Nagarjuna's tetralemma in contrast to Nichiren's interpretation of Tendai 3 Truths

[Caoimhghín]

Space, the two cessations, suchness/emptiness and all their synonyms are the uncompounded entities mentioned in Mahāyāna.

So I read the sutra excerpts that you posted, and I am a bit confused as to why you brought up the emptiness of unconditioned things versus the emptiness of conditioned things in response to Queequeg. One says "If one is diligent in the emptiness of compounded and uncompounded phenomena, one is called 'diligent.'" Both the conditioned and unconditioned are empty. Another says, "That being the case, child of a good family, the Buddha is the the dharma, the dharma is the sangha. The sangha is uncompounded. The uncompounded is emptiness. The emptiness of the uncompounded, the emptiness of the compounded, the internal emptiness, and external emptiness, the emptiness of the large, and the emptiness of the small are alike as emptiness, and not otherwise." They are alike as emptiness, so how are they otherwise as "emptiness of the conditioned" and "emptiness of the unconditioned?"

As far as I'm concerned, there are no unconditioned "things." "Things," and by that I actually mean "dharmas," are not unconditioned. I personally don't believe in Theravāda's autonomous nirvāṇa-dharma anymore than Sarvāstivāda's two similar nirvāṇa-dharmas. I am somewhat committed to the stance of nirvāṇa not being truly a dharma at all, in that dharmas themselves are not dharmas, much less nirvāṇa. When the unconditioned is a dharma, when it is experienced, it gets caught up in perceiver, perceiving, and that which is perceived, and it gets "caught up" in the conditioned and is itself revealed to actually be conditioned. So in what sense do you bring up the emptiness of unconditioned things here (as opposed to conditioned things, I presume)?

I was once reading the Madhyamakālaṁkāra from Ven Śāntarakṣita, and imagine my surprise when I encountered the exact same objection as I raised to the Theravādin А̄bhidhammika conception of nibbāna:

3. Even according to the approach of those who speak of the unconditioned as an object of knowledge for a cognition which arises out of meditation, it is not a unitary (entity), because these (unconditioned entities) would be related to a cognition which has phases (of before and after).

(Madhyamakālaṁkāra on "Neither unity nor diversity," stanza 3, translation K. Lipman)

It sums things up nicely IMO. I was glad to find it, because at least someone agrees. So with it in mind that you didn't mean "unconditioned things" in the sense that Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda mean them, what did you mean? Empty things in general? When things are empty, why say "conditioned" or "unconditoned?" My not understanding is probably an issue of language.

[Malcolm]

So in what sense do you bring up the emptiness of unconditioned things here (as opposed to conditioned things, I presume)?

In the same sense that space and the two cessations are included in the dharmadhatu as objects of the manodhatu.

The term “dharma,” in all its ten meanings, has no direct translation into English, but there do exist, conventionally speaking, uncompounded dharmas such as space, the two cessations, etc.

[Caoimhghín]

I can see already how difficult this conversation would be to even have, so we probably shouldn't have it and won't. Maybe if we meet some day we'll have it, who knows. I too can concede that the dharmas in the matrices of the Abhidharmas "exist" in a way, but I don't give them any kind of actual ontological status whatsoever. I don't even give them "conventionally ontologically existing" status. They are just ways that X or Y tradition of Buddhism has chosen to schematize reality based on the experiences of the meditators therein. So I can agree with you enough to get what you meant then.

"Ontology" is a bad word, because it makes me sound like I'm accusing you of materialism or something, but that's really not what I mean. What I mean is that I don't really believe in "the dharmas," even though I agree that there is a way that they exist and that they are the most useful way to categorize experience.

I can only concede that

there do exist, conventionally speaking, uncompounded dharmas such as space, the two cessations, etc.

if their existence is strictly prajñaptisat, but that's just eccentric old me.

[Malcolm]

I can see already how difficult this conversation would be to even have, so we probably shouldn't have it and won't. Maybe if we meet some day we'll have it, who knows. I too can concede that the dharmas in the matrices of the Abhidharmas "exist" in a way, but I don't give then any kind of actual ontological status whatsoever.

