Gelug Madhyamaka

Nicholas2727
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Gelug Madhyamaka

Post by Nicholas2727 »

I was reading Tibetan Buddhism from the Ground Up by Alan Wallace and was slightly confused on some of his explanations of emptiness. He stated that things have no inherent existence, but things do exist. From the way I understood his explanation he was saying that non-existent things come together to form existent things (which does not seem possible). Or if everything is truly non-existent and empty, then this would fall into nihilism. He went on to say "Perceived objects exist in relation to our perceptions of them, and conceived objects exist in relation to the conceptual schemata within which they are understood." Although from this sentence I still get the impression that they are stating nothing truly exists. Would someone be able to help clarify the Gelug view for me?
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Re: Gelug Madhyamaka

Post by Malcolm »

Nicholas2727 wrote: Sun Jan 03, 2021 5:31 pmI still get the impression that they are stating nothing truly exists.

Yes, if by "truly" you mean "ultimately."

The Geluks make a distinction between "mere existence", which is not an object of analysis, and "true existence," which is an object of analysis. In Geluk Madhyamaka, the mode of investigation is to search for inherent existence in a given thing.

So yes, the Geklukpas are saying nothing truly exists, and that things exist merely on a conventional level, which cannot withstand ultimate analysis.
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Re: Gelug Madhyamaka

Post by Nicholas2727 »

Malcolm wrote: Sun Jan 03, 2021 6:18 pm
Nicholas2727 wrote: Sun Jan 03, 2021 5:31 pmI still get the impression that they are stating nothing truly exists.

Yes, if by "truly" you mean "ultimately."

The Geluks make a distinction between "mere existence", which is not an object of analysis, and "true existence," which is an object of analysis. In Geluk Madhyamaka, the mode of investigation is to search for inherent existence in a given thing.

So yes, the Geklukpas are saying nothing truly exists, and that things exist merely on a conventional level, which cannot withstand ultimate analysis.
Would they also say that consciousness does not ultimately exist? In a section of the book Alan Wallace goes on to say that the mind is also empty and does not ultimately exist, but does not directly say that consciousness does not exist.

I would be curious how this fits with Madhyamaka philosophy. From my very limited understanding, Madhyamaka is supposed to be the middle way between nihilism and externalism. If they say nothing ultimately exists how is this between nihilism and eternalism?

Also from my understanding, many Sakyapas hold the Rangtong view of emptiness. Does there interpretation match with the Gelug view that nothing ultimately exists?
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Re: Gelug Madhyamaka

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Nicholas2727 wrote: Sun Jan 03, 2021 7:31 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sun Jan 03, 2021 6:18 pm
Nicholas2727 wrote: Sun Jan 03, 2021 5:31 pmI still get the impression that they are stating nothing truly exists.

Yes, if by "truly" you mean "ultimately."

The Geluks make a distinction between "mere existence", which is not an object of analysis, and "true existence," which is an object of analysis. In Geluk Madhyamaka, the mode of investigation is to search for inherent existence in a given thing.

So yes, the Geklukpas are saying nothing truly exists, and that things exist merely on a conventional level, which cannot withstand ultimate analysis.
Would they also say that consciousness does not ultimately exist? In a section of the book Alan Wallace goes on to say that the mind is also empty and does not ultimately exist, but does not directly say that consciousness does not exist.

I would be curious how this fits with Madhyamaka philosophy. From my very limited understanding, Madhyamaka is supposed to be the middle way between nihilism and externalism. If they say nothing ultimately exists how is this between nihilism and eternalism?

Also from my understanding, many Sakyapas hold the Rangtong view of emptiness. Does there interpretation match with the Gelug view that nothing ultimately exists?
The keywords are 'truely' and 'dependend'. Existence is kept aside in order to avoid nihilism. Things neither exist truly nor do they not exist. Those thing which are dependently arosen do not exist inherently on their own.
This includes consciousness and even emptiness. Even emptiness is not inherently existing on it's own. It needs something that is empty in n order to have emptiness.

