Question about dependent origination

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Sherab
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Re: Question about dependent origination

Post by Sherab »

krodha wrote: Mon Nov 29, 2021 1:26 am
Sherab wrote: Sun Nov 28, 2021 1:37 amWhat I was asking is whether the thing being referred to in "fundamentally there is no thing", only refers to the mental image in the mind and not to the physical thing from which the perceiving mind generates its image, or the physical thing or both. We all know that the mental image of a thing is NOT a true representation of the physical thing. The mental image is only a functional represention of the physical thing. Since it is only a functional representation, that thing being represented does not truly exist. But the physical thing out there could still truly exist. Therefore how the thing in "fundamentally there is no thing" is interpreted needs clarification.
This phenomena-noumena dichotomy is not found in Buddhist teachings. Positing a noumena beyond your senses is positing a svabhāva.
What you say is all in your mind, not mine. Show me where I stated that there must be a noumena.
Malcolm
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Re: Question about dependent origination

Post by Malcolm »

Sherab wrote: Mon Nov 29, 2021 9:34 pm
krodha wrote: Mon Nov 29, 2021 1:26 am
Sherab wrote: Sun Nov 28, 2021 1:37 amWhat I was asking is whether the thing being referred to in "fundamentally there is no thing", only refers to the mental image in the mind and not to the physical thing from which the perceiving mind generates its image, or the physical thing or both. We all know that the mental image of a thing is NOT a true representation of the physical thing. The mental image is only a functional represention of the physical thing. Since it is only a functional representation, that thing being represented does not truly exist. But the physical thing out there could still truly exist. Therefore how the thing in "fundamentally there is no thing" is interpreted needs clarification.
This phenomena-noumena dichotomy is not found in Buddhist teachings. Positing a noumena beyond your senses is positing a svabhāva.
What you say is all in your mind, not mine.
Conventionally, there are things out there. It's not a problem unless one wants to propose that things exist from their own side. That includes everything, both subject and objects, insides and outsides.
White Lotus
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Re: Question about dependent origination

Post by White Lotus »

Grasping at mind is grasping at self. Do not grasp. This is grasping.

The point depends upon absolute zero, everything depends upon a collection of other dependents. Not even nothing is independent. Nothing does not exist, if it does it is dependent and therefore not alone and thus not nothing.
in any matters of importance. dont rely on me. i may not know what i am talking about. take what i say as mere speculation. i am not ordained. nor do i have a formal training. i do believe though that if i am wrong on any point. there are those on this site who i hope will quickly point out my mistakes.
White Lotus
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Re: Question about dependent origination

Post by White Lotus »

What is the point? The point is not the point. There is no point, that’s the point. Pointless. Vanity.
in any matters of importance. dont rely on me. i may not know what i am talking about. take what i say as mere speculation. i am not ordained. nor do i have a formal training. i do believe though that if i am wrong on any point. there are those on this site who i hope will quickly point out my mistakes.
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Matt J
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Re: Question about dependent origination

Post by Matt J »

How about the snang ba - snang yul dichotomy?
krodha wrote: Mon Nov 29, 2021 1:26 am
Sherab wrote: Sun Nov 28, 2021 1:37 amWhat I was asking is whether the thing being referred to in "fundamentally there is no thing", only refers to the mental image in the mind and not to the physical thing from which the perceiving mind generates its image, or the physical thing or both. We all know that the mental image of a thing is NOT a true representation of the physical thing. The mental image is only a functional represention of the physical thing. Since it is only a functional representation, that thing being represented does not truly exist. But the physical thing out there could still truly exist. Therefore how the thing in "fundamentally there is no thing" is interpreted needs clarification.
This phenomena-noumena dichotomy is not found in Buddhist teachings. Positing a noumena beyond your senses is positing a svabhāva.
"The world is made of stories, not atoms."
--- Muriel Rukeyser
White Lotus
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Re: Question about dependent origination

Post by White Lotus »

Happiness is possible.
in any matters of importance. dont rely on me. i may not know what i am talking about. take what i say as mere speculation. i am not ordained. nor do i have a formal training. i do believe though that if i am wrong on any point. there are those on this site who i hope will quickly point out my mistakes.
Malcolm
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Re: Question about dependent origination

Post by Malcolm »

Matt J wrote: Mon Nov 29, 2021 10:08 pm How about the snang ba - snang yul dichotomy?
Neither exists from its own side.
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Matt J
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Re: Question about dependent origination

Post by Matt J »

Well, if they don't exist from their own side, and are only mere appearances, and mere appearances only appear in minds... :D
Malcolm wrote: Mon Nov 29, 2021 10:35 pm
Matt J wrote: Mon Nov 29, 2021 10:08 pm How about the snang ba - snang yul dichotomy?
Neither exists from its own side.
"The world is made of stories, not atoms."
--- Muriel Rukeyser
Malcolm
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Re: Question about dependent origination

Post by Malcolm »

You are changing the terms.