They exist conventionally.

I don't even give them "conventionally ontologically existing" status.

That’s an error. There are no such thing as “conventionally ontologically-existing” entities. There are conventional entities, like uncompounded space, however.

They are just ways that X or Y tradition of Buddhism has chosen to schematize reality based on the experiences of the meditators therein.

How is space, absence of impediment, an experience of meditation? How is the cessation of the series of a burnt seed an experience of meditation? Granted, cessation due to analysis is a result of insight, but that refers to the cessation of births, so how are these three uncompounded dharmas not even conventional entities?

So I can agree with you enough to get what you meant then.

You need to study abhidharma.

[Caoimhghín]

I don't believe in Abhidharma, but I do agree that I need to study it more if I want to criticize it.

[Malcolm]

I don't believe in Abhidharma, but I do agree that I need to study it if I want to criticize it.

You mean you don’t believe you have five skandhas? Twelves ayatanas, eighteen dhatus, twenty-two indriyas? Etc?

I am not suggesting one has to accept Abhidharma uncritically, but one needs a solid grounding in it.

Not only that, but the things I mentioned are quite acceptable conventionally. Why? Because they are functional, arthakriya. For example, if one does not accept space, there can be no extension and all material entities must occupy the same location, etc.

[Caoimhghín]

How is space, absence of impediment, an experience of meditation? How is the cessation of the series of a burnt seed an experience of meditation? Granted, cessation due to analysis is a result of insight, but that refers to the cessation of births, so how are these three uncompounded dharmas not even conventional entities?

The space between your fingers is conditioned. The space that is seen in a cave is conditioned. The unconditioned spaces are the products of divine vision, as far as I am aware, like the "endless deepest darkness" between world systems described in the suttas. Similarly, the burnt seed is not burnt, because the Buddhas rouse the Arhats. When I talk about "dharmas," I mean "moments." I don't think the "moments" actually exist. They are just one way to divide experience. According to the MMK, they have no moment of arising, no moment of abiding, and no moment of cessation. They do not actually exist as discrete entities at all, ultimately speaking, because they have no "edges."

I was once very seriously interested in Theravada, so I don't feel that I'm especially ignorant of how Theravadin Abhidhammika Buddhism presents itself to potential lay adherents.

They way that I understand Theravadin notion of a "dhamma" is that it is like an immaterial peddle. The Madhyamaka perspective is that they are inventions of the analyst and have no basis in objectivity. The mind can simply be impermanent without the constant stream of systematized atomic "moments" that are discreet and conceptually separated from one another. The dharmas, instead of being like separate slides in a projector that run in front of the light and are projected onto the screen, can instead be like hallucinations. The dharmas can have no sharply-defined boundaries (i.e. the "edges" of a particular moment) and blur into one another yet still correspond to a diversity of experiences without "the moments." This ultimately is, AFAIK myself and from instruction, the Madhyamaka proposal, that the dharmas are like lumps of foam and not pebbles. A pebble here is like a moment because it is concrete, specific, and has demarcated edges. The pebble has an edge, a core that is distinct from its edge (i.e. the stone within is not of the same texture as the stone without), and sides that are roughly opposite each other.

pebble.jpg (54.12 KiB) Viewed 8732 times

The pebble has a right side and a left side. The differentiated core, the right side, and the left side, are like arising, abiding, and ceasing. The Abhidharmika believes arising, abiding, and ceasing to be particular moments, particular moments unlike one another, and particular things therefore. A lump of foam, being a conglomerate of air-bubbles are watery material, has no such core that is different from its surface when it is split open to look inside (i.e. smooth versus jagged, edge versus non-edge before it is split, or if it is a geode then crystal versus non-crystal). When splitting the lump of foam, there is no hard boundary to break. Inside is like outside. Analysing it, the Madhyamaka finds no discreet particular "moments" of arising, abiding, or ceasing for it, just like the one who examines foam instead of a pebble finds it comparatively insubstantial. I'm sure we're not in disagreement.

