Coëmgenu wrote: ↑Sat Aug 25, 2018 9:20 pm
boundless wrote: ↑Sat Aug 25, 2018 3:32 pmBTW, the third option ("A and B") always semmed to me as an impossible position to be held, since it appears to be a contradiction.
Imagine two intersecting constituents that substantially overlap but also have parts that are separate.
Imagine a red line segment and a blue line segment. The two are side by each like so:
rrrrrrrrrr bbbbbbbbbb
The red segment is represented by 10 R's, the blue by 10 B's.
I am going to smash them together so they overlap partially:
rrrrrpppppbbbbb
The overlapping section is both blue and red. I've shown it as P for purple, but I want to stress that the point of this was to illustrate a combination of constituents that simultaneously house a dual and a non-dual presentation, rather than showing two things coming together to create something new. The non-dual presentation is represented by the purple. The dual presentation is the red and blue. In entirety, the two constituents as a whole are both same and different.
Apply this to modalities of being instead of coloured line segments.
Coëmgenu wrote: ↑Sat Aug 25, 2018 9:29 pm
All that nonsense above the is leftovers from me trying to figure out what tenfold interpenetration is actually supposed to "be".
Two or more interpenetrating dhaatava.h are characteristic by being both identical and different. The above was the only way I could figure it working, before I gave up on 10fold interpenetration since it's really something you are supposed to realize in yogic equipoise, not with pen and paper.
Good points!
But that is possible only if "blue" and "red" are not
mutually exclusive. Now, in the tetralemma we have: "exists" (Pali: hoti, Sanskrit: bhavati), "does not exist", "exists and does not exist", "neither exists nor does not exist". If "exists" and "does not exist" are
not mutually exclusive, then the position is possible. Yet, I cannot see how the two propositions can be both true in this case. However, there is still the possibility that, as you say:
The above was the only way I could figure it working, before I gave up on 10fold interpenetration since it's really something you are supposed to realize in yogic equipoise, not with pen and paper.
but in this case, we need to admit that logic here does not apply. This can have, IMO, unfortunate consequences because I find Buddhist analysis very logical. Why? Because I think that one rejects the notion of a "self" (atman) by understanding the implications of such a notion and by veryfing that the implications are falsified in experience. But, of course, the Dharma is said to be "beyond the scope of reasoning" (e.g.
MN 72). Anyway, I think that in the case of the tetralemma, it is the realization of "anatman" that leads to the rejection of it (i.e. by realizing that the empirical predictions of the assumption of an existing atman are not met in experience).
Anyway, I do not know if "exists and does not exist" can also mean "it is only partially annihilated" or "it is annihilated only in some respects".
On the other hand, the Buddha IMHO rejected
all four propositions because they were
nonsensical, rather than wrong. Why? Because all of them assumed that there was a "truly existing entity" that could persist, could be annihilated and so on. So they are unanswerable questions, because the question themselves are wrongly put. The skeptics, on the other hand, suspended the judgment. So, while the skeptics could not take a position because they tried to suspend the judgement (i.e. the Skeptics advocated an agnostic position on this issue), the Buddha rejected all four propositions, because they were all based on a wrong assumption. So, there is a BIG difference between Buddhism and Skepticism with regards to the tetralemma.
Sherab wrote: ↑Sun Aug 26, 2018 12:14 am
boundless wrote: ↑Sat Aug 25, 2018 3:32 pm
Sherab wrote: ↑Wed Aug 22, 2018 11:34 pm
I don't recall the Buddha actually using the Catuṣkoṭi form of analysis himself. I can only recall the Buddha using it only in relation to its use by his opponents.
Would appreciate if someone could provide examples in the Suttas or Sutras where the Buddha himself resorted to Catuṣkoṭi analysis in his teaching?
Greetings Sherab, all,
I do not know if it is relevant for this discussion but apparently, there is IMHO something similar to a partial "Catuṣkoṭi" in the 31 planes of existence.
From the article
The Thirty-one Plnaes of Existence in accesstoinsight we have: both the "impercipient beings" (Pali: asaññasatta, Sanskrit: Asaṃjñasattva) and the "sphere of neither perception nor non-perception" (Pali: nevasaññanasaññayatanupaga, Sanskrit: Naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana). Apparently, the first ones are imperciptient beings and the others are "neither percipient nor impercipient". So, with regards to perception we might have "perception" (A), "non-perception" (B) and "neither perception nor nonperception" (neither A nor B).
Maybe this indicates that being "percipient" and "impercipient" are two possibilities and "neither percipient nor impercipient" is something else.
BTW, the third option ("A and B") always semmed to me as an impossible position to be held, since it appears to be a contradiction.
Good example.
But it does not mean that the Buddha uses the Catuṣkoṭi for analysis. You may wish to read my latest reply to Coëmgenu regarding my take on the method of negation.
It is possible where neither perception nor non-perception could be of the form A and B where not A is really B, with A and B being mutually exclusive so that there is middle NOT A and NOT B. I don't know.
Perhaps, someone who is able to reach that state of neither perception nor non-perception could define precisely what perception is and what non-perception is.
