video of Brunnhölzl: Buddha Nature as a radical teaching

[Malcolm]

I think your translation makes the point stronger, actually. Buddhanature is not a possession. Per Higgins, Mikyo Dorje's whole point is that deluded mind doesn't become pure mind--- rather, once, the impure mind is destroyed, only the pure mind remains. So it is not that the alayavijnana is a deluded tathagatgarbha, but rather the alayavijnana IS the delusion.

So there are two minds now? One impure, the other pure? So nine consciousnesses, rather than eight? Sapan already dispensed with this absurdity. The gnyug ma sems is just the clarity aspect of the all-basis consciousness, that's the point.

This is one of the problems with tathāgatagarbha theory. You have one sūtra proclaiming it is dharmakāya encased in afflictions; another claiming it is just a name for ālayavijñāna. The Yogacārins, as Karl correctly points out, won't have anything to do with it. And then you have Tibetans with too much time on their hands trying to reconcile all these conflicting doctrines, which do not actually have to be reconciled at all.

Just stick with Prasanga. You'll be happier.

[undefineable]

Buddhanature is not a possession. Per Higgins, Mikyo Dorje's whole point is that deluded mind doesn't become pure mind--- rather, once, the impure mind is destroyed, only the pure mind remains. So it is not that the alayavijnana is a deluded tathagatgarbha, but rather the alayavijnana IS the delusion. Like the snake and the rope. When we realize the rope, we don't ask where the snake went, or how the snake became the rope.

Which is Karl's point IMO: Buddhanature isn't something within sentient beings, like a little sky inside a cloud, or a heart within a body. Rather, the sentient beings appears within the space of Buddhanature, like the cloud in the sky. This seems to be a fairly classic Shentong presentation.

It seems that this argument over distinguishing between Buddha[-nature] and sentient being can be fairly supported on either side without predicating either a difference in the basic reality of things ('dharmata' if you understand this in a related way perhaps), or a difference in the philosophical framework used(e.g. shentong v. rangtong). A difference in perspective, in other words

Alayavijnana may seem to be another matter, since it's widely agreed that -in some manner of speaking- it doesn't survive enlightenment. How does this square with the view that the correct view of 'rope' remains after the "alayavijnana delusion" of 'snake' vanishes? If the alaya is indeed some kind of 'repository' for karma (see https://www.rigpawiki.org/index.php?tit ... sciousness etc.), then wouldn't it be something that's simply abandoned, the abandonment contributing to the 'extinction' of rebirth at parinirvana-?

I'm not criticising your analogy - just suspecting that there's a reason you picked it that I'm not aware of. The Mipham Rinpoche quote on the {concise!} link above isn't clear (hence my emphasis) whether alaya (like the skandhas) effectively 'switches mode' at enlightenment:

The state of consciousness that is mere clarity and knowing, which does not veer off into an active sense cognition, and which is the support of habitual tendencies

.

It's all going to hinge on what functions you ascribe to alayavijnana - For instance, if it's the empty, penetrative clarity of mind's nature, then wouldn't Buddhas still 'need' their alaya alongside their [human] bodies?

[Malcolm]

Alayavijnana may seem to be another matter, since it's widely agreed that -in some manner of speaking- it doesn't survive enlightenment.

There are two ways to understand this: one is that ālayavijñāna vanishes when the seeds it contains are exhausted (Vasubandu in Karmasiddhiprakarana). The other is that it undergoes a transformation into gnosis, along with the other skandhas. They are not discarded, they are subject to a "a transformation in the basis" or as Karl has it, "a fundamental change" (āśrayaparivṛitti). His section on ālayavijñāna in the introduction to his translation of the Mahāyāna Samgraha is worth reading. Also the relationship between dharmakāya and ālayavijñāna is discussed in chapter 10 of the MS, pg. 238. The main problem with Yogacāra that everyone points out, is that there is a internal contradiction when one claims something compounded (the ālayavijñāna) transforms into something uncompounded (the dharmakāya).

