Madyamika Sautrantika vs Prasangika

[Malcolm]

Not at all. Recall, all phenomena means all the five sense organs and sense objects, six consciousnesses, mental factors and unconditioned phenomena i.e. what is included in one skandha, one ayatana, and one dhātu.

One's own wisdom means that one encompasses all phenomena with omniscience.

Thus, no monism.

N

I see.

So it is more a realization of the nature of all phenomena.

Yes, precisely.

[Mariusz]

Because it does not work as "the Path" for you. You need the Path until you are a sentient being whatever exactly your "the seeming" is, no more no less. It is not the "fault" of a Buddha you have not been the "self-liberated" yet.

If your the seeming would be more "undeceived" you will be able the see a Buddha who is talking to you, using words, concepts etc like during conversations with bodhisattvas, arhats.... When the collapse all the seeming you will be a buddha when there is no more any division, reference points like conceptual or non-conceptual.

Right, but I'm talking from the point of view of a Buddha, not from the point of view of I "the sentient being."

If a Buddha talks to a sentient being (defined as a person who has not perceived paramatha satya), she must talk in the language of that sentient being. Correct?

Why would she do that? From the Mahayana point of view, out karuna and upaya: that is what a Buddha does; she liberates sentient beings.

The moment she talks to that sentient being, in the language of that sentient being, she is involved in the conventions of language and concept.

Therefore, how can it be asserted that conventional phenomena disappear upon apprehension of the ultimate?

You are writing about Nirmanakaya only, not about Dharmakaya for Buddhahood and Sambhogakaya which is possible only for Bodhisattvas. Conventional phenomena seems to be also not disappeared for Nirmanakayas-buddhas but their the seeming is very different. Nirmanakayas have realization of Dharmakaya "non-division" and can emanate Sambhogakayas for Bodhisattvas. Moreover, there is traditional analogy for it: The seeming is like the dream. Nirmanakayas although experience dreams they are aware this is only dreaming and do not suffer but are free like in "lucid dreaming". Sentient beings take dreaming to be real and suffer whatever nightmare they are experiencing.

Nāgārjuna’s Niraupamyastava says:
Lord, you have realized that saṃsāra
Is free from permanence and extinction
And lacks characteristics and what is to be characterized,
Just like a dream or an illusion.

Āryadeva’s Jñānasārasamucchaya:
A “something that has parts” does not exist,
Minute particles do not exist,
And what appears distinctly is unobservable—
Experiences are like a dream.

My reincarnation (Nirmanakaya):http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-XrfN8TY80Y

[Mariusz]

Well, for bodhisattva on the stages, apprehension of the conventional occurs only in post-equipoise. Buddhas experience no post-equipioise phase, ergo, no apprehension of conventional i.e. deluded phenomena.

Does it mean Nirmanakaya-buddha Siakyamuni did not have the 5 aggregates which enabled Him communication with humans?

[tobes]

I think there is more at stake here than the inevitable Tsong Khapa vs everyone else Tibetan framing of the problem.

I'd agree that the way a Buddha perceives a given phenomenal object is devoid of any conceptual content.

But it doesn't matter how spontaneous a Buddha's interactions with sentient beings may be: if the Buddha speaks she is using concepts. Concepts which are necessarily conventional.

How could speech possibly be non-conceptual???

It is simply a Tsongkhapa vs. the world argument.

As far as Buddha's speech goes, as the Guhyasamaja says, "A single vajra word is heard differently by different sentient beings". A Buddha's vocal actions are also non-conceptual.

This is a very huge polemical area in Tibetan Buddhism, but in general, Nyingmas, Sakyapas and Kagyupas hold that a Buddha's actions, whether verbal or physical are completely spontaneous and free from conceptuality and cognition of conventional signs.

N

Notice how you're leaning on a tantric text to support your argument?

There is nothing in Nagarjuna, nor Chandrakirti which asserts vajra speech. The assumption clearly comes from elsewhere.

The problem with reading Madhyamika through Tibetan polemics, is that everyone imputes their particular practical-soteriological orientation into the texts......and assumes unqualified consistency.

Both Tsong Khapa and Gorampa do this, and it is not necessarily problematic - it is only problematic when it becomes impossible to have a conversation about early Indian Madhyamika because everyone is too busy establishing its concomitance to their Vajrayana practice.

[tobes]

Therefore, how can it be asserted that conventional phenomena disappear upon apprehension of the ultimate?

Well, for bodhisattva on the stages, apprehension of the conventional occurs only in post-equipoise. Buddhas experience no post-equipioise phase, ergo, no apprehension of conventional i.e. deluded phenomena.

