The so-called emptiness of objects

[Dexing]

Yes, but you need to ask why causes and conditions are considered illusory.

It is because one cannot establish the event of a cause with its effect, not because causality does not exist.

No one is saying causality does not exist just because external causes & conditions are illusory. That is not the only possible cause & condition.

Because causes presuppose other causes, in an infinite regression, and entities presuppose other entities in an infinite chain of relation. Neither a single cause nor a single entity can be established. Hence causes and entities are empty of intrinsic existence.

In this sort of false setup of dependent origination, that is true. But true dependent origination arrives very clearly at a single point. The problem is you are too fixated on a multitude of external causes & conditions, when the true origin of all of this, even that system of dependent origination has an origin, and has been explicitly revealed in such teachings as the Śūraṅgama Sūtra which has been quoted so far.

But this is in no way a denial of causality. It is the precise assertion of a particular kind of causality: Dependent Origination.

This why Nagarjuna asserts at the end of the Vig: I adore that incomparable Buddha who taught that voidness, Dependent Origination and the Middle Way as equivalent.

The problem is in understanding exactly what origination is dependent upon. As long as you keep looking outwardly, you'll never find it.

[Jnana]

But this is in no way a denial of causality. It is the precise assertion of a particular kind of causality: Dependent Origination.

Nāgārjuna's MMK and Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā clearly demonstrate that the four kinds of conditions do not withstand analysis. Thus causality is a convention. The two truths cannot be conflated. Candrakīrti's commentaries emphasize this in numerous places.

All the best,

Geoff

[ground]

But this is in no way a denial of causality. It is the precise assertion of a particular kind of causality: Dependent Origination.

Nāgārjuna's MMK and Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā clearly demonstrate that the four kinds of conditions do not withstand analysis. Thus causality is a convention. The two truths cannot be conflated. Candrakīrti's commentaries emphasize this in numerous places.

All the best,

Geoff

The analysis you are referring to is a convention too!

If applied it appears as if there is no causality from its own side, that there is no causality which may be separated from the subject that is either thinking of the convention "causality" or applying the conventional analysis which shows that "causality" cannot be found if such a conventional analysis is applied.
However this does not invalidate the Buddha's saying "When there is this, then there is that. With the cessation of this, that comes to an end."

Kind regards

[Jnana]

The analysis you are referring to is a convention too!

Of course.

However this does not invalidate the Buddha's saying "When there is this, then there is that. With the cessation of this, that comes to an end."

There is no need to invalidate conventions. Without conventions the ultimate cannot be realized.

All the best,

Geoff

[tobes]

Yes, but you need to ask why causes and conditions are considered illusory.

It is because one cannot establish the event of a cause with its effect, not because causality does not exist.

No one is saying causality does not exist just because external causes & conditions are illusory. That is not the only possible cause & condition.

Because causes presuppose other causes, in an infinite regression, and entities presuppose other entities in an infinite chain of relation. Neither a single cause nor a single entity can be established. Hence causes and entities are empty of intrinsic existence.

In this sort of false setup of dependent origination, that is true. But true dependent origination arrives very clearly at a single point. The problem is you are too fixated on a multitude of external causes & conditions, when the true origin of all of this, even that system of dependent origination has an origin, and has been explicitly revealed in such teachings as the Śūraṅgama Sūtra which has been quoted so far.

But this is in no way a denial of causality. It is the precise assertion of a particular kind of causality: Dependent Origination.

This why Nagarjuna asserts at the end of the Vig: I adore that incomparable Buddha who taught that voidness, Dependent Origination and the Middle Way as equivalent.

The problem is in understanding exactly what origination is dependent upon. As long as you keep looking outwardly, you'll never find it.

You're basically asserting a first cause here, which is exactly the antithesis of the logic of dependent origination, in any Buddhist tradition. The basic premise of dependent origination is that it does not have an origin. Each point presupposes a previous point, whether we are talking about internal phenomena or external.

[tobes]

But this is in no way a denial of causality. It is the precise assertion of a particular kind of causality: Dependent Origination.

Nāgārjuna's MMK and Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā clearly demonstrate that the four kinds of conditions do not withstand analysis. Thus causality is a convention. The two truths cannot be conflated. Candrakīrti's commentaries emphasize this in numerous places.

All the best,

Geoff

So do you hold that causality (which in the Madhyamakan account is dependent origination), is a conventional truth which is ultimately erroneous?

[tobes]

The analysis you are referring to is a convention too!

If applied it appears as if there is no causality from its own side, that there is no causality which may be separated from the subject that is either thinking of the convention "causality" or applying the conventional analysis which shows that "causality" cannot be found if such a conventional analysis is applied.
However this does not invalidate the Buddha's saying "When there is this, then there is that. With the cessation of this, that comes to an end."