An appearance indeed belongs to a mind; but an apparent object does not (as Longchenpa shows in both chapter 8 and chapter 12 of his commentary on the Treasury of the Dharmdhātu). For this reasons there are appearances for sentient beings, but not for rocks and trees. Saying that neither appearances nor apparent objects exist from their own side does not entail that that both exist from the mind's side. The mind itself does not exist from its own side.
Matt J wrote: Tue Nov 30, 2021 6:51 pm Well, if they don't exist from their own side, and are only mere appearances, and mere appearances only appear in minds... :D
Malcolm wrote: Mon Nov 29, 2021 10:35 pm
Matt J wrote: Mon Nov 29, 2021 10:08 pm How about the snang ba - snang yul dichotomy?
Neither exists from its own side.
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Matt J
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Re: Question about dependent origination

Post by Matt J »

This is Mipham's phrasing in his Beacon at 6.2.1.3.2.1 states that "the common perceptual object is a mere appearance (snang tsam)." This is not to say that things exist from the mind's side, or that the mind exists. However, it is unclear how a non-existent object can appear absent a mind. Even Longchenpa cites scriptures about how everything is an illusion. How can there be illusions absent minds?

The rock itself doesn't have a mind, so talking about things appearing to rocks doesn't make sense. In addition, the rock itself is merely an appearance to certain classes of sentient beings--- it doesn't appear as a rock to other sentient beings. Mipham criticizes the notion that there is some nature to objects apart from their various appearances, positing a common substance with multiple appearances, or some sort of slightly existing object.
Malcolm wrote: Tue Nov 30, 2021 6:59 pm You are changing the terms.

An appearance indeed belongs to a mind; but an apparent object does not (as Longchenpa shows in both chapter 8 and chapter 12 of his commentary on the Treasury of the Dharmdhātu). For this reasons there are appearances for sentient beings, but not for rocks and trees. Saying that neither appearances nor apparent objects exist from their own side does not entail that that both exist from the mind's side. The mind itself does not exist from its own side.
Matt J wrote: Tue Nov 30, 2021 6:51 pm Well, if they don't exist from their own side, and are only mere appearances, and mere appearances only appear in minds... :D
Malcolm wrote: Mon Nov 29, 2021 10:35 pm

Neither exists from its own side.
"The world is made of stories, not atoms."
--- Muriel Rukeyser
Malcolm
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Re: Question about dependent origination

Post by Malcolm »

Matt J wrote: Tue Nov 30, 2021 9:31 pm This is Mipham's phrasing in his Beacon at 6.2.1.3.2.1 states that "the common perceptual object is a mere appearance (snang tsam)." This is not to say that things exist from the mind's side, or that the mind exists. However, it is unclear how a non-existent object can appear absent a mind.
The common perceptual object is liquid. How it appears to beings in the six realms is a mere appearance for the mind of a sentient being in one of the six realms. However, the point here is that there is a common perceptual object.
Even Longchenpa cites scriptures about how everything is an illusion. How can there be illusions absent minds?
Illusions are perceptual objects. How can there be an illusion without the sticks, mud, paper, mantra of the illusionist?
criticizes the notion that there is some nature to objects apart from their various appearances, positing a common substance with multiple appearances, or some sort of slightly existing object.
Mipham is criticizing here Tsongkhapa's assertion that the common perceptual object is composed of six parts, making it possible for it to appear as six different entities to six different kinds of sentient beings.

All we need to know is that, conventionally speaking, there are common perceptual objects. Even Mipham cannot avoid using the term "object" as the basis for a mental appearance. Why? Because it is incoherent to posit the arising of a sense consciousness in absence of a sense organ and a sense object. Hence nothing in the triad exists from its own side.
However, it is unclear how a non-existent object can appear absent a mind.
A nonexistent object cannot appear at all, for example, the child of a barren women or the horns of a hare. An existent object can certainly appear, such as liquid to the sentient beings of the six realms, without having to posit that existence as anything more than a convention. Certainly, one cannot establish such an object ultimately, but on the other hand, one cannot speak of the emptiness of a nonexistent, such as the child of a barren women either. Thus appearances are neither true, nor are they false, just like the moon in the water. Without the moon reflected in the water, an appearance of the moon in the water cannot exist, and thus a mind in which the moon in the water appears cannot exist. The mind in which the moon appears to be reflected in the water cannot exist before the moon is reflected in the water, nor after. The mind in which the moon appears to be reflected in the water can exist only while it is apprehending the moon reflected in the water. When the moon is no longer reflected in the water, the mind in which the moon reflected in the water appears ceases.

