RichardLinde wrote:So, according to that web page, at least, vikalpa is defined to be the projection of inherent existence onto things.
The omniscience is not only the freedom from concepts, but from all the seeming as yogacara explained:
From The Treasury of Knowledge
Book Six, Part Three:
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy
Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö TayéSimply put, the imagination of what is unreal is the aspect of the dependent
nature that creates the sense of duality (gnyis snang). It could also be said that it
is a term used for the dependent nature in its impure state. (See p. 181 for the
two divisions of the dependent nature.) “Imagination” (parikalpa, kun rtog) includes
both conceptual and nonconceptual cognition (rnam rig) or perception (blo) and the
perceived referents, thus “imagination” is not identical with “thought” or “concept”
(vikalpa, rnam rtog).
The dependent and imagined [characteristics] are equal in that they
do not really exist (bden par med); equal in being delusive appearances;
and equal in being conventionalities and false. It is necessary, however,
to distinguish them in terms of their respective characteristics: imagined
[characteristics] do not exist even on a conventional [level], whereas the
dependent do exist conventionally.
Moreover, when return to madhyamaka debate, it is not such thing as projection of inherent existence at all, because inherent existence is always impossible unique for us, not somehow universal and easy to locate like for example acording to Tsongkhapa. Unique inherent existence of any object is always impossible to locate for sentient beings becuse the object always changing during incalculable moments according to limitless causes/conditions (object side perspective) and infinitive relative cognitions of the subject of the perceivers. Inherent existence as universal and somehow separated from the object is by critics of Tsongkhapa like horn-like rabbit example.