Making sense of types of thought

[LastLegend]

Astus,

If one knows of Buddha nature, and not grasping to mind appearance, that’s good. When Buddha nature is not recognized, and call it just a concept is really doing a disservice to Buddhas and Patriarchs. There is a difference between grasping to names versus calling its names (Buddha nature, pure empty, Bodhi, etc) without grasping.

[Astus]

'Our mortal nature is our buddhanature. Beyond this nature there's no buddha.'
(Bloodstream Sermon, p 17, tr Red Pine; X63n1218p2c20-21)

What Bodhidharma is saying (that’s a really great book, btw!) is that realization can be had, here and now, in this body.

What do you base that interpretation on? It's a recurring topic in that text and in Chan in general that 'this mind is buddha' (即心是佛 / 心即是佛).

'The mind is the buddha, and the buddha is the mind. Beyond the mind there's no buddha, and beyond the buddha there's no mind.'
(Bloodstream Sermon, tr Red Pine, p 11; X63n1218p2b11-12)

Sikong Benjing:
"The master replied, ‘If there is a wish to seek for Buddha, then “Heart is Buddha”. If there is a wish to understand Dao, then the “Empty Heart is Dao”.’
‘What is meant by saying “Heart is Buddha”,’ asked the Envoy.
‘Buddha awakens by means of the heart,’ replied the master, ‘and the heart manifests through Buddha. When the empty heart is awakened then even Buddha does not exist.’
Guangting asked further, ‘What is meant by saying that the empty heart is Dao?’
‘Dao is originally the empty heart and the name for empty heart is Dao,’ replied the master. ‘When the empty heart is understood then the empty heart is Dao.’"
(Records of the Transmission of the Lamp, vol 2, 5.86; T51n2076p242b27-c2)

Mazu: 'All of you, each one should have the faith that your own heart is Buddha, that this heart is the Buddha-heart. ... Apart from heart there is no other Buddha and apart from Buddha there is no heart.'
(Records of the Transmission of the Lamp, vol 2, 6.91; T51n2076p246a4-5, a10)

Huangbo: 'This mind is the Buddha; the Buddha is the sentient being.'
(Essentials of the Transmission of Mind, in Zen Texts, BDK ed, p 13; T48n2012Ap379c26)

[Astus]

It’s the same that sunlight is what brightens the sky and thus enables us to see sunlight. Actually, when you are seeing, you do see that you are seeing.

Sunlight is not lit by sunlight, sunlight is already light.

'The Guardian of the World himself has said
That mind cannot be seen by mind.
In just the same way, he has said,
The sword’s edge cannot cut the sword.
“But,” you say, “it’s like the flame
That perfectly illuminates itself.”
The flame, in fact, can never light itself.
And why? Because the darkness never dims it!'
(Bodhicaryavatara 9.17-19, tr Padmakara)

[Astus]

When Buddha nature is not recognized, and call it just a concept is really doing a disservice to Buddhas and Patriarchs.

As long as it's not recognised, how could it be anything else but a concept? And after it is recognised, do you assume it is it?

Since you brought up the patriarchs, do you think Linji was wrong?

'All phenomena worldly and world-transcending are without a real fixed identity of their own, they have no inherent nature. There are just empty names, and names are empty too.'
(The Recorded Sayings of Linji, in Three Chan Classics, BDk ed, p 29; T47n1985p499c15-16)

And was Shenhui right after all?

'One day the master announced to the assembly, “I have a thing without head or tail, without name or title, without front or back. Do you know what it is?”
Shenhui came forth and said, “It is the fundamental source of the buddhas. It is my buddha-nature.”
The master said, “I told you it was without name or title, but you have called it the fundamental source, the buddha-nature. You’ve just covered your head with thatch. You’ve become a follower with only discriminative understanding.”'
(Platform Sutra, ch 8, BDK ed, p 78)

[Malcolm]

No, it is an imagined, nonexistent self that causes and experiences everything, for example, when a car is in accident, it is the imagined car for which one pays the damages, not the wrong view of the imagined car. But perhaps this is a special point of Candrakīrti's Madhyamaka, unlikely to be found the Visuddhimagga.

In one manner of speaking it can be said so that it's the self/car that acts or is damaged, but at the same time, any type of self-view is imputed in dependence on the aggregates (according to Candrakirti too: MA 6.150 and 6.162-164), just as a car is imputed in dependence on its parts. And just as if the windshield is broken then saying 'the car is damaged' is talking in general terms, similarly, whatever actions and results occur are the causal events of the aggregates, even if commonly it can be said to be that of a self or being.

Well, that's not the point really. The imputation itself is the agent and recipient of action, that's the point. Otherwise, one faces the contradiction of asserting that something real passes from this life to the next (consciousness), but we know that nothing at all passes from this life to the next. Certainly other Mādhyamikas make allowances for this and are prepared admit consciousness is an appropriate basis of imputation for a self, which can pass from this life to the next, and is the agent and recipient of action, conventionally speaking, but Candra will not go that far:

MAV, verse 6:162

Likewise, the self is asserted to be the appropriator
in dependence on the aggregates, sense elements,
and sense basis that worldly acknowledge—
appropriation is the action, this is also the agent.

