Berzin vs Hopkins on dependence on cognition
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Berzin vs Hopkins on dependence on cognition
In the Gelug tradition, we talk about phenomena being dependent in three ways: upon parts, causes and conditions, and cognition. I’ve always understood this to mean that any given phenomena is dependent upon *all three* factors, but this raises some interesting questions, especially in regards to how we understand cosmology. For example, in his book, The Gelug/Kagyu Tradition of Mahamudra, Berzin writes:
“In fact, as soon as we raise the issue of how things exist, we have entered the realm of description which can only be carried out by the mind. But that does not mean that everything exists only in the mind and that the earth did not exist before there was life on it. An object need not be experienced by a specific mind at this moment in order to exist.”
So, Berzin here is explicitly saying that dependence upon cognition is not a necessary condition for phenomena to be said to exist--cognition is only a factor when description comes into play. So it’s not that things depend in part upon cognition for their existence; it’s that their *descriptions* depend upon cognition, which seems to be granting a generous amount of ontological realism to phenomena. In other words, they’re mind independent, unless we experience or talk about them. This position would seem to push against the tetralemma.
It also feels like a weaker version of the three dependencies framework, though the convenient thing about it is that it allows modern Buddhist practitioners to hold the current scientific narratives about the evolution of life on the planet alongside a Madhyamaka presentation of ontology.
Contrast Berzin, for a moment, with Jeffery Hopkins, who, in Meditation On Emptiness, writes:
"All existents are objects of knowledge, or more literally objects of knowing, because all objects are continually known by some consciousness. Without even considering the penetrating clairvoyance of Buddhas and yogis, the various hungry ghosts and unusual types of beings which exist everywhere ensure that even particles in the centers of huge rocks are cognized by some being" (ME, pp. 203).
So, do or are all phenomena cognized by some consciousness, meaning all phenomena--down to the “particles in the centers of huge rocks”--are dependent, in part, upon cognition? Or, per Berzin, are there phenomena that just aren’t cognized? Is this a question of literalism/traditionalism (Hopkins) vs. modernism (Berzin)? Or, perhaps Berzin meant that phenomena weren't cognized by "life on earth" but perhaps by, as Hopkins has it: Buddhas, yogis, various hungry ghosts, etc.
Thoughts?
“In fact, as soon as we raise the issue of how things exist, we have entered the realm of description which can only be carried out by the mind. But that does not mean that everything exists only in the mind and that the earth did not exist before there was life on it. An object need not be experienced by a specific mind at this moment in order to exist.”
So, Berzin here is explicitly saying that dependence upon cognition is not a necessary condition for phenomena to be said to exist--cognition is only a factor when description comes into play. So it’s not that things depend in part upon cognition for their existence; it’s that their *descriptions* depend upon cognition, which seems to be granting a generous amount of ontological realism to phenomena. In other words, they’re mind independent, unless we experience or talk about them. This position would seem to push against the tetralemma.
It also feels like a weaker version of the three dependencies framework, though the convenient thing about it is that it allows modern Buddhist practitioners to hold the current scientific narratives about the evolution of life on the planet alongside a Madhyamaka presentation of ontology.
Contrast Berzin, for a moment, with Jeffery Hopkins, who, in Meditation On Emptiness, writes:
"All existents are objects of knowledge, or more literally objects of knowing, because all objects are continually known by some consciousness. Without even considering the penetrating clairvoyance of Buddhas and yogis, the various hungry ghosts and unusual types of beings which exist everywhere ensure that even particles in the centers of huge rocks are cognized by some being" (ME, pp. 203).
So, do or are all phenomena cognized by some consciousness, meaning all phenomena--down to the “particles in the centers of huge rocks”--are dependent, in part, upon cognition? Or, per Berzin, are there phenomena that just aren’t cognized? Is this a question of literalism/traditionalism (Hopkins) vs. modernism (Berzin)? Or, perhaps Berzin meant that phenomena weren't cognized by "life on earth" but perhaps by, as Hopkins has it: Buddhas, yogis, various hungry ghosts, etc.
Thoughts?
Re: Berzin vs Hopkins on dependence on cognition
It always depends on what tenant system you’re talking about. Without knowing which system Hopkins or berzin are speaking within it’s hard to compare (not having the books on On me).
FWIW I take berzin when he Says “an object need not be cognised by a specific mind at this moment in order to exist” to start something along the lines of, an object is “in principle” cognizable even if it is not at this very moment cognised. So a object that is not and can never be cognised by any mind whatsoever does not exist.
