Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Malcolm
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Malcolm »

Astus wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 8:51 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 2:25 pmIn brief, conventions do not generate appearances, for example, calling the appearance of sand “water” does not change that appearance into water. First there an appearance, then there is a conventional designation.
How is that not like the Abhidharma view that takes dharmas as paramartha, and how is it consolidated with statements like this one:

'Since the Buddhas have stated
That the world is conditioned by ignorance,
So why is it not reasonable [to assert]
That this world is [a result of] conceptualization?'

(Yuktisastika 37, tr Geshe Thupten Jinpa; cf. Yuktisastika 33-34; Acintyastava 6, 35, 44; Lokatitastava 19)
Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛitti states:

“Mundane conventional designations are engagements of the mundane, that is to say, having the characteristics of cognitions and objects of cognition, but do not have the characteristic of verbalizations because of being described subsequent to those [cognitions].”

Gorampa adds:

Therefore all those objects and everything defined on those from the perspective of appearing to a mundane mind is said to be the meaning of defining the relative through the perspective of convention.
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Astus »

Malcolm wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 9:04 pm Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛitti states:

“Mundane conventional designations are engagements of the mundane, that is to say, having the characteristics of cognitions and objects of cognition, but do not have the characteristic of verbalizations because of being described subsequent to those [cognitions].”

Gorampa adds:

Therefore all those objects and everything defined on those from the perspective of appearing to a mundane mind is said to be the meaning of defining the relative through the perspective of convention.
How does that support the claim that first there are appearances and only then conventions? Appearances are conventional according to Jnanakirti, he simply makes a distinction there between cognition and verbalisation.
1 Myriad dharmas are only mind.
Mind is unobtainable.
What is there to seek?

2 If the Buddha-Nature is seen,
there will be no seeing of a nature in any thing.

3 Neither cultivation nor seated meditation —
this is the pure Chan of Tathagata.

4 With sudden enlightenment to Tathagata Chan,
the six paramitas and myriad means
are complete within that essence.


1 Huangbo, T2012Ap381c1 2 Nirvana Sutra, T374p521b3; tr. Yamamoto 3 Mazu, X1321p3b23; tr. J. Jia 4 Yongjia, T2014p395c14; tr. from "The Sword of Wisdom"
Malcolm
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Malcolm »

Astus wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 10:01 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 9:04 pm Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛitti states:

“Mundane conventional designations are engagements of the mundane, that is to say, having the characteristics of cognitions and objects of cognition, but do not have the characteristic of verbalizations because of being described subsequent to those [cognitions].”

Gorampa adds:

Therefore all those objects and everything defined on those from the perspective of appearing to a mundane mind is said to be the meaning of defining the relative through the perspective of convention.
How does that support the claim that first there are appearances and only then conventions? Appearances are conventional according to Jnanakirti, he simply makes a distinction there between cognition and verbalisation.
because of being described subsequent to those [cognitions]. The argument takes aim at the Geluk idea that appearances are derived from conventions themselves.
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by SilenceMonkey »

Malcolm wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 10:17 pm The argument takes aim at the Geluk idea that appearances are derived from conventions themselves.
Why would Geluks say that?

Also, by "convention" are we talking about names and language (མིང་ ming)?
Malcolm
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Malcolm »

SilenceMonkey wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 11:32 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 10:17 pm The argument takes aim at the Geluk idea that appearances are derived from conventions themselves.
Why would Geluks say that?

Also, by "convention" are we talking about names and language (མིང་ ming)?
You should read Gorampa. He explains it very clearly.
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by SilenceMonkey »

Malcolm wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 2:20 am
SilenceMonkey wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 11:32 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 10:17 pm The argument takes aim at the Geluk idea that appearances are derived from conventions themselves.
Why would Geluks say that?

Also, by "convention" are we talking about names and language (མིང་ ming)?
You should read Gorampa. He explains it very clearly.
One day. Mipham first! :tongue:
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Malcolm »

SilenceMonkey wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 2:42 am
Malcolm wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 2:20 am
SilenceMonkey wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 11:32 pm

Why would Geluks say that?

