Why is everything which is a product - impermanent ?

[PeterC]

Are we trying here to prove a negative proposition - that no things are permanent?

Surely what we should be trying to do is disprove it by finding something that *is* permanent. None of the examples given above meet that criterion.

[PadmaVonSamba]

Electron microscopes

Is there a way to know it via deduction (logical inference) ?

Even when looking at rocks, one can observe that they can be worn away by water.

Beyond that, it’s simple logic:
1. Things arise due to conditions (causes).
2. When those conditions cease, what is the result of those causes also ceases.
This is observable in practically everything.

Now, one may say, “what about volcanic rock, produced by an erupting volcano? Years after the volcano stopped erupting, the rock is still there.”
Yes, that’s true. But the erupting volcano only produced that rock in the past. It no longer provides the causes and conditions for that rock to be here at this moment.
The causes of that volcanic rock to be here at this moment include, among other things, whatever conditions have preserved it and not caused it to be destroyed.
A good example is strip mining. We normally think of a mountain as being permanent. As long as the conditions arise for that mountain to stand, then the mountain will stand. But if the conditions include strip mining machines, the mountain can be destroyed.

[sam_r]

Beyond that, it’s simple logic:
1. Things arise due to conditions (causes).
2. When those conditions cease, what is the result of those causes also ceases.
This is observable in practically everything.

(Emphazis mine).

This is not observable in everything. The individual mindstream arises due to causes and conditions. But it never ceases...

Also, I believe that this is not the point of the syllogism. The point of the syllogism, I believe, is that all phenomena that depend on causes and conditions are in a state of constant flux, never remaining the same.

Saying that a phenomena never remains the same is different from saying that ceases at some point. The mindstream never remains the same, as what it perceives in one moment is different from what it perceives in the next moment. But it never ceases, in the sense that it's continuity never being stops (as argued by Dharmakirti).

[PadmaVonSamba]

Beyond that, it’s simple logic:
1. Things arise due to conditions (causes).
2. When those conditions cease, what is the result of those causes also ceases.
This is observable in practically everything.

(Emphazis mine).

This is not observable in everything. The individual mindstream arises due to causes and conditions. But it never ceases...

Also, I believe that this is not the point of the syllogism. The point of the syllogism, I believe, is that all phenomena that depend on causes and conditions are in a state of constant flux, never remaining the same.

Saying that a phenomena never remains the same is different from saying that ceases at some point. The mindstream never remains the same, as what it perceives in one moment is different from what it perceives in the next moment. But it never ceases, in the sense that it's continuity never being stops (as argued by Dharmakirti).

All that is true. But I n being a stream,
What is being referred to is a series of momentary events.

Just as with a stream of water or a ribbon of smoke from a stick of burning incense, it is only by our own perception and our labeling, we refer to it as a solitary “thing”.

But this is precisely the point of understanding sunyata (“emptiness”), is that it’s not really a thing, in the sense that there’s nothing to actually cling to.

Every “moment” of a stream (of water, of smoke, of consciousness) does cease. This is easily proven: if you take a movie of a glowing stream, and then try to exactly match up any two frames from that movie, they will not perfectly match up. They are slightly different. We say the movie itself is a “thing” but all that term really means is that it is a collection of still images. A collection of other things. The appearance of continuous movement is an illusion.

Likewise it is with consciousness, except that the illusion of continuous movement (thus, “stream”) occurs because each moment of thought is also the cause for the next moment to arise.

Interestingly, this is also part of the argument for the occurrence of rebirth: a moment of consciousness only follows a previous moment of consciousness; consciousness cannot spontaneously arise simply from cells or cell division. Thus, it is a series of (very subtle) consciousness moments that pass from one life to the next.

It should be noted too, that the idea of “moment” is also just a label. There is no time span, even a minutely brief nanosecond that cannot be further divided. When we talk about a “moment” of thought (which some Buddhist texts, I think, describe as being something like 1/64th of a finger snap) that moment itself is composed of infinitely shorter moments.
...

[sam_r]

Every “moment” of a stream (of water, of smoke, of consciousness) does cease.

First, let's agree on a common definition of what it means "to cease". Is "come to an end" acceptible?

[Malcolm]

Every “moment” of a stream (of water, of smoke, of consciousness) does cease.

First, let's agree on a common definition of what it means "to cease". Is "come to an end" acceptible?

No, “to cease” means there is an absence of a cause. That’s it.

[PadmaVonSamba]

Every “moment” of a stream (of water, of smoke, of consciousness) does cease.

First, let's agree on a common definition of what it means "to cease". Is "come to an end" acceptible?

Before even that, let’s first come to an agreement about exactly what is arising, occurring, ceasing, or “coming to an end”.
Also, please note that there is no disputing that conventionally we can say that a stream (of something) has a beginning, a period of duration, and an end. Conventionally, we can say that a stream exists. We can even name streams of things, such as rivers. But moment to moment, as the saying goes, “you can’t stand in the same river twice.” The stream that existed a moment ago no longer exists. The movement may be continuous, but what is moving has already come and gone. “Gone” is what is meant by “ceased” or “come to an end”.

But when we are talking about the nature of composite phenomena, we are going beyond conventional appearances. Conventionally, you can look at a newly built house and it appears solid and unchanging. But over the course of time, that house will begin to shift and settle, the roof will sag, the walls will crack, and eventually it will collapse.
While it is standing, one can literally “take refuge” in it. One can rely on it as a source of shelter. But eventually, this will not be the case, because the house is made of components which are gradually, themselves, becoming unreliable.

