Gorampa untenable according to Karmapa

[Mariusz]

"inherent existence" is an abstract concept only appearing to an onto-analytical consciousness of a philosopher, and even then not usually when he's drinking tea!

No - inherent existence is an emotional grasping to objects. If someone broke a favourite cup then this causes emotional distress with most people who liked that cup. Grasping to inherent existence of phenomena takes place before conscious thought and is a product of momentary ignorance of impermanence and dependant origination.

Kirt

Yes, it is "the seeming" only which was never in the first place but is not the "self-liberated". Lookin for any reference point here is an obstacle by itself.

[Malcolm]

"inherent existence" is an abstract concept only appearing to an onto-analytical consciousness of a philosopher, and even then not usually when he's drinking tea!

No - inherent existence is an emotional grasping to objects. If someone broke a favourite cup then this causes emotional distress with most people who liked that cup. Grasping to inherent existence of phenomena takes place before conscious thought and is a product of momentary ignorance of impermanence and dependant origination.

Kirt

Gorampa would not agree with this assessment.

[Tsongkhapafan]

What is 'inherently existent' defined as by Tsongkhapa? Surely he would not mean inherently existing as in not caused by causes or bearing a permanent existence or nature apart from it's parts and so on.

Kevin

Put simply, inherent existence is existence without depending upon the mind. When we see objects they appear to exist without needing our minds to bring them into existence in any way at all, when in reality they are mere imputations of conceptual thought that totally depend on the mind.

The world we normally see doesn't depend upon the mind at all - this is where we are going wrong.

[Anders]

I am not sure how one can possibly avoid existence and non-existence.

This is the purpose of dependent origination.

For conventional purposes, I mean. As I said, pretty hard to have a language without it.

[Virgo]

What is 'inherently existent' defined as by Tsongkhapa? Surely he would not mean inherently existing as in not caused by causes or bearing a permanent existence or nature apart from it's parts and so on.

Kevin

Put simply, inherent existence is existence without depending upon the mind. When we see objects they appear to exist without needing our minds to bring them into existence in any way at all, when in reality they are mere imputations of conceptual thought that totally depend on the mind.

The world we normally see doesn't depend upon the mind at all - this is where we are going wrong.

Oh man. The old tree falls in the forest bit?

First of all, my apologies to everyone in this thread because I am a total novice in this area, but this is a good learning experience for me. So thank you all.

Now, to address this Tsongkhapafan,

So what you are getting at is say there are no sentient beings around at all, but there are some rocks and trees, these rocks and trees "exist" regardless if they are cognized by a mindsream or not, and therefore they inherently exist and this is the inherent existence that Tsongkhapa is talking about?

Kevin

[Tsongkhapafan]

So what you are getting at is say there are no sentient beings around at all, but there are some rocks and trees, these rocks and trees "exist" regardless if they are cognized by a mindsream or not, and therefore they inherently exist and this is the inherent existence that Tsongkhapa is talking about?

Kevin

The point is that things cannot exist without being cognized. Without mind, there are no objects, but that's not how it seems. It seems that rocks, trees and so on can exist quite happily without sentient beings, 'out there'. Believing this is the ignorance of self-grasping - grasping at inherent existence. That rocks and trees seem to exist without depending on the mind is inherent existence.

[kirtu]

"inherent existence" is an abstract concept only appearing to an onto-analytical consciousness of a philosopher, and even then not usually when he's drinking tea!

No - inherent existence is an emotional grasping to objects. If someone broke a favourite cup then this causes emotional distress with most people who liked that cup. Grasping to inherent existence of phenomena takes place before conscious thought and is a product of momentary ignorance of impermanence and dependant origination.

Kirt

Gorampa would not agree with this assessment.

How would Gorampa critique it?

Kirt

[Malcolm]

How would Gorampa critique it?
Kirt

As I explained elsewhere, according to Goramap the imputation of mere existence is sufficient to produce this distress.

[Virgo]

So what you are getting at is say there are no sentient beings around at all, but there are some rocks and trees, these rocks and trees "exist" regardless if they are cognized by a mindsream or not, and therefore they inherently exist and this is the inherent existence that Tsongkhapa is talking about?

Kevin

The point is that things cannot exist without being cognized. Without mind, there are no objects, but that's not how it seems. It seems that rocks, trees and so on can exist quite happily without sentient beings, 'out there'. Believing this is the ignorance of self-grasping - grasping at inherent existence. That rocks and trees seem to exist without depending on the mind is inherent existence.

Well I think they do exist, they are just not known or cognized at all.

Kevin

[kirtu]

Gorampa points out that Tsongkhapa's first assertion is untrue, since inherent existences does not appear

But don't sentient beings naturally impute or assume this?

That is what Tsongkhapa believes and what Gorampa rejects.

You can ask yourself the question very simply-- when you see a cup of coffee, do you think, even for a second, that it exists inherently? Or do you merely accept that it is exists there?

Gorampa is right - but Tsongkhapa is not wrong. The issue is that people project inherent existence onto grasping at phenomena without thinking about it at all. It's just habitual. Existence means inherent existence for people emotionally. An example is some behaviour that we take to be pleasurable. Without thinking about it we are just attached to the behaviour as if it really were pleasurable in and of itself even if we know otherwise.

Kirt

[Pema Rigdzin]

For me, since no compounded phenomena can be found ultimately, it seems perfectly right to say that they don't exist but that yet they clearly appear, and that due to this heavily ingrained mental habit of conception, very compelling and real-seeming cause and effect and physical laws are therefore our guaranteed experience (until awakening) and cannot be intellectually explained away - no nihilism there. But I suppose there are people out there who in being convinced of Madhyamaka's arguments about the ultimately unfindable nature of phenomena would be unable to wrap their minds around still being subject to cause and effect, etc., and might go off the deep end without someone like Tsongkhapa telling them that only "inherent existence" is negated. Maybe Tsongkhapa's interpretation of Madhyamaka is just the right kind of medicine for that kind of person.

