Two truths in Mahayana Buddhism

[Aemilius]

The principle of two truths is present in the early sutras

Where? There's only one short sutta talking of neyyattha and nitattha, and the way they're interpreted by later authors is a retrospective projection of the two truths idea found nowhere in the suttas themselves. The mere presence of reference to conventional ways of talking is not equivalent of talking of two truths, nor is it called conventional truth.

'Considering what we have said so far regarding language and truth in early Buddhism, it would be possible to give a totally different explanation of the two terms nitattha and neyyattha without introducing two levels of truth. The past participle nita (from the toot ni, nayati, 'to lead') means that to which one "has been led" and the term neyya (a potential participial form of the same verb) implies that to which one "ought to lead." When these two terms are prefixed to the term attha or meaning, we have a meaning that has been led to, that is, a meaning (temporarily) completed, and a meaning that ought to lead, that is, a meaning stretched into the future. This is not the least different from the distinction that we have noticed so far between 'the dependently arisen' and 'dependent arising' or 'the become' and 'becoming.' One is a conception of truth formulated on the basis of information available so far and the other is a conception of truth grounded on the information available and extended into the unknown future. As such, these two types of discourses have nothing to do with conventional and ultimate truths.'
(The Buddha's Philosophy of Language by David J. Kalupahana, p 82-83)

it acts as a basis for the development and arising of the Abhidharma

Not even the seven Abhidhamma texts talk of two truths. They also contain nothing on neyyattha and nitattha.

Abbhidharma is regarded a higher Dharma or highest Dharma, because it is higher than the Dharma that uses only conventional expressions and conventional language.

Not in Theravada where the two truths are not seen as higher and lower, unlike in Sarvastivada.

Two truths appear in the sutta commentaries according to K. N. Jayatilleke, which makes it a lot earlier than the time of Buddhaghosha.

The basic commentary (atthakatha) to the Anguttara Nikaya is attributed to Buddhaghosa.

The word "Abhidharma" means 'highest dharma'. Therefore the idea of a higher dharma, that is above the dharma of ordinary language, is present in the very conception of Abhidharma.

The sutta commentaries are said to derive from the period before Buddhaghosha. They existed in sinhala and prakrit languages before Buddhaghosha, who collected and translated them into the pali language. This was the common view taught in early 1980's. There certainly were commentaries before Buddhaghosha, he didn't invent the genre.

"Aṭṭhakathā (Pali for explanation, commentary) refers to Pali-language Theravadin Buddhist commentaries to the canonical Theravadin Tipitaka. These commentaries give the traditional interpretations of the scriptures. The major commentaries were based on earlier ones, now lost, in Prakrit and Sinhala, which were written down at the same time as the Canon, in the last century BCE. Some material in the commentaries is found in canonical texts of other schools of Buddhism, suggesting an early common source."

According to K.R. Norman:

"There is no direct evidence that any commentarial material was in fact recited at the first council, but there is clear evidence that some parts of the commentaries are very old, perhaps even going back to the time of the Buddha, because they afford parallels with texts which are regarded as canonical by other sects, and must therefore pre-date the schisms between the sects. As has already been noted, some canonical texts include commentarial passages, while the existence of the Old Commentary in the Vinaya-pitaka and the canonical status of the Niddesa prove that some sort of exegesis was felt to be needed at a very early stage of Buddhism."

[Astus]

The Buddha is very clear in a passage that appears in Śamathadeva's commentary [mngon, ju 47a (Toh. 4094)] that one is not to have attachment to the etymologies (nirukti) of the people (jānapada), one is not to hasten to mundane names. It is because they are false.
Prior to this, [mngon, ju 40b (Toh. 4094)], the Buddha is quoted as "Bhikṣus, the supreme (mchog) falsity is the phenomena that are false and deceptive. Bhikṣus, the supreme truths are like this, this is how they are. Therefore, the bhikṣus who posses that possess, the supreme blessings of truth." Moreover, there is a whole section later, where he discusses that which is empty as being false, deceptive, etc.