Nothing exists from its own side. Objects are not primary, nor are minds. They are mutually dependent, therefore, neither are established in truth, and all is conventional. This is the meaning of arising from conditions.
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Sherab
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Re: Question about dependent origination

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Malcolm wrote: Mon Nov 29, 2021 9:38 pm
Sherab wrote: Mon Nov 29, 2021 9:34 pm
krodha wrote: Mon Nov 29, 2021 1:26 am
This phenomena-noumena dichotomy is not found in Buddhist teachings. Positing a noumena beyond your senses is positing a svabhāva.
What you say is all in your mind, not mine.
Conventionally, there are things out there. It's not a problem unless one wants to propose that things exist from their own side. That includes everything, both subject and objects, insides and outsides.
As I have argued previously, it is all mental representations based on your argument. Because of that kind of argument, whether things that are out there actually exist from their own side is not a knowledge accessible to such a mind which itself is also a convention.
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Sherab
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Re: Question about dependent origination

Post by Sherab »

Malcolm wrote: Tue Nov 30, 2021 6:59 pm An appearance indeed belongs to a mind; but an apparent object does not (as Longchenpa shows in both chapter 8 and chapter 12 of his commentary on the Treasury of the Dharmdhātu). For this reasons there are appearances for sentient beings, but not for rocks and trees. Saying that neither appearances nor apparent objects exist from their own side does not entail that that both exist from the mind's side. The mind itself does not exist from its own side.
As I have argued previously, since you argued that all things are mental representations, including the mind itself, there is no way that such a mind can know whether rocks and trees exist from their own side or not.
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Re: Question about dependent origination

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The amazing thing about Buddha nature…is that it’s not anything we possibly imagine it to be. One would need to know this through examination or contemplation. Is it inside or outside of the body or inside the brain or outside in space? Does it have anything in itself? Other than it’s clear (not deluded)? It has appearance of mental activities, self, clarity, etc which reflect the physical worlds. But that appearance too is not different from it has no location, not anything in itself, not space or air, and no characteristics as well. Does it have any characteristics at all? Of physical things? It doesn’t then it is not dependent on physical things.
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Re: Question about dependent origination

Post by Malcolm »

Sherab wrote: Tue Nov 30, 2021 10:58 pm
Malcolm wrote: Mon Nov 29, 2021 9:38 pm
Sherab wrote: Mon Nov 29, 2021 9:34 pm
What you say is all in your mind, not mine.
Conventionally, there are things out there. It's not a problem unless one wants to propose that things exist from their own side. That includes everything, both subject and objects, insides and outsides.
As I have argued previously, it is all mental representations based on your argument. Because of that kind of argument, whether things that are out there actually exist from their own side is not a knowledge accessible to such a mind which itself is also a convention.
Things can’t exist from their own side because if they did, that would require them to exist inherently. Further, no one at any time has ever beheld an inherently existing thing.
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Re: Question about dependent origination

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Malcolm wrote: Tue Nov 30, 2021 11:50 pm
whether things that are out there actually exist from their own side is not a knowledge accessible to such a mind which itself is also a convention.
Things can’t exist from their own side because if they did, that would require them to exist inherently. Further, no one at any time has ever beheld an inherently existing thing.
Also, it’s the concept of mind, (meaning whatever it people imagine mind to be), which is a convention, rather than mind itself.

In arguing that mind is a convention and thus any subsequent convention (including but not limited to theories about the nature of phenomena) is therefore not valid, one also invalidates that very argument for the same reason: that argument too is a convention.
EMPTIFUL.
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Re: Question about dependent origination

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PadmaVonSamba wrote: Wed Dec 01, 2021 1:01 am
Malcolm wrote: Tue Nov 30, 2021 11:50 pm
whether things that are out there actually exist from their own side is not a knowledge accessible to such a mind which itself is also a convention.
Things can’t exist from their own side because if they did, that would require them to exist inherently. Further, no one at any time has ever beheld an inherently existing thing.
Also, it’s the concept of mind, (meaning whatever it people imagine mind to be), which is a convention, rather than mind itself.