[conebeckham]

..or it could be that there was a NEED to stress the workings of conventional truth, cause and effect, and the law of Karma....in order to draw focus back to Ethical considerations. Reform, writ large.

[Mariusz]

How would Gorampa critique it?
Kirt

As I explained elsewhere, according to Goramap the imputation of mere existence is sufficient to produce this distress.

Interesting. Is it means the distress is really produced? In contrast, let's look what IX Karmapa wrote:

In sum, for the Consequentialists all relative things are, even in the relative
truth, empty of performing their own functions. ... For
the relative truth is merely something posited from the confused perspec-
tive of worldly beings who cling to it as real. (p.162)

(p.249)Nāgārjuna’s Commentary on the Heart of Awakening
(Bodhichittavivaraṇa, Changchub Semdrel/byang chub sems ’grel)
says:
There is no difference between things in dreams and things in the
waking state
In terms of their performance of functions.
All things are the same as things in a dream:
They are equal in terms of performing functions, but they have no
inherent nature.

[Tsongkhapafan]

So what you are getting at is say there are no sentient beings around at all, but there are some rocks and trees, these rocks and trees "exist" regardless if they are cognized by a mindsream or not, and therefore they inherently exist and this is the inherent existence that Tsongkhapa is talking about?

Kevin

The point is that things cannot exist without being cognized. Without mind, there are no objects, but that's not how it seems. It seems that rocks, trees and so on can exist quite happily without sentient beings, 'out there'. Believing this is the ignorance of self-grasping - grasping at inherent existence. That rocks and trees seem to exist without depending on the mind is inherent existence.

Well I think they do exist, they are just not known or cognized at all.

Kevin

Thanks Kev, you've just demonstrated what it means to perceive things as inherently existent as we all do

[Mariusz]

The point is that things cannot exist without being cognized. Without mind, there are no objects, but that's not how it seems. It seems that rocks, trees and so on can exist quite happily without sentient beings, 'out there'. Believing this is the ignorance of self-grasping - grasping at inherent existence. That rocks and trees seem to exist without depending on the mind is inherent existence.

Well I think they do exist, they are just not known or cognized at all.


Thanks Kev, you've just demonstrated what it means to perceive things as inherently existent as we all do

You are wrong because when you carefully read for example Santideva:
The ultimate is not the sphere of cognition.
It is said that cognition is the seeming."
you will see there is no cognition at all but it is merely something posited from the confused perspec-
tive of worldly beings who cling to it, it is only their "seeming".

[Tsongkhapafan]

You are wrong because when you carefully read for example Santideva:
The ultimate is not the sphere of cognition.
It is said that cognition is the seeming."
you will see there is no cognition at all but it is merely something posited from the confused perspec-
tive of worldly beings who cling to it, it is only their "seeming".

It depends what you mean by 'cognition'. Cognition in the general sense means to be known. Nothing exists without being known.

What's the chapter and verse you're quoting?

[Mariusz]

It depends what you mean by 'cognition'. Cognition in the general sense means to be known. Nothing exists without being known.

What's the chapter and verse you're quoting?

Wordly conventions "depend" by their very nature. Even conventionaly you can investigate nothing not only not exists, but also not not-exists, the both these, the neither of these. All these reference points just collapse because of their very nature, which was never in the first place. When you are looking for the cause to be "enlightened" you will be never the "self-liberated".

The Santideva is from chapter on wisdom paramita of His most known Bodhisattva's way of life (Bodhicaryavatara) which is very easy clear and fully commented in agreement with Karmapa Mikyo Dorje by Pawo Rinpoche in ""The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition", Snow Lion Publications, 2004. Highly recommented.

[catmoon]

Defining inherent existence:


I've always taken "inherency" to mean "a natural part of and inseparable". So one might, in ordinary daily language, say sugar is inherently sweet.

If you take that definition of inherency, then to say something is inherently existent is to say that its very existence is not separable from it, thus it cannot cease to exist. Since change involves the cessation of one kind of existence and transformation into another, new kind of existence, it follows that an inherently existing object cannot change in any way.

Thing do change and cease to exist all the time, and this gives rise to suffering. Why? If we expected things to change and cease to exist, would there be suffering? I think the answer is yes and no, because the suffering of change is not the only kind of suffering.

We have stuff and we expect it to always be there, and we get upset when it isn't. This is the unspoken assumption of inherent existence operating all around us.

[Malcolm]

[quote="Mariusz"Is it means the distress is really produced? In contrast, let's look what IX Karmapa wrote:
[/quote]


Of course not. There is no real production.

[Pema Rigdzin]

Defining inherent existence:


I've always taken "inherency" to mean "a natural part of and inseparable". So one might, in ordinary daily language, say sugar is inherently sweet.

If you take that definition of inherency, then to say something is inherently existent is to say that its very existence is not separable from it, thus it cannot cease to exist. Since change involves the cessation of one kind of existence and transformation into another, new kind of existence, it follows that an inherently existing object cannot change in any way.

Thing do change and cease to exist all the time, and this gives rise to suffering. Why? If we expected things to change and cease to exist, would there be suffering? I think the answer is yes and no, because the suffering of change is not the only kind of suffering.

We have stuff and we expect it to always be there, and we get upset when it isn't. This is the unspoken assumption of inherent existence operating all around us.

But we don't typically expect that things will last forever - to the contrary, we merely expect them to last for some estimated time and when they are things we like we fear their impermanence. Because of that, we often are very careful with objects we like and try to protect them lest they should fall into ruin and keep us from enjoying them any longer.