Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

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Astus
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Astus »

Malcolm wrote: Fri Apr 09, 2021 9:22 pmSo which comes first, appearance or convention?
First for what?
1 Myriad dharmas are only mind.
Mind is unobtainable.
What is there to seek?

2 If the Buddha-Nature is seen,
there will be no seeing of a nature in any thing.

3 Neither cultivation nor seated meditation —
this is the pure Chan of Tathagata.

4 With sudden enlightenment to Tathagata Chan,
the six paramitas and myriad means
are complete within that essence.


1 Huangbo, T2012Ap381c1 2 Nirvana Sutra, T374p521b3; tr. Yamamoto 3 Mazu, X1321p3b23; tr. J. Jia 4 Yongjia, T2014p395c14; tr. from "The Sword of Wisdom"
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Malcolm »

Astus wrote: Fri Apr 09, 2021 10:02 pm
Malcolm wrote: Fri Apr 09, 2021 9:22 pmSo which comes first, appearance or convention?
First for what?
Do appearances arise from conventional designations, or are conventional designations made on the basis of appearances?
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Astus
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Astus »

Malcolm wrote: Fri Apr 09, 2021 10:20 pmDo appearances arise from conventional designations, or are conventional designations made on the basis of appearances?
Without further specifications they are practically synonyms, so one preceding the other is not an option.
1 Myriad dharmas are only mind.
Mind is unobtainable.
What is there to seek?

2 If the Buddha-Nature is seen,
there will be no seeing of a nature in any thing.

3 Neither cultivation nor seated meditation —
this is the pure Chan of Tathagata.

4 With sudden enlightenment to Tathagata Chan,
the six paramitas and myriad means
are complete within that essence.


1 Huangbo, T2012Ap381c1 2 Nirvana Sutra, T374p521b3; tr. Yamamoto 3 Mazu, X1321p3b23; tr. J. Jia 4 Yongjia, T2014p395c14; tr. from "The Sword of Wisdom"
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Malcolm »

Astus wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 11:16 am
Malcolm wrote: Fri Apr 09, 2021 10:20 pmDo appearances arise from conventional designations, or are conventional designations made on the basis of appearances?
Without further specifications they are practically synonyms, so one preceding the other is not an option.
Wrong answer.
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Schrödinger’s Yidam »

You two guys deserve your own forum.
1.The problem isn’t ‘ignorance’. The problem is the mind you have right now. (H.H. Karmapa XVII @NYC 2/4/18)
2. I support Mingyur R and HHDL in their positions against lama abuse.
3. Student: Lama, I thought I might die but then I realized that the 3 Jewels would protect me.
Lama: Even If you had died the 3 Jewels would still have protected you. (DW post by Fortyeightvows)
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Astus
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Astus »

Malcolm wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 11:59 am Wrong answer.
Which appearance isn't a convention? Which convention isn't an appearance?
1 Myriad dharmas are only mind.
Mind is unobtainable.
What is there to seek?

2 If the Buddha-Nature is seen,
there will be no seeing of a nature in any thing.

3 Neither cultivation nor seated meditation —
this is the pure Chan of Tathagata.

4 With sudden enlightenment to Tathagata Chan,
the six paramitas and myriad means
are complete within that essence.


1 Huangbo, T2012Ap381c1 2 Nirvana Sutra, T374p521b3; tr. Yamamoto 3 Mazu, X1321p3b23; tr. J. Jia 4 Yongjia, T2014p395c14; tr. from "The Sword of Wisdom"
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Malcolm »

Astus wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 2:10 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 11:59 am Wrong answer.
Which appearance isn't a convention? Which convention isn't an appearance?
This point is explained correctly by Gorampa. In brief, conventions do not generate appearances, for example, calling the appearance of sand “water” does not change that appearance into water. First there an appearance, then there is a conventional designation.
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Natan »

You can see a tree and climb it before knowing it's called a "tree."
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by SilenceMonkey »

Is it like this?

