Does Mipham qualify as a "classical Madhyamaka scholar"?
All classical Madhyamaka scholars in Tibet accept emptiness as a non-affirming negation.
Gelug responses to these critiques of Tsongkhapa?
-
- Posts: 132
- Joined: Tue Nov 12, 2013 5:01 am
Re: Gelug responses to these critiques of Tsongkhapa?
Re: Gelug responses to these critiques of Tsongkhapa?
He accepts emptiness as explained by Madhyamaks as a non-affirming negation. Freedom from the four extremes is a series of negations which do not affirm anything. If there is nothing in the relative that can be found by an examination of the four extremes, there is also nothing ultimate which can be found by any of the four extremes. Mipham's final view is prasangika, just as it is the view of Longchenpa, etc.wei wu wei wrote: ↑Fri May 20, 2022 4:24 pmDoes Mipham qualify as a "classical Madhyamaka scholar"?
All classical Madhyamaka scholars in Tibet accept emptiness as a non-affirming negation.
-
- Posts: 132
- Joined: Tue Nov 12, 2013 5:01 am
Re: Gelug responses to these critiques of Tsongkhapa?
Thanks for the clarification.Malcolm wrote: ↑Fri May 20, 2022 5:09 pmHe accepts emptiness as explained by Madhyamaks as a non-affirming negation. Freedom from the four extremes is a series of negations which do not affirm anything. If there is nothing in the relative that can be found by an examination of the four extremes, there is also nothing ultimate which can be found by any of the four extremes. Mipham's final view is prasangika, just as it is the view of Longchenpa, etc.wei wu wei wrote: ↑Fri May 20, 2022 4:24 pmDoes Mipham qualify as a "classical Madhyamaka scholar"?
All classical Madhyamaka scholars in Tibet accept emptiness as a non-affirming negation.
-
- Posts: 132
- Joined: Tue Nov 12, 2013 5:01 am
Re: Gelug responses to these critiques of Tsongkhapa?
Malcolm, would you mind if I share this in a FB conversation?
All Classical Madhyamakas agree that emptiness is the emptiness of something, and that without something, there cannot be nothing. What is that something? Dependent Origination. No classical Madhyamaka accepts a self-established ineffable emptiness. The ultimate is the ultimate of something, no classical Madhyamaka rejects this, including Mipham. Otherwise one cannot have the Union of the two truths and so on which became codified with the translation of the MAV of Candrakirti.
Re: Gelug responses to these critiques of Tsongkhapa?
Not at all.wei wu wei wrote: ↑Sun Jun 19, 2022 11:38 pmMalcolm, would you mind if I share this in a FB conversation?
All Classical Madhyamakas agree that emptiness is the emptiness of something, and that without something, there cannot be nothing. What is that something? Dependent Origination. No classical Madhyamaka accepts a self-established ineffable emptiness. The ultimate is the ultimate of something, no classical Madhyamaka rejects this, including Mipham. Otherwise one cannot have the Union of the two truths and so on which became codified with the translation of the MAV of Candrakirti.
-
- Posts: 132
- Joined: Tue Nov 12, 2013 5:01 am
Re: Gelug responses to these critiques of Tsongkhapa?
Thanks. One clarification, though. You write, "...without something there cannot be nothing [emptiness]." It sounds like you're making emptiness and nothingness equivalent here?Malcolm wrote: ↑Mon Jun 20, 2022 12:41 amNot at all.wei wu wei wrote: ↑Sun Jun 19, 2022 11:38 pmMalcolm, would you mind if I share this in a FB conversation?
All Classical Madhyamakas agree that emptiness is the emptiness of something, and that without something, there cannot be nothing. What is that something? Dependent Origination. No classical Madhyamaka accepts a self-established ineffable emptiness. The ultimate is the ultimate of something, no classical Madhyamaka rejects this, including Mipham. Otherwise one cannot have the Union of the two truths and so on which became codified with the translation of the MAV of Candrakirti.