In other words we do not know how things exist, because they exist differently of how they appear. Things appear differently than they exist. And if we understand how things ultimately exist - it's quite difficult to express it online. :thinking:
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Re: Gelug Madhyamaka

Post by Malcolm »

Nicholas2727 wrote: Sun Jan 03, 2021 7:31 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sun Jan 03, 2021 6:18 pm
Nicholas2727 wrote: Sun Jan 03, 2021 5:31 pmI still get the impression that they are stating nothing truly exists.

Yes, if by "truly" you mean "ultimately."

The Geluks make a distinction between "mere existence", which is not an object of analysis, and "true existence," which is an object of analysis. In Geluk Madhyamaka, the mode of investigation is to search for inherent existence in a given thing.

So yes, the Geklukpas are saying nothing truly exists, and that things exist merely on a conventional level, which cannot withstand ultimate analysis.
Would they also say that consciousness does not ultimately exist?
Consciousness is a dependently arising dharma. So not, it does not ultimately exist.
I would be curious how this fits with Madhyamaka philosophy. From my very limited understanding, Madhyamaka is supposed to be the middle way between nihilism and externalism. If they say nothing ultimately exists how is this between nihilism and eternalism?
Whatever is dependently originated, that is empty, that is dependently designated, and that is the middle way.

That which arises dependently is free from the extremes of permanence and annihilation. You might try reading Tsongkhapa's Praise to Dependent Origination. Many people consider it Tsongkhapa's final statement on his realization of emptiness.

Also from my understanding, many Sakyapas hold the Rangtong view of emptiness. Does there interpretation match with the Gelug view that nothing ultimately exists?
There is no such thing as a rang stong view of emptiness unless one holds a gzhan stong view of emptiness. Since neither the Sakyas nor the Geluks hold a gzhan stong view of emptiness, they cannot maintain a rang stong view of emptiness.
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Re: Gelug Madhyamaka

Post by Nicholas2727 »

Also from my understanding, many Sakyapas hold the Rangtong view of emptiness. Does there interpretation match with the Gelug view that nothing ultimately exists?
There is no such thing as a rang stong view of emptiness unless one holds a gzhan stong view of emptiness. Since neither the Sakyas nor the Geluks hold a gzhan stong view of emptiness, they cannot maintain a rang stong view of emptiness.
[/quote]

Thank you for all of your replies, that helps clarify some confusion I had on the issue. Would you be able to clarify more on the last point that I quoted? I understand that they do not have a rangtong view since they do not hold a shentong view, but what disagreements do they have on emptiness then? From what I have seen, the Sakya Pandita and Tsongkhapa had different interpretations of emptiness, but from the little bit I have read it seems the Sakya interpretation and Gelug interpretation are similar.
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Re: Gelug Madhyamaka

Post by Malcolm »

Nicholas2727 wrote: Tue Jan 05, 2021 4:50 pm
Thank you for all of your replies, that helps clarify some confusion I had on the issue. Would you be able to clarify more on the last point that I quoted? I understand that they do not have a rangtong view since they do not hold a shentong view, but what disagreements do they have on emptiness then? From what I have seen, the Sakya Pandita and Tsongkhapa had different interpretations of emptiness, but from the little bit I have read it seems the Sakya interpretation and Gelug interpretation are similar.
The disagreements between Sakya and Geluk on Madhyamaka fill many volumes.
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Re: Gelug Madhyamaka

Post by Nicholas2727 »

Malcolm wrote: Tue Jan 05, 2021 5:17 pm
Nicholas2727 wrote: Tue Jan 05, 2021 4:50 pm
Thank you for all of your replies, that helps clarify some confusion I had on the issue. Would you be able to clarify more on the last point that I quoted? I understand that they do not have a rangtong view since they do not hold a shentong view, but what disagreements do they have on emptiness then? From what I have seen, the Sakya Pandita and Tsongkhapa had different interpretations of emptiness, but from the little bit I have read it seems the Sakya interpretation and Gelug interpretation are similar.
The disagreements between Sakya and Geluk on Madhyamaka fill many volumes.
Hoping that you Malcolm or someone else who is knowledgeable on Madhyamaka could help clarify the difference between Sakya and Gelug views. As you stated, the disagreements fill many volumes, so I am not sure if a short and simple explanation is possible.