A lump of foam however is not a piece of particular rock and is a conglomerate of air bubbles. The edge of where one lump of foam ends and the next begins is poorly-defined compared to the boundary between one pebble and the next or one section of the pebble and the next section.

Of course, knowing how objects are through modern science, we can see that even seemingly-solid objects like pebbles actually have no properly-defined edges and boundaries. So much for human intuition. That the mind has moments is like suggesting that the beach has a bunch of tiny pebbles in the form of sand. To the everyday person, yes, the beach is full of sand, but on a deeper level, the sand is a series of excitements of wavelengths.

I don't believe in Abhidharma, but I do agree that I need to study it if I want to criticize it.

You mean you don’t believe you have five skandhas? Twelves ayatanas, eighteen dhatus, twenty-two indriyas? Etc?

Not that they exist how the Sri Lankan Venerables explained them to exist at the Scarborough Mahavihara. Like I said, this is a difficult matter to talk about. I don't think that the five aggregates are "things" that immaterially exist in the manner that material things conventionally exist. They are just ways to divide experience.

[Malcolm]

How is space, absence of impediment, an experience of meditation? How is the cessation of the series of a burnt seed an experience of meditation? Granted, cessation due to analysis is a result of insight, but that refers to the cessation of births, so how are these three uncompounded dharmas not even conventional entities?

The space between your fingers is conditioned. The space that is seen in a cave is conditioned. The unconditioned spaces are the products of divine vision, as far as I am aware, like the "endless deepest darkness" between world systems described in the suttas. Similarly, the burnt seed is not burnt, because the Buddhas rouse the Arhats. When I talk about "dharmas," I mean "moments." I don't think the "moments" actually exist. They are just one way to divide experience. According to the MMK, they have no moment of arising, no moment of abiding, and no moment of cessation. They do not actually exist as discrete entities at all, ultimately speaking, because they have no "edges."

Unconditioned space is just absence of obstruction. That’s all. If you don’t study and internalize these basic definitions, you’ll just engage in tons of proliferation as you have here. Further, you won’t understand the crucial metaphor of space that is endemic in all Mahayana texts all the way through Dzogpachenpo, Chan, and so on.

I was once very seriously interested in Theravada, so I don't feel that I'm especially ignorant of how Theravadin Abhidhammika Buddhism presents itself to potential lay adherents

Abhidhamma is irrelevant to Mahayana. Abhidharma, however, is pretty important. For example, if one wishes to understand the negation of cause and condition in the first chapter of MMK and have any hope of following the exchange.

[haha]

For catuskoti, there is correlation in 4 types of Samadhi of Tianti, then three truths.
That is: sitting, walking, walking and sitting, neither walking nor sitting.

The catuskoti is just a rhetorical device. It can be used and misused. But Nāgārjuna uses it as follows:

An existent does not arise from an existent;
an existent does not arise from a nonexistent;
a nonexistent does not arise from an existent;
a nonexistent does not arise from a nonexistent.
Where can there be arising?

The point is that every school would make their own assertion. Even in the interpretation of Tibetan Buddhism, Tsongkhapa has regarded sutra is not enough to realize emptiness (i.e. four types of emptiness); the tantric practice is needed. In dzogchen, madhyamaka type of emptiness is regarded as a kind of calm abiding or empty experience. Zhiyi proceeded further with his three truths/buddha nature as other tradition did. It is not even his innovation; the initial concept could be found in Chinese Mahayana sutra.

Hence the [Bodhisattva Necklace Fundamental Practices] Sutra states: “The previous two contemplations are provisional paths. It is because of the contemplation of these two emptinesses that one succeeds in entering the contemplation of the primary meaning of the Middle Way. One engages in simultaneous illumination of the two truths, perceives every single thought-moment as quiescent extinction…and one naturally flows on into the sea of sarvajnata.”

The Essentials of Buddhist Meditation, Sramana Zhiyi, Translation by Bhikshu Dharmamitra

When reading the Zhiyi, it is important to put Bodhisattva Practice Jeweled Necklace Sutra, Maha-Prajnaparamita-Sastra, etc. into the consideration; however, research in modern times has given more light on this subject; this type of scrutiny would not possible in those centuries but it just the historicity of the text. Such innovations are all over India, China, Tibet (i.e. it includes sutra as well as tantra).

