Chariot Example in Chandrakirti

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Subcontrary
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Chariot Example in Chandrakirti

Post by Subcontrary »

Hello!

I have a goal of understanding Madhyamaka as deeply as I can, and was directed to the Madhyamakavatara by Chandrakirti and the Catuhsataka by Aryadeva. I have read them both (too hastily perhaps) and needless to say I have a number of questions, the first of which I'll ask below:

Chandrakirti writes in verses 152-155 about the famous chariot simile, and specifically how the chariot cannot really be a collection of parts in a certain configuration. In the commentary Jamgon Mipham writes "A chariot is just an imputation, occurring in dependence on the collection of its parts." However, he and Chandrakirti are both making these arguments to a hypothetical opponent who "denies real (substantial) existence to collections," and I have not yet been convinced of that.

I feel as if there are a number of steps between "the chariot depends on its parts," which I freely concede, and "the chariot doesn't exist," which I have massive difficulty conceding. Without analysis it seems to me perfectly consistent and intuitive that a thing can both depend on its parts and also exist.

If I were to tell Chandrakirti that I concede that a chariot depends on its parts, what might his line of reasoning be from that place, to the conclusion that the chariot doesn't ultimately exist at all?

Thank you for any light you can shine on this topic!
Malcolm
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Re: Chariot Example in Chandrakirti

Post by Malcolm »

Subcontrary wrote: Wed Jul 21, 2021 10:35 pm
If I were to tell Chandrakirti that I concede that a chariot depends on its parts, what might his line of reasoning be from that place, to the conclusion that the chariot doesn't ultimately exist at all?

Thank you for any light you can shine on this topic!
The chariot can not be found in any of its parts, one of its parts or separate from its parts, therefore, there is no "chariot" at all, apart from an imputation, "chariot," upon an assembly of parts. The part you are missing is functionality. In order for a thing to be accepted as conventionally existent, prior to analysis, it must perform its imputed function successfully. Upon analysis, even if a given thing properly performs its function, it cannot be found in the collection of its parts, even though it still continues to function.
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Re: Chariot Example in Chandrakirti

Post by GrapeLover »

I feel as if there are a number of steps between "the chariot depends on its parts," which I freely concede, and "the chariot doesn't exist," which I have massive difficulty conceding. Without analysis it seems to me perfectly consistent and intuitive that a thing can both depend on its parts and also exist.
What do you understand by “exists”? Part of the idea is basically that, if something truly and intrinsically existed, it wouldn’t depend on anything. It would be a chariot per se chariot, with its own intrinsic “chariotness”. Since you recognise that, in actuality, the chariot depends on its parts, you also recognise that “chariot” is just an arbitrary conceptual designation that you impute onto a collection of phenomena—it doesn’t exist in itself.

From there, you can go in a couple of directions. The view of the Sautrāntika school was basically that, if you analysed a phenomenon (eg a chariot) into smaller and smaller parts, you would eventually come to fundamental particles that don’t depend on anything and basically are existent in themselves. As such, the chariot is not truly existent, but the most fundamental constituents that it depends on are truly existent.

Part of the concern of Madhyamaka is the attempt to demonstrate that such fundamental particles cannot truly exist either, and therefore that no phenomenon has true existence.

This is different from the idea of a chariot “not existing” in the same way as the horns of a rabbit don’t exist, as the classical example goes. If it helps, some would say that the chariot has conventional existence, in that it ‘exists’ in a functional/practical way in our world as a useful concept, but that it doesn’t have ultimate or intrinsic existence, which is more ontological. This is similar to how a dream chariot may “exist” for the practical purposes of that dream, but that is different from saying that the dream chariot has truly-established, intrinsic existence.
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PadmaVonSamba
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Re: Chariot Example in Chandrakirti

Post by PadmaVonSamba »

Subcontrary wrote: Wed Jul 21, 2021 10:35 pm I feel as if there are a number of steps between "the chariot depends on its parts," which I freely concede, and "the chariot doesn't exist," which I have massive difficulty conceding.
I think this is the most common hurdle for students of Dharma, and it’s based on a misunderstanding.
It’s not that “no chariot exists” because if course, it’s right there, with a horse attached to it!