Are there any specific sutras named/known as the sources for those quotes?

So you really just have not looked well enough, because of a literal mindedness you have been infected with through reading too much text critical literature. To insist that the two truths are not in the agamas because the term "satyadvaya" does not explicitly occur is very myopic. But the two truths are there, you just have to know to see them. Maybe you should get your eyes checked again.

To identify two truths there have to be two ways of perception and expression specified, for instance to say that 'self' is conventional (as in the Vajirāsutta) but then also to say that expressions like aggregates and no-self are ultimately real. The second part is absent from the sutras. Compare that to the pairing of conditioned-unconditioned, that's fairly straightforward.

[Malcolm]

Are there any specific sutras named/known as the sources for those quotes?

Most of the sutras in that commentary are unnamed, as are these.

To identify two truths there have to be two ways of perception and expression specified

Two truths are specified, seeing correctly and seeing falsely. That’s enough. No need to have the Buddha declare that aggregates and so on are ultimate, otherwise it would have been game over for Madhyamaka at the beginning.

[Astus]

The word "Abhidharma" means 'highest dharma'. Therefore the idea of a higher dharma, that is above the dharma of ordinary language, is present in the very conception of Abhidharma.

'we need to understand the significance of the commentarial statement that the Buddha sometimes teaches the Dhamma according to conventional truth, sometimes according to ultimate truth, and sometimes through a combination of both. As one Pāli commentary says, it is like a teacher choosing different dialects to teach his pupils who speak different dialects. There is absolutely no implication here that one dialect is either higher or lower than another.'
(Theravada Abhidhamma by Y. Karunadasa, introduction)

'This does not mean, as some are inclined to think, that the teachings in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka represent a higher set of doctrines. The distinction drawn should be understood in the same way as that between the two kinds of truth. Understood in that way, it does not in any way refer to two kinds of doctrines of which one kind is higher than the other. All that it does is to bring into focus two different ways of presenting the same set of doctrines. In the Sutta Piṭaka more use is made of conventional and transactional terms in ordinary parlance, whereas in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka more use is made of specific, technical terms that directly refer to the ultimate categories of empirical existence. It is a question pertaining to methodology and not a question pertaining to content.'
(Theravada Abhidhamma by Y. Karunadasa, ch 3)

There certainly were commentaries before Buddhaghosha, he didn't invent the genre.

It still leaves them to be post-canonical.

[Astus]

Two truths are specified, seeing correctly and seeing falsely. That’s enough.

However, that's not how the two truths are understood in Theravada. At least we'd need some identifiable agamas to say that conventional language is false.

[Zhen Li]

There certainly were commentaries before Buddhaghosha, he didn't invent the genre.

It still leaves them to be post-canonical.

Define canon, and for whom it was canonical.

[Matt J]

It must be, otherwise you'd have absurd consequences, such as the Buddha teaching a self because he uses the word "atta."

Consider the Pottahapada Sutta, often translating:

But, Citta, these are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world, which the Tathágata uses without misapprehending them.

In the same way, Citta, when any one of the three assumed selves is present, then we do not speak of either of the other two. For these are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world. But a Tathāgata [one who has fully realized the truth] makes use of them, but does not misapprehend them."

Two truths are specified, seeing correctly and seeing falsely. That’s enough.

However, that's not how the two truths are understood in Theravada. At least we'd need some identifiable agamas to say that conventional language is false.

[Malcolm]

Two truths are specified, seeing correctly and seeing falsely. That’s enough.

However, that's not how the two truths are understood in Theravada. At least we'd need some identifiable agamas to say that conventional language is false.

Who cares what what Theravada thinks? Their tradition has no observable influence on this topic.

[Astus]

Define canon, and for whom it was canonical.

As they're Theravadin commentaries, it's their canon, in particular a set of discourses they took as buddhavacana.

[madhyamaka man]

I have some questions about two truths:

1.Do all Mahayana schools / sects accept two truths?

