The point is that you have already admitted this is just so much conceptual language. That means it is provisional, not definitive. The real issue between gzhan stong pas and gelukapas is whether or not this verbal description is to be taken literally or not. You both agree that meditative equipoise is free of proliferation, where such conceptualizations are absent. So in the end, you are just arguing about how the room is decorated.stong gzugs wrote: ↑Fri May 26, 2023 3:52 pmNo. I established above that the Ratnagotravibhāga describes buddha qualities to humble arrogant rangtongpas. (If the shoe fits...)
When it comes to Vajrayāna, it does not really matter what post-equipoise view one holds. That's why I regard all these polemics to be total bullshit, though sometimes entertaining. What matters in Vajrayāna is the example wisdom, not analytical wisdom.
Longchenpa states:
Within this dhātu that has always been naturally perfected,
samsara is Samantabhadra, nirvana is Samantabhadra,
but there is never been samsara or nirvana in the dimension of Samantabhadra.
Appearance is Samantabhadra, emptiness is Samantabhadra,
but there is never been appearance or emptiness in the dimension of Samantabhadra.
Birth and death are Samantabhadra, happiness and suffering are Samantabhadra,
but there is never been happiness and suffering or birth and death in the dimension of Samantabhadra.
Self and other is Samantabhadra, permanence and annihilation are Samantabhadra,
but there is never been self and other or permanence and annihilation in the dimension of Samantabhadra.
He comments:
Since vidyā bodhicitta has never been established in the space-like essence, whatever appears such as samsara and nirvana, appearance and emptiness, birth and death, happiness and suffering, self and other has never been established. Since those appearances as a mere state, potential, or play self-appear without ceasing and due to the absence of inherent existence in appearances—like illusions, dreams, moons in the water, optical illusions, fairy castles, and emanations—all phenomena of samsara and nirvana have never existed from the moment they appear, are baseless, and never move from transcendent state of Samantabhadra and Samantabhadri.
That includes all your qualities. Longchenapa's two favorite Indian treatises to cite from are the Uttaratantra and the Madhyamaka-avatara. He often cites them side by side.
It isn't, no more than pointing out the error of asserting hair on tortoises is view.
Gorampa was the person who originated this distinction. So, at the time, ground breaking. And no, his critiques do not come from Rendawa. The extant translation out there has a translation error. The text, translated by Geshe Jamspel, incorrectly identifies Rendawa's critique of gzhan stong as the one Gorampa favors, when in fact it is the more gentle criticism leveled by Rongton he favors. I received this teaching directly, so I am quite certain this the translation you have is mistaken here. Rongton's more gentle criticism labels gzhan stong an intermediate view between false aspectarian yogacāra and proper madhyamaka. Gorampa in fact devotes very little time to gzhan stong in Moonrays, mostly because in the end gzhan stong pas basically agree with the approach to meditative equipoise free of proliferation found in classic Madhyamaka, despite whatever other erroneous claims they make.Gorampa's "Jonang is eternalist, Geluk is nihilist, the middle way is between them" isn't exactly groundbreaking stuff. Plus Gorampa's critiques of Jonang are basically derivative of Rendawa. He should have studied Dölpopa's Mountain Dharma more closely, particularly the section that distinguishes between absolute and relative Cittamātra.
Then he did not read Moonrays very carefully. What Gorampa states very clearly in his summation of critiques of Jonang is this, quoting Jetsun:Pelden Dorje also says the differences between Jonang and Sakya aren't about the ultimate like Gorampa says, but about the conventional.
“If it is said ‘…there is existence in the ultimate,’ now then, because of falling into the extreme of existence, it will not be path of madhyamaka. But if it is said ‘…you assert non-existence in the ultimate, also you fall into the the extreme of non-existence,’ because we never established existence in the ultimate, we do not assert nonexistence."
Now then, if it is asked ‘…what do you assert?’ However things exist in the relative, we assert them as such, and hence we are freed from the extreme of annihilationist view in the relative. Since there is nothing whatever to assert as ultimate, since we are free from all extremes we are called ‘Mādhyamikas.’”
In other words, the basic point here is that if there were something truly established as ultimate, it should be seen in the equipoise of an ārya, but since nothing is perceived in the equipoise of an ārya according to any of the four extremes, being totally free of proliferation, there is nothing to assert as ultimate in post-equipoise. This is quite different than asserting the ultimate is "rang stong" or "gzhan stong." This brings us back to Longchenpa:
Since vidyā bodhicitta has never been established in the space-like essence, whatever appears such as samsara and nirvana, appearance and emptiness, birth and death, happiness and suffering, self and other has never been established.
This why Longchenpa can assert that the kāyas and wisdoms abide in the basis, without being a gzhan stong pa, because he agrees that even the appearances of nirvana have "never been established" and "have never existed from the moment they appear."
Gorampa does not mention Shakya Chogden in Moonrays at all. I translated the text.Gorampa even criticizes Chokden for holding the Jonang view in his Distinguishing the Views.
No. The locus classicus for Sakya view is a text called rin po che ljon shing by Jetsun Drakpa Gyaltsen, which is on the abhisamaya of the Hevajra Tantra.the original intention of the Sakya founders as being closer to Jonang.
He indeed proclaims that the view of the Hevajra Tantra, freedom from extremes, is higher than Madhyamaka. What is Jetsun's final view in this text? gNas lugs med pa, i.e. "There is no reality." Why? Because nothing can be found by way of an analysis of any of the four extremes in the relative or the ultimate. Since no relative phenomena can be found be means of such an analysis, there is nothing in the ultimate that can be found to exist in any of the four extremes nor in the middle. The Samputa says, "The yogi does not rely on emptiness, nor on nonemptiness, nor on the middle." The Sgra thal gyur states when explaining liberation from extremes (mtha' grol), "Since the extremes are not found, the middle is not found; since the middle is not found, the extremes are not found."
If you want to say that your infinite, uncompounded qualities exist in the ultimate, the very claim they exist in the ultimate makes you an eternalist because you are claiming something exists in the ultimate, and you are claiming the ultimate exists. The only way out of this problem is to accept that "all phenomena of samsara and nirvana have never existed from the moment they appear" like like illusions, dreams, moons in the water, optical illusions, fairy castles, and emanations.