But rather, what is argued is, “nothing is there within the collection of parts which is the chariot”.

(There is a subtle but very important difference).

And it means that there is no essence, no chariotness that “exists” intrinsically within the chariot.
“Exist” in the Buddhist context refers to intrinsically arising, or not depending on any supporting causes or parts.
We can certainly say that the chariot occurs, in the same sense that all phenomena temporarily occur, or arise, as long as the conditions are there to produce the result.

But when the causes ease, the axle has broken and the sides of the chariot rotten and fallen away, where it the chariot?
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Subcontrary
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Re: Chariot Example in Chandrakirti

Post by Subcontrary »

GrapeLover wrote: Wed Jul 21, 2021 11:27 pm Part of the concern of Madhyamaka is the attempt to demonstrate that such fundamental particles cannot truly exist either, and therefore that no phenomenon has true existence.
I think I have the conventional definition of "existence;" if I'm not mistaken the rabbit's horns don't even exist conventionally, but the rabbit itself doesn't exist ultimately. What I struggle with is the difference between something that exists conventionally but doesn't exist ultimately: it seems as if there is no difference, then why divide them in this counterintuitive way?

People would laugh if I told them that there isn't really any such thing as rabbits, and they would laugh even harder if I told them they themselves don't even exist, but eventually I would like to be able to convince others of the reality of Madhyamaka, if indeed it is reality.

Karen Lang translated Aryadeva (Chapter 9, verse 22; or verse 222) thus:

"At the time of liberation, what value is there in [positing] consciousness (caitanya) for someone free from existence (vibhava)? Also, an unconscious existence clearly is analogous to non-existence!"

This I agreed with, though as something to strive for it gave me the nihilistic vibes that people sometimes get from Madhyamaka. From the point of view of experience, I can't detect a difference between the deepest of sleep, when consciousness is thoroughly extinguished, and non-existence. Similarly, to a rock, not existing is identical to being a rock.

It seems like Aryadeva is saying that when Nirvana is achieved, consciousness no longer occurs, which I think implies that experiences no longer occur either, as experiences rely on consciousness. On the other hand, omniscience, at the very least, is an experience, but Aryadeva writes (chapter 5, verse 3; or verse 103) thus:

"The Sage has power over what should be done and what should not be done, and what should be said and what should not be said. Therefore, what reason is there for saying that the All-Knowing One is not omniscient?"

Which seems to imply that Buddhas have the experience of omniscience. Perhaps my overarching difficulty is understanding how non-existence and experience can coincide. While Aryadeva and Chandrakirti both have explained that things don't exist the way we experience them, how am I to explain that the experience itself doesn't exist? Everyone understands how the rabbit's horns are non-existent if you have a dream of a horned rabbit, but few argue that the dream itself, the thing being experienced, doesn't exist. In the same way, I understand (sort of) how a rabbit can be ultimately non-existent, but how can the experience of the rabbit be non-existent?

I'm sorry if this post is meandering, hopefully I have only communicated my confusion and not spread it: thank you for your time, patience, and guidance!
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Re: Chariot Example in Chandrakirti

Post by Malcolm »

Subcontrary wrote: Fri Jul 23, 2021 10:55 pm
People would laugh if I told them that there isn't really any such thing as rabbits, and they would laugh even harder if I told them they themselves don't even exist, but eventually I would like to be able to convince others of the reality of Madhyamaka, if indeed it is reality.
Why would you tell people there is no such thing as rabbits? Or People? The subtle object of negation is inherent existence; not existence, which is the coarse object of negation. Once one understands the subtle object of negation, the coarse object of negation naturally falls away. But some people are able to infer the subtle object of negation from the coarse object of negation, and thus they do not negate the appearance of a thing, only it’s essence, which is its existence.
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Re: Chariot Example in Chandrakirti