He provided systematic method for realizing of emptiness (i.e. mentation in ten bhumi sutra, pranjnaparamita, etc.); it covered the two truths theory. Not just rhetoric.

Here is an example,

This means that, no matter what the mind dwells upon, if one understands that all dharmas are produced from causes and conditions and are devoid of an inherently-existent nature, then the mind will not seize upon them.

from The Essentials of Buddhist Meditation, Sramana Zhiyi,

Above logic does not apply on every statement (i.e. why would the uncompounded be established?). After that what he said was more important and this logic.
Even nagarjuna came to define the characteristic (laksana).

From MMK:
Like freedom (i.e. the characteristics of reality/dharmata), the nature of things is non-arisen and non-ceased. (anutpanna aniruddha hi nirvaṇam iva dharmata).

Independently realized, peaceful, unobsessed by obsessions, without discriminations and a variety of meanings: such is the characteristic of truth. (aparapratyayam santam prapancair aprapancitam | nirvikalpam ananartham etat tattvasya laksanam)

[Malcolm]

The point is that every school would make their own assertion. Even in the interpretation of Tibetan Buddhism, Tsongkhapa has regarded sutra is not enough to realize emptiness (i.e. four types of emptiness); the tantric practice is needed.

False. Tsongkhapa merely acceded to the notion that common Mahayana was a slow path,

In dzogchen, madhyamaka type of emptiness is regarded as a kind of calm abiding or empty experience.

False. Longchenpa admits that the view of dzogchen is analytically identical with prasanga.


This is going off topic.

My point is simple: Madhyamaka needs no improvement. It’s the highest of the four tenet systems, and attempts to improve upon it merely obscure its austere elegance.

[Caoimhghín]

If you don’t study and internalize these basic definitions, you’ll just engage in tons of proliferation as you have here.

I'm explaining to you how Theravadins believe in the dhammas and how I don't believe in that. I don't think the Theravadins and the Sarvastivadins are exceptionally different in how they believe in the naive reality of the dharmas. The Sarvastivadins believe in the persistence of the dharmas though extra times.

[Malcolm]

If you don’t study and internalize these basic definitions, you’ll just engage in tons of proliferation as you have here.

I'm explaining to you how Theravadins believe in the dhammas and how I don't believe in that. I don't think the Theravadins and the Sarvastivadins are exceptionally different in how they believe in the naive reality of the dharmas. The Sarvastivadins believe in the persistence of the dharmas though extra times.

Yes. That’s not the Abhidharma that is relevant here. Sorry. You need to study Vasubandhu,

[Caoimhghín]

I get why you were asking your earlier question. I do think that the conventional exists conventionality. What I don't believe is that the dharmas are discreet atomic entities. They don't have particular moments of arising, abiding, and ceasing, that are discrete and autonomous, and I'm sure that we actually agree on this. This is not something I eccentrically believe myself, but is as I understand the teaching of the Madhyamakaśāstra and its underlying MMK. When the interlocutor must defend the moment of arising, he resorts of a web of Abhidharma complexity, the arising of arising. This itself is just an ancient practice of moving the goalpost. Now there must be arising of arising of arising, etc.

Perhaps my bringing up of Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma muddled things, I will admit that my largest exposure to the Kośa is via Venerable Dhammajoti's scholarship.

[Caoimhghín]

What I don't believe is that the dharmas are discreet atomic entities. They don't have particular moments of arising, abiding, and ceasing, that are discrete and autonomous, and I'm sure that we actually agree on this. This is not something I eccentrically believe myself, but is as I understand the teaching of the Madhyamakaśāstra and its underlying MMK. When the interlocutor must defend the moment of arising, he resorts of a web of Abhidharma complexity, the arising of arising. This itself is just an ancient practice of moving the goalpost. Now there must be arising of arising of arising, etc.