This is definitely the conclusion of Chandrakirti. I agree only to the extent that apprehension of conventional phenomenal entities disappears. He often to turns to metaphors of sight to explain the two truths - in this respect, he is clearly pointing us towards an understanding of how empirical phenomena ought to be apprehended.

The question of language is more vexed.

Without resorting to an idea of vajra speech, how can you explain the fact that if a Buddha still speaks to sentient beings, she must apprehend the concepts which those sentient beings communicate?

Those concepts are necessarily conventional.

So, does it not follow, that a Buddha must be able to apprehend the conventional phenomena of ordinary speech?

[tobes]

Just to be clear where I'm coming from:

Nagarjuna is clearly concerned to be systematically consistent with the historical Buddha, and the discourses of the historical Buddha.

So, instead of thinking about the vajra universe, Buddhalands, sambogakaya as the grounds for communication etc, let us contemplate for a moment both the historical and logical connection between Nagarjuna's work and Gautama's discourses.

Does anyone want to argue that the Pali cannon is not conceptual?

That the many dialogues which Gautama had with a range of different sentient beings, was not conceptual?

That he was not intimately engaged with the ordinary language of sentient beings?

And therefore, that he necessarily apprehended the conventional phenomena of ordinary language and concepts, in order to teach, in order to liberate.

[Tom]

Just to be clear where I'm coming from:

Nagarjuna is clearly concerned to be systematically consistent with the historical Buddha, and the discourses of the historical Buddha.

So, instead of thinking about the vajra universe, Buddhalands, sambogakaya as the grounds for communication etc, let us contemplate for a moment both the historical and logical connection between Nagarjuna's work and Gautama's discourses.

Does anyone want to argue that the Pali cannon is not conceptual?

That the many dialogues which Gautama had with a range of different sentient beings, was not conceptual?

That he was not intimately engaged with the ordinary language of sentient beings?

And therefore, that he necessarily apprehended the conventional phenomena of ordinary language and concepts, in order to teach, in order to liberate.

Tobes,

Ever had a conversation in a dream, dealt with a virtual call centre, received an email auto response, googled something?

Why should interaction involving language necessitate conception on the other party?

Why should it for a Buddha?

Paul Griffiths has a few interesting things to say on the subject …

"Our utterance is usually marked with deliberation and choice … perhaps the only true spontaneous, choiceness, effortless utterances that most of us ever make are … grunts of agony or ecstasy, moans of appreciation and the like.. they also, of course, generally communicate across boundaries of natural languages. Some few of us … may do more: we may compose poetry, prose or speak ad hoc in a manner which, in terms of its phenomenal properties at least, appear to us to be spontaneous and effortless in just the way that Buddha's utterance must be. But such instances are for us atypical, mysterious even to those who experience them, while for Buddha's they are all that is possible".

[tobes]

Just to be clear where I'm coming from:

Nagarjuna is clearly concerned to be systematically consistent with the historical Buddha, and the discourses of the historical Buddha.

So, instead of thinking about the vajra universe, Buddhalands, sambogakaya as the grounds for communication etc, let us contemplate for a moment both the historical and logical connection between Nagarjuna's work and Gautama's discourses.

Does anyone want to argue that the Pali cannon is not conceptual?

That the many dialogues which Gautama had with a range of different sentient beings, was not conceptual?

That he was not intimately engaged with the ordinary language of sentient beings?

And therefore, that he necessarily apprehended the conventional phenomena of ordinary language and concepts, in order to teach, in order to liberate.

Tobes,

Ever had a conversation in a dream, dealt with a virtual call centre, received an email auto response, googled something?

Why should interaction involving language necessitate conception on the other party?

Why should it for a Buddha?

Paul Griffiths has a few interesting things to say on the subject …

"Our utterance is usually marked with deliberation and choice … perhaps the only true spontaneous, choiceness, effortless utterances that most of us ever make are … grunts of agony or ecstasy, moans of appreciation and the like.. they also, of course, generally communicate across boundaries of natural languages. Some few of us … may do more: we may compose poetry, prose or speak ad hoc in a manner which, in terms of its phenomenal properties at least, appear to us to be spontaneous and effortless in just the way that Buddha's utterance must be. But such instances are for us atypical, mysterious even to those who experience them, while for Buddha's they are all that is possible".

I find this very unconvincing.

Why does language necessitate conception? Because that is what language is. Each signifier is a concept. The word "apple" is not the reality of an apple; it is the concept of an apple abstracted from reality and shared in a community of language speakers.

