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The issue is that you are conflating contexts. In the overarching picture the two truths are a conventional dichotomy, meaning at the end of the day the two truths are merely a pedagogical tool that is implemented to allow the aspirant to comprehend the nature of the predicament the buddhadharma aims to resolve. The model does not survive in the end, and therefore it is only conventional in nature.
What "truth" do you think there is apart from the absence of origination in allegedly conditioned entities?Sherab wrote: ↑Wed Mar 28, 2018 11:56 pmVeridical means truthful or veracious. By definition something that is non-veridical cannot be relied upon for the truth. So if you accept Malcolm's definition of conventional truth as a non-veridical cognition of an entity, then you also have to accept that conventional truth is not truthful and therefore cannot be relied upon for truth.
Freedom from the dual extremes of existence and non-existence means no subject or objects can be found.
Conflating contexts? How? Are you saying that all cognitions must necessarily go through a sense media?krodha wrote: ↑Mon Apr 02, 2018 7:16 amThe issue is that you are conflating contexts. In the overarching picture the two truths are a conventional dichotomy, meaning at the end of the day the two truths are merely a pedagogical tool that is implemented to allow the aspirant to comprehend the nature of the predicament the buddhadharma aims to resolve. The model does not survive in the end, and therefore it is only conventional in nature.
You seems to be saying that when you see something, you are not really going through the intermediary of the eye organ and the eye consciousness and so forth for the other sense organs? Or are you saying that conventionally the cognition went through the intermediaries but actually it does not? Or are you saying that false cognition is plague by ignorance and therefore cognition occurs in the presence of the sense media while true perception is free from ignorance and therefore either the intermediaries do not appear to the true cognition, or the true cognition can bypass the sense media?krodha wrote: ↑Mon Apr 02, 2018 7:16 am Then within the more specific context of two truth model itself, we treat saṃvṛtisatya or "conventional truth" as fallacious and pāramārthasatya or "ultimate truth" as valid or "veridical." Yet ultimate truth is only veridical in that it is a working knowledge of a lack of validity in so-called conventional truth. It is not "veridical" in the sense that it is a legitimate nature that stands apart from what is termed "conventional" within the scope of the two truths, as you seem to be suggesting.
An ultimate truth is only taught because there is something to be understood about the nature of phenomena that is not currently known. One's current knowledge of phenomena is afflicted by ignorance, giving rise to the inaccurate conviction that there are entities, structures and processes that are truly real and established. The intermediary you bring up is precisely one of those structures. Meaning "sense media" is a false appearance, and because it is a fallacious appearance there is not actually a species of cognition that functions through an intermediary and a species of cognition that functions independently of said intermediary. Rather, there is simply the very same noetic capacity that is either (i) plagued by ignorance or (ii) free from ignorance, and the appearance of an intermediary, in this case sense media, manifests or subsides accordingly as a result of said cause.
The only things that can be spoken about is the conventional. When describing the process of liberation, we are using conventions. So if this is what you meant by the entire process of liberation is conventional, I would agree. Otherwise, you have to elaborate further.krodha wrote: ↑Mon Apr 02, 2018 7:16 amWhat "truth" do you think there is apart from the absence of origination in allegedly conditioned entities?Sherab wrote: ↑Wed Mar 28, 2018 11:56 pm Veridical means truthful or veracious. By definition something that is non-veridical cannot be relied upon for the truth. So if you accept Malcolm's definition of conventional truth as a non-veridical cognition of an entity, then you also have to accept that conventional truth is not truthful and therefore cannot be relied upon for truth.
If the so-called "truth" in question is merely a lack of validity in relation to purported entities that are in actuality misconceptions that were never established in the first place, how is that lack of establishment itself a truly established or substantial truth?
The "truth" you are intended to recognize is that conventional entities are "non-veridical."
This is what is meant in texts which state the dharmadhātu is a mere name, and not truly existent. Or that nirvana does not actually exist, or that upon exhausting dharmas, dharmatā is also exhausted, etc.
Regarding recognition, the entire process of liberation from beginning to end is conventional in nature. Within that overarching conventional scope we define impure and pure cognitions as "conventional" and "ultimate," however this dichotomy is again, merely conventional. Thus we can say recognition occurs, and jñāna, the modality of cognition that manifests during instances of equipoise, is a "veridical" species of consciousness because it apprehends the dharmatā of mind and/or phenomena, but this does not mean jñāna is something ultimately established that stands apart from so-called conventional phenomena. Likewise, other so-called "veridical" attributes of the path, such as prajñā, dharmadhātu, dharmakāya, etc., are also merely conventions, despite their roles as definitive principles that are related to so-called ultimate truth.
All entities and processes are illusory and ultimately without substance. Occurrences like the recognition of dharmatā appear and have soteriological implications and value, but are ultimately essenceless appearances like anything else.
It is a huge leap from freedom from extremes of existence and non-existence to no subject or objects to be found. First, define for me what you meant by freedom from the extreme of existence and what you meant by freedom from the extreme of non-existence. I have given my definitions what these phrase meant and went through the process of how examination of the conventional leads to the ultimate. I have not seen yours.