At the conclusion of Chapter 7 on examining arising, abiding and ceasing, the MMK describes phenomena as having marks "like an illusion, like a dream, like a city of gandharvas" (T1564.12a15 如幻亦如夢如乾闥婆城所說生住滅其相亦如是 "Like an illusion, like a dream, like a city of gandharvas -- the arising, abiding, and ceasing of which we speak have marks such as these.").

When the sun rises, we see a city (nagara) of buildings with stories (kūṭāgāra), palaces (rājakula), with people coming in and going out. The higher the sun rises, the more indistinct this city becomes; it is just an optical illusion without any reality. This is what is called a city of the gandharvas. People who have never before seen it and who discover it some morning in the east believe in its reality and hurry towards it; but the closer they come, the more unclear it becomes and when the sun is high, it disappears. Tormented by hunger and thirst (kṣutpipāsā), the people who perceive a haze like a herd of gazelles (ghoṭakamṛga) believe in the presence of water and hasten towards it, but the closer they come, the more the illusion becomes blurred. Exhausted, worn out, they come to a high mountain or a narrow valley; they utter cries and groans and the echo replies to them; they believe in the presence of inhabitants and try to find them, but they tire themselves out in vain and find nothing. Finally, when they have reflected and understood, their illusion disappears. In the same way, the ignorant man thinks he sees an ātman and dharmas in the aggregates (skandha), the elements (dhātu) and the bases of consciousness (āyatana) which are empty (śūnya) of any reality. Prey to desire (rāga), anger (dveśa) and obstinacy (cittābhiniveśa), they wander in the four directions to satisfy their desire. Lost and deceived, they are plunged into poverty and misery. But when they have recognized the non-existence of the ātman and real dharmas by means of wisdom (prajñā), their mistake (viparyāsa) disappears.

Furthermore, the city of the gandharvas is not a city; it is the mind of the person who sees it as such. In the same way, fools (bāla) conceive of that which is not a body as a body (kāya) and as a mind (citta) that which is not a mind.

(Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa)

The city "is not a city," and the dharmas in the same way "are not dharmas." To be more precise, as it is the marks that are "like a city of gandharvas," the marks are not marks, like the city is not a city. As it is approached, it vanishes, and as they are approached, they vanish. Obviously we cannot say that there is no conventionality, but as the edges and borders of discrete conventional objects are analyzed, they "vanish." By "edges and borders, " I mean "arising, abiding" etc.

[haha]

The point is that every school would make their own assertion. Even in the interpretation of Tibetan Buddhism, Tsongkhapa has regarded sutra is not enough to realize emptiness (i.e. four types of emptiness); the tantric practice is needed.

False. Tsongkhapa merely acceded to the notion that common Mahayana was a slow path,

It is not my assertion (sorry for me being poor in my expression). Lower tantras (i.e. assertion is that they are superior then sutra; same way comparing Zhiyi's view on Madhyamaka from five periods) lead up to the path of seeing, not beyond. From that point to Buddhahood, one is not going to attain Buddhahood faster unless anuttaryoga is used. So, it is about time (i.e. quicker or longer).

For reference for above statement: Guy Newland - "Tsongkhapa's Explanation of Emptiness and the Two Truths" - Session 1 of 4 (timing around 1hr:17min) link: www.youtube.com/watch?v=UPRIHcHi68U

They did not consider the examination of time (Kala pariksa) in their interpretation; they considered sutra vs tantra.

In dzogchen, madhyamaka type of emptiness is regarded as a kind of calm abiding or empty experience.

False. Longchenpa admits that the view of dzogchen is analytically identical with prasanga.

Here is my point:

Longchen Rabjam writes:
Dzogpa Chenpo's view of freedom from extremes is similar to Prasangika-Madhyamaka's for the most part. [The main difference is that] the important basic view of Madhyamaka is of a spacelike empty aspect, while the principal basic view [of Dzogpa Chenpo] is of primordially pure and naked intrinsic awareness, which is ineffable and unceasing.

The Third Dodrupchen (1865-1926) writes:
Dzogpa Chenpo, on the other hand, solely maintains intrinsic awareness (rig pa) [the true nature of mind], and uses it as the path. It does not employ concepts (rtog pa), since concepts [are the province of] mind (sems), and Dzogpa Chenpo involves meditation [on intrinsic awareness after] distinguishing mind from intrinsic awareness.