Post by Malcolm »

Subcontrary wrote: Fri Jul 23, 2021 10:55 pmbut Aryadeva writes (chapter 5, verse 3; or verse 103) thus:

"The Sage has power over what should be done and what should not be done, and what should be said and what should not be said. Therefore, what reason is there for saying that the All-Knowing One is not omniscient?"
This means that the Buddha knows everything about paths, not things.
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Re: Chariot Example in Chandrakirti

Post by Schrödinger’s Yidam »

I like the Greek version of the chariot thought experiment. In that experiment, you take a chariot and you take a wheel off. You replace the wheel with a new wheel. And then you take the axle off. And you replace it with a new axle. And then you take the other wheel off and replace it and so forth one piece at a time. Then also you start to rebuild another chariot with the old pieces.

Once every piece has been replaced you have two chariots. The question now is “which one is the original chariot?” Is it the one that has continuity by adding pieces to it? Or is the assemblage of all the old pieces once again into exactly the same thing as the original chariot? I believe the answer is that there is no such thing as “the original chariot“.

It’s a Greek thought experiment (I think), but it illustrates the Buddha’s point about emptiness pretty well.
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Subcontrary
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Re: Chariot Example in Chandrakirti

Post by Subcontrary »

Malcolm wrote: Sat Jul 24, 2021 3:01 am Why would you tell people there is no such thing as rabbits? Or People? The subtle object of negation is inherent existence; not existence, which is the coarse object of negation. Once one understands the subtle object of negation, the coarse object of negation naturally falls away. But some people are able to infer the subtle object of negation from the coarse object of negation, and thus they do not negate the appearance of a thing, only it’s essence, which is its existence.
Well I definitely don't want to say anything foolish to anyone. I am unfamiliar with the distinction between the coarse and subtle objects of negation but I would like to learn about them if you would like to explain them! From Aryadeva and Chandrakirti (and Jamgon Mipham's commentary) I gathered that Madhyamaka seeks to refute the real existence of phenomena, (e.g. rabbits and the self) If these truly do not exist, then the reason I would tell people that rabbits and the self don't exist is because this is an accurate account of reality. Of course if my interpretation is wrong then I would never tell anyone such things. In the texts there are a number of terms that qualify existence (and which are negated), such as "real existence," "true existence," and "inherent existence," I assumed, perhaps wrongly, that these all amounted to the same thing.

Jamgon Mipham writes "And, says Chandrakirti, just as the three elements mentioned (object, sense, and consciousness) are equally unreal in the dreaming state, the same applies to the waking state as well." This seems to imply that, were I to ask Chandrakirti, "Was the rabbit I dreamed of real or unreal?" He would answer "unreal;" and then if I asked him, "Is the rabbit I'm seeing and touching real or unreal?" he would equally answer "unreal," and for the same reason. That is to say, it seems like Chandrakirti would tell me that rabbits are unreal -- but is there some difference I haven't detected between saying "there is no such thing as rabbits" and "rabbits are unreal?"

I hope my questions are making sense! Thank you for all your assistance.
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Re: Chariot Example in Chandrakirti

Post by Malcolm »

Subcontrary wrote: Sat Jul 24, 2021 4:19 amis there some difference I haven't detected between saying "there is no such thing as rabbits" and "rabbits are unreal?"
There are such things as rabbits, which is why you can say they are unreal. If there were no such thing as rabbits, what would could be described as unreal?
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Re: Chariot Example in Chandrakirti

Post by PadmaVonSamba »