Authentic relative truth: direct perception of appearances
Confused relative truth: deluded perception of appearances, adding all sorts of conceptual elaborations (ie. conventions)
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Malcolm »

SilenceMonkey wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 3:48 pm Is it like this?

Authentic relative truth: direct perception of appearances
Confused relative truth: deluded perception of appearances, adding all sorts of conceptual elaborations (ie. conventions)
Functionality is how conventions are defined. Example, though no car can be found in the appearance that is the basis of conventional designation of a car, in its parts, one of its parts, or separate from them, that appearance is a car if it functions like a car.
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by fckw »

Könchok Chödrak wrote: Thu Apr 08, 2021 7:39 am [Mod note: edit] We say “we all have Buddha Nature”. What is this ”we”? After we erase the “I” are we going to erase the “we”? Eventually it must be understood that there are Real Transcendental activities for the individual after liberation, and that there still is an individual, even after many lifetimes of self-negation.
Nobody addressed this.

It never made much sense to me how Buddhism apparently finds it totally acceptable to assume the definition of "individual minds" while going on and negating the existence of any such thing as jiva, atman and the like.
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Malcolm »

fckw wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 4:39 pm
Könchok Chödrak wrote: Thu Apr 08, 2021 7:39 am [Mod note: edit] We say “we all have Buddha Nature”. What is this ”we”? After we erase the “I” are we going to erase the “we”? Eventually it must be understood that there are Real Transcendental activities for the individual after liberation, and that there still is an individual, even after many lifetimes of self-negation.
Nobody addressed this.

It never made much sense to me how Buddhism apparently finds it totally acceptable to assume the definition of "individual minds" while going on and negating the existence of any such thing as jiva, atman and the like.
Buddhism does not define “individual minds” as such, but rather discrete, momentary continuums which arise from their own causes and conditions. In short, jivas, pudgalas, atmans, etc., do not function as defined by their proponents, so they are negated.
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by fckw »

Malcolm wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 4:43 pm
fckw wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 4:39 pm
Könchok Chödrak wrote: Thu Apr 08, 2021 7:39 am [Mod note: edit] We say “we all have Buddha Nature”. What is this ”we”? After we erase the “I” are we going to erase the “we”? Eventually it must be understood that there are Real Transcendental activities for the individual after liberation, and that there still is an individual, even after many lifetimes of self-negation.
Nobody addressed this.

It never made much sense to me how Buddhism apparently finds it totally acceptable to assume the definition of "individual minds" while going on and negating the existence of any such thing as jiva, atman and the like.
Buddhism does not define “individual minds” as such, but rather discrete, momentary continuums which arise from their own causes and conditions.
This still does not define where the "discretion" comes from or where it resides in. The continua might not have individuality in the sense of the vedic position, that's true, but they are still "particulars" or "discrete" or however we want to call them, i.e. distinct from each other. Hence, there's a "discretization process" at work which remains unexplained.
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Queequeg »

fckw wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 4:49 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 4:43 pm
fckw wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 4:39 pm
Nobody addressed this.

It never made much sense to me how Buddhism apparently finds it totally acceptable to assume the definition of "individual minds" while going on and negating the existence of any such thing as jiva, atman and the like.
Buddhism does not define “individual minds” as such, but rather discrete, momentary continuums which arise from their own causes and conditions.
This still does not define where the "discretion" comes from or where it resides in. The continua might not have individuality in the sense of the vedic position, that's true, but they are still "particulars" or "discrete" or however we want to call them, i.e. distinct from each other. Hence, there's a "discretization process" at work which remains unexplained.
This may not be helpful and feel free to ignore.

Conceptualize a 3 axis, 3 dimensional graph. The origin has no absolute location. It is relatively defined against itself. Conceptually, every point on that graph could conceivably be another origin.