From A Treasure Trove of Scriptural Transmission, Longchen Rabjam, Introduction pp x-xi

This is going off topic.

My point is simple: Madhyamaka needs no improvement. It’s the highest of the four tenet systems, and attempts to improve upon it merely obscure its austere elegance.

I also fully agree on this point. But it is nice in theory only. What they do practice is more important than what they do say. For practically speaking, everyone (Tsongkhapa, Longchenpa, Dolpopa, Zhiyi, Nichiren, etc.) has their own way. Everyone had built something over it.

[Malcolm]

The point is that every school would make their own assertion. Even in the interpretation of Tibetan Buddhism, Tsongkhapa has regarded sutra is not enough to realize emptiness (i.e. four types of emptiness); the tantric practice is needed.

False. Tsongkhapa merely acceded to the notion that common Mahayana was a slow path,

It is not my assertion (sorry for me being poor in my expression). Lower tantras (i.e. assertion is that they are superior then sutra; same way comparing Zhiyi's view on Madhyamaka from five periods) lead up to the path of seeing, not beyond. From that point to Buddhahood, one is not going to attain Buddhahood faster unless anuttaryoga is used. So, it is about time (i.e. quicker or longer).

For reference for above statement: Guy Newland - "Tsongkhapa's Explanation of Emptiness and the Two Truths" - Session 1 of 4 (timing around 1hr:17min) link: www.youtube.com/watch?v=UPRIHcHi68U

They did not consider the examination of time (Kala pariksa) in their interpretation; they considered sutra vs tantra.

The difference is method, and thus time on the path, one to sixteen lifetimes vs three samkhyakalpas.

In dzogchen, madhyamaka type of emptiness is regarded as a kind of calm abiding or empty experience.

False. Longchenpa admits that the view of dzogchen is analytically identical with prasanga.

Here is my point:

You said Madhyamaka, according to dzogchen, is a kind of empty experience or calm abiding. But thus is false. Again,the difference between Dzogchen and Madhyamaka is method. The latter uses analysis, the former does not.

This is going off topic.

My point is simple: Madhyamaka needs no improvement. It’s the highest of the four tenet systems, and attempts to improve upon it merely obscure its austere elegance.

I also fully agree on this point. But it is nice in theory only. What they do practice is more important than what they do say. For practically speaking, everyone (Tsongkhapa, Longchenpa, Dolpopa, Zhiyi, Nichiren, etc.) has their own way. Everyone had built something over it.

With respect to the first two masters you mention, they did not build anything over Madhyamaka, they are simply Vajrayana practitioners; with the respect to the third, his Madhyamaka is distorted; with respect to fourth, it seems he used Madhyamaka as a departure and indeed constructed a novel system, and the fifth follows the fourth.

[Bristollad]

Malcolm wrote: ↑Thu Jan 21, 2021 3:57 am

haha wrote: ↑Thu Jan 21, 2021 3:40 am
The point is that every school would make their own assertion. Even in the interpretation of Tibetan Buddhism, Tsongkhapa has regarded sutra is not enough to realize emptiness (i.e. four types of emptiness); the tantric practice is needed.

False. Tsongkhapa merely acceded to the notion that common Mahayana was a slow path,

It is not my assertion (sorry for me being poor in my expression). Lower tantras (i.e. assertion is that they are superior then sutra; same way comparing Zhiyi's view on Madhyamaka from five periods) lead up to the path of seeing, not beyond. From that point to Buddhahood, one is not going to attain Buddhahood faster unless anuttaryoga is used. So, it is about time (i.e. quicker or longer).

For reference for above statement: Guy Newland - "Tsongkhapa's Explanation of Emptiness and the Two Truths" - Session 1 of 4 (timing around 1hr:17min) link: www.youtube.com/watch?v=UPRIHcHi68U

They did not consider the examination of time (Kala pariksa) in their interpretation; they considered sutra vs tantra.