In arguing that mind is a convention and thus any subsequent convention (including but not limited to theories about the nature of phenomena) is therefore not valid, one also invalidates that very argument for the same reason: that argument too is a convention.
You're onto something bc "itself" is a convention. Innate mind, nature of mind, do not have a referent, which is the point of pith instructions' exercises of looking around for one and then dropping looking altogether.
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Re: Question about dependent origination

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Malcolm wrote: Tue Nov 30, 2021 9:54 pm The common perceptual object is liquid. How it appears to beings in the six realms is a mere appearance for the mind of a sentient being in one of the six realms. However, the point here is that there is a common perceptual object.
This is exactly the position that Mipham negates. He also negates the idea that there are degrees of emptiness or existence, or that there is a separation between emptiness and appearances.
Illusions are perceptual objects. How can there be an illusion without the sticks, mud, paper, mantra of the illusionist?
Interestingly, in his explanations in the autocommentary to the Sems nyid ngal gso (212: 3-223:4), he says phenomenon are "hallucinatory appearances produced by the mind's habitual tendencies." (Trans Padmakara Trans Group) and then references phlegmatic seeing hairs in the sky. No mud necessary.

What is not clear to me is really what Longchenpa's position is. In the above commentary, discussing the snang ba - snang yul distinction, he says that "all of the perceptions, or perceived appearances evaluated by one's intellect, are mind. Likewise, the perceptions of all the other beings, and the retention of such perceptions, are mind." So far, no problem--- snang ba.

But then he says "[n]evertheless, the objects that trigger the conceptualization of mental consciousness, and all the objects of the five senses, appear while being nonexistent, on account of the mind's beginningless habitual tendencies. They are like the hairs floating in the air as seen by some one suffering from a visual disorder."
"The world is made of stories, not atoms."
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Re: Question about dependent origination

Post by Malcolm »

Matt J wrote: Wed Dec 01, 2021 9:41 pm
Malcolm wrote: Tue Nov 30, 2021 9:54 pm The common perceptual object is liquid. How it appears to beings in the six realms is a mere appearance for the mind of a sentient being in one of the six realms. However, the point here is that there is a common perceptual object.
This is exactly the position that Mipham negates. He also negates the idea that there are degrees of emptiness or existence, or that there is a separation between emptiness and appearances.
He is just negating what Gorampa has already negated: in other words, the appearance of liquid in the human realm is invalid in the preta realm. Calling liquid a common perceptual object is merely a convention to conform to the fact that different beings perceive liquids. It does mean that one is asserting some really existing common perceptual object.

And of course, there are no degrees of existence or emptiness, nor is there a separation between appearance and emptiness. No one suggested there was.
Illusions are perceptual objects. How can there be an illusion without the sticks, mud, paper, mantra of the illusionist?
Interestingly, in his explanations in the autocommentary to the Sems nyid ngal gso (212: 3-223:4), he says phenomenon are "hallucinatory appearances produced by the mind's habitual tendencies." (Trans Padmakara Trans Group) and then references phlegmatic seeing hairs in the sky. No mud necessary.
This is only one of the eight examples. One can only understand them by using all eight.

As I have pointed out to you before, specifically, Longchenpa rejects that idea that, conventionally-speaking, there are no outer objects. This is well known. He summarizes a long complex argument about illusionists, mountains, and dead people and so on, with this statement, "That appearance for that deceased is no more, but because the cessation of the outer play cannot be accepted, and there is a difference between appearances and apparent objects, there is no fault and it is valid." He then cites Samadhirāja sūtra to the effect that everything is just a designation.

So, positing a common perceptual object is just a designation; likewise the liquid, likewise the water. Likewise the moon in the water. These things are neither true nor false, as Jetsun Drakpa Gyaltsen points out:
The moon in the water is not the moon in the sky,
but without the latter the former will not appear.
Similarly, the nature of all things
is taught in the two truth.
There are no dharmas
not included in the two truths.
Because the nature is not true and not false,
grasping to the two truths is deluded.
It is a fools errand to try and prove that there are no outer objects. The very endeavor itself proves that there are, just as in absence of water there is no reflection of the moon, and in absence of the moon, there is no reflection either. As Chandra points out:

Empty things, reflections and the like,
dependent on conditions, are not imperceptible.
And just as empty forms reflected in a glass
create a consciousness in aspect similar,
so all things, though empty,
strongly manifest within their very emptiness,
and since inherent nature is in neither truth,
phenomena are neither nothing nor unchanging entities.


Intro to Middle Way, pg. 73, Padmakara.
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Re: Question about dependent origination

Post by PadmaVonSamba »

Malcolm wrote: Wed Dec 01, 2021 10:58 pm
It is a fools errand to try and prove that there are no outer objects. The very endeavor itself proves that there are, just as in absence of water there is no reflection of the moon, and in absence of the moon, there is no reflection either.
Fer sure.
Even the Buddha refers to external objects over and over within the context of his teachings, particularly by way of presenting hypothetical examples and analogies. This doesn’t mean he regards external objects as having intrinsic arising,
…or lacking dependent origination, the topic of this thread
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