In short, the one cannot really appreciate the nuances of Yogacara, tathāgatagarbha theory from soundbites of videos of scholars on the internet. Its not even responsible to present these teachings in that way.

[Matt J]

So there are two minds now? One impure, the other pure? So nine consciousnesses, rather than eight? Sapan already dispensed with this absurdity. The gnyug ma sems is just the clarity aspect of the all-basis consciousness, that's the point.

That's Mikyo Dorje's formulation, not mine. The problem is IMO that Tibetans try to transform phenomenological, non-conceptual descriptions into concrete, conceptual philosophy. Mikyo Dorje has one. Ju Mipham has another (that may be intellectually more satisfying from some). But at the end of the day, these are just words and typically do not reflect the practical teachings.

This is one of the problems with tathāgatagarbha theory. You have one sūtra proclaiming it is dharmakāya encased in afflictions; another claiming it is just a name for ālayavijñāna. The Yogacārins, as Karl correctly points out, won't have anything to do with it. And then you have Tibetans with too much time on their hands trying to reconcile all these conflicting doctrines, which do not actually have to be reconciled at all.

Karl sets forth this a critique from Sakya Chogden in his commentary on the Dharamdhatustava"if actual buddhahood existed just through what is called "natural buddhahood," one would assert the philosophical system of the Samkhyas. For then, during the time of sentient beings, buddhahood would reside in them in a nonmanifest way and would [just] need to be made clearly manifest through the power of the path later."

When asked about this, Thrangu Rinpoche reportedly said "if you do not practice these teachings on buddha nature, the mere view is just like the Samkhya position." Karl writes :[t]hus, from a practical point of view, no matter how sophisticated the terminological or philosophical distinctions with regard to the Buddha heart may be formulated or conceived, for Buddhists, the whole point of these teachings is to personally connect with the experience and realization that they try to convey through the Buddhist path, that is, nothing less than discovering this Heart in themselves and becoming Buddhas. "

Just stick with Prasanga. You'll be happier.

You mean nihilism?

Just kidding!

I don't get why we can't appreciate different presentations without needing to assert the superiority of one over the other, or reducing one into the other.

[Matt J]

I'm not sponsoring the view as applied to alayavijnana per se-- I haven't really heard it taught in that way and I don't really know much about it. I just got sucked into this because I thought Karl's initial point was fairly unsurprising. However, SY was putting forth a slightly different position that appears to be based on Mikyo Dorje, which I thought was unsupportable but evidently not.

The point of the snake-rope analogy generally is because once the illusion is removed, there is nothing left to be done. You don't remove the snake then create, build, or cultivate the rope. Nor is there nothing at all.

I'm not criticising your analogy - just suspecting that there's a reason you picked it that I'm not aware of. The Mipham Rinpoche quote on the {concise!} link above isn't clear (hence my emphasis) whether alaya (like the skandhas) effectively 'switches mode' at enlightenment:

The state of consciousness that is mere clarity and knowing, which does not veer off into an active sense cognition, and which is the support of habitual tendencies

.

It's all going to hinge on what functions you ascribe to alayavijnana - For instance, if it's the empty, penetrative clarity of mind's nature, then wouldn't Buddhas still 'need' their alaya alongside their [human] bodies?

[Malcolm]

I don't get why we can't appreciate different presentations without needing to assert the superiority of one over the other, or reducing one into the other.

We can, but Candrakīrti's presentation is the best, when all is said and done.

I don't study these things for their aesthetics, though there is much that is aesthetically pleasing in Yogacāra theory. I study these things for my practice. And the traditions in which I practice, Sakya and Dzogchen, for many reasons, find Madhyamaka to be the definitive Mahāyāna view. Also the Indian Buddhist tantras show a clear bias towards Madhyamaka.

Anyway, you quote Shakya Chogden, you should always remember that Shakya Chogden's view was kicked out of Sakya by the protector Caturmukha Mahākāla in favor of Gorampa's. And in truth it is not even clear that gshan stong was really his final view. It's been speculated that since his main sponsors were Kagyus, he was writing for his audience.