Kind regards

Yes, that's exactly the point: the conventions of causality being refuted by Chandrakirti are (in the Madhyamakavatara) the conventions of Sankya and Yogacara. Of course, in employing the reductio method, he does not assert a positive account of causality......

But this method and those arguments do not deny the Buddha's saying "When there is this, then there is that. With the cessation of this, that comes to an end." That is, what remains after the reductio is the Madhyamakan account of causality....not the negation of causality as merely a false truth which has no relationship with emptiness and the ultimate truth.

[tobes]

Be careful not to assume that the rupaskandha represents all that form is.

What else might form be?

Rupa implies anything with a material basis

Rupaskandha only implies the material constituents of subjective existence

[Jnana]

So do you hold that causality (which in the Madhyamakan account is dependent origination), is a conventional truth which is ultimately erroneous?

Causality is ultimately unestablished.

Yes, that's exactly the point: the conventions of causality being refuted by Chandrakirti are (in the Madhyamakavatara) the conventions of Sankya and Yogacara. Of course, in employing the reductio method, he does not assert a positive account of causality......

The four types of conditions: cause, object, immediate, and dominant, are common to all Buddhist schools. Nāgārjuna's MMK and Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā demonstrate that these four types of conditions do not withstand analysis.

But this method and those arguments do not deny the Buddha's saying "When there is this, then there is that. With the cessation of this, that comes to an end."

These statements are conventional, taught with a purpose. Commenting on MMK 1.10, the Prasannapadā states:

The definition of condition as dominant factor (adhipateya) assumed here is this: a factor which, on being present, something arises, is the dominant factor of the latter. But as nothing is self-existent, all things arising in mutual dependence, how can the "this" be represented as a cause? And how can the "that" be represented as an effect? So although the dominant factor is defined, it has not been established.

(BTW, if you're reading Garfield's translation of the MMK, his translation of MMK 1.10 is questionable. Apparently he's trying to save Nāgārjuna from modern critics accusations of nihilism. But all such accusations are quite pointless; they fail to correctly understand the two truths.)

All the best,

Geoff

[tobes]

So do you hold that causality (which in the Madhyamakan account is dependent origination), is a conventional truth which is ultimately erroneous?

Causality is ultimately unestablished.

Yes, that's exactly the point: the conventions of causality being refuted by Chandrakirti are (in the Madhyamakavatara) the conventions of Sankya and Yogacara. Of course, in employing the reductio method, he does not assert a positive account of causality......

The four types of conditions: cause, object, immediate, and dominant, are common to all Buddhist schools. Nāgārjuna's MMK and Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā demonstrate that these four types of conditions do not withstand analysis.

But this method and those arguments do not deny the Buddha's saying "When there is this, then there is that. With the cessation of this, that comes to an end."

These statements are conventional, taught with a purpose. Commenting on MMK 1.10, the Prasannapadā states:

The definition of condition as dominant factor (adhipateya) assumed here is this: a factor which, on being present, something arises, is the dominant factor of the latter. But as nothing is self-existent, all things arising in mutual dependence, how can the "this" be represented as a cause? And how can the "that" be represented as an effect? So although the dominant factor is defined, it has not been established.

(BTW, if you're reading Garfield's translation of the MMK, his translation of MMK 1.10 is questionable. Apparently he's trying to save Nāgārjuna from modern critics accusations of nihilism. But all such accusations are quite pointless; they fail to correctly understand the two truths.)

All the best,

Geoff

Garfield is quite explicitly influenced by the Gelugpa presentation of the two truths, which you clearly reject. However, his translation of the MMK is usually acknowledged to be very reliable. One of my own teachers, who is from the Kagyu lineage and has actually given open minded teachings on Dolpopa (about as far away from the Gelugpa presentation as you can get) has recommended the Garfield trans as the best.....and I agree. His commentary one can take or leave; I personally find it very useful.

But if you're not satisfied with that, how about this from the intro of the Mipham commentary of Chandrakirti's Madhyamakavatara:

"It is however, important to bear in mind that, in this context [the discussion about causation] causes are understood exclusively in a substantial or material sense......the everyday notion that real effects are produced by real causes is a mistake; it cannot possibly be true. Causes and effects, so much a feature of existence, are, he [Nagarjuna] says, essentially definable only in terms of mutual dependence; they are not real things in themselves."

Therefore, what is being undermined is the intrinsic existence of entities and the conventions of causality posited on that (erronerous) basis; not the the mutual relation (causal) between dependent entities.

So,

"It is important to understand, however, that he is not trying to deny our experience of production and change, or of anything else in the phenomenal world. That would be absurd; the world-process is all around us constantly, undeniably."