I was reading "When Tibetans Found Their Voice" and it goes over the Sakya Pandita, Dolpopa, and Tsongkhapa. I understand how Dolpopa's view is different, but the article does not go into much detail about the difference between the Sakya Pandita and Tsongkhapa. I have just begun to study Madhyamaka, so possibly this is over my head at this point.

Here is a link to the article I mentioned: https://fpmt.org/wp-content/uploads/sit ... -voice.pdf
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Re: Gelug Madhyamaka

Post by PadmaVonSamba »

Nicholas2727 wrote: Sun Jan 03, 2021 5:31 pm

I was reading Tibetan Buddhism from the Ground Up by Alan Wallace and was slightly confused on some of his explanations of emptiness. He stated that things have no inherent existence, but things do exist. From the way I understood his explanation he was saying that non-existent things come together to form existent things (which does not seem possible). Or if everything is truly non-existent and empty, then this would fall into nihilism. He went on to say "Perceived objects exist in relation to our perceptions of them, and conceived objects exist in relation to the conceptual schemata within which they are understood." Although from this sentence I still get the impression that they are stating nothing truly exists. Would someone be able to help clarify the Gelug view for me?
I don’t think this specifically is a “Gelug” thing. I’m
Not saying different traditions don’t have different or conflicting interpretations. But this itself doesn’t appear to be a question where doctrinal disputes need to enter the picture.

“things have no inherent existence, but things do exist” is a clumsy use of language leading to a basically idiotic statement. Perhaps saying that, “things have no inherent existence, but events do occur” would provide a more accurate understanding of the point being made.
(‘exist’ vs.‘occur’ is an issue I frequently bring up).
A melody played from a saxophone occurs, but doesn’t “exist”. Why is that? Because it is a temporary event.
But all appearances of arising phenomena that we mistakenly experience as solid, as “existing” are, ultimately temporary events. Are they not?

"Perceived objects exist in relation to our perceptions of them” If you see a jet plane high up in the sky, it appears to be moving very slowly. If you were a bird and it flew past you, you would see it as very fast. We see elephants as big and mice as small only because of their relative size to humans. To an ant, a mouse is big. To a blue whale, an elephant is small. Horses eyes fool them. They see humans as being bigger than they are, which may be why they let humans ride them.

“conceived objects exist in relation to the conceptual schemata within which they are understood." It means that we have concepts about what things are or should be according to standards we have already internalized. A watermelon is red inside. But there are some watermelons that are bright yellow inside and if you’ve never seen one it’s a bit of a visual shock if you’ve only ever seen the red ones. Another example, most people on the West recognize a picture of Jesus when they see one. But how is this possible? Nobody knows what he looked like. Even the Mormon’s picture of blond European Jesus, people look at and think it’s a picture of Jesus. But because there is a concept of Jesus, we process images and impute on those images that identity.

In all of these examples, nobody is saying that the phenomena don’t occur. Rather, that although they occur, they have no intrinsic existence to them.
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Re: Gelug Madhyamaka

Post by Nicholas2727 »

PadmaVonSamba wrote: Thu Feb 04, 2021 5:58 pm
Nicholas2727 wrote: Sun Jan 03, 2021 5:31 pm

I was reading Tibetan Buddhism from the Ground Up by Alan Wallace and was slightly confused on some of his explanations of emptiness. He stated that things have no inherent existence, but things do exist. From the way I understood his explanation he was saying that non-existent things come together to form existent things (which does not seem possible). Or if everything is truly non-existent and empty, then this would fall into nihilism. He went on to say "Perceived objects exist in relation to our perceptions of them, and conceived objects exist in relation to the conceptual schemata within which they are understood." Although from this sentence I still get the impression that they are stating nothing truly exists. Would someone be able to help clarify the Gelug view for me?
I don’t think this specifically is a “Gelug” thing. I’m
Not saying different traditions don’t have different or conflicting interpretations. But this itself doesn’t appear to be a question where doctrinal disputes need to enter the picture.