Tsongkhapa himself says the Perfection Vehicle and the Mantra Vehicle do not differ in regards to realising emptiness, nor in bodhicitta, only in regards to method:

INDICATING THE REASON FOR DIVIDING THE GREAT VEHICLE INTO A PERFECTION VEHICLE AND MANTRA VEHICLE
...Hence the two differ with respect to the sense of "vehicle" as the causes by which [trainees] progress, and furthermore, concerning this there is no difference in:
-- their realisation, the view [of emptiness]
-- their attitude, mind-generation [an aspiration to highest enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings],
-- or their behaviour, mere training in the six perfections:
therefore, they cannot be divided from these points of view.
The Great Exposition of Secret Mantra - Volume 1 - Tantra in Tibet by Tsongkhapa, translated by Jeffrey Hopkins p. 97

Listening to Guy Newland's video, I didn't hear him make the point you (Haha) suggested (but I only listened to the first 50 minutes or so).

[Malcolm]

Tsongkhapa himself says the Perfection Vehicle and the Mantra Vehicle do not differ in regards to realising emptiness, nor in bodhicitta, only in regards to method:

Indeed, as do almost all Tibetan scholars following Sakya Pandita.

[Bristollad]

Perhaps there was confusion with the four empties:

Even in the interpretation of Tibetan Buddhism, Tsongkhapa has regarded sutra is not enough to realize emptiness (i.e. four types of emptiness); the tantric practice is needed.

Four empties (Wyl. stong pa bzhi) — “The four empties are respectively termed the empty, the very empty, the great empty and the all-empty and are also called the mind of radiant white appearance, the mind of radiant red or orange increase, the mind of radiant black near-attainment and the mind of clear light.” See Daniel Cozort, Highest Yoga Tantra (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1986), pp. 73–76. “These subtle types of consciousness are to be used to realize emptiness, but they are not themselves emptinesses, nor realizations of emptiness.” See Highest Yoga Tantra, p. 73.
https://www.rigpawiki.org/index.php?title=Four_empties

[haha]

With respect to the first two masters you mention, they did not build anything over Madhyamaka, they are simply Vajrayana practitioners; with the respect to the third, his Madhyamaka is distorted; with respect to fourth, it seems he used Madhyamaka as a departure and indeed constructed a novel system, and the fifth follows the fourth.

Different is method. That is accepted. If Madhyamaka needs no improvement, then why one should need different methods. In other word, it means that it is not enough to realize. If someone says it takes three asamkhyakalpas, it is polite way to saying one is not going to attain. lol Three asamkhyakalpas is differentiating rhetoric (between arhat and buddhahood).

here is the examination of time:

Maitreya, the World-honored One has bestowed on your noble person the prediction that you will achieve anuttarā samyak saṃbodhi in a single lifetime. What lifetime will you use to experience this prediction, past, future, or present? If a past life, then the past life is already extinguished. If a future life, then the future life has not arrived. If the present life, then the present life is nonabiding.

The Vimalakīrti Sutra Translated by John R. McRae

There might be some references for that statement too but I am not after the trouble. Various teachers made various statements in their teachings. Many points, one can bring for trouble. Example, rejecting the base Madhaymika would not understand the dzogchen (something like that). You have read as well as listened a lot on the topic; so I will restricted myself on that topic. I have no problem accepting my statement being faulty; for showing that I am always grateful.

Somewhere, someone wrote articles mentioning Dolpopa theory based on Prajnaparamita. So, I would not say distortion; otherwise, one is saying such and such the prajnaparamita texts are distortion.

Nagarjuna is a big tree. Svatantrika Madhyamaka, Prasangika Madhyamaka, Yogacara Madyamaka, Great Madhyamaka, Secret Mantra-Madhyamaka, they all are the branches. How well one interprets, how bigger it looks, they are just the branches; they are just reinterpreting the Nagarjuna. So the masters from China and Japan did same.

Listening to Guy Newland's video, I didn't hear him make the point you (Haha) suggested (but I only listened to the first 50 minutes or so).

I have provided the timing above (it is around 1hr:17min).

Your provided references are noted. Indeed, it is about clear light mind (i.e. resultant aspect).