Subcontrary wrote: Sat Jul 24, 2021 4:19 am If these truly do not exist, then the reason I would tell people that rabbits and the self don't exist is because this is an accurate account of reality.
Try to determine in what sense a rabbit exists.
Or, you might say, “at what level does a rabbit exist?”
Does a rabbit exist at the microscopic level?
A rabbit is composed entirely of microscopic parts: cells, molecules, atoms. Rabbit DNA. So, you might answer that a rabbit exists at the microscopic level. However, if you isolate any one of those parts, for example, a carbon molecule, or some calcium, that’s not specifically “rabbit”. None of its basic components are “rabbit”. So then, you have to determine at what exact point their coming together suddenly becomes “rabbit”. But there is no exact point. And even if one asserts that a rabbit still occurs as the result of these various parts, the rabbit is still just a label given to the collection of parts. If you change some of those parts, modify the DNA, then maybe you have a squirrel instead, just as humans and other primates are separate by only a few genetic differences.
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Re: Chariot Example in Chandrakirti

Post by PadmaVonSamba »

Subcontrary wrote: Sat Jul 24, 2021 4:19 amIs there some difference I haven't detected between saying "there is no such thing as rabbits" and "rabbits are unreal?"
The helpful word you want to use is occur.
Do events in dreams occur? Yes.
It can be determined that they occur because they are objects of awareness (we experience them, we remember them). If they didn’t occur, there could be no awareness of them (you can’t be aware of something that never happened!)
Are the events in dreams “real” ?
They are not real in the sense that they do not occur in any other way except as products of the imagination.
So, if I dream a tiger is chasing me, I might have some actual physiological responses to that. My heartbeat might increase, I may sweat or toss and turn on my sleep. But the tiger isn’t “real” in the same sense as a tiger that actually lives in the jungle.
But the tiger in the jungle, while very real in the sense that it actually might chase me and eat me, in other words, real within the context of other things, it has no intrinsic reality, but only “occurs” as a temporary phenomenon. It doesn’t “exist” in any absolute sense.
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Re: Chariot Example in Chandrakirti

Post by 55055 »

GrapeLover wrote: Wed Jul 21, 2021 11:27 pm The view of the Sautrāntika school was basically that, if you analysed a phenomenon (eg a chariot) into smaller and smaller parts, you would eventually come to fundamental particles that don’t depend on anything and basically are existent in themselves. As such, the chariot is not truly existent, but the most fundamental constituents that it depends on are truly existent.
indeed. and whether the ultimate particles are able to sustain a thing such as an ultimate whole is irrelevant and offtopic compared to one newly establishing empirically the existence of imputedly knowable objects ie. such as the category 'chariot'.

once you can pull that off ie. sautrantiks path of seeing direct perception of the coarse apprehension of the 4 arya truths etcetc are you able to approach the actual meaning of analyzing the chariot. as you suspect, it has little to do with the category since you already established its mode of existence. the meaning of thea analysis pertains to the physicality and mind involved there themselves, not merely perceiving coarse imputation which has nothing to do with emptiness.
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Re: Chariot Example in Chandrakirti

Post by GrapeLover »

55055 wrote: Sat Jul 24, 2021 8:17 pm
GrapeLover wrote: Wed Jul 21, 2021 11:27 pm The view of the Sautrāntika school was basically that, if you analysed a phenomenon (eg a chariot) into smaller and smaller parts, you would eventually come to fundamental particles that don’t depend on anything and basically are existent in themselves. As such, the chariot is not truly existent, but the most fundamental constituents that it depends on are truly existent.
indeed. and whether the ultimate particles are able to sustain a thing such as an ultimate whole is irrelevant and offtopic compared to one newly establishing empirically the existence of imputedly knowable objects ie. such as the category 'chariot'.

once you can pull that off ie. sautrantiks path of seeing direct perception of the coarse apprehension of the 4 arya truths etcetc are you able to approach the actual meaning of analyzing the chariot. as you suspect, it has little to do with the category since you already established its mode of existence. the meaning of thea analysis pertains to the physicality and mind involved there themselves, not merely perceiving coarse imputation which has nothing to do with emptiness.
Going to have to put this through the “explain like I’m 5” filter if you’d like me to understand the point you’re making. But if it’s just a general comment for the topic then that is fine.