2. Why is conventional / relative truth still called temporary?
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two_tru ... st%20sense.
Is the conventional truth being abolished over time?

3. Does absolute truth deny and cancel conventional truth? As far as I know, two truths are true and valid at the same time?

4. On this website:
https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.lionsr ... ruths/amp/

It is pointed out that two truths is a temporary doctrine and in fact there is only one final truth. What happens to all conventional phenomena after two truths come together?

5. Do Buddhas and enlightened Buddhists also believe in conventional truth?

During my meditation, I tried to understand the absolute truth, of why there is no self (the doctrine of emptiness - the ultimate truth).
During my meditation, I observed. I said to myself - I can feel a self. I kept asking, I can still feel a self. I contemplated and probed. There is a self. Why did the Buddha say there is no self. I can still feel myself. Myself is really real. I do exist!
And then I said, I feel the self again. I can sense the self. There is a indeed a self. "I think, therefore I exist."
And I can still feel myself. Why did the Buddha say there is no self?

When I stopped thinking and asking all these questions, meta-cognitively and subconsciously,
I got a very clear glimpse of the absolute, ultimate truth.

There is indeed no self. And then the relationships between the two truths make more sense.

Just stop thinking. You will see there is no self and understand how the two truths work together.

The conventional truth traps you in samsara. The ultimate truth can take you out of samsara.

[Caoimhghín]

Two truths are specified, seeing correctly and seeing falsely. That’s enough.

However, that's not how the two truths are understood in Theravada. At least we'd need some identifiable agamas to say that conventional language is false.

It strikes me that there is no actual ground presented so far by which to say this. I understand that it might be Karunadasa's view, but can you cite anywhere that he demonstrates this instead of just asserting it? In the Vajirāsutta, "a being" was "Māra's view" and "five aggregates" was the correct view. Surely Māra's convention was wrong, no? Similarly, in the Pupphasutta, he specifies that he is not at variance with "the world," but that nevertheless the world is at variance with him. Surely "the world" is wrong when it is at variance with the Buddha? In the āgama parallel, it is even more clear. The Buddha uses the analogy of an almsbowl called different names in different local usages. The Buddha will call an almsbowl whatever name the situation demands. This is compared to those who fetishize mere local usage and confuse the name for the essence and/or the thing itself. That the five aggregates are impermanent is actually worldly wisdom, he declares towards the end, but the world does not see this, being blind and deaf.

[Astus]

It must be, otherwise you'd have absurd consequences, such as the Buddha teaching a self because he uses the word "atta."

If the mere fact of being a worldly expression rendered something false, then there could be no correct speech in the world and the Buddha would have been lying. But the Buddha did teach correct speech and also taught noble expressions (AN 8.68). Saying that the usage of personal pronouns is the way a sentence is normally formed is not saying it's false but rather not misapprehending, not grasping at it as if it signified something more than it does. How noble expressions are not misapprehended/grasped (aparāmasana/anupādā) is clarified in MN 74 and MN 112.

[Astus]

Who cares what what Theravada thinks? Their tradition has no observable influence on this topic.

Assuming that Sarvastivadins worked from generally the same sutras, since their version of the two truths is somewhat different, if the origin of the two truths doctrine is the sutras, there should be some sutras not found in the Theravada canon to explain the discrepancy.

[Astus]

I understand that it might be Karunadasa's view, but can you cite anywhere that he demonstrates this instead of just asserting it?

From the chapter on two truths:

'As F. Edgerton observes, in Buddhist hybrid Sanskrit literature, “a nītārtha text … is recommended as a guide in preference to one that is neyārtha.” As he further observes, “In Pāli neither is ipso facto preferred to the other; one errs only in interpreting one as if it were the other.”'
source: Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary, see nītārtha.

'Statements referring to convention-based things (saṅketa) are valid because they are based on common agreement; statements referring to ultimate categories (paramattha) are valid because they are based on the true nature of the real existents.'
source: AA. I, 54; KvuA. 34; DA. 251; SA. II, 77; SS. v. 3.