The commentary clarifies:

Although the self is not defined as a mundane convention in relative truth, but like a chariot, it is asserted to be the appropriator.

The next three passages bring the point to bear well. Not sure what translation you are using, but the Padmakara version is fuzzy on this point.

So, this is a special point of Candrakīrti's which one can discover more fully discussed by Gorampa in his Differentiation of Views.

[LastLegend]

As long as it's not recognised, how could it be anything else but a concept? And after it is recognised, do you assume it is it?

Mind is recognized at this point as the empty clear sky literally. One would need to practice Samadhi right here. But this is tricky because once you see mind clear inside outside, you still have to deal with karma. If you feel heavy most of time, you would know that’s karma.

Since you brought up the patriarchs, do you think Linji was wrong?

'All phenomena worldly and world-transcending are without a real fixed identity of their own, they have no inherent nature. There are just empty names, and names are empty too.'
(The Recorded Sayings of Linji, in Three Chan Classics, BDk ed, p 29; T47n1985p499c15-16)

And was Shenhui right after all?

'One day the master announced to the assembly, “I have a thing without head or tail, without name or title, without front or back. Do you know what it is?”
Shenhui came forth and said, “It is the fundamental source of the buddhas. It is my buddha-nature.”
The master said, “I told you it was without name or title, but you have called it the fundamental source, the buddha-nature. You’ve just covered your head with thatch. You’ve become a follower with only discriminative understanding.”'
(Platform Sutra, ch 8, BDK ed, p 78)

Patriarchs were not wrong. You still call a table a table? What else could it be? You only use the draft to a certain point, you don’t sit in meditation with “everything is lacking self-existence” or constant carrying that around. Once empty clear mind is seen, there is no use for that. It’s time to practice Samadhi. It takes practice to nurture your aware nature. The isn’t calm because it constantly acts.

[LastLegend]

Astus,

One would also need to train mind to be functional, how to deal with karma when it arises in mind, what’s self blockage that’s blocking us, etc. These things are like clouds blocking the clear sky. Karma includes grasping to Dharma.

[Astus]

The imputation itself is the agent and recipient of action, that's the point.

That is more likely the view of Gorampa.

'In the Madhyamaka system, it is not feasible for the skandhas to be the agent of actions and the experiencer of results, because neither the self nor the skandhas exist when analyzed, and the self appears as the agent and the experiencer at the conventional level, not the skandhas.'
(Distinguishing the Views, p 75)

As for Candrakirti's own explanation of 6.162 and other commentators I checked (Mikyö Dorje (p 417), Wangchuk Dorje (p 393), Tsongkhapa (p 466), Mipham (p 303), Jamyang Khyentse (p 285)), they simply explain it in the context of the relationship between the self and the aggregates as appopriator and appropriated. This is in line with the teachings on the 20 types of identity view (e.g. SN 22.47, AKB 5.7), where the self is simply a wrong view that assumes identity with or ownership of an aggregate. That agrees with the conventional mind where self is always a shorthand for 'I am this' and 'this is mine'. In other words, just as a car is imaginable only with its parts present, a self is always conceived of as an aggregate, therefore saying that the appropriator self is the doer and enjoyer of actions, as if it could be something apart from the aggregates, sounds like assuming an appropriator without the appropriated.
By the way, if the self were to be used as the agent and experiencer by Candrakirti (despite teachings like SN 12.12), then it would have been a simple way to explain karma, but he did not do so at for instance MA 6.39.

[Malcolm]

The imputation itself is the agent and recipient of action, that's the point.

That is more likely the view of Gorampa.

No, it is the view of Candrakīrti, but perhaps it's too subtle for some people to grasp.

[Astus]

No, it is the view of Candrakīrti, but perhaps it's too subtle for some people to grasp.

Do you know perhaps others who picked up that interpretation? On the other hand, wouldn't it be quite close to what Gorampa criticised in Tsongkhapa interpreting conventional phenomena as purely designations?

[SilenceMonkey]

The imputation itself is the agent and recipient of action, that's the point.

[Malcolm]

No, it is the view of Candrakīrti, but perhaps it's too subtle for some people to grasp.

Do you know perhaps others who picked up that interpretation? On the other hand, wouldn't it be quite close to what Gorampa criticised in Tsongkhapa interpreting conventional phenomena as purely designations?

Rongton, etc.

And no. Gorampa is faulting Tsongkhapa for not getting this point. Gorampa argues this point more thoroughly in his yet to translated commentary on MAV.

[LastLegend]

Astus,

How do you drop your own statement because a statement cannot established to exist, yet you still have mind phenomena arise as pure and unpure? Do you want to say pure and unpure cannot established either?

[Malcolm]

Do you want to say pure and unpure cannot established either?

Of course, they are also relative.

[Astus]

How do you drop your own statement because a statement cannot established to exist, yet you still have mind phenomena arise as pure and unpure?

Do you mean that if one believed there was a tiger in the room but when looking into it no tiger was found, how is it possible that one no longer believed in one's previous idea?