Actually, the problem with Tibetans, and I have said this before, is that because Ratnakāraśānti asserted in his Madhyamaka texts that Asanga was a third stage bodhisattva and Nāgārjuna was a first stage bodhisattva, and also the main translator of them, Śantibhadra, was hostile to Candrakīrti's school, there has been a push amongst Tibetans to reconcile the treatises of Maitreya and Nāgarjuna.

Personally, I see no need to reconcile Madhyamaka with Yogacāra, since the former is higher than the latter; and even Karl admits that the gzhan stong approach to the three natures, for example, is not precedented in the Indian traditions from which the gzhan stong school draws its inspiration.

[Malcolm]

The point of the snake-rope analogy generally is because once the illusion is removed, there is nothing left to be done. You don't remove the snake then create, build, or cultivate the rope. Nor is there nothing at all.

Yes there is, then you examine the rope. If you don't, well, you haven't finished your job. You are settling for another appearance, true relative truth, instead of false relative truth, but still not ultimate truth.

[Johnny Dangerous]

So there are two minds now? One impure, the other pure? So nine consciousnesses, rather than eight? Sapan already dispensed with this absurdity. The gnyug ma sems is just the clarity aspect of the all-basis consciousness, that's the point.

That's Mikyo Dorje's formulation, not mine. The problem is IMO that Tibetans try to transform phenomenological, non-conceptual descriptions into concrete, conceptual philosophy. Mikyo Dorje has one. Ju Mipham has another (that may be intellectually more satisfying from some). But at the end of the day, these are just words and typically do not reflect the practical teachings.

This is one of the problems with tathāgatagarbha theory. You have one sūtra proclaiming it is dharmakāya encased in afflictions; another claiming it is just a name for ālayavijñāna. The Yogacārins, as Karl correctly points out, won't have anything to do with it. And then you have Tibetans with too much time on their hands trying to reconcile all these conflicting doctrines, which do not actually have to be reconciled at all.

Karl sets forth this a critique from Sakya Chogden in his commentary on the Dharamdhatustava"if actual buddhahood existed just through what is called "natural buddhahood," one would assert the philosophical system of the Samkhyas. For then, during the time of sentient beings, buddhahood would reside in them in a nonmanifest way and would [just] need to be made clearly manifest through the power of the path later."

When asked about this, Thrangu Rinpoche reportedly said "if you do not practice these teachings on buddha nature, the mere view is just like the Samkhya position." Karl writes :[t]hus, from a practical point of view, no matter how sophisticated the terminological or philosophical distinctions with regard to the Buddha heart may be formulated or conceived, for Buddhists, the whole point of these teachings is to personally connect with the experience and realization that they try to convey through the Buddhist path, that is, nothing less than discovering this Heart in themselves and becoming Buddhas. "

Just stick with Prasanga. You'll be happier.

You mean nihilism?

Just kidding!

I don't get why we can't appreciate different presentations without needing to assert the superiority of one over the other, or reducing one into the other.

Same here. I feel like at different times different presentations have helped my practice, but picking one as some forever -definitive view above all the other views isn’t a thing that attracts me in particular, because for me all the argumentation and assertion is annoying and pulls me away from simple things like maintaining presence in daily life.

I try to learn them as best I can and apply what I learn, but I’ve found it’s bad for my practice to somehow assert to myself that one is true and others are false, it’s just not a thing that I care about that much. The less I get all personally invested in the battle the better my practice seems to go.

Everyone is different though, I have a good Dharma brother I really respect whose practice is mostly this sort of dialectical approach, and it is an approach with some history behind it too.

It ain’t my bag, but as that same Dharma friend says “someone is always that guy no matter who we are.

[Malcolm]

So there are two minds now? One impure, the other pure? So nine consciousnesses, rather than eight? Sapan already dispensed with this absurdity. The gnyug ma sems is just the clarity aspect of the all-basis consciousness, that's the point.

That's Mikyo Dorje's formulation, not mine.