Individuation is merely the identification of an origin. Everything else, all other dharmas are mapped in relation to the origin, each of which is theoretically another origin.

In other words, individuality is the nexus of the sum of causes and conditions that define that nexus. No two nexi are the same.
There is no suffering to be severed. Ignorance and klesas are indivisible from bodhi. There is no cause of suffering to be abandoned. Since extremes and the false are the Middle and genuine, there is no path to be practiced. Samsara is nirvana. No severance achieved. No suffering nor its cause. No path, no end. There is no transcendent realm; there is only the one true aspect. There is nothing separate from the true aspect.
-Guanding, Perfect and Sudden Contemplation,
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Malcolm »

fckw wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 4:49 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 4:43 pm
fckw wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 4:39 pm
Nobody addressed this.

It never made much sense to me how Buddhism apparently finds it totally acceptable to assume the definition of "individual minds" while going on and negating the existence of any such thing as jiva, atman and the like.
Buddhism does not define “individual minds” as such, but rather discrete, momentary continuums which arise from their own causes and conditions.
This still does not define where the "discretion" comes from or where it resides in. The continua might not have individuality in the sense of the vedic position, that's true, but they are still "particulars" or "discrete" or however we want to call them, i.e. distinct from each other. Hence, there's a "discretization process" at work which remains unexplained.
Things appear to be discrete, so we label them “discrete.” If things appear to be nondiscrete, we are not able to label them as discrete. For example, from a distance a mountain does not appear to be composed of discrete parts, so we label that appearance “mountain.” When we get closer, we see there are many parts, and what was formally labeled a mountain gets redefined into slopes, peaks, ravines, and so on. When we meet someone, we label that person a self, a person, a living being, but these labels attached to appearances will not bear analysis. It’s the same with mental continuum’s, even the notion of mental continuum will not bear ultimate analysis, but since the cause and result of karma, etc., appear to be discrete, mind streams are, conventionally speaking, discrete, because there is an observable function.. If we wish to aggregate minds, we refer to all consciousnesses as the dhatu of consciousness, just as we refer to aggregated elements as the space dhatu, etc.
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by fckw »

Malcolm wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 5:05 pm
fckw wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 4:49 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 4:43 pm

Buddhism does not define “individual minds” as such, but rather discrete, momentary continuums which arise from their own causes and conditions.
This still does not define where the "discretion" comes from or where it resides in. The continua might not have individuality in the sense of the vedic position, that's true, but they are still "particulars" or "discrete" or however we want to call them, i.e. distinct from each other. Hence, there's a "discretization process" at work which remains unexplained.
Things appear to be discrete, so we label them “discrete.” If things appear to be nondiscrete, we are not able to label them as discrete. For example, from a distance a mountain does not appear to be composed of discrete parts, so we label that appearance “mountain.” When we get closer, we see there are many parts, and what was formally labeled a mountain gets redefined into slopes, peaks, ravines, and so on. When we meet someone, we label that person a self, a person, a living being, but these labels attached to appearances will not bear analysis. It’s the same with mental continuum’s, even the notion of mental continuum will not bear ultimate analysis, but since the cause and result of karma, etc., appear to be discrete, mind streams are, conventionally speaking, discrete, because there is an observable function.. If we wish to aggregate minds, we refer to all consciousnesses as the dhatu of consciousness, just as we refer to aggregated elements as the space dhatu, etc.
This in turn presumes the existence of an "observer" (or "knower" or "knowing capacity" comparable to rigpa or whatever) who observes mind to either take a discretionary or an aggregate position, but we are not able to determine if the "observer/knower/knowing capacity" is itself a discrete or an aggregate, because in order to decide we'd need a second observer observing the first one (infinite regress), or state that the "observer/knower/knowing capacity" can know itself (identity argument, which does not really explain anything), or state that the "observer/knower/knowing capacity" can both appear in the role of subject and object at the same time knowing itself by itself, which (might potentially make a lot of sense as a meditation instruction but from the perspective of formal logic) is not really anything else than a circular argument.