FWIW I take berzin when he Says “an object need not be cognised by a specific mind at this moment in order to exist” to start something along the lines of, an object is “in principle” cognizable even if it is not at this very moment cognised. So a object that is not and can never be cognised by any mind whatsoever does not exist.
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Re: Berzin vs Hopkins on dependence on cognition
Both Berzin and Hopkins--especially Hopkins--are writing from a Gelug perspective.
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Re: Berzin vs Hopkins on dependence on cognition
Gelug yes. But it sounds like Gelug Cittamatra, not Gelug Madhyamaka.wei wu wei wrote: ↑Mon Oct 25, 2021 3:51 pm Both Berzin and Hopkins--especially Hopkins--are writing from a Gelug perspective.
If I had to guess it sounds like Hopkins is more orthodox here. Berzin sounds like a westernized interpretation. But I'm no expert on this, so don't take what I say as anything other than my guess.
1.The problem isn’t ‘ignorance’. The problem is the mind you have right now. (H.H. Karmapa XVII @NYC 2/4/18)
2. I support Mingyur R and HHDL in their positions against lama abuse.
3. Student: Lama, I thought I might die but then I realized that the 3 Jewels would protect me.
Lama: Even If you had died the 3 Jewels would still have protected you. (DW post by Fortyeightvows)
2. I support Mingyur R and HHDL in their positions against lama abuse.
3. Student: Lama, I thought I might die but then I realized that the 3 Jewels would protect me.
Lama: Even If you had died the 3 Jewels would still have protected you. (DW post by Fortyeightvows)
Re: Berzin vs Hopkins on dependence on cognition
As stated above, Gelug is not a tenet school. Within Gelug you could conceivably have points of view from nearly all of the four major tenet schools, as well as, their various subdivisions.wei wu wei wrote: ↑Mon Oct 25, 2021 3:51 pm Both Berzin and Hopkins--especially Hopkins--are writing from a Gelug perspective.
Also, if I remember correctly, enlightened beings do not cognize objects via the lens of sense consciousness' and conception. Everything is a direct perception.
Shaun
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Re: Berzin vs Hopkins on dependence on cognition
True, they debate all the views. But the Gelugpas are known for holding Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka as the highest view.As stated above, Gelug is not a tenet school. Within Gelug you could conceivably have points of view from nearly all of the four major tenet schools, as well as, their various subdivisions.
1.The problem isn’t ‘ignorance’. The problem is the mind you have right now. (H.H. Karmapa XVII @NYC 2/4/18)
2. I support Mingyur R and HHDL in their positions against lama abuse.
3. Student: Lama, I thought I might die but then I realized that the 3 Jewels would protect me.
Lama: Even If you had died the 3 Jewels would still have protected you. (DW post by Fortyeightvows)
2. I support Mingyur R and HHDL in their positions against lama abuse.
3. Student: Lama, I thought I might die but then I realized that the 3 Jewels would protect me.
Lama: Even If you had died the 3 Jewels would still have protected you. (DW post by Fortyeightvows)
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Re: Berzin vs Hopkins on dependence on cognition
Sorry not to clarify. Both of these authors are presenting the Gelug view of Madhyamaka-Prasangika.
Is there a way to edit my initial post to reflect this clarification?
Is there a way to edit my initial post to reflect this clarification?
Re: Berzin vs Hopkins on dependence on cognition
Yes Tsongkhapa ascribes to Prasangika-Madhyamaka and even Madhyamaka is subdivided into two; Svatantrika-Madhyamaka and Prasangika-Madhyamaka where Svatantrika is identified as having yet another Svatantrika-Yogacara-Madhyamaka. All of this becomes extremely subtle in terms of differences. However, there is neither nihilism nor substantialism represented and these systems are considered by many to be the pinnacle of Nagarjuna and his spiritual sons' thought. So, again the context of the excerpts from the OP would have to be ascertained and, again if properly examined, I feel confident that we would find that both extremes are avoided.Schrödinger’s Yidam wrote: ↑Mon Oct 25, 2021 7:03 pmTrue, they debate all the views. But the Gelugpas are known for holding Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka as the highest view.As stated above, Gelug is not a tenet school. Within Gelug you could conceivably have points of view from nearly all of the four major tenet schools, as well as, their various subdivisions.
Shaun
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Re: Berzin vs Hopkins on dependence on cognition
So apologies to all for not having clarified from the beginning what school of tenets these statements were drawn from; however, given that they are both ostensibly writing from a Gelug Prasangika-Madhyamaka view, I wonder if we can return to the OP. Hopkins indicates that all phenomena are always cognized by some consciousness while Berzin seems to hold that there are phenomena that are not cognized (for example, he says, the earth prior to life).
