "Nirvana is peace" denotes actualizing the absence of characteristics.
Candrakīrti concurs in his Madhyamakāvatāra:
  • The absence of all characteristics is peace.
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