Madyamika Sautrantika vs Prasangika

[Mariusz]

... Madhyamakas would say that objects are not perceived at all.

Now I agree. Thank you. But the presentation can be more complete. I can add They are not perceiving this very "not perceived at all" too because the total freedom from all reference points including this very freedom itself. These reference points are for example: object, non-object, wisdom, inherent existence...and so on.

[Mariusz]

...as the display of one's wisdom. But this is not really part of madhyamaka.

The so-called Buddhahood, the ultimate, the unblurred and unimpared vision=the total freedom from all "seeming", "deceiving", "obscured". So for example Madhyamaka on Middle Way and Yogacara on Buddha Nature can be supplementary.

[Malcolm]

Namdrol,

Do you mind elaborating on the apparent contradiction…

"A correct perception takes ultimate truth as its object" and "most Madhyamakas would say that objects are not perceived at all"

Or put another way how do you equate for Candra referring to ultimate truth as an object with Santideva's emphasis that it is not an object (9:2)

I understand that Gelugpa's in post meditation identify emptiness as an object and as such need to tweak Santideva's position but what about most Madhyamikas where ultimate truth is beyond any categorizations don't they need to tweak Candra's assertion which refers to ultimate truth as an object?

Candra is speaking conventionally, hence no contradiction.

[Mariusz]

Moreover, to be honest, and I'm sure many people here will not agree with it, I investigated this very "the seeming which is not totally faulty" is called Alaya-vijnana, that is to say. And I think it is not Shentong at all

[tobes]

Wouldn't that mean then that Buddha would bump every object along his way?
Might there be the case that, at least from a Dzogchen perspective, all phenomena are recognized as ornaments, manifestation of the energy aspect and not taken as something existent? I'm just asking to see if I can make some sense out of this.

Buddhas perceive only wisdom.

A Buddha gets into a car. When she encounters a traffic light, does she need to distinguish between the conventional meanings of red, orange and green?

These are nothing but imputations of conventional meaning: but to say that they are not perceived is to say that the Buddha cannot function amidst the conventions of human life.

Surely it is necessary for a Buddha to perceive conventional meanings a/ in order to communicate with sentient beings and b/ in order to function harmoniously in the world of sentient beings.

[Malcolm]

Wouldn't that mean then that Buddha would bump every object along his way?
Might there be the case that, at least from a Dzogchen perspective, all phenomena are recognized as ornaments, manifestation of the energy aspect and not taken as something existent? I'm just asking to see if I can make some sense out of this.

Buddhas perceive only wisdom.

A Buddha gets into a car. When she encounters a traffic light, does she need to distinguish between the conventional meanings of red, orange and green?

Depends on who you ask. According to the Gelugpas, yes -- according to everyone else, no.

These are nothing but imputations of conventional meaning: but to say that they are not perceived is to say that the Buddha cannot function amidst the conventions of human life.

Conventional truths are objects of delusion. Buddhas possess no delusion, therefore, do not perceive conventional truths.

Surely it is necessary for a Buddha to perceive conventional meanings a/ in order to communicate with sentient beings and b/ in order to function harmoniously in the world of sentient beings.

Not at all, a Buddha's interactions with sentient beings are completely spontaneous and non-conceptual.

[tobes]

I think there is more at stake here than the inevitable Tsong Khapa vs everyone else Tibetan framing of the problem.

I'd agree that the way a Buddha perceives a given phenomenal object is devoid of any conceptual content.

But it doesn't matter how spontaneous a Buddha's interactions with sentient beings may be: if the Buddha speaks she is using concepts. Concepts which are necessarily conventional.

How could speech possibly be non-conceptual???

[catmoon]

How could speech possibly be non-conceptual???

Glaabeldy forkit necklbaum, zimp todal nonfreckit; pastle ingcrotz nom nom zoodlebitzen.

[tobes]

How could speech possibly be non-conceptual???

Glaabeldy forkit necklbaum, zimp todal nonfreckit; pastle ingcrotz nom nom zoodlebitzen.

Exactly - that ain't gonna liberate sentient beings is it?

[catmoon]

How could speech possibly be non-conceptual???

Glaabeldy forkit necklbaum, zimp todal nonfreckit; pastle ingcrotz nom nom zoodlebitzen.

Exactly - that ain't gonna liberate sentient beings is it?

I don't know. Let's wait and see.

[Mariusz]

How could speech possibly be non-conceptual???

Glaabeldy forkit necklbaum, zimp todal nonfreckit; pastle ingcrotz nom nom zoodlebitzen.

Exactly - that ain't gonna liberate sentient beings is it?

Because it does not work as "the Path" for you. You need the Path until you are a sentient being whatever exactly your "the seeming" is, no more no less. It is not the "fault" of a Buddha you have not been the "self-liberated" yet.

If your the seeming would be more "undeceived" you will be able the see a Buddha who is talking to you, using words, concepts etc like during conversations with bodhisattvas, arhats.... When the collapse all the seeming you will be a buddha when there is no more any division, reference points like conceptual or non-conceptual.