Thanks
Thanks
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Re: Berzin vs Hopkins on dependence on cognition
This doesn't seem to be born out in the full quote, though: "But that does not mean that everything exists only in the mind and that the earth did not exist before there was life on it. An object need not be experienced by a specific mind at this moment in order to exist.”iskaral wrote: ↑Mon Oct 25, 2021 1:55 pm
FWIW I take berzin when he Says “an object need not be cognised by a specific mind at this moment in order to exist” to start something along the lines of, an object is “in principle” cognizable even if it is not at this very moment cognised. So a object that is not and can never be cognised by any mind whatsoever does not exist.
Re: Berzin vs Hopkins on dependence on cognition
After reading both texts It’s not clear what tenant systems they’re speaking from since Hopkins in that section outlines multiple tenant positions, and berzin is just an introduction passage but so as to not eel wriggle out of addressing the actual question, I was having a look for berzins explicitly prasangika presentation and found: https://studybuddhism.com/en/advanced-s ... le-objects
Where he says the following:
Where he says the following:
Hopkins to me does sound very much like a sautrantika presentation of lorig in that section, which is the tenant system lorig is often done from. But even if that were not the case berzins prasangika lorig does seem more inline with the Hopkins quote you’ve quoted. Berzin has always seemed quite traditional to me, and has multiple articles on “dharma-lite” which he isn’t exactly fond of, so I don’t think it’s a traditional vs modern distinction.Names and concepts, however, do not create their referent objects. Nor do referent objects of words and concepts exist independently of the words and concepts for them. Nor do validly knowable objects exist independently of their being validly knowable as the referent objects of the words and concepts for them, although we may validly know them non-conceptually – without relying on words and concepts. If they did exist independently of all valid mental processes, how could we ever know that they exist? There is nothing on the sides of objects that establishes their existence, independently of all valid mental processes, otherwise how could we ever know that they establish their existence?
Thus, only the valid cognition (tshad-ma) of the mind that labels phenomena establishes their existence, not anything on the sides of the phenomena themselves
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Re: Berzin vs Hopkins on dependence on cognition
Thanks, Iskaral. Yes, the Berzin quote you provide sounds like standard Gelug Prasangika-Madhyamaka epistemology and I think Hopkins would agree with all of it. Odd that Berzin's other passage sounded so different, in terms of positing independence of objects in the context of a scientific understanding of evolution (i.e., there would have been a time, according to that model, when no consciousnesses would have existed to cognize objects). None of this is a problem if we are talking strictly about epistemology or soteriology or if we are using a Buddhist cosmology, but I do wonder what happens if we try to use this model of dependence on cognition in an scientific-evolutionary context.
Re: Berzin vs Hopkins on dependence on cognition
Maybe he’s pulling a sneaky. Life = sentient being. Buddha =/= sentient being. Buddha is cognizent of the earth prior to life therefore the earth existed before there was life.
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Re: Berzin vs Hopkins on dependence on cognition
Right! But aren't there some disagreements about what exactly Buddhas cognize?
At any rate, I think the root of my question (after all of these preparatory comments!) is:
Within the Gelug Prasangika-Madhyamaka presentation of the three dependencies:
If we say that all objects are dependent upon a cognizing consciousness (among the other two types of dependence)--so they are not just epistemically but also ontologically dependent--then we have to give an account for how each and every object in the universe is cognized. This is what Hopkins does in that quote above...down the a grain in the center of a rock at the bottom of the sea.
On the other hand, if we say that only objects of *knowledge*--i.e., only known objects being cognized by a given consciousness at a given time--are dependent on an awareness, and that there can be some out there which are not currently being cognized, then don't we allow that objects aren't really dependent in three ways, only two? Which seems to open the door to say that they exist from their own side.
At any rate, I think the root of my question (after all of these preparatory comments!) is:
Within the Gelug Prasangika-Madhyamaka presentation of the three dependencies:
If we say that all objects are dependent upon a cognizing consciousness (among the other two types of dependence)--so they are not just epistemically but also ontologically dependent--then we have to give an account for how each and every object in the universe is cognized. This is what Hopkins does in that quote above...down the a grain in the center of a rock at the bottom of the sea.
On the other hand, if we say that only objects of *knowledge*--i.e., only known objects being cognized by a given consciousness at a given time--are dependent on an awareness, and that there can be some out there which are not currently being cognized, then don't we allow that objects aren't really dependent in three ways, only two? Which seems to open the door to say that they exist from their own side.