deepbluehum wrote:Namdrol wrote:Sutrayāna upholds substance dualism
I haven't found it in the Pali Canon.
Oh it's in the Suttas, but fleshed out much more in the Theravada Abhidhamma.
Kevin
deepbluehum wrote:Namdrol wrote:Sutrayāna upholds substance dualism
I haven't found it in the Pali Canon.
Virgo wrote:Oh it's in the Suttas
The metaphor of Indras jeweled net which is used in the Avatamsaka sutra may help clarify this issue for you http://dharmaflower.net/_collection/avatamsaka.pdfWhat is it that separates one beginningless series from another one?

Wait a second, this sounds suspiciously like you are willing to accept a claim to authority!!!KevinSolway wrote:Please provide a quote that says that the most fundamental kinds of substance are mental and material, and that there is definitely nothing more fundamental than those, along with the reasons why there can't be anything more fundamental.
You're slipping Kev! 
gregkavarnos wrote:Wait a second, this sounds suspiciously like you are willing to accept a claim to authority!!!
KevinSolway wrote:Namdrol wrote:There cannot be an absolute cause of a beginningless series.
There can't be a serial beginning to a beginningless series, but there can certainly be a cause to the entire series.
What is it that separates one beginningless series from another one? That would be the cause of a particular beginningless series.
deepbluehum wrote:Namdrol wrote:Sutrayāna upholds substance dualism
I haven't found it in the Pali Canon.
KevinSolway wrote:gregkavarnos wrote:Wait a second, this sounds suspiciously like you are willing to accept a claim to authority!!!
I am lowering the level of my communications by a hundredfold so as to not offend the beings in this realm.
How does the saying go? "When in Rome, do as the Roman's do."
Namdrol wrote:deepbluehum wrote:Namdrol wrote:Sutrayāna upholds substance dualism
I haven't found it in the Pali Canon.
Examine Dharmakirti's proofs of rebirth.
Virgo wrote:deepbluehum wrote:Namdrol wrote:Sutrayāna upholds substance dualism
I haven't found it in the Pali Canon.
Oh it's in the Suttas, but fleshed out much more in the Theravada Abhidhamma.
Kevin
Namdrol wrote:KevinSolway wrote:Namdrol wrote:There cannot be an absolute cause of a beginningless series.
There can't be a serial beginning to a beginningless series, but there can certainly be a cause to the entire series.
What is it that separates one beginningless series from another one? That would be the cause of a particular beginningless series.
One cannot posit a first cause of a beginningless series, that is a contradiction in terms.
deepbluehum wrote:Consciousness is not the only thing in existence nor inherently existent because it cannot be perceived.
KevinSolway wrote:deepbluehum wrote:Consciousness is not the only thing in existence nor inherently existent because it cannot be perceived.
If it can't be perceived in any way then you can't know anything about it, and you wouldn't know that it can't be perceived.
Go read everything Nagarjuna wrote, then read the commentaries, then find a teacher to explain them to you, then meditate on the meanings.KevinSolway wrote:So it's clear from the above that you cannot conceive of consciousness, as you define it, as having an external cause - outside of the series of moments of consciousness. The only way this could be possible is if one of the following were true:
1. You conceive of consciousness as being inherently existent.
or
2. You conceive of consciousness as being the only thing in existence.
Do you agree?
If consciousness were the only thing in existence, then we can discuss whether that is possible, or meaningful, and if it were possible, what that would mean so far as rebirth is concerned. On the other hand, if you conceive that consciousness is not the only thing in existence, but that it is inherently existent, then we can discuss the possibility of that, and what it would mean for rebirth.

KevinSolway wrote:
So it's clear from the above that you cannot conceive of consciousness, as you define it, as having an external cause - outside of the series of moments of consciousness. The only way this could be possible is if one of the following were true:
1. You conceive of consciousness as being inherently existent.
or
2. You conceive of consciousness as being the only thing in existence.
Do you agree?
deepbluehum wrote:
That's 7th Century stuff; a lot of water under the bridge there. I'm saying Pali Suttas are sutra stuff, and I can't find dualism in Buddha's sermons. The opposite.
I remember you saying in another thread that consciousness is composed of the mahabhuta of air, from which yana does this teaching come from, and if it is true (across all yana) then does this then not mean that even formless realm beings have a (subtle) physical basis (I was going to say body, but then reminded myself of name and form)?Namdrol wrote:deepbluehum wrote:
That's 7th Century stuff; a lot of water under the bridge there. I'm saying Pali Suttas are sutra stuff, and I can't find dualism in Buddha's sermons. The opposite.
The very fact that formless realms beings are immaterial proves substance dualism in sutrayāna.

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