Also, by "convention" are we talking about names and language (མིང་ ming)?
You should read Gorampa. He explains it very clearly.
One day. Mipham first! :tongue:
Mipham depends quite heavily on Gorampa.
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by SilenceMonkey »

Malcolm wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 3:00 am
SilenceMonkey wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 2:42 am
Malcolm wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 2:20 am

You should read Gorampa. He explains it very clearly.
One day. Mipham first! :tongue:
Mipham depends quite heavily on Gorampa.
Good to know. Gorampa was a great master.
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Astus »

Malcolm wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 10:17 pmbecause of being described subsequent to those [cognitions]. The argument takes aim at the Geluk idea that appearances are derived from conventions themselves.
Both Jnanagarbha and Gorampa state that conventional truth include not just words or labels but the whole cognitive process of perception. I did not equate conventions with just words.

What the Satyadvayavibhangavrtti says:

'This is why the sutra says:
What is relative truth? All ordinary designations, syllables, utterances, and words. Ultimate truth cannot even be known, let alone conveyed in syllables.
An ordinary designation (loka-prajnapti) is an ordinary activity that is cognitive in nature (jnana-jneya-laksana) rather than verbal in nature (abhidhana-laksana), since [syllables] are mentioned later [in the quotation]. The word "all" is meant to be inclusive. This means that items cognized by perceptions (pratyaksa) that are nonconceptual (nirvikalpa), such as perceptions of form (rupa) or pleasure (sukha), are only relative truth. [The word "all"] is also to be taken with the subsequent [terms in the sentence]. Thus it applies to [the phrase "ordinary designations"], which has just been quoted from the sutra, and to syllables, utterances, and words.'

(Jnanagarbha on the Two Truths, p 74)
1 Myriad dharmas are only mind.
Mind is unobtainable.
What is there to seek?

2 If the Buddha-Nature is seen,
there will be no seeing of a nature in any thing.

3 Neither cultivation nor seated meditation —
this is the pure Chan of Tathagata.

4 With sudden enlightenment to Tathagata Chan,
the six paramitas and myriad means
are complete within that essence.


1 Huangbo, T2012Ap381c1 2 Nirvana Sutra, T374p521b3; tr. Yamamoto 3 Mazu, X1321p3b23; tr. J. Jia 4 Yongjia, T2014p395c14; tr. from "The Sword of Wisdom"
Malcolm
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Malcolm »

Astus wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 11:24 amI did not equate conventions with just words.
I wasn’t sure, that’s why I asked you, which comes first, an appearance or it’s label.
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by fckw »

Malcolm wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 6:58 pm The argument that a knower is a self has already been advanced and dismantled in Buddhist texts. If a knower can have many cognitions, it already has many parts and cannot be a unitary or an integral entity. We are therefore not operating here at a position prior to recognizing discrete entities, the very fact that our minds (citta) are variegated (citra) proves the mind is not an integral entity, proves it is made of parts, and since those cognitions happen sequentially, this proves the mind is also impermanent, momentary, and dependent. So, it is impossible for a conventional knower to be a self.
Well, if you ask me, this is not logical at all:
If a knower can have many cognitions, it already has many parts
We have not clarified whether the "knower" here is same or different from the "known" (i.e. its cognitions).

Besides above point, there's another one I'd like to address briefly, but it's not the main argument on my side.
the very fact that our minds (citta) are variegated (citra)
As I'm not a Sanskritist I am not sure I undestand what "variegated/citra" here actually means. There are at least two interpretations, and I am not sure which one you are referring to: Either to state that there are "many minds" in the sense "each individual has its own mind", or to state that "a single mind has many mind events" that are "distinct" from each other. I take it you mean the latter. If that is the case then I am pretty sure there are some 'hindu' school of thoughts arguing that there are in fact no "distinct mind events", but that they are a single stream of "mind stuff continuously morphing into something else".
As far as I'm informed that's actually the position taken in the Patanjali's Yogasutras. It's, by the way, also what you experience if you practice those Patanjali Yogasutra meditations, i.e. the subjective experience along the path is quite different from both Therevada Vipassana as well as Mahamudra/Dzogchen style meditation. But that's just a side note.
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Natan »