'Conceptions will occur if things are held to exist,
But how things do not exist has been thoroughly analyzed.
When things are seen not to exist, conceptions about their existence will not arise,
Just as fire will not burn without fuel.
Ordinary beings are bound by conception,
And yogins, free from conception, are liberated.
The wise ones teach that the reversal of conception
Is the result of analysis.'
(Madhyamakavatara 6.116-117, tr T. Dewar)

'Those who do not meditate with wisdom by analyzing the entity of things specifically, but merely meditate on the elimination of mental activity, cannot avert conceptual thoughts and also cannot realize identitylessness because they lack the light of wisdom. If the fire of consciousness knowing. phenomena as they are is produced from individual analysis of suchness, then like the fire produced by rubbing wood it will burn the wood of conceptual thought. The Buddha has spoken in this way.'
(Bhavanakrama in Stages of Meditation, p 134)

Do you want to say pure and unpure cannot established either?

Established as ultimate entities? No. All phenomena are dependently arisen, don't you agree?

[LastLegend]

Do you mean that if one believed there was a tiger in the room but when looking into it no tiger was found, how is it possible that one no longer believed in one's previous idea?

I meant to say that you can’t establish even a view or a statement to be true. Like the view, “everything lacks self-existence,” do you hold this to be absolutely true? At which point this view is also dropped or you have to think about it constantly? You can’t retain a view to be true to be grasped.

'Conceptions will occur if things are held to exist,
But how things do not exist has been thoroughly analyzed.
When things are seen not to exist, conceptions about their existence will not arise,
Just as fire will not burn without fuel.
Ordinary beings are bound by conception,
And yogins, free from conception, are liberated.
The wise ones teach that the reversal of conception
Is the result of analysis.'
(Madhyamakavatara 6.116-117, tr T. Dewar)

Would you say that conception can be pure? Or conception is always with grasping?

'Those who do not meditate with wisdom by analyzing the entity of things specifically, but merely meditate on the elimination of mental activity, cannot avert conceptual thoughts and also cannot realize identitylessness because they lack the light of wisdom. If the fire of consciousness knowing. phenomena as they are is produced from individual analysis of suchness, then like the fire produced by rubbing wood it will burn the wood of conceptual thought. The Buddha has spoken in this way.'
(Bhavanakrama in Stages of Meditation, p 134)

This depends on how one takes the analysis: or they observe it directly in their mind? Or they playing philosophy.

Established as ultimate entities? No. All phenomena are dependently arisen, don't you agree?

Has the view of dependently arisen taken care of grasping, since pure and unpure are still distinguished? When unpure arises, how is it dealt with?

[Astus]

I meant to say that you can’t establish even a view or a statement to be true. Like the view, “everything lacks self-existence,” do you hold this to be absolutely true? At which point this view is also dropped or you have to think about it constantly? You can’t retain a view to be true to be grasped.

It depends on the criteria of truth. Also, what's the line between absolute and relative truths? These can be relevant questions, but usually one just works with one's already existing assumptions in order to eliminate all identifications and attachments. The point is not really to claim some idea as the best, but to be free from suffering.

Would you say that conception can be pure? Or conception is always with grasping?

Conceptions here is about sticking to assumptions and ideas as truth. There are good conceptions in the sense of leading to good births, but there's always grasping and identifying with it.

This depends on how one takes the analysis: or they observe it directly in their mind? Or they playing philosophy.

Analysis means applying the teachings to observe phenomena.

Has the view of dependently arisen taken care of grasping, since pure and unpure are still distinguished? When unpure arises, how is it dealt with?

Based on understanding one can observe dependent arising, and with that remove the root of attachment, the taints of taking things to be self or belonging to self. That's because one can then confirm that things are not reliable, pleasurable, or controllable to be taken as one's identity or possession.

[muni]

Also, what's the line between absolute and relative truths?

Top question!

No line.

A line is creating ideas as a separation between relative and absolute, what is illusions. The two truths are method to realize there are no two truths.

No any thought has any power on itself.

[iskaral]

Different schools with have slightly differing and slightly overlapping takes on the two truths. Guy Newland has an excellent set of lectures on YouTube on the varieties of madhyamaka in nyingma, sakya, kagyu, jonang and gelug.

[LastLegend]

It depends on the criteria of truth. Also, what's the line between absolute and relative truths? These can be relevant questions, but usually one just works with one's already existing assumptions in order to eliminate all identifications and attachments. The point is not really to claim some idea as the best, but to be free from suffering.

Would you say that conception can be pure? Or conception is always with grasping?

Conceptions here is about sticking to assumptions and ideas as truth. There are good conceptions in the sense of leading to good births, but there's always grasping and identifying with it.

When you define relative, absolute, a view, orbs statement they become concepts which bring grasping. Also, if you have a purpose or intention in mind to abolish grasping that too is grasping. You might not have escaped duality as you think.

Analysis means applying the teachings to observe phenomena.

Based on understanding one can observe dependent arising, and with that remove the root of attachment, the taints of taking things to be self or belonging to self. That's because one can then confirm that things are not reliable, pleasurable, or controllable to be taken as one's identity or possession.

Still there is a difference between having thought of a tree versus seeing the thought itself of the tree.