I agree. IMHO, this is the case were the B is not "not A". I think that in this case, the "logical space" (the ensemble of possibilities) has three elements. In this case, we have A,B,C. So, "not A" can be either "B" or "C". So, in our case we maybe have "A=perception", "B=non-perception" and "C=neither perception nor non-perception". On the other hand, even in this case (assuming that we indeed are in a situation where "B" and "not A" are not the same), it seems that A, B and C are all mutually exclusive. Hence, we cannot have the state "D=perception and non-perception".
Anyway, I agree with you that we need to clarify what we are negating. Personally, maybe "truly existing" means "enduring", i.e. an entity persisting for some time. If this is the case, then, negating all four propositions of the dilemma means that we deny that there is something that endures even for a very small duration (if we do not do that, then we fall in an annihilationist position because we assume the existence of something that gets destroyed after some time).
Anyway, to be honest I still have to understand
what is negated in the tetralemma. For example, if we consider the
Anatta-lakkhana Sutta:
Thus I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was living at Benares, in the Deer Park at Isipatana (the Resort of Seers). There he addressed the bhikkhus of the group of five: "Bhikkhus." — "Venerable sir," they replied. The Blessed One said this.
"Bhikkhus, form is not-self. Were form self, then this form would not lead to affliction, and one could have it of form: 'Let my form be thus, let my form be not thus.' And since form is not-self, so it leads to affliction, and none can have it of form: 'Let my form be thus, let my form be not thus.'
"Bhikkhus, feeling is not-self...
"Bhikkhus, perception is not-self...
"Bhikkhus, determinations are not-self...
"Bhikkhus, consciousness is not self. Were consciousness self, then this consciousness would not lead to affliction, and one could have it of consciousness: 'Let my consciousness be thus, let my consciousness be not thus.' And since consciousness is not-self, so it leads to affliction, and none can have it of consciousness: 'Let my consciousness be thus, let my consciousness be not thus.'
"Bhikkhus, how do you conceive it: is form permanent or impermanent?" — "Impermanent, venerable Sir." — "Now is what is impermanent painful or pleasant?" — "Painful, venerable Sir." — "Now is what is impermanent, what is painful since subject to change, fit to be regarded thus: 'This is mine, this is I, this is my self'"? — "No, venerable sir."
"Is feeling permanent or impermanent?...
"Is perception permanent or impermanent?...
"Are determinations permanent or impermanent?...
"Is consciousness permanent or impermanent?" — "Impermanent, venerable sir." — "Now is what is impermanent pleasant or painful?" — "Painful, venerable sir." — "Now is what is impermanent, what is painful since subject to change, fit to be regarded thus: 'This is mine, this is I, this is my self'"? — "No, venerable sir."
"So, bhikkhus any kind of form whatever, whether past, future or presently arisen, whether gross or subtle, whether in oneself or external, whether inferior or superior, whether far or near, must with right understanding how it is, be regarded thus: 'This is not mine, this is not I, this is not myself.'
"Any kind of feeling whatever...
"Any kind of perception whatever...
"Any kind of determination whatever...
"Any kind of consciousness whatever, whether past, future or presently arisen, whether gross or subtle, whether in oneself or external, whether inferior or superior, whether far or near must, with right understanding how it is, be regarded thus: 'This is not mine, this is not I, this is not my self.'
(Ven. Ñanamoli Thera translation)
we have that what is negated is that we can have
control over the five aggregates. Since there is no control, there is not also a "truly existing" controller. It is something that we can test in our experience, by seeing if we can control it. So, in this case, if by "self" is meant the (supposed) "controller of the experience" we can verify its absence by contemplating the impossibility to have control on experience. Hence, if there is no controller, the four propositions of the tetralemma are all based on a false assumption of a controller. Hence, they are in fact
nonsensical because a concept cannot be said to "exist", "not exist" etc after death. Apparently, according to the Theravada school the rejection of an atman is more than realizing that there is no controller as is explained in
this answer by Venerable Yuttadhammo (as it happens, I still do not understand how to test empirically the other characteristics). Also, impermanence (Sanskrit: anitya, Pali: anicca), which implies also the absence of control, is the reason that all conditioned existence is "anatman/anatta" and it cannot be used to explain the fact that the third mark also applies on
Nirvana (see
another answer of Venerable Yuttadhammo). Anyway, I think that in the Theravada Nirvana (despite not being impermanent) is not considered a self because it has not the characteristics of a supposed self, as explained in the first answer I linked.
So, I think that one needs to understand the assumption of what the assumption of an existing "self" (Pali: atta, Sanskrit: anatman) means and what the assumption
implies. Hence, I think that the rejection of the tetralemma is based on an empirical
realization that the assumption on which the propositions are based (i.e. the existence of an "atman") is wrong.
On the other hand, I also think that the concept of "emptiness" (
shunyata) in Mahayana goes beyond than the above, anatman. In Madhyamaka, unconditioned dharmas are not real and hence, they are of course empty of "inherent existence". I do not know if the realization of impermanence
by itself leads to the realization of the absence of "inherent existence", however. Anyway, it seems that "anatman/anatta" and "shunyata" are subtly different, check for example
this post.
(I hope to have remained on-topic).