'As pointed out by K. N. Jayatilleke in his Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, one misconception about the Theravāda version of double truth is that paramattha-sacca is superior to sammuti-sacca and that “what is true in the one sense, is false in the other.” This observation that the distinction in question is not based on a theory of degrees of truth will become clear from the following free translation of the relevant passages contained in three Pāli commentaries:
Herein references to living beings, gods, Brahma, and so on, are sammuti-kathā, whereas references to impermanence, suffering, egolessness, the aggregates of the empiric individuality, the bases and elements of sense perception and mind cognition, bases of mindfulness, right effort, and so on, are paramattha-kathā. One who is capable of understanding and penetrating to the truth and hoisting the flag of arahantship when the teaching is set out in terms of generally accepted conventions, to him the Buddha preaches the doctrine based on sammuti-kathā. One who is capable of understanding and penetrating to the truth and hoisting the flag of arahantship when the teaching is set out in terms of ultimate categories, to him the Buddha preaches the doctrine based on paramattha-kathā. To one who is capable of awakening to the truth through sammuti-kathā, the teaching is not presented on the basis of paramattha-kathā, and, conversely, to one who is capable of awakening to the truth through paramattha-kathā, the teaching is not presented on the basis of sammuti-kathā.
There is this simile: Just as a teacher of the three Vedas who is capable of explaining their meaning in different dialects might teach his pupils by adopting the particular dialect which each pupil understands, even so the Buddha preaches the doctrine adopting, according to the suitability of the occasion, either the sammuti- or the paramattha-kathā. It is by taking into consideration the ability of each individual to understand the four noble truths that the Buddha presents his teaching either by way of sammuti or by way of paramattha or by way of both (vomissakavasena). Whatever the method adopted, the purpose is the same: to show the way to immortality through the analysis of mental and physical phenomena.'
source1: Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, 364.
source2: AA. I, 54–55; DA. I, 251–52; SA. II, 77.

'What is more, as the commentary to the Aṅguttaranikāya states specifically, whether the Buddhas preach the doctrine according to sammuti or paramattha, they teach only what is true, only what accords with actuality, without involving themselves in what is not true (amusā’va).'
source: DA. I, 251; see also SA. II, 72.

'Convention requires the use of such terms, but as long as one does not imagine substantial entities corresponding to them, such statements are valid. On the other hand, as the commentators observe, if for the sake of conforming to the ultimate truth one would say, “The five aggregates eat” (khandhā bhuñjanti), “The five aggregates walk” (khandhā gacchanti), instead of saying, “A person eats,” “A person walks,” such a situation would result in what is called vohārabheda — that is, a breach of convention resulting in a breakdown in meaningful communication.'
source: SA. I, 51.

'Hence in presenting the teaching, the Buddha does not exceed linguistic conventions (na hi Bhagavā samaññam atidhāvati) 287 but uses such terms as “person” without being led astray by their superficial implications (aparāmasaṃ voharati).288 Because the Buddha is able to employ such linguistic designations as “person” and “individual” without assuming corresponding substantial entities, he is called “skilled in expression” (vohāra-kusala).289 The use of such terms does not in any way involve falsehood (musāvādo na jāyati).290 As one commentary says: “Whether the buddhas speak according to conventional truth or whether the buddhas speak according to absolute truth, they speak only what is true and only what is actual.”291 Skillfulness in the use of words is the ability to conform to conventions (sammuti), usages (vohāra), designations (paññatti), and turns of speech (nirutti) in common use in the world without being led astray by them.292 Hence in understanding the teaching of the Buddha, one is advised not to adhere dogmatically to the mere superficial meanings of words (na vacanabhedamattam ālambitabbaṃ).293'
287 KvuA. 103.
288 VsmṬ. 346; KvuA. 103: Atthi puggalo ti vacana-mattato abhiniveso na kātabbo. Cf. AA. I, 54–55: Lokasammutiñ ca
Buddhā Bhagavanto nappajahanti, lokasamaññāya lokaniruttiyā lokābhilāpe ṭhitā yeva dhammaṃ desenti.
289 SA. I, 51.
290 Cf. MA. I, 125: Tasmā vohāra-kusalassa lokanāthassa satthuno, / sammutiṃ voharantassa musāvādo na jāyati.
291 DA. I, 251–52.
292 DA. I, 351.
293 Abhvt. 88: Na ca daḷhaṃ mūlhagāhinā bhavitabbaṃ.