All this madhyamaka discussion is off topic. The buddhanature is not fully elaborated in the Sutras. It is merely described with analogies. And why is there not even one reference to a tathatagarbha sutra? There's a lot of hot air in this thread and it's misleading.
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Malcolm »

fckw wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 9:10 pm
Malcolm wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 6:58 pm The argument that a knower is a self has already been advanced and dismantled in Buddhist texts. If a knower can have many cognitions, it already has many parts and cannot be a unitary or an integral entity. We are therefore not operating here at a position prior to recognizing discrete entities, the very fact that our minds (citta) are variegated (citra) proves the mind is not an integral entity, proves it is made of parts, and since those cognitions happen sequentially, this proves the mind is also impermanent, momentary, and dependent. So, it is impossible for a conventional knower to be a self.
Well, if you ask me, this is not logical at all:
If a knower can have many cognitions, it already has many parts
We have not clarified whether the "knower" here is same or different from the "known" (i.e. its cognitions).
If the knower were the same as the known, it would have to have parts in order to change. It would have to transform into all the different objects it knows, meaning it is not a self, has parts and components. This is the rebuttal to the Hindu idea you bring up below. You might object, well, what is mind is substance like gold, which can be shaped into ashtray or a statue. You then have to explain to us how this transformation of shape, if you will, occurs.

Besides above point, there's another one I'd like to address briefly, but it's not the main argument on my side.
the very fact that our minds (citta) are variegated (citra)
As I'm not a Sanskritist I am not sure I undestand what "variegated/citra" here actually means. There are at least two interpretations, and I am not sure which one you are referring to: Either to state that there are "many minds" in the sense "each individual has its own mind", or to state that "a single mind has many mind events" that are "distinct" from each other. I take it you mean the latter. If that is the case then I am pretty sure there are some 'hindu' school of thoughts arguing that there are in fact no "distinct mind events", but that they are a single stream of "mind stuff continuously morphing into something else".
As far as I'm informed that's actually the position taken in the Patanjali's Yogasutras. It's, by the way, also what you experience if you practice those Patanjali Yogasutra meditations, i.e. the subjective experience along the path is quite different from both Therevada Vipassana as well as Mahamudra/Dzogchen style meditation. But that's just a side note.
You are talking about Samkhya philosophy which is utilized in the Yogasūtras. The line you are think of yogaḥcittavṛttinirodhaha, "Yoga is the cessation of the transformations of consciousness."

The difference here of course is that in the citta in this case is actually different than the knower (jñā). The knower is termed puruśa, is a passive consumer, and is utterly different than praḳrti, which is where the transformations are occurring. The knower itself never changes, but merely witnesses the transformations of prakṛti. But none of this is what I am talking about.

in Buddhism, it is axiomatically assumed that there are many independent mind streams; this is proven by Dharmakirti in Saṃtānāntarasiddhi, "Proof of Other's Minds."
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Malcolm »

Crazywisdom wrote: Mon Apr 12, 2021 3:58 pm All this madhyamaka discussion is off topic. The buddhanature is not fully elaborated in the Sutras.
Sure it is. The Lanka states that tathāgatgarbha is the natural luminosity of the mind. What more does one need to know?
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Natan »

Malcolm wrote: Mon Apr 12, 2021 7:50 pm
Crazywisdom wrote: Mon Apr 12, 2021 3:58 pm All this madhyamaka discussion is off topic. The buddhanature is not fully elaborated in the Sutras.
Sure it is. The Lanka states that tathāgatgarbha is the natural luminosity of the mind. What more does one need to know?
There is the nonmaterial appearance of wisdom.
Last edited by Natan on Mon Apr 12, 2021 11:24 pm, edited 9 times in total.
Malcolm
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Malcolm »

Crazywisdom wrote: Mon Apr 12, 2021 10:32 pm
Malcolm wrote: Mon Apr 12, 2021 7:50 pm
Crazywisdom wrote: Mon Apr 12, 2021 3:58 pm All this madhyamaka discussion is off topic. The buddhanature is not fully elaborated in the Sutras.
Sure it is. The Lanka states that tathāgatgarbha is the natural luminosity of the mind. What more does one need to know?
There is the nonmaterial appearance of wisdom.
That's beyond the scope of Karl B's talk.
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by fckw »

Malcolm wrote: Mon Apr 12, 2021 7:49 pm If the knower were the same as the known, it would have to have parts in order to change. It would have to transform into all the different objects it knows, meaning it is not a self, has parts and components. This is the rebuttal to the Hindu idea you bring up below. You might object, well, what is mind is substance like gold, which can be shaped into ashtray or a statue. You then have to explain to us how this transformation of shape, if you will, occurs.
That's exactly why I find actually both positions equally dissatisfying.