Yes, I am pointing out this this idea has already been negated, and that there is no doubt Mikyo Dorje is aware of this.

And I not sure, in this little sound bite exchange, if this is really representative of Mikyo Dorje's views. As I understand things, Mikyo Dorje went through a number of shifts in his life, like Shakya Chogden, Tsongkhapa, Dolbupa, etc.

[Malcolm]

Same here. I feel like at different times different presentations have helped my practice, but picking one as some forever -definitive view above all the other views isn’t a thing that attracts me in particular, because for me all the argumentation and assertion is annoying and pulls me away from simple things like maintaining presence in daily life.

Well, you see here we are talking about a tenet system. Even though Karl can claim this is about practice, it isn't. It is about analyzing texts and what they say, and my point, is that these issues are too intricate and complicated to be well addressed by the presentations of sound bites.

[Schrödinger’s Yidam]

As Khenpo Tsultrim has pointed out, all forms of Mahayana claim to be able to sit in uncontrived emptiness. And it is my understanding they also share the idea that the Ultimate is ineffable.

So all this blah blah blah is merely temporary support and guidance. And, depending on our group and/or individual karmic trajectories, the orientation and guidance may differ as is appropriate for each of us. So don’t sweat the differences.

Or, more simply put, if the shoe fits wear it.

[Matt J]

I disagree--- these are clearly descriptions of practice that can be verified first hand, not intellectual positions to be believed. They are just put into a specific conceptual framework.

I don't get why we can't appreciate different presentations without needing to assert the superiority of one over the other, or reducing one into the other.

We can, but Candrakīrti's presentation is the best, when all is said and done.

I don't study these things for their aesthetics, though there is much that is aesthetically pleasing in Yogacāra theory. I study these things for my practice. And the traditions in which I practice, Sakya and Dzogchen, for many reasons, find Madhyamaka to be the definitive Mahāyāna view. Also the Indian Buddhist tantras show a clear bias towards Madhyamaka.

[Johnny Dangerous]

Same here. I feel like at different times different presentations have helped my practice, but picking one as some forever -definitive view above all the other views isn’t a thing that attracts me in particular, because for me all the argumentation and assertion is annoying and pulls me away from simple things like maintaining presence in daily life.

Well, you see here we are talking about a tenet system. Even though Karl can claim this is about practice, it isn't. It is about analyzing texts and what they say, and my point, is that these issues are too intricate and complicated to be well addressed by the presentations of sound bites.

Naw, it’s about a lot more than analyzing texts for me, though they can certainly be part of it. Exactitude in language only goes so far, though sure it can be vital at certain times.

[tobes]

I also think they're very complementary, and if one is practicing rather than intellectualising, a lot of these apparent inconsistencies dissolve into irrelevancy.

I thought it was interesting how Jay Garfield - who as we all know has been schooled in Gelug Prasangika with special emphasis on Chandrakirti - recently took a bit of a Yogacaran turn. I haven't listened to all of the lectures, but the gist of it is: Yogacara gives more detail on the subjective-phenonemological side, which is generally quite implicit in Madhyamaka.

[Johnny Dangerous]

I also think they're very complementary, and if one is practicing rather than intellectualising, a lot of these apparent inconsistencies dissolve into irrelevancy.

I thought it was interesting how Jay Garfield - who as we all know has been schooled in Gelug Prasangika with special emphasis on Chandrakirti - recently took a bit of a Yogacaran turn. I haven't listened to all of the lectures, but the gist of it is: Yogacara gives more detail on the subjective-phenonemological side, which is generally quite implicit in Madhyamaka.

One of my Sakya teachers once told me that for people primarily focused on meditation the view to get comfortable with initially is Yogcara, and to develop other studies after that.

[Schrödinger’s Yidam]

…and my point, is that these issues are too intricate and complicated to be well addressed by the presentations of sound bites.

The Brunnhölzl video is from the Tsadra Foundation website that is focused on Buddha Nature. They have staff person that will answer questions for free. His credentials are quite good.