Not at all, a Buddha's interactions with sentient beings are completely spontaneous and non-conceptual.

So I don't agree. "completely non-conceptual" is reference point only and an implication from it is: there is no more freedom from all reference points during Buddhahood because "non-conceptual" only has to be.

[Mariusz]

if the Buddha speaks she is using concepts. Concepts which are necessarily conventional.

How could speech possibly be non-conceptual???

There are many such paradoxes when one is going to use the object-side perspective, for example treating a buddha like an object "out there", for example: the "fault" is in Him I'm not liberated, the "error" is in my root Lama I have not recognized Rigpa when He/She pointed it out...

When one is using the subject side perspective everything works I think. Contrary to one is using the object-side perspective when one have to built epistemological very complicated system that should fit together and there is "infinitive regress" without hope to complete it, as I understand Tsongkhapa and now also Namdrol.

The subject side perspective is clear and easy like it:
Animals, Humans, Pretas perceive differently. But there is the Path. Because of this Path, sentient beings by subject side perceive gross Nirmanakaya, bodhisattvas free from clinging perceive subtle Sambhogakaya, buddhas?.... because there is not any division at this level "they" can not continue to perceive but the Dharmakaya. The object of all of these is what? The division is where? Never was at the first place but only seems to. But until it seems to be division is also the Path. This Path leads to the no division. When division between "Buddha" and "sentient being" is completely no more, it means the all qualities (Dharmakaya, Rupakaya). This I meant by my sentence: All divisions belong to the seeming not to the buddhas.

[tobes]

Because it does not work as "the Path" for you. You need the Path until you are a sentient being whatever exactly your "the seeming" is, no more no less. It is not the "fault" of a Buddha you have not been the "self-liberated" yet.

If your the seeming would be more "undeceived" you will be able the see a Buddha who is talking to you, using words, concepts etc like during conversations with bodhisattvas, arhats.... When the collapse all the seeming you will be a buddha when there is no more any division, reference points like conceptual or non-conceptual.

Right, but I'm talking from the point of view of a Buddha, not from the point of view of I "the sentient being."

If a Buddha talks to a sentient being (defined as a person who has not perceived paramatha satya), she must talk in the language of that sentient being. Correct?

Why would she do that? From the Mahayana point of view, out karuna and upaya: that is what a Buddha does; she liberates sentient beings.

The moment she talks to that sentient being, in the language of that sentient being, she is involved in the conventions of language and concept.

Therefore, how can it be asserted that conventional phenomena disappear upon apprehension of the ultimate?

[Malcolm]

I think there is more at stake here than the inevitable Tsong Khapa vs everyone else Tibetan framing of the problem.

I'd agree that the way a Buddha perceives a given phenomenal object is devoid of any conceptual content.

But it doesn't matter how spontaneous a Buddha's interactions with sentient beings may be: if the Buddha speaks she is using concepts. Concepts which are necessarily conventional.

How could speech possibly be non-conceptual???

It is simply a Tsongkhapa vs. the world argument.

As far as Buddha's speech goes, as the Guhyasamaja says, "A single vajra word is heard differently by different sentient beings". A Buddha's vocal actions are also non-conceptual.

This is a very huge polemical area in Tibetan Buddhism, but in general, Nyingmas, Sakyapas and Kagyupas hold that a Buddha's actions, whether verbal or physical are completely spontaneous and free from conceptuality and cognition of conventional signs.

N

[Malcolm]

So I don't agree. "completely non-conceptual"

I said "completely spontaneous" for emphasis on spontaneity; not completely non-conceptual, which would be redundant.
N

[alwayson]

one perceives all phenomena as the display of one's wisdom.

Monistic tendencies strike again LOL

[Malcolm]

Therefore, how can it be asserted that conventional phenomena disappear upon apprehension of the ultimate?

Well, for bodhisattva on the stages, apprehension of the conventional occurs only in post-equipoise. Buddhas experience no post-equipioise phase, ergo, no apprehension of conventional i.e. deluded phenomena.

[Malcolm]

one perceives all phenomena as the display of one's wisdom.

Monistic tendencies strike again LOL

Not at all. Recall, all phenomena means all the five sense organs and sense objects, six consciousnesses, mental factors and unconditioned phenomena i.e. what is included in one skandha, one ayatana, and one dhātu.

One's own wisdom means that one encompasses all phenomena with omniscience.

Thus, no monism.

N

[alwayson]

I want to make sure my mango not only looks ripe, but is in fact ripe.

But the mango can also spoil if you wait too long.

I would really love it if you wrote a book on Madhyamaka and/or Dzogchen.

[alwayson]

Not at all. Recall, all phenomena means all the five sense organs and sense objects, six consciousnesses, mental factors and unconditioned phenomena i.e. what is included in one skandha, one ayatana, and one dhātu.

One's own wisdom means that one encompasses all phenomena with omniscience.

Thus, no monism.

N

I see.

So it is more a realization of the nature of all phenomena.