If the knower has "parts and components" then we have not explained where the distinction between one part and another comes from. Remember that we were discussing before exactly this point, i.e. where the capacity to "distinguish" actually comes from, and we certainly don't want to end up in a circular argument stating that the "knower distinguishes its components by its capacity to distinguish its components".

But the other option that you suggest is equally dissatisfactory. Mind made of a substance like gold continuously transforming into other appearances yet never losing its substance - well, this does in no way explain how this process of transformation takes place. Is it a capacity of the mind? Is it same as mind? Is it different?

My personal conclusion here is that neither system actually really properly describes things. Formal logic, that's my conclusion, is not suited to properly address these questions. It can take you far, but not to the end.
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Natan »

Malcolm wrote: Tue Apr 13, 2021 12:18 am
Crazywisdom wrote: Mon Apr 12, 2021 10:32 pm
Malcolm wrote: Mon Apr 12, 2021 7:50 pm

Sure it is. The Lanka states that tathāgatgarbha is the natural luminosity of the mind. What more does one need to know?
There is the nonmaterial appearance of wisdom.
That's beyond the scope of Karl B's talk.
I'm sorry I thought we were discussing tathatagarbha sutras. Remind me where he mentions the Madhyamaka contribution.

Remember the bit about the Buddhas appearing within lotuses withering instantly from Buddha's emanation of light?

If one wants to understand this it helps to rely on Lord Jigten Sumgon's Gongchig where he asserts the Buddha seeds the next wheel in the previous wheel. The TGS wheel lays out an introduction to something more clearly elucidated in the mantra wheel.

The Madhyamaka especially Nagarjuna, is a commentary on the Hinayana, later expositors on the Prajnaparamita. So in relation to TGS only help in removing a notion of a permanent self. Whereas, TGS present a new vision of an innate functional nonmaterial buddha within everyone.

The mantra wheel, especially Kalachakra, clarifies the Madhyamaka as relating with a material reality. So to understand the Tathatagarbha Sutras one must contend with the analogies. With due respect, Lankavatara is not, IMO, properly a TGS. It's sort of a collage and an asterix. At least, it does not stand for the principle of Tathatagarbha as say the Tathatagarbha Sutra.

Why this is important is a term like clear light is formless and static and easily confused with a notion like Atman. We do not need pages of refutations to understand the distinction Buddha realized which is that emptiness is form as in Heart Sutra and as innumerable manifestations as in TGS through mantra.

PS Those thread is in the Kagyu forum, not the Mahayana, Nyingma or Saiyan forum. At least Vajrayana is in issue here, if not the contributions of the Kagyu lineage, rather than slanted toward those prominent proponents of minority views.
Last edited by Natan on Tue Apr 13, 2021 11:33 am, edited 2 times in total.
Malcolm
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Re: Brunnhölzl on Buddha Nature as a radical teaching.

Post by Malcolm »

fckw wrote: Tue Apr 13, 2021 10:48 am
Malcolm wrote: Mon Apr 12, 2021 7:49 pm If the knower were the same as the known, it would have to have parts in order to change. It would have to transform into all the different objects it knows, meaning it is not a self, has parts and components. This is the rebuttal to the Hindu idea you bring up below. You might object, well, what is mind is substance like gold, which can be shaped into ashtray or a statue. You then have to explain to us how this transformation of shape, if you will, occurs.
That's exactly why I find actually both positions equally dissatisfying.

If the knower has "parts and components" then we have not explained where the distinction between one part and another comes from. Remember that we were discussing before exactly this point, i.e. where the capacity to "distinguish" actually comes from, and we certainly don't want to end up in a circular argument stating that the "knower distinguishes its components by its capacity to distinguish its components".

But the other option that you suggest is equally dissatisfactory. Mind made of a substance like gold continuously transforming into other appearances yet never losing its substance - well, this does in no way explain how this process of transformation takes place. Is it a capacity of the mind? Is it same as mind? Is it different?

My personal conclusion here is that neither system actually really properly describes things. Formal logic, that's my conclusion, is not suited to properly address these questions. It can take you far, but not to the end.
The mind is a composite phenomena. That’s just how it is.
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