What The Buddha is saying is that beings are always looking for something that will be a constant source of satisfaction (“happiness”) and so we pursue this object or that object. That thing, or that person or whatever.
But because those objects are composites, the conditions upon which they arise are always subject to change and cessation. For that reason, attachment to phenomena leads to suffering (a return to dissatisfaction).

Not everything in one’s lifetime is temporary. The Sun, for example, although it will burn out some day, for us it is permanent. So, there is of course a relative aspect to this. A sandwich may be very satisfying and in itself won’t be a cause for suffering. But that’s only because I know that the satisfaction from it is temporary. If I foolishly thought that by eating it, hunger would never return, then I would be in for a very disappointing surprise.
But the point that the Dharma teachings make is that this is precisely what people do, which is why there is a constant return to a state of restlessness and dissatisfaction.

[Malcolm]

Every “moment” of a stream (of water, of smoke, of consciousness) does cease.

First, let's agree on a common definition of what it means "to cease". Is "come to an end" acceptible?

Before even that, let’s first come to an agreement about exactly what is arising, occurring, ceasing, or “coming to an end”.
Also, please note that there is no disputing that conventionally we can say that a stream (of something) has a beginning, a period of duration, and an end. Conventionally, we can say that a stream exists. We can even name streams of things, such as rivers. But moment to moment, as the saying goes, “you can’t stand in the same river twice.” The stream that existed a moment ago no longer exists. The movement may be continuous, but what is moving has already come and gone. “Gone” is what is meant by “ceased” or “come to an end”.

But when we are talking about the nature of composite phenomena, we are going beyond conventional appearances. Conventionally, you can look at a newly built house and it appears solid and unchanging. But over the course of time, that house will begin to shift and settle, the roof will sag, the walls will crack, and eventually it will collapse.
While it is standing, one can literally “take refuge” in it. One can rely on it as a source of shelter. But eventually, this will not be the case, because the house is made of components which are gradually, themselves, becoming unreliable.

What The Buddha is saying is that beings are always looking for something that will be a constant source of satisfaction (“happiness”) and so we pursue this object or that object. That thing, or that person or whatever.
But because those objects are composites, the conditions upon which they arise are always subject to change and cessation.
Not everything in one’s lifetime is temporary. The Sun, for example, although it will burn out some day, for us it is permanent. So, there is of course a relative aspect to this.

You can’t stand in the same river even once.

[sam_r]

Browsing the internet, I have come across the following statements by George Dreyfus, a Western Geshe :

For example, the questioner will point to a mountain and state: “It follows that this mountain also lasts for a short moment since it is momentary.” If the defender still agrees, the questioner may point to the fact that it cannot exist just for a short moment since the mountain has been there for millions of years. He may also try to oblige his opponent to agree with blatantly counterintuitive statements. For example, he can ask: “Have you never seen any object lasting more than a moment? Have you never seen any object older than a moment? Have you never seen any person older than a moment?”

...

The defender is in a difficult position in this debate. Non-Geluk scholars would answer such a claim, which is often presented by Geluk scholars as a refutation of their views, by making a quasi-Humean distinction between the domain of reality, where duration does not exist, and the conceptual domain, where duration is necessary. In reality, there is no duration—only a succession of similar moments that create the false but useful impression that things last. True to their moderate realism, the Geluk tradition understands momentariness in a more commonsensical way. For them, a phenomenon is momentary not because it lasts only a moment but because it is composed of temporal parts and hence is in constant transformation

http://www.thlib.org/#!essay=/dreyfus/d ... ticed/all/

PadmaVonSamba, would you characterize your position as the position George Dreyfus attributes to the Geluk or to the non-Geluk? Assuming you agree with his division and distinction of course...

[PadmaVonSamba]

(edited for simplicity)

Non-Geluk scholars ...making a distinction between the domain of reality, where duration does not exist, and the conceptual domain, where duration is necessary. In reality, there is no duration—only a succession of similar moments that create the false but useful impression that things last.
The Geluk tradition understands momentariness in a more commonsensical way. For them, a phenomenon is momentary not because it lasts only a moment but because it is composed of temporal parts and hence is in constant transformation

http://www.thlib.org/#!essay=/dreyfus/d ... ticed/all/

Oh my gosh, who has time to read through all that!

PadmaVonSamba, would you characterize your position as the position George Dreyfus attributes to the Geluk or to the non-Geluk? Assuming you agree with his division and distinction of course...

I think it’s more like fractals, spirals made up of infinitely smaller spirals, which reflects the Gelug position, and what we conceive of, what we experience as temporal solidity (because of the limits of primate perception) are very large entities, the “larger spirals” you might say, which I think reflects the non-Gelug position.

A very simple way, using an every-day type of experience to appreciate this distortion, is to observe something that is moving quite rapidly, such as a jet, or a waterfall, which when seen from a distance appears to be moving very slowly. The farther away you get from an object, the more solid it appears. Likewise with astronauts observing the earth (or astronomers observing Jupiter’s Great Red Spot) who won’t see the motion of the clouds.

Similarly, if I pick up a pebble on the beach, I cannot detect any motion on or within that pebble, because in terms of scale, my sense organs are miles away from that object. With a microscope, i can get closer. I might discover its surface is teeming with all sorts of life forms. With an electron microscope, I might see that with that pebble, a entire cosmos of atoms spinning around at nearly the speed of light.

Time duration is the same way.