This is nothing but a strawman of all that I have said. You have not provided valid reasoning showing that the lack of distinction between subject and object in a non-dualistic cognition necessarily implies a fusion of subject and object. Besides, I have maintained all along that the ultimate is not describable by conventional terms.
When the ultimate is cognized, all phenomena as experienced by deluded beings are seen as false. Since these phenomena are seen as false, there can be no real arising nor real ceasing, etc.krodha wrote: ↑Mon Apr 02, 2018 7:16 am .... the view I am communicating demonstrates that subjects and objects cannot be found when sought to begin with. Because subject and object are recognized to have never arisen in the first place, the treatment I am championing contrasts your own in that it promotes a non-reductive and insubstantial non-dual nature as a lack of essence. The difference between these two views is subtle but important, and contrasting interpretations like this is what sets the buddhadharma apart from substantialist tirthika dharmas.
You have a strawman of what I actually argued in your mind. I have said repeatedly that the ultimate is indescribable. How do you establish something indescribable for anyone? You can only establish it for yourself through direct cognition. The Buddha said the ultimate is to realized individually.
ditto
Hmm, it seems that there are two different translation of the same verse. Here's a translation that is different from yours.
Excellent post.krodha wrote: ↑Mon Apr 02, 2018 7:16 amThe issue is that you are conflating contexts. In the overarching picture the two truths are a conventional dichotomy, meaning at the end of the day the two truths are merely a pedagogical tool that is implemented to allow the aspirant to comprehend the nature of the predicament the buddhadharma aims to resolve. The model does not survive in the end, and therefore it is only conventional in nature.
Then within the more specific context of two truth model itself, we treat saṃvṛtisatya or "conventional truth" as fallacious and pāramārthasatya or "ultimate truth" as valid or "veridical." Yet ultimate truth is only veridical in that it is a working knowledge of a lack of validity in so-called conventional truth. It is not "veridical" in the sense that it is a legitimate nature that stands apart from what is termed "conventional" within the scope of the two truths, as you seem to be suggesting.
An ultimate truth is only taught because there is something to be understood about the nature of phenomena that is not currently known. One's current knowledge of phenomena is afflicted by ignorance, giving rise to the inaccurate conviction that there are entities, structures and processes that are truly real and established. The intermediary you bring up is precisely one of those structures. Meaning "sense media" is a false appearance, and because it is a fallacious appearance there is not actually a species of cognition that functions through an intermediary and a species of cognition that functions independently of said intermediary. Rather, there is simply the very same noetic capacity that is either (i) plagued by ignorance or (ii) free from ignorance, and the appearance of an intermediary, in this case sense media, manifests or subsides accordingly as a result of said cause.
What "truth" do you think there is apart from the absence of origination in allegedly conditioned entities?Sherab wrote: ↑Wed Mar 28, 2018 11:56 pmVeridical means truthful or veracious. By definition something that is non-veridical cannot be relied upon for the truth. So if you accept Malcolm's definition of conventional truth as a non-veridical cognition of an entity, then you also have to accept that conventional truth is not truthful and therefore cannot be relied upon for truth.
If the so-called "truth" in question is merely a lack of validity in relation to purported entities that are in actuality misconceptions that were never established in the first place, how is that lack of establishment itself a truly established or substantial truth?
The "truth" you are intended to recognize is that conventional entities are "non-veridical."
This is what is meant in texts which state the dharmadhātu is a mere name, and not truly existent. Or that nirvana does not actually exist, or that upon exhausting dharmas, dharmatā is also exhausted, etc.
Regarding recognition, the entire process of liberation from beginning to end is conventional in nature. Within that overarching conventional scope we define impure and pure cognitions as "conventional" and "ultimate," however this dichotomy is again, merely conventional. Thus we can say recognition occurs, and jñāna, the modality of cognition that manifests during instances of equipoise, is a "veridical" species of consciousness because it apprehends the dharmatā of mind and/or phenomena, but this does not mean jñāna is something ultimately established that stands apart from so-called conventional phenomena. Likewise, other so-called "veridical" attributes of the path, such as prajñā, dharmadhātu, dharmakāya, etc., are also merely conventions, despite their roles as definitive principles that are related to so-called ultimate truth.
All entities and processes are illusory and ultimately without substance. Occurrences like the recognition of dharmatā appear and have soteriological implications and value, but are ultimately essenceless appearances like anything else.
Freedom from the dual extremes of existence and non-existence means no subject or objects can be found.
Therefore, whereas your interpretation views a lack of duality as a fusion of subject and object which creates a reductive and substantial ultimate nature that is "non-dual," the view I am communicating demonstrates that subjects and objects cannot be found when sought to begin with. Because subject and object are recognized to have never arisen in the first place, the treatment I am championing contrasts your own in that it promotes a non-reductive and insubstantial non-dual nature as a lack of essence. The difference between these two views is subtle but important, and contrasting interpretations like this is what sets the buddhadharma apart from substantialist tirthika dharmas.
In any case, it seems you believe there is actually some sort of established or substantial ultimate nature, and this error in view causes you to perceive various substance dualities.
A gestalt shift is in order...
- When the [ultimate] truth is explained as it is, the conventional is not obstructed; Independent of the conventional, no [ultimate] truth can be found.
-- Bodhicittavivarana