So, it makes no difference how poetic, or spontaneous or effortless a stream of prose or an utterance may be - poetry is the organisation of signifiers in a particularly aesthetic way.......it may yield non-conceptual experiences in the reader.....but the form of poetry, being in language is still nothing more or less than the articulation of concepts.

Surely we all agree on this?

Now in any case, the Buddha - Gautama - was doing far more than making utterances or producing poetry. He was talking to ordinary folk all the time. He was relating to kings and resolving their political problems.

How could the Buddha talk to a king, and resolve a particular political problem, without entering into that understanding - that language game - of politics etc?

So, the linguistic relation between the Buddha and his subjects is not at all akin to a virtual call centre or an auto email response: because surely it is a two way process. A mutual dialogue.

Might it be like a conversation in a dream? Well, Chandrakirti would say that for the subject, it would be like a dream. Because that subject does not apprehend paramatha satya. But I'm talking from the point of view of the Buddha, not the subject. The dream has ended for the Buddha - but he still talks. So, I'm asking, what are the implications of this for our understanding of the two truths?

It seems to me, that either, a Buddha can still apprehend samvriti-satya - that it is simultaneous with paramatha-satya. So, a Tsong Khapian kind of argument.

Or, that the language and concepts that a Buddha uses are somehow considered paramatha-satya - in which case, I would like to know how it can also be held that paramatha-satya is the cessation of all conceptual thought and activity.

[Tom]

Why does language necessitate conception? Because that is what language is.

Tobes,

That was not my question and you missed my point.

I am not convinced that just because language and conception are intimately linked that it follows that an interaction with another being involving speech requires that being to have a conceptual mind, for example one might have what appears to be a conversation albeit a short one with a parrot.

If this is true why not an extended conversation with a Buddha without him engaging in conception. Further why would the conversation need to be two ways in the way we normally think of conversations. After all the Buddha needs nothing from us. I think it is Paul Williams who has suggested that the Buddha's appearance and skillful guidance might come about primarily from his past prayers to benefit all beings and also the needs and karma of sentient beings. He goes on to suggest that the Buddha then would not actually need a mind and appeals to analogies such as wish-fulfilling gem etc.

Now whilst I don't agree with Williams, I also don't think that claiming the Buddha has a conceptual mind because people received teachings from him and had conversations with him is a very convincing response.

[tobes]

Why does language necessitate conception? Because that is what language is.

Tobes,

That was not my question and you missed my point.

I am not convinced that just because language and conception are intimately linked that it follows that an interaction with another being requires that being to have a conceptual mind, for example one might have what appears to be a conversation albeit a short one wit a parrot.

If this is true why not an extended conversation with a Buddha without him engaging in conception. Further why would the conversation need to be two ways in the way we normally think of conversations. After all the Buddha needs nothing from us. I think it is Paul Williams who has suggested that the Buddha's appearance and skillful guidance might come about primarily from his past prayers to benefit all beings and also the needs and karma of sentient beings. He goes on to suggest that Buddha then would not actually need a mind and appeals to analogies such as wish-fulfilling gem etc.

Now whilst I don't agree with Williams, I also don't think that claiming the Buddha has a conceptual mind because people received teachings from him and had conversations with him is a very convincing response.

Okay - well I suppose I'm not claiming that the Buddha has a conceptual mind per se, only that in moments of discursive relation to humans he must be able to enter into a dialogical relationship, and that the nature of this dialogical relationship, being linguistic, is necessarily conceptual. [And further, perhaps this tells us something important about the two truths].

Your parrot analogy is problematic - because one is not really having a conversation with it; mutual dialogue and understanding does not place. And the reason understanding doesn't take place (between a human and a parrot) is because the parrot only repeats the phonetics of the words, and does not understand that those words refer to abstract things.

That is, the parrot does not have the conceptual capacity which allows mutual understanding to occur.

The Buddha, in responding to the problem of a king for example, clearly does have that capacity.

[Tom]

Okay - well I suppose I'm not claiming that the Buddha has a conceptual mind per se, only that in moments of discursive relation to humans he must be able to enter into a dialogical relationship, and that the nature of this dialogical relationship, being linguistic, is necessarily conceptual. [And further, perhaps this tells us something important about the two truths].

Your parrot analogy is problematic - because one is not really having a conversation with it; mutual dialogue and understanding does not place. And the reason understanding doesn't take place (between a human and a parrot) is because the parrot only repeats the phonetics of the words, and does not understand that those words refer to abstract things.