-
- Posts: 7
- Joined: Thu Aug 25, 2022 9:08 pm
Re: Gelug responses to these critiques of Tsongkhapa?
wei wu wei wrote: ↑Mon May 16, 2022 12:12 am I believe, BTW, that this is from Douglass Duckworth:
"This first difference between Tsong kha pa and his critics is probably the most significant in terms of the objectives of these authors, who aim at providing proper guidance for the realization of emptiness but disagree on how to do so. For Tsong kha pa, emptiness is a negation (dgagpa, pratisedha) and must be understood in terms of the negation of a putative object of negation (dgag bya).Tsong kha pa describes such a putative object within the Präsangika context as inherent existence (rang bzhin gyis grub pa), existence from the side of the object (rang ngosnasgrub pa), or objective existence (ranggi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa). The understanding of emptiness presupposes the identification of such an object whose nonexistence is then demonstrated by the various Madhyamaka reasonings. This, for Tsong kha pa, is how to realize emptiness.
This part is blatantly wrong : " The understanding of emptiness presupposes the identification of such an object whose nonexistence is then demonstrated by the various Madhyamaka reasonings. This, for Tsong kha pa, is how to realize emptiness.
I disagree with it, because it has nothing to do with Tsongkhapa's view.
It is a straw-man, a straw-Tsongkhapa's view.
Re: Gelug responses to these critiques of Tsongkhapa?
Yes, and he accepts the non-affirming negation.wei wu wei wrote: ↑Fri May 20, 2022 4:24 pmDoes Mipham qualify as a "classical Madhyamaka scholar"?
All classical Madhyamaka scholars in Tibet accept emptiness as a non-affirming negation.
Re: Gelug responses to these critiques of Tsongkhapa?
wei wu wei wrote: ↑Mon Jun 20, 2022 6:15 amThanks. One clarification, though. You write, "...without something there cannot be nothing [emptiness]." It sounds like you're making emptiness and nothingness equivalent here?Malcolm wrote: ↑Mon Jun 20, 2022 12:41 amNot at all.wei wu wei wrote: ↑Sun Jun 19, 2022 11:38 pm
Malcolm, would you mind if I share this in a FB conversation?
Emptiness is an absence, it is a nothing. For example, emptiness free from four extremes is the absence existence, nonexistence, both, and neither, both relatively and ultimately. Wherever there is an absence, there is nothing there, just as there is nothing in an empty cup, hence it is called "empty." But in order for there to be an empty cup, there has to be a cup.
Re: Gelug responses to these critiques of Tsongkhapa?
You misunderstand what Duckworth is saying, he means to say "the identification of such an object [of negation]..." He is accurately portraying Tsongkhapa's stance.Lhundrub Jinpa wrote: ↑Thu Aug 25, 2022 10:11 pm
This part is blatantly wrong : " The understanding of emptiness presupposes the identification of such an object whose nonexistence is then demonstrated by the various Madhyamaka reasonings. This, for Tsong kha pa, is how to realize emptiness.
I disagree with it, because it has nothing to do with Tsongkhapa's view.
It is a straw-man, a straw-Tsongkhapa's view.
-
- Posts: 7
- Joined: Thu Aug 25, 2022 9:08 pm
Re: Gelug responses to these critiques of Tsongkhapa?
OK. Then I agree.
What Duckworth is saying : " This, for Tsong kha pa, is how to intellectually understand emptiness, which comes down to our logical mental experience of a so-called "valid inference" that is characterized as a "non-affermative negative". "
- conebeckham
- Posts: 5715
- Joined: Mon Jun 14, 2010 11:49 pm
- Location: Bay Area, CA, USA
Re: Gelug responses to these critiques of Tsongkhapa?
The object of negation being the inherent existence of a given phenomenon, correct? The question is then whether this object, "the inherent existence of a given phenomenon" differs from the phenomenon itself as an object of negation.Malcolm wrote: ↑Thu Aug 25, 2022 11:02 pmYou misunderstand what Duckworth is saying, he means to say "the identification of such an object [of negation]..." He is accurately portraying Tsongkhapa's stance.Lhundrub Jinpa wrote: ↑Thu Aug 25, 2022 10:11 pm
This part is blatantly wrong : " The understanding of emptiness presupposes the identification of such an object whose nonexistence is then demonstrated by the various Madhyamaka reasonings. This, for Tsong kha pa, is how to realize emptiness.
I disagree with it, because it has nothing to do with Tsongkhapa's view.
It is a straw-man, a straw-Tsongkhapa's view.
དམ་པའི་དོན་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ཆེ་བ་དང་།
རྟོག་གེའི་ཡུལ་མིན་བླ་མའི་བྱིན་རླབས་དང་།
སྐལ་ལྡན་ལས་འཕྲོ་ཅན་གྱིས་རྟོགས་པ་སྟེ།
དེ་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ལ་ནི་ལོ་རྟོག་སེལ།།
"Absolute Truth is not an object of analytical discourse or great discriminating wisdom,
It is realized through the blessing grace of the Guru and fortunate Karmic potential.