If it’s relevant, I didn’t mean to say that only recognising the emptiness of conceptual imputations is sufficient in terms of establishing a Madhyamaka view of emptiness. I was noting that, once you recognise the emptiness of imputations, it’s possible to take the view that imputations and composite objects are empty, but that their fundamental constituents are ultimately existent. I then pointed out that Madhyamaka, in establishing its presentation of emptiness, also seeks to disprove the ultimate existence of fundamental particles.

The purpose of this was to aid in providing a stepwise understanding to OP.
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Re: Chariot Example in Chandrakirti

Post by SilenceMonkey »

When madhyamaka says things don't exist, it's talking about existing in an ultimate sense. If a chariot existed in an ultimate sense (as an ultimate truth), it wouldn't depend on parts or anything else for its existence. If you completely disassembled the chariot piece by piece, there would still be something we could call "chariot." But there's no essence of "chariot-ness" somewhere within the assembly of its parts. So it isn't an ultimate truth -- ie. it doesn't (ultimately) exist.

Maybe it should be said that when Nyingmapas say "there is no object," this is referring to ultimate truth. Gelukpas would say there is no "inherent existence," while qualifying it by saying "the object conventionally exists."
Subcontrary wrote: Fri Jul 23, 2021 10:55 pm
GrapeLover wrote: Wed Jul 21, 2021 11:27 pm Part of the concern of Madhyamaka is the attempt to demonstrate that such fundamental particles cannot truly exist either, and therefore that no phenomenon has true existence.
I think I have the conventional definition of "existence;" if I'm not mistaken the rabbit's horns don't even exist conventionally, but the rabbit itself doesn't exist ultimately. What I struggle with is the difference between something that exists conventionally but doesn't exist ultimately: it seems as if there is no difference, then why divide them in this counterintuitive way?
It's to show that our common sense is ignorance, not the truth.
If our common sense were the truth, there would be no need for Madhyamaka.
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Re: Chariot Example in Chandrakirti

Post by SilenceMonkey »

PadmaVonSamba wrote: Sat Jul 24, 2021 2:28 pm
Subcontrary wrote: Sat Jul 24, 2021 4:19 amIs there some difference I haven't detected between saying "there is no such thing as rabbits" and "rabbits are unreal?"
The helpful word you want to use is occur.
Do events in dreams occur? Yes.
It can be determined that they occur because they are objects of awareness (we experience them, we remember them). If they didn’t occur, there could be no awareness of them (you can’t be aware of something that never happened!)
"Nothing Happens."
-- HH Karmapa XVI
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Re: Chariot Example in Chandrakirti

Post by Subcontrary »

Schrödinger’s Yidam wrote: Sat Jul 24, 2021 4:02 am I like the Greek version of the chariot thought experiment...

...It’s a Greek thought experiment (I think), but it illustrates the Buddha’s point about emptiness pretty well.
That is very useful! I've only ever heard the Ship of Theseus example, which doesn't go further, as yours does, in making a second ship out of the first ship's discarded pieces (tangentially the Wikipedia article for the Ship of Theseus refers to a story about identity in a Buddhist text called Da zhidu lun. Here is the paper it cites: https://www.academia.edu/45371004/Is_Th ... BJHP_2021_).
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Re: Chariot Example in Chandrakirti

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PadmaVonSamba wrote: Sat Jul 24, 2021 2:28 pm
Subcontrary wrote: Sat Jul 24, 2021 4:19 amIs there some difference I haven't detected between saying "there is no such thing as rabbits" and "rabbits are unreal?"
The helpful word you want to use is occur.
Do events in dreams occur? Yes.
It can be determined that they occur because they are objects of awareness (we experience them, we remember them). If they didn’t occur, there could be no awareness of them (you can’t be aware of something that never happened!)
Are the events in dreams “real” ?
They are not real in the sense that they do not occur in any other way except as products of the imagination.
So, if I dream a tiger is chasing me, I might have some actual physiological responses to that. My heartbeat might increase, I may sweat or toss and turn on my sleep. But the tiger isn’t “real” in the same sense as a tiger that actually lives in the jungle.
But the tiger in the jungle, while very real in the sense that it actually might chase me and eat me, in other words, real within the context of other things, it has no intrinsic reality, but only “occurs” as a temporary phenomenon. It doesn’t “exist” in any absolute sense.
Thank you for bringing up this distinction, between exist and occur: I have vague memories of reading (modern) Buddhists suggest that things we think of as objects are far better described as events (a river is a fine example, but I remember the author suggesting Stonehenge, too, is an event!) In the Catuhsataka and the Madhyamakavatara I also sort of noticed the distinction being made (very subtly) between existence and occurrence.