That is, the parrot does not have the conceptual capacity which allows mutual understanding to occur.

The Buddha, in responding to the problem of a king for example, clearly does have that capacity.

What I am questioning is wether it makes sense to talk of Buddhas referring to conventional truths from their perspective. Conventional truths might only make sense in relation to an ordinary perspective. Even the conventional aspects of a Buddha such as their from bodies and activities such as giving teachings and even their part in mutual understanding might be explained entirely in relation to an ordinary beings perspective. From X'x perspective the Buddha appeared to do Y. Thus the dream analogy etc. This avoids the uncomfortable position of considering the language and activities of the Buddha to be ultimate truth.

The alternative as you say is to take Tsongkapa's perspective and I prefer it to the above but it entails accepting that the domain of the wisdom realizing ultimate truth does not extend to invalidate conventional truths.

[Mariusz]

Just to be clear where I'm coming from:

Nagarjuna is clearly concerned to be systematically consistent with the historical Buddha, and the discourses of the historical Buddha.

So, instead of thinking about the vajra universe, Buddhalands, sambogakaya as the grounds for communication etc, let us contemplate for a moment both the historical and logical connection between Nagarjuna's work and Gautama's discourses.

Does anyone want to argue that the Pali cannon is not conceptual?

That the many dialogues which Gautama had with a range of different sentient beings, was not conceptual?

That he was not intimately engaged with the ordinary language of sentient beings?

And therefore, that he necessarily apprehended the conventional phenomena of ordinary language and concepts, in order to teach, in order to liberate.

We are in The Way of The Boddhisattva forum where 3 kayas are used in Mahayana, not topics written by Pali. As for me I always wrote Buddhahood is the freedom from all reference points, such apprehended the conventional phenomena or not apprehended the conventional phenomena. This is soteriologically efficient because the Path for us is crucial. Unlike object-side perspective which I find not soteriologically efficient. Nirmanakaya seems to be conditioned unlike Dharmakaya. Of course it is interesting, what "objects are perceived" by a Nirmanakaya-buddha, but shall we our prapañca (reference points) keep spinning only endlessly instead of practise the Path for direct realization? I'm sure we will never complete what Buddhahood conceptually looks like.

From "The Center of Sunlit Sky":
Thus, for Buddhist reasoning and meditation to be soteriologically efficient,
it is crucial to acknowledge that their actual target lies not at the level of the
apprehended objects—the notions of a real personal or phenomenal identity—
but at the level of the apprehending subject—the largely unconscious and instinctive
clinging to such identities.

So if it is still a reference point how does it act as an antidote to Samsara? In contrast to it, we can use also Yogacara which describe: when your have realization that an object has no nature of its own (the imaginary naure), the subject that holds on to this object dissolves naturally (the other-dependent nature), until unblurred vision = beyond all reference points, to reveal the perfect nature. Moreover Yogacara as a supplement of Madhyamaka is more detailed what "seems to be" Buddhahood, why "the seeming is not totally faulty" and how the Path works for us..

[tobes]

Okay - well I suppose I'm not claiming that the Buddha has a conceptual mind per se, only that in moments of discursive relation to humans he must be able to enter into a dialogical relationship, and that the nature of this dialogical relationship, being linguistic, is necessarily conceptual. [And further, perhaps this tells us something important about the two truths].

Your parrot analogy is problematic - because one is not really having a conversation with it; mutual dialogue and understanding does not place. And the reason understanding doesn't take place (between a human and a parrot) is because the parrot only repeats the phonetics of the words, and does not understand that those words refer to abstract things.

That is, the parrot does not have the conceptual capacity which allows mutual understanding to occur.

The Buddha, in responding to the problem of a king for example, clearly does have that capacity.

What I am questioning is wether it makes sense to talk of Buddhas referring to conventional truths from their perspective. Conventional truths might only make sense in relation to an ordinary perspective. Even the conventional aspects of a Buddha such as their from bodies and activities such as giving teachings and even their part in mutual understanding might be explained entirely in relation to an ordinary beings perspective. From X'x perspective the Buddha appeared to do Y. Thus the dream analogy etc. This avoids the uncomfortable position of considering the language and activities of the Buddha to be ultimate truth.

Interesting. I think you're right that it is at very least paradoxical to talk of Buddhas referring to conventional truths from their perspective.

But is there maybe a distinction to be made between giving an explanation of a Buddha taking part in a mutual understanding with an ordinary being (necessarily conventional).....and the reality of that dialogical engagement?

Maybe we're inevitably led to the point we're we can't really say anything about what happens in that dialogue.