“things have no inherent existence, but things do exist” is a clumsy use of language leading to a basically idiotic statement. Perhaps saying that, “things have no inherent existence, but events do occur” would provide a more accurate understanding of the point being made.
(‘exist’ vs.‘occur’ is an issue I frequently bring up).
A melody played from a saxophone occurs, but doesn’t “exist”. Why is that? Because it is a temporary event.
But all appearances of arising phenomena that we mistakenly experience as solid, as “existing” are, ultimately temporary events. Are they not?

"Perceived objects exist in relation to our perceptions of them” If you see a jet plane high up in the sky, it appears to be moving very slowly. If you were a bird and it flew past you, you would see it as very fast. We see elephants as big and mice as small only because of their relative size to humans. To an ant, a mouse is big. To a blue whale, an elephant is small. Horses eyes fool them. They see humans as being bigger than they are, which may be why they let humans ride them.

“conceived objects exist in relation to the conceptual schemata within which they are understood." It means that we have concepts about what things are or should be according to standards we have already internalized. A watermelon is red inside. But there are some watermelons that are bright yellow inside and if you’ve never seen one it’s a bit of a visual shock if you’ve only ever seen the red ones. Another example, most people on the West recognize a picture of Jesus when they see one. But how is this possible? Nobody knows what he looked like. Even the Mormon’s picture of blond European Jesus, people look at and think it’s a picture of Jesus. But because there is a concept of Jesus, we process images and impute on those images that identity.

In all of these examples, nobody is saying that the phenomena don’t occur. Rather, that although they occur, they have no intrinsic existence to them.
Thank you for your reply, that cleared up some confusion I had on a few things. I still have a few questions, so hopefully you would be able to clarify a few things or suggest some readings to explain the topic better.

The part I am confused about is how this does not fall into nihilism at the ultimate level. From your description and Malcolm's description, I understand that phenomena occur, but they have no intrinsic existence. Therefore to conventionally say nothing exists would be obvious nihilism and not true, but I am confused at how it is not nihilism at the ultimate level? I am not implying that it is nihilism, but I am having trouble understanding how it is not. Hopefully someone with more knowledge will be able to help.
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Re: Gelug Madhyamaka

Post by Malcolm »

Nicholas2727 wrote: Sat Feb 06, 2021 5:34 pm

The part I am confused about is how this does not fall into nihilism at the ultimate level. From your description and Malcolm's description, I understand that phenomena occur, but they have no intrinsic existence. Therefore to conventionally say nothing exists would be obvious nihilism and not true, but I am confused at how it is not nihilism at the ultimate level? I am not implying that it is nihilism, but I am having trouble understanding how it is not. Hopefully someone with more knowledge will be able to help.
If things existed ultimately, they would be permanent, and hence, this would be eternalism, for example, like Samkhya.
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Re: Gelug Madhyamaka

Post by Nicholas2727 »

Malcolm wrote: Sat Feb 06, 2021 6:25 pm
Nicholas2727 wrote: Sat Feb 06, 2021 5:34 pm

The part I am confused about is how this does not fall into nihilism at the ultimate level. From your description and Malcolm's description, I understand that phenomena occur, but they have no intrinsic existence. Therefore to conventionally say nothing exists would be obvious nihilism and not true, but I am confused at how it is not nihilism at the ultimate level? I am not implying that it is nihilism, but I am having trouble understanding how it is not. Hopefully someone with more knowledge will be able to help.
If things existed ultimately, they would be permanent, and hence, this would be eternalism, for example, like Samkhya.
Correct, but wouldn't the other side of that argument be, if things don't exist ultimately, they would be impermanent and hence this would be nihilism? This is the part I am having trouble understanding. At the conventional level it makes sense, but at the ultimate level I am confused.
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Re: Gelug Madhyamaka