I feel like my view of existence has always been pretty inclusive, and I count occurrences as things that exist. I'm getting a sense that the Madyamikas negate a view of existence that I don't think I've ever had, a view that does not include occurrences. If I'm not oversimplifying things, and I'm understand everyone correctly, it seems what's being negated is existence in the "substance theory" manner of Aristotle. It seems absurd to say that occurrences all contain some "occurrence-ness," but the notion that occurrences don't exist in the most inclusive sense is negated by every moment of experience, isn't it? What does an experience do but occur?

Speaking of which, I am also not sure what to make of this quote from HH Karmapa XVI, which seems to indicate that occurrences don't happen after all!
SilenceMonkey wrote: Sun Jul 25, 2021 4:30 am "Nothing Happens."
-- HH Karmapa XVI
It seems the counterargument to this statement is that, if nothing happens, and it is merely a mistake to think otherwise, then at the very least a mistake happens.

I know I've driven this thread far from the original chariot topic, but I thought this would be more conscientious than to make a whole bunch of new threads each based on my latest half-baked thoughts.
Last edited by Subcontrary on Tue Jul 27, 2021 12:11 am, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Chariot Example in Chandrakirti

Post by Schrödinger’s Yidam »

Subcontrary wrote: Mon Jul 26, 2021 11:51 pm
Schrödinger’s Yidam wrote: Sat Jul 24, 2021 4:02 am I like the Greek version of the chariot thought experiment...

...It’s a Greek thought experiment (I think), but it illustrates the Buddha’s point about emptiness pretty well.
That is very useful! I've only ever heard the Ship of Theseus example, which doesn't go further, as yours does, in making a second ship out of the first ship's discarded pieces (tangentially the Wikipedia article for the Ship of Theseus refers to a story about identity in a Buddhist text called Da zhidu lun. Here is the paper it cites: https://www.academia.edu/45371004/Is_Th ... BJHP_2021_).
I actually do have a snarky answer to my own question “which chariot is the original chariot”. It’s whichever one is registered with the DMV (Department of Motor Vehicles). But that kinda spoils the meaning of it.
1.The problem isn’t ‘ignorance’. The problem is the mind you have right now. (H.H. Karmapa XVII @NYC 2/4/18)
2. I support Mingyur R and HHDL in their positions against lama abuse.
3. Student: Lama, I thought I might die but then I realized that the 3 Jewels would protect me.
Lama: Even If you had died the 3 Jewels would still have protected you. (DW post by Fortyeightvows)
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Re: Chariot Example in Chandrakirti

Post by npr »

Malcolm wrote: Wed Jul 21, 2021 10:50 pm
Subcontrary wrote: Wed Jul 21, 2021 10:35 pm
If I were to tell Chandrakirti that I concede that a chariot depends on its parts, what might his line of reasoning be from that place, to the conclusion that the chariot doesn't ultimately exist at all?

Thank you for any light you can shine on this topic!
The chariot can not be found in any of its parts, one of its parts or separate from its parts, therefore, there is no "chariot" at all, apart from an imputation, "chariot," upon an assembly of parts. The part you are missing is functionality. In order for a thing to be accepted as conventionally existent, prior to analysis, it must perform its imputed function successfully. Upon analysis, even if a given thing properly performs its function, it cannot be found in the collection of its parts, even though it still continues to function.
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And then comes the explanation of gold and ornaments which shows the option Chandrakirti did not refer to
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