"The true status of the phenomena that we experience is not, therefore, to be found in their supposed real entity, but in their relatedness, their interdependence with all other phenomena. This is Nagarjuna's interpretation of the doctrine of dependent arising, understood not in the sense of a temporal sequence, but in the essential dependence of phenomena......Their interdependence is their emptiness of inherent existence."

Which means that:

"In fact, the ultimate is not separate from phenomena; it is the very nature of phenomena. The ultimate is what the conventional reality really is; the conventional is the way the ultimate appears. The two truths are never separate; the merge and coincide in phenomena. The difference is not ontological but epistemic."

If mutual dependence is denied, then dependent arising (causality) is denied, which means that emptiness is denied.

[Jnana]

But if you're not satisfied with that, how about this from the intro of the Mipham commentary of Chandrakirti's Madhyamakavatara

Also from the same intro:

Phenomena, being the interplay of interdependent factors, are unreal.

Nāgārjuna's commentary on his Śūnyatāsaptati demonstrates that arising, abiding, and dissolution do not withstand analysis:

1. Duration, origination, destruction, existence, non-existence, inferiority, mediocrity and superiority were taught by the Buddha in accord with conventional usage, not by the power of the real.

Whatsoever was taught by the Buddha in accord with conventional usage: duration, origination, destruction, inferiority, mediocrity and superiority were all not taught by the power of the real.

5. The originated is not the object to be originated. The unoriginated is also not the object to be originated. The (object) at the time of origination is also not the object to be originated, because it would be originated and unoriginated.

First, the originated is not the object to be originated -- If it is asked -- why? -- Because it is already originated. An object which is already originated is not the object to be originated. The not originated is also not the object to be originated -- why? -- Because it is not originated. An object which is not originated is not the object to be originated, because (it) is without activity, without efficiency and non-existent. Thus, it is not the object to be originated. An object at the time of origination is also not the object to be originated -- why? -- Because it is exhausted between the originated and the unoriginated, and the object which is originated and the object which is not originated is also not the object to be originated, simply because of the considerations explained above. Of the two, the first, the originated is not the object to be originated, because it is already originated and the object which is not originated is also not the object to be originated, because it is not originated, without the activity of origination, without efficiency and non-existent. Thus, for the reason that excluding the originated and the not originated, there is no third which is the moment of origination, the object at the time of origination is also not the object to be originated. Moreover, there is also no origination, because a cause is not justified.

30. Because the three characteristics of the compounded (factors) -- origination, duration and destruction -- are non-existent, therefore the compounded (factors) and the uncompounded (factors) are not at all existent.

Origination, duration and destruction which were taught to be the three characteristics of the compounded factors are not justified, if analyzed. Therefore, (they are) non-existent. Since they (the three characteristics) are non-existent, compounded factors and uncompounded factors are not at all existent.

31. The undestroyed is not destroyed, nor is the destroyed. The enduring does not endure, nor does the unenduring endure. The originated does not originate, nor does the unoriginated (originate).

At this point, it may be considered whether the originated originates or the unoriginated (originates). In this case, first, the originated does not originate. It may be asked -- why? -- Because, it is already originated. The unoriginated also does not originate. Why? Because it is unoriginated. It may be considered whether the enduring endures or the unenduring (endures). In this case, the enduring does not endure, because it is already enduring. The unenduring also does not endure. Why? Because, it is unenduring. Finally, it may be considered whether the destroyed is destroyed or the undestroyed (is destroyed). Neither alternative is justified. Thus the compounded factors are non-existent, because even though they are accepted, they are not justified through these three processes. Since the compounded factors are not existent, the uncompounded factors are likewise impossible.

All the best,

Geoff

[ground]

There has never been, there is nothing and there never will be anything beyond the 5 aggregates, beyond the 6 sense bases.
Even all this proliferation is the sphere of the 5 aggregates and the 6 sense bases.
And the self-referential application of these same aggregates and the senses in order to find themselves is just futile.

Sometimes it appears as if this person called Nagarjuna just triggered as mass of useless proliferation.

Kind regards

[Dexing]

You're basically asserting a first cause here, which is exactly the antithesis of the logic of dependent origination, in any Buddhist tradition. The basic premise of dependent origination is that it does not have an origin. Each point presupposes a previous point, whether we are talking about internal phenomena or external.

I'm not such a beginner that I don't know the basic premise of dependent origination...

I'm not talking about a first cause within dependent origination (where you keep getting stuck), as such a cause obviously cannot be found, but the very origin of the illusory appearance of all this, including the apparent law of dependent origination itself.

You cannot find the origin of this great illusion if you still take it as real.