In summary for the above references:

'The foregoing observations should show that according to the Theravāda version of double truth, one kind of truth is not held to be superior or inferior to the other. In this connection, one important question arises. If no preferential evaluation is made in respect to the two truths, what is the justification for calling one the absolute or ultimate truth and the other the conventional truth? Here what should not be overlooked is that if one truth is called absolute or ultimate it is because this particular kind of truth has for its vocabulary the technical terms used to express what is ultimate — that is, the dhammas into which the world of experience is ultimately resolved. Strictly speaking, the expression paramattha (absolute/ultimate) does not refer to the truth as such, but to the technical terms through which it is expressed. Thus paramattha-sacca really means the truth expressed by using the technical terms expressive of the ultimate factors of existence. In like manner, sammuti-sacca or conventional truth means the truth expressed by using conventional or transactional terms in common parlance.'

[Caoimhghín]

Thank you for the detailed response. There is a lot to engage with in it.

'Statements referring to convention-based things (saṅketa) are valid because they are based on common agreement; statements referring to ultimate categories (paramattha) are valid because they are based on the true nature of the real existents.'
source: AA. I, 54; KvuA. 34; DA. 251; SA. II, 77; SS. v. 3.

TBH, this seems largely consonant with the example the Buddha gives in SĀ 38. The name of an almsbowl is determined by local usage, or "common agreement." There is also a lengthy essay on "common agreement" by Venerable Vimalākṣa in the Chinese Madhyamakaśāstra which lays out a definition of conventional wisdom identically.

'Hence in presenting the teaching, the Buddha does not exceed linguistic conventions (na hi Bhagavā samaññam atidhāvati) 287 but uses such terms as “person” without being led astray by their superficial implications (aparāmasaṃ voharati).288 Because the Buddha is able to employ such linguistic designations as “person” and “individual” without assuming corresponding substantial entities, he is called “skilled in expression” (vohāra-kusala).289 The use of such terms does not in any way involve falsehood (musāvādo na jāyati).290 As one commentary says: “Whether the buddhas speak according to conventional truth or whether the buddhas speak according to absolute truth, they speak only what is true and only what is actual.”291

Something that comes to mind in response to this is, "What is 'the conventional' exactly? Is it the designatory labels, or it is what this scholar calls the 'superficial implications' of concepts like 'a being' or 'a chariot?'"

In the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, that all empty compounded phenomena are known by designatory labels is identified with "the middle way," not with "the conventional." Arguably, as when Bhikṣuṇī Vajrā scolds Māra, "a sentient being" is not a merely designatory label in the way that he uses it. It's not necessarily a convention that designatory labels are used. Sometimes it's a misapprehension that designatory labels are used, like when the rūpa of a rope is mistaken for the rūpa of a snake. Māra is using the convention of "a being" as more than a designatory label. Do you agree?

[madhyamaka man]

Something that comes to mind in response to this is, "What is 'the conventional' exactly? Is it the designatory labels, or it is what this scholar calls the 'superficial implications' of concepts like 'a being' or 'a chariot?'"

In the MMK, that all empty compounded phenomena are known by designatory labels is identified with "the middle way," not with "the conventional." Arguably, as when Bhikṣuṇī Vajrā scolds Māra, "a sentient being" is not a merely designatory label in the way that he uses it. It's not necessarily a convention that designatory labels are used. Sometimes it's a misapprehension that designatory labels are used, like when the rūpa of a rope is mistaken for the rūpa of a snake. Māra is using the convention of "a being" as more than a designatory label. Do you agree?