Like this, mistaken ideas of discriminating wisdom are clarified."
- (Kyabje Bokar Rinpoche, from his summary of "The Ocean of Definitive Meaning")
རྟོག་གེའི་ཡུལ་མིན་བླ་མའི་བྱིན་རླབས་དང་།
སྐལ་ལྡན་ལས་འཕྲོ་ཅན་གྱིས་རྟོགས་པ་སྟེ།
དེ་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ལ་ནི་ལོ་རྟོག་སེལ།།
"Absolute Truth is not an object of analytical discourse or great discriminating wisdom,
It is realized through the blessing grace of the Guru and fortunate Karmic potential.
Like this, mistaken ideas of discriminating wisdom are clarified."
- (Kyabje Bokar Rinpoche, from his summary of "The Ocean of Definitive Meaning")
-
- Posts: 132
- Joined: Tue Nov 12, 2013 5:01 am
Re: Gelug responses to these critiques of Tsongkhapa?
As an important correction to all involved in this conversation, I misattributed the quote about Tsongkhapa's critics above to Douglass Duckworth (who very well might agree with it anyway). The actual author of the quotation is Georges Dreyfus, from The Svantantrika-Prasangika Distinction in his contributing chapter, "Would The True Prasangika Please Stand?" Georges Dreyfus is an interesting scholar, having been trained formally as a Gelugpa, receiving the Geshe Lharampa degree. But he writes, to my mind, very honestly about the strengths and weaknesses of all the Tibetan schools.
The object of negation being the inherent existence of a given phenomenon, correct? The question is then whether this object, "the inherent existence of a given phenomenon" differs from the phenomenon itself as an object of negation.
But to Conebeckham's question...having perused Dharma Wheel for some time and having read your posts, I confess that I'm afraid your question is a bit of a trap! I've seen your familiarity with Tsongkhapa's system and don't think such a basic issue would have escaped your notice. But, setting that aside, the answer to your question is yes, the inherent existence of an object is necessarily distinct from the object under analysis, since inherent existence is something like a projected status mistakenly granted to that object.
Re: Gelug responses to these critiques of Tsongkhapa?
I'm just dropping in to mention that given the publication ban of the works criticising Gelug view in old Tibet, it's not surprising that the critiques weren't addressed. His Holiness the Dalai Lama has encouraged Gelug monastics to read the works of Gorampa and others, so we can probably expect some polemical responses from the Gelug side.
- conebeckham
- Posts: 5715
- Joined: Mon Jun 14, 2010 11:49 pm
- Location: Bay Area, CA, USA
Re: Gelug responses to these critiques of Tsongkhapa?
So, if we negate the “projected status mistakenly granted” that still leaves us with the object, does it not?
But to Conebeckham's question...having perused Dharma Wheel for some time and having read your posts, I confess that I'm afraid your question is a bit of a trap! I've seen your familiarity with Tsongkhapa's system and don't think such a basic issue would have escaped your notice. But, setting that aside, the answer to your question is yes, the inherent existence of an object is necessarily distinct from the object under analysis, since inherent existence is something like a projected status mistakenly granted to that object.
I’m not trying to create a trap, btw, nor am I an expert in The purported view of Tsong Khapa. But when one enters in to analysis of an object, creating a separate and distinct object of negation shifts the focus away from the object itself.
Phenomema are empty of existence when subjected to analysis. The object itself does not exist. Nevertheless, appearances manifest regardless. This object called “inherent existence” has never appeared except in the conceptual mind.
As a concept, I think it can be helpful, pinpointing exactly what “existence” means—but as the sole object of madhyamika analysis I think it misses the point.
དམ་པའི་དོན་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ཆེ་བ་དང་།
རྟོག་གེའི་ཡུལ་མིན་བླ་མའི་བྱིན་རླབས་དང་།
སྐལ་ལྡན་ལས་འཕྲོ་ཅན་གྱིས་རྟོགས་པ་སྟེ།
དེ་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ལ་ནི་ལོ་རྟོག་སེལ།།
"Absolute Truth is not an object of analytical discourse or great discriminating wisdom,
It is realized through the blessing grace of the Guru and fortunate Karmic potential.