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Nihilism would deny appearances. Appearances negate nihilism. To quote Gendun Chophel:
There are those who fear that if vases, pillars, and so on were refuted through reasoning, everyone would come to espouse nihilistic views of nonexistence. Their worries are pointless. For in the case of ordinary, everyday beings who are looking at a vase in front of them, how is it possible that a nihilistic view regarding the vase to be utterly nonexistent could arise? Even if such an outlook did happen to arise in someone, he or she would directly cognize that the vase can still be seen and touched. Therefore, if a mind naturally arose that thinks, "The vase is appearing to me, but while appearing, it is utterly nonexistent," that is the Middle Way view known as "the two-fold collection of appearance and emptiness that cognizes how appearing phenomenon do not exist in the way they appear." How is that nihilism?
Nicholas2727 wrote: Sat Feb 06, 2021 5:34 pm The part I am confused about is how this does not fall into nihilism at the ultimate level. From your description and Malcolm's description, I understand that phenomena occur, but they have no intrinsic existence. Therefore to conventionally say nothing exists would be obvious nihilism and not true, but I am confused at how it is not nihilism at the ultimate level? I am not implying that it is nihilism, but I am having trouble understanding how it is not. Hopefully someone with more knowledge will be able to help.
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Re: Gelug Madhyamaka

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Nicholas2727 wrote: Sat Feb 06, 2021 5:34 pmThe part I am confused about is how this does not fall into nihilism at the ultimate level.
In nihilism, not only is nothing existing,
but there isn’t even anything occurring.
Buddhists would argue that the events we experience are occurring. They are surely happening, but they are illusions of a sort, because they lack any “intrinsic reality” and “intrinsic reality” means some kind self-created existence, some essence of “self-ness”.
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Re: Gelug Madhyamaka

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Thank you all for your replies, that cleared up the confusion I had in regards to nihilism within Madhyamaka. Another question I have, which may also be above my capacity at the moment, is how Gelug's view enlightenment or Buddhahood? I have heard the argument from Shentongpas that if enlightenment is self-empty then it is no different from samsara. I have also heard Chan practitioners say that if enlightenment was empty it could be lost. So I am wondering what the other side to those arguments are. Hopefully I am understanding each sides argument properly, if I am not please correct me.
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Re: Gelug Madhyamaka

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Nicholas2727 wrote: Sat Feb 06, 2021 9:27 pm Thank you all for your replies, that cleared up the confusion I had in regards to nihilism within Madhyamaka. Another question I have, which may also be above my capacity at the moment, is how Gelug's view enlightenment or Buddhahood? I have heard the argument from Shentongpas that if enlightenment is self-empty then it is no different from samsara. I have also heard Chan practitioners say that if enlightenment was empty it could be lost. So I am wondering what the other side to those arguments are. Hopefully I am understanding each sides argument properly, if I am not please correct me.
Are you sure they said “no different from samsara”
did they say, “inseparable from samsara”?

There is a point frequently made, that while the conditions and circumstances are the same, regardless whether one is either unenlightened or enlightened, an enlightened person’s experience is an enlightened experience and a confused or unenlightened person’s experience is a confused (full of grasping, etc) or unenlightened experience.

It’s like me and my dog during a thunderstorm. I know the storm will pass. I enjoy it. But my dog experiences panic and worry. It’s the same storm, isn’t it? Likewise, a realized person sees samsara as lacking intrinsic reality. An unenlightened person sees everything as a self-existing entity to either like or dislike. So, that is sometimes described as nirvana and samsara being the “same”. It’s not really that the experience is identical, but rather, what is experienced is the same.
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Re: Gelug Madhyamaka

Post by Nicholas2727 »

PadmaVonSamba wrote: Sat Feb 06, 2021 10:08 pm
Nicholas2727 wrote: Sat Feb 06, 2021 9:27 pm Thank you all for your replies, that cleared up the confusion I had in regards to nihilism within Madhyamaka. Another question I have, which may also be above my capacity at the moment, is how Gelug's view enlightenment or Buddhahood? I have heard the argument from Shentongpas that if enlightenment is self-empty then it is no different from samsara. I have also heard Chan practitioners say that if enlightenment was empty it could be lost. So I am wondering what the other side to those arguments are. Hopefully I am understanding each sides argument properly, if I am not please correct me.
Are you sure they said “no different from samsara”
did they say, “inseparable from samsara”?