This implies: We don't know whether the "observer/knower/knowing capacity" is actually "one" or "many", because it is at the root of making such discretions. In the absence of this knowledge someone might actually argue that this knowing capacity is exactly same as "self". And what position could anyone take to refute it (or to confirm it, for that matter)? We are operating here at a position prior to the discretization function we posited before.
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Malcolm »

fckw wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 6:25 pm
This implies: We don't know whether the "observer/knower/knowing capacity" is actually "one" or "many", because it is at the root of making such discretions. In the absence of this knowledge someone might actually argue that this knowing capacity is exactly same as "self". And what position could anyone take to refute it (or to confirm it, for that matter)? We are operating here at a position prior to the discretization function we posited before.
The argument that a knower is a self has already been advanced and dismantled in Buddhist texts. If a knower can have many cognitions, it already has many parts and cannot be a unitary or an integral entity. We are therefore not operating here at a position prior to recognizing discrete entities, the very fact that our minds (citta) are variegated (citra) proves the mind is not an integral entity, proves it is made of parts, and since those cognitions happen sequentially, this proves the mind is also impermanent, momentary, and dependent. So, it is impossible for a conventional knower to be a self.
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by PadmaVonSamba »

Malcolm wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 2:25 pm
Astus wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 2:10 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 11:59 am Wrong answer.
Which appearance isn't a convention? Which convention isn't an appearance?
This point is explained correctly by Gorampa. In brief, conventions do not generate appearances, for example, calling the appearance of sand “water” does not change that appearance into water. First there an appearance, then there is a conventional designation.
This is also supported by the fact that otherwise nothing could appear as a totally unprecedented experience. For example, sweet, salty, sour, are all conventional designations of sensations to the tongue. If you had never tasted hot pepper, didn’t even know that such a sensation could even occur,
then tasting its “palatable appearance” for the first time would occur even though you had no conventional designation for it.
EMPTIFUL.
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Volan »

According to Nagarjuna`s Madhyamakakàrikà chapter 18, verse 9, on the ultimate level there is neither atman nor anatman, because both of them are the results of prapanca. One has to get rid of prapanca during the meditative equipoise to get the direct experience of the ultimate.

On the relative level it`s normal to designate one of the 5 skandhas as "me". The goal of Buddhism is to get rid of experiencing it as something permanent - one moment you designate your visual consciousness as "me", next moment it will be your tongue, but it has never existed there. It`s a designation by one`s manas, as Kalupahana says, "the faculty which is responsible for the formulation of the metaphysical ideas of self and substance".
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Astus »

Malcolm wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 2:25 pmIn brief, conventions do not generate appearances, for example, calling the appearance of sand “water” does not change that appearance into water. First there an appearance, then there is a conventional designation.
How is that not like the Abhidharma view that takes dharmas as paramartha, and how is it consolidated with statements like this one:

'Since the Buddhas have stated
That the world is conditioned by ignorance,
So why is it not reasonable [to assert]
That this world is [a result of] conceptualization?'

(Yuktisastika 37, tr Geshe Thupten Jinpa; cf. Yuktisastika 33-34; Acintyastava 6, 35, 44; Lokatitastava 19)
1 Myriad dharmas are only mind.
Mind is unobtainable.
What is there to seek?

2 If the Buddha-Nature is seen,
there will be no seeing of a nature in any thing.

3 Neither cultivation nor seated meditation —
this is the pure Chan of Tathagata.

4 With sudden enlightenment to Tathagata Chan,
the six paramitas and myriad means
are complete within that essence.


1 Huangbo, T2012Ap381c1 2 Nirvana Sutra, T374p521b3; tr. Yamamoto 3 Mazu, X1321p3b23; tr. J. Jia 4 Yongjia, T2014p395c14; tr. from "The Sword of Wisdom"
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