Rupa implies anything with a material basis

Rupaskandha only implies the material constituents of subjective existence

Oh, and what kind of things with a material basis might be constituents of objective existence, apparently what you call "rupa", and how exactly are they objective and existing?

[Jnana]

Rupa implies anything with a material basis

The Mādhyamaka reasoning of "neither one nor many" also demonstrates that phenomena with form as well as formless phenomena do not withstand analysis and are ultimately false. Kamalaśīla's first Bhāvanākrama:

Things are of two sorts: those with a material form and those which are immaterial.

But here, first of all, those with a material form, such a pots and so forth, do not have an individual nature since a material form is divisible into atoms. (And) their multiplicity (also) is not logical, since the condition of having the nature of a collection of atoms is not proven for atoms aligned in sequence being divided into directions like “in front” and so forth. And since aside from single or multiple natures there does not exist any other nature whatsoever for a thing, from the ultimate perspective natureless indeed are these entities with material form, just like the forms perceived in a dream. And this was stated by the Bhagavān himself in the noble Laṅkāvatāra: “O Mahāmāti! As a cowhorn being divided into atoms does not remain, so too even the atoms – being divided they do not retain the character of atomhood.”

And those which are immaterial, being analyzed in the same way, are also definitely without an inherent nature. That is to say, since an object which is external such as blue does not exist, the immaterial aggregates such as consciousness and the rest appear in the form of “blue” out of their own capacity. It should be approached in this way. The Bhagavān said, “Material form is not outside, it is one’s own mind that is seen outside.” And thus those (immaterial things) having a singular nature are not logically possible since they appear in various aspects such as blue and so on (and) since they appear under the (two) forms of subject and object. And an individual having a multiple nature is not reasonable, since “one” and “many” are opposed. Since no individual nature (can be) established, then a multiple nature is also illogical – since something multiple has the form of a collection of individuals!

But if it is accepted here that those untrue material forms and so forth appear as aspects, then consciousness also proves to be false since consciousness is no different in nature from those. For there is no other form of consciousness apart from the form it has in appearing. And material forms and so forth do not appear on their own. And since those which have been reduced to the nature of consciousness are false, it should be granted that all consciousness is false. Therefore the Bhagavān said, “All consciousness is like an illusion.”

Therefore it is certain that all these things are ultimately false because of their voidness of singular or multiple natures. And this meaning was spoken by the Bhagavān in the Laṅkāvatāra: “Just as a form in a mirror, its oneness and otherness abandoned, is seen and yet is not there, so too is the reality of things.”

“Oneness and otherness abandoned” means “without oneness or otherness.” And again it is said: “Discriminating with the intellect, an inherent nature is not ascertained. Thus they are shown to be inexpressible and without an inherent nature.”

Atīśa's Madhyamakopadeśa agrees with this analysis:

Entities are of two kinds: those that possess form and those that are without form. Those that possess form are collections of infinitesimal particles. When these are analyzed and broken up in terms of their directional parts, not even their minutest [part] remains and they are without any shape. Since they are just like space, they are not established. Or, they are free from unity and multiplicity. Thus, they are without color and utterly without appearance.

What is without form is the mind. As for that [mind], the past mind has [already] ceased and perished. The future mind has not [yet] arisen or originated. As for the present mind, it is also difficult to examine: It has no color and is without any shape. Since it is just like space, it is not established. Or, when analyzed and scrutinized with the weapon of reasoning, it is free from unity and multiplicity. In other words, it is unarisen. Or, [it may be said that] it is natural luminosity and so on. Therefore, one realizes that it is not established.

At the point when these two [what possesses form and what is without form] definitely do not exist and are not established as [having] any nature whatsoever, the very knowledge that discriminates them is not established either ... once all specifically characterized and generally characterized phenomena are established as nonexistent [through knowledge], this knowledge itself is without appearance, luminous, and not established as [having] any nature whatsoever.

As does Atīśa's Ratnakaraṇḍodghātanāmamadhyamakopadeśa:

One may wonder, “From where did all of this come in the first place, and to where does it depart now?” Once examined in this way, [one sees that] it neither comes from anywhere nor departs to anywhere. All inner and outer phenomena are just like that. Therefore, everything is the illusory magical display of one’s own mind. It is appearing yet delusive, and delusive while appearing. Thus, all of it is contained in the body, and the [body] is again contained in the mind.

As for the mind, it has no color and no shape. It is natural luminosity that is primordially unborn. The very knowledge that discriminates this is also luminosity. In this interval, consciousness is nothing whatsoever, does not abide as anything, is not established as anything, and has not arisen as any aspect, and all discursiveness without exception is completely at peace. This meditative concentration of space-vajra that is without appearance and