Lopen (Dr) Karma Phuntsho is one of Bhutan’s leading intellectuals. He finished his monastic training in Bhutan and India before he pursued a M.St in Classical Indian Religions and a D.Phil in Oriental Studies at Balliol College, Oxford. He was a researcher at CNRS, Paris, a Research Associate in the Department of Social Anthropology at Cambridge University, and the Spalding Fellow for Comparative Religion at Clare Hall, Cambridge University. He was also a Research Consultant at University of Virginia.
An author of over one hundred books and articles including the authoritative History of Bhutan and Mipham’s Dialectics and the Debates on Emptiness, he speaks and writes extensively on Bhutan and Buddhism. His work has received extensive media coverage by the BBC, BBS, Kuensel, The Bhutanese, Science, Radio Free Asia, Oxford Today, Times of India, India Today, and Channel News Asia. He is also the President and founder of Loden Foundation, a leading educational, entrepreneurial, and cultural initiative in Bhutan. He is currently based in Thimphu, Bhutan. Read a complete bio on Wikipedia.

Here’s the link to ask him a question.
https://buddhanature.tsadra.org/index. ... residence
Tsadra Foundation leans Karma Kagyu, but they do try to be Rime. But as of this post I can’t say what his bias would be, if any.

[Malcolm]

The Brunnhölzl video is from the Tsadra Foundation website that is focused on Buddha Nature. They have staff person that will answer questions for free. His credentials are quite good.

The point I am making is that you seem to think that these issues, which come from long, complicated texts, with complex intellectual histories, can be encapsulated in sound bites.

But they can’t.

[Malcolm]

I also think they're very complementary, and if one is practicing rather than intellectualising, a lot of these apparent inconsistencies dissolve into irrelevancy.

I thought it was interesting how Jay Garfield - who as we all know has been schooled in Gelug Prasangika with special emphasis on Chandrakirti - recently took a bit of a Yogacaran turn. I haven't listened to all of the lectures, but the gist of it is: Yogacara gives more detail on the subjective-phenonemological side, which is generally quite implicit in Madhyamaka.

The Madhyamaka school has always focused more on view, whereas the Yogacara school focuses more on the path — this is obvious from looking at their respective texts. This is not news.

As for Jay, he is expert in Western Philosophy, including Bishop Berkeley’s idealism, and has been teaching the latter at Sarnath to Tibetans there for almost three decades. His interest in Yogacara idealism is longstanding, not nascent. We are acquainted as he and my late father were colleagues at Smith College.

[Schrödinger’s Yidam]

The Brunnhölzl video is from the Tsadra Foundation website that is focused on Buddha Nature. They have staff person that will answer questions for free. His credentials are quite good.

The point I am making is that you seem to think that these issues, which come from long, complicated texts, with complex intellectual histories, can be encapsulated in sound bites.

But they can’t.

My doctor doesn’t have to put me through med school to tell me what’s wrong with me. He summarizes it.

So I posted a link to a reputable source that has expertise in the subjects. I’ve not had direct contact, but he’s there to answer questions. Somebody might find that useful.

[Malcolm]

Same here. I feel like at different times different presentations have helped my practice, but picking one as some forever -definitive view above all the other views isn’t a thing that attracts me in particular, because for me all the argumentation and assertion is annoying and pulls me away from simple things like maintaining presence in daily life.

Well, you see here we are talking about a tenet system. Even though Karl can claim this is about practice, it isn't. It is about analyzing texts and what they say, and my point, is that these issues are too intricate and complicated to be well addressed by the presentations of sound bites.

Naw, it’s about a lot more than analyzing texts for me, though they can certainly be part of it. Exactitude in language only goes so far, though sure it can be vital at certain times.

When we are discussing a complicated treatise such as the one this sound bite has been extracted, it is pure dilettantism to imagine one has understood the entirety of the thought of a sophisticated scholar like Mikyo Dorje based on such a snippet, especially a scholar whose work demonstrates a marked shift in views over several decades.