From my understanding,

conventional truth is the perception from a non-awaken sentient being;
non-awaken sentient beings do not understand the doctrine of emptiness nor the doctrine of no-self, no-dharma.

They focus on greed and phenomena - (the goal of Mara).

Ultimate truth is the perception from a Buddha, using conventional designatory labels, to convey and lead sentient beings to the ultimate truth.

The "conventional perception", by itself, traps you in samsara and suffering - the rupa of a snake.

The "ultimate perception" (from and of a Buddha), the rupa of a rope for liberation, understands and uses both the conventional truth and ultimate truth for the goal of leading sentient beings away from suffering and to enlightenment.

[Malcolm]

Who cares what what Theravada thinks? Their tradition has no observable influence on this topic.

Assuming that Sarvastivadins worked from generally the same sutras, since their version of the two truths is somewhat different, if the origin of the two truths doctrine is the sutras, there should be some sutras not found in the Theravada canon to explain the discrepancy.

You are speculating. It’s very clear the two truths are the Buddha’s teaching, as Nagarjuna proclaims. If there was any disagreement at all, it would be evident in polemics against his assertion, but none can be found anywhere. All there there is pushback against his, and one presumes, his teachers formulation of ultimate truth, and none against his formulation of mundane convention, which also is found in sutra.

[Caoimhghín]

Speaking to the issue of Theravādin exegesis, which I don't think is completely off-topic since they are still a Śrāvaka Abhidharma school, there is an essay from Venerable Bodhi that I want to quote shortly that lays out the Theravādin versus the Madhyamaka sense of "emptiness." The gist of it is that Madhyamaka believes in "Emptiness of the dharmas," and Theravāda believes in "Emptiness because of the dharmas." The dharmas are not "empty of themselves" in traditional Theravāda. Rather, they are "empty of yourself." They are real entities that confound the ultimate reality of what is superimposed over them, i.e. the conceptual overlay of the worldling.

[Malcolm]

Speaking to the issue of Theravādin exegesis, which I don't think is completely off-topic since they are still a Śrāvaka Abhidharma school...

The Theravadin tradition had zero impact on the continental Indian thought of the period we are discussing. While the record of debates at the time of Aśoka in the Kathāvatthu is certainly interesting, as is the Vibhańga, and so on, this predates the Theravadin tradition by hundreds of years.

What Astus is looking for is the term "satyavidhaṃdvaya" in a sūtra in the same way we find "catursatya" in order to confirm the Buddha taught two truths. What I am pointing out is that term needn't be there for the intention to be there. And the intention is clearly there.

[Caoimhghín]

Speaking to the issue of Theravādin exegesis, which I don't think is completely off-topic since they are still a Śrāvaka Abhidharma school...

The Theravadin tradition had zero impact on the continental Indian thought of the period we are discussing. While the record of debates at the time of Aśoka in the Kathāvatthu is certainly interesting, as is the Vibhańga, and so on, this predates the Theravadin tradition by hundreds of years.

What Astus is looking for is the term "satyavidhaṃdvaya" in a sūtra in the same way we find "catursatya" in order to confirm the Buddha taught two truths. What I am pointing out is that term needn't be there for the intention to be there. And the intention is clearly there.

I agree that we can speak of the intentions of the two truths being there and also that we don't literally need to find the words "two truths" or some equivalent for the general idea to be present. With respect to Theravāda, the modern name of the surviving Tāmraparṇiya Vibhajyavādins, they've had no significant impact on continental Vibhajyavādin thought, let alone a significant impact on mainstream Indian Buddhism, but the period we are speaking of has had an effect on them. Knowing that, I'd argue that discussing them is not utterly irrelevant. They are one particularized stream of Buddhism that has been necessarily influenced by certain continental trends.