After all, the assertion that that dialogical engagement is devoid of conceptual content is also a necessarily conventional explanation. So if it is held that conventional truth is always a deluded apprehension.....then if follows that that assertion has no more basis than the assertion that dialogical engagement does have conceptual content.

[Mariusz]

Interesting. I think you're right that it is at very least paradoxical to talk of Buddhas referring to conventional truths from their perspective...

Maybe we're inevitably led to the point we're we can't really say anything about what happens in that dialogue.

After all, the assertion that that dialogical engagement is devoid of conceptual content is also a necessarily conventional explanation. So if it is held that conventional truth is always a deluded apprehension.....then if follows that that assertion has no more basis than the assertion that dialogical engagement does have conceptual content.

Here quotes that agree with it:
IN PRAISE OF DHARMADHĀTU; ithaca, new york; Nāgārjuna and the Third Karmapa, Rangjung Dorje; Translated and introduced by Karl Brunnhölzl,

p.103:
Likewise,
once the adventitious stains—or, more personally speaking, we as sentient
beings—have dissolved, it is a moot question whether “our” dharmadhātu (or
buddha nature) and “all the rest” of the dharmadhātu (or the buddha natures
of all Buddhas) are the same or different, since what is called a sentient being is nothing but the very mistakenness that makes up such a distinction.

p.101:
From the point of view of what appears to the sentient
beings who obscure this very [Heart; Buddha Nature] and other beings to be guided, it appears as if they have become Buddhas, which is just seeming buddhahood.
At this point, once the adventitious stains have become pure, it appears as if this very buddhahood needed to become completely perfect omniscient buddhahood
again. But in terms of the definitive meaning, this very Buddha heart
is buddhahood by its sheer presence. Therefore, it does not need to become
buddhahood again, and nothing else is able to make it become buddhahood
either. ...As Lord Karmapa Tüsum Kyenba sang:
If there is no change in buddhahood,
There is no aspiration to attain all these fruitions.

[Malcolm]

Notice how you're leaning on a tantric text to support your argument?

There is nothing in Nagarjuna, nor Chandrakirti which asserts vajra speech. The assumption clearly comes from elsewhere.

There are sutra statements to similar effect. Anyway, it merely proves the point, which, in essence, is that people hear what they want to hear regardless of who is speaking.

N

[Mr. G]

Topic cleaned and re-opened

[5heaps]

But false perception is mthong brdzun, so what Candrakirti is clearly saying is that false/faulty/incorrect perception is relative, or totally obscuring, truth.

seems like this blockhead understanding of Chandra leads to the following idea:

The two truths are about how objects are perceived. They can be perceived in only two ways, correctly and incorrectly. Perceiving them incorrectly, a false perception of them is called relative truth. The word brdzun pa means "to lie" as well.

for in gelugpa the two truths are divisions of reality. what do you think about the two truths being 1 entity? for me it seems super air-tight so it would be good if you could find a sharp barb to sink in!

[catmoon]

Here's a view. The two truths are in fact a false division in reality. But conventional reality is easily understood, ultimate reality is understandable with some difficulty, and the way things really are, the fusion of the two, is almost beyond comprehension. So we use the duality of the two truths as a convenient tool to access as much of the real truth as we can.

[Mariusz]

But conventional reality is easily understood

I don't agree. It is impossible to understood. Conventional reality of any object is "workable daily life" consensus only, as far as not analyzed. When analyzed is completely lost according to Madhyamaka.

ultimate reality is understandable with some difficulty

The same implication. Ultimate reality is beyond the understanding because the totall freedom from all reference points. So also impossible for us, sentient beings.

So you see, the both "the two truths" are the same impossible for sentient beings, and the same beyond "the mind of sentient being" from the perspective of buddhas. All divisions such "the two truths" are completely lost even conventionally when analyzed, let alone ultimately when the totall freedom from all reference points.

[Malcolm]

But false perception is mthong brdzun, so what Candrakirti is clearly saying is that false/faulty/incorrect perception is relative, or totally obscuring, truth.

seems like this blockhead understanding of Chandra leads to the following idea:

The two truths are about how objects are perceived. They can be perceived in only two ways, correctly and incorrectly. Perceiving them incorrectly, a false perception of them is called relative truth. The word brdzun pa means "to lie" as well.

for in gelugpa the two truths are divisions of reality. what do you think about the two truths being 1 entity? for me it seems super air-tight so it would be good if you could find a sharp barb to sink in!

If the two truths are one entity, seeing relatives truth would be seeing ultimate truth and all commoners would always have correct perception.

N