There is a point frequently made, that while the conditions and circumstances are the same, regardless whether one is either unenlightened or enlightened, an enlightened person’s experience is an enlightened experience and a confused or unenlightened person’s experience is a confused (full of grasping, etc) or unenlightened experience.

It’s like me and my dog during a thunderstorm. I know the storm will pass. I enjoy it. But my dog experiences panic and worry. It’s the same storm, isn’t it? Likewise, a realized person sees samsara as lacking intrinsic reality. An unenlightened person sees everything as a self-existing entity to either like or dislike. So, that is sometimes described as nirvana and samsara being the “same”. It’s not really that the experience is identical, but rather, what is experienced is the same.
Here is a quote from Khentrul Rinpoche that describes my statement of "no different from samsara"

"Thus it is not possible for buddha-nature to have even the slightest change at any one of those times. If it were possible that our buddha-nature was different during the ground, path and result, then the ultimate result, buddhahood would necessarily be impermanent and compounded. If that were so, then buddhahood would again be nothing more than suffering. It would be no different than all of the relative phenomena of samsara."

He continues with some other points throughout the book, although I am not sure if I should be filling the Gelug forum with Shentong Jonang quotes. This also strays from my original point of the post which was to try and understand different views of Madhyamaka, so hopefully I did not anger anyone.
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Re: Gelug Madhyamaka

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Nicholas2727 wrote: Sat Feb 06, 2021 10:58 pm Here is a quote from Khentrul Rinpoche that describes my statement of "no different from samsara"

"Thus it is not possible for buddha-nature to have even the slightest change at any one of those times. If it were possible that our buddha-nature was different during the ground, path and result, then the ultimate result, buddhahood would necessarily be impermanent and compounded. If that were so, then buddhahood would again be nothing more than suffering. It would be no different than all of the relative phenomena of samsara."
I’m afraid you’ve misread what he says.
So, he’s talking about Buddha nature (tathagatagharba) which is the potential for every sentient being to eventually achieve buddhahood.
...and what he’s saying is that this potential doesn’t change. It doesn’t increase or diminish because of circumstances.
...and he says that if it did change because of changing circumstances, it wouldn’t be any different than any other cause of suffering, in which case there would be no difference between samsara and nirvana.
In other words, there would be no point to the Buddhist path at all if your innate potential to become a Buddha was merely some conditional thing.
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Re: Gelug Madhyamaka

Post by Nicholas2727 »

I understand the meaning he was trying to point out now. I am afraid that I did misread this. When he mentioned Buddhahood I took it that he was referring to that state, not Buddha-nature. Thank you for the explanation and your previous comments as well, they were all very helpful
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Re: Gelug Madhyamaka

Post by Malcolm »

Nicholas2727 wrote: Sat Feb 06, 2021 6:37 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sat Feb 06, 2021 6:25 pm
Nicholas2727 wrote: Sat Feb 06, 2021 5:34 pm

The part I am confused about is how this does not fall into nihilism at the ultimate level. From your description and Malcolm's description, I understand that phenomena occur, but they have no intrinsic existence. Therefore to conventionally say nothing exists would be obvious nihilism and not true, but I am confused at how it is not nihilism at the ultimate level? I am not implying that it is nihilism, but I am having trouble understanding how it is not. Hopefully someone with more knowledge will be able to help.
If things existed ultimately, they would be permanent, and hence, this would be eternalism, for example, like Samkhya.
Correct, but wouldn't the other side of that argument be, if things don't exist ultimately, they would be impermanent and hence this would be nihilism? This is the part I am having trouble understanding. At the conventional level it makes sense, but at the ultimate level I am confused.
Things are impermanent.
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