Like this, mistaken ideas of discriminating wisdom are clarified."
- (Kyabje Bokar Rinpoche, from his summary of "The Ocean of Definitive Meaning")
རྟོག་གེའི་ཡུལ་མིན་བླ་མའི་བྱིན་རླབས་དང་།
སྐལ་ལྡན་ལས་འཕྲོ་ཅན་གྱིས་རྟོགས་པ་སྟེ།
དེ་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ལ་ནི་ལོ་རྟོག་སེལ།།
"Absolute Truth is not an object of analytical discourse or great discriminating wisdom,
It is realized through the blessing grace of the Guru and fortunate Karmic potential.
Like this, mistaken ideas of discriminating wisdom are clarified."
- (Kyabje Bokar Rinpoche, from his summary of "The Ocean of Definitive Meaning")
-
- Posts: 132
- Joined: Tue Nov 12, 2013 5:01 am
Re: Gelug responses to these critiques of Tsongkhapa?
conebeckham wrote: ↑Tue Sep 06, 2022 3:18 pmSo, if we negate the “projected status mistakenly granted” that still leaves us with the object, does it not?
But to Conebeckham's question...having perused Dharma Wheel for some time and having read your posts, I confess that I'm afraid your question is a bit of a trap! I've seen your familiarity with Tsongkhapa's system and don't think such a basic issue would have escaped your notice. But, setting that aside, the answer to your question is yes, the inherent existence of an object is necessarily distinct from the object under analysis, since inherent existence is something like a projected status mistakenly granted to that object.
I’m not trying to create a trap, btw, nor am I an expert in The purported view of Tsong Khapa. But when one enters in to analysis of an object, creating a separate and distinct object of negation shifts the focus away from the object itself.
Phenomema are empty of existence when subjected to analysis. The object itself does not exist. Nevertheless, appearances manifest regardless. This object called “inherent existence” has never appeared except in the conceptual mind.
As a concept, I think it can be helpful, pinpointing exactly what “existence” means—but as the sole object of madhyamika analysis I think it misses the point.
Got it. Yes, the “what’s-left-over” critique. I think this has been pounced on by many of his critics throughout the centuries…the pot isn’t empty of the pot but only of the inherently existent pot: so there’s a pot left over after the negadum is removed. This is one of those times when I think polemics erode charitable readings, though I’m sure there’s enough of that to go around on all sides.
It’s surprising to me that this critique has as much traction as it does. If it were true and Tsongkhapa’s approach only refuted some add-on putative object of negation that was never really there anyway (put a hat on, take a hat off), then not only would the Gelug approach to Madhyamaka not even be Madhyamaka–it would be merely an ineffective regurgitation of realism that accomplished nothing.
What’s left over in the aftermath of the refutation is an illusion-like, unfindable object that exists only by designation, in dependence upon cause and conditions. The same metaphors that are used elsewhere in Madhyamaka are employed by the Gelugpas: the moon’s reflection, a rainbow, a dream, etc. Jeffery Hopkins adds that unless one is shaken to their very core by even an indirect experience of emptiness, they haven’t even begun this meditation. What’s removed is the independent, objective, thing-in-itselfness of an object. Candrakirti writes: “When things are subjected to logical analysis…because the essence of things remains unestablished, the illusory-like nature of each individual object should remain as a remainder.”
- conebeckham
- Posts: 5715
- Joined: Mon Jun 14, 2010 11:49 pm
- Location: Bay Area, CA, USA
Re: Gelug responses to these critiques of Tsongkhapa?
^^ very good.
A mere appearance. I have a minor quibble with "illusion-like," but I think we are near the limit of conceptual descriptions here.What’s left over in the aftermath of the refutation is an illusion-like, unfindable object that exists only by designation, in dependence upon cause and conditions.
དམ་པའི་དོན་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ཆེ་བ་དང་།
རྟོག་གེའི་ཡུལ་མིན་བླ་མའི་བྱིན་རླབས་དང་།
སྐལ་ལྡན་ལས་འཕྲོ་ཅན་གྱིས་རྟོགས་པ་སྟེ།
དེ་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ལ་ནི་ལོ་རྟོག་སེལ།།
"Absolute Truth is not an object of analytical discourse or great discriminating wisdom,
It is realized through the blessing grace of the Guru and fortunate Karmic potential.
Like this, mistaken ideas of discriminating wisdom are clarified."
- (Kyabje Bokar Rinpoche, from his summary of "The Ocean of Definitive Meaning")
རྟོག་གེའི་ཡུལ་མིན་བླ་མའི་བྱིན་རླབས་དང་།
སྐལ་ལྡན་ལས་འཕྲོ་ཅན་གྱིས་རྟོགས་པ་སྟེ།
དེ་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ལ་ནི་ལོ་རྟོག་སེལ།།
"Absolute Truth is not an object of analytical discourse or great discriminating wisdom,
It is realized through the blessing grace of the Guru and fortunate Karmic potential.
Like this, mistaken ideas of discriminating wisdom are clarified."
- (Kyabje Bokar Rinpoche, from his summary of "The Ocean of Definitive Meaning")
-
- Posts: 132
- Joined: Tue Nov 12, 2013 5:01 am
Re: Gelug responses to these critiques of Tsongkhapa?
Thanks!conebeckham wrote: ↑Thu Sep 08, 2022 1:01 am ^^ very good.
A mere appearance. I have a minor quibble with "illusion-like," but I think we are near the limit of conceptual descriptions here.What’s left over in the aftermath of the refutation is an illusion-like, unfindable object that exists only by designation, in dependence upon cause and conditions.
Do you feel it's more accurate to just use unqualified illusion?
Re: Gelug responses to these critiques of Tsongkhapa?
? Is there any qualified illusion?wei wu wei wrote: ↑Thu Sep 08, 2022 3:38 pmThanks!conebeckham wrote: ↑Thu Sep 08, 2022 1:01 am ^^ very good.
A mere appearance. I have a minor quibble with "illusion-like," but I think we are near the limit of conceptual descriptions here.What’s left over in the aftermath of the refutation is an illusion-like, unfindable object that exists only by designation, in dependence upon cause and conditions.
Do you feel it's more accurate to just use unqualified illusion?
I think, Tsongkhapa did not explain emptiness intellectually, he rather explained how to find out about it. Manuals for meditation.
So, one begins to explore the object of negation with looking at ones own deluded idea about Me/I.
This does not acknowledge the deluded idea as true. One just starts where they are.
Because emptiness cannot be conceived within conceptual thinking, he did not explain it conceptually.
- conebeckham
- Posts: 5715
- Joined: Mon Jun 14, 2010 11:49 pm
- Location: Bay Area, CA, USA
Re: Gelug responses to these critiques of Tsongkhapa?
Phenomena are illusory appearances. Beyond existing, non-existing,,,,,,no ontological statement can be made. Put another way, Conceptual consciousness cannot encompass the way things are.wei wu wei wrote: ↑Thu Sep 08, 2022 3:38 pmThanks!conebeckham wrote: ↑Thu Sep 08, 2022 1:01 am ^^ very good.
A mere appearance. I have a minor quibble with "illusion-like," but I think we are near the limit of conceptual descriptions here.What’s left over in the aftermath of the refutation is an illusion-like, unfindable object that exists only by designation, in dependence upon cause and conditions.
Do you feel it's more accurate to just use unqualified illusion?
དམ་པའི་དོན་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ཆེ་བ་དང་།
རྟོག་གེའི་ཡུལ་མིན་བླ་མའི་བྱིན་རླབས་དང་།
སྐལ་ལྡན་ལས་འཕྲོ་ཅན་གྱིས་རྟོགས་པ་སྟེ།
དེ་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ལ་ནི་ལོ་རྟོག་སེལ།།
"Absolute Truth is not an object of analytical discourse or great discriminating wisdom,
It is realized through the blessing grace of the Guru and fortunate Karmic potential.
Like this, mistaken ideas of discriminating wisdom are clarified."
- (Kyabje Bokar Rinpoche, from his summary of "The Ocean of Definitive Meaning")
རྟོག་གེའི་ཡུལ་མིན་བླ་མའི་བྱིན་རླབས་དང་།
སྐལ་ལྡན་ལས་འཕྲོ་ཅན་གྱིས་རྟོགས་པ་སྟེ།
དེ་ནི་ཤེས་རབ་ལ་ནི་ལོ་རྟོག་སེལ།།
"Absolute Truth is not an object of analytical discourse or great discriminating wisdom,
It is realized through the blessing grace of the Guru and fortunate Karmic potential.
Like this, mistaken ideas of discriminating wisdom are clarified."
- (Kyabje Bokar Rinpoche, from his summary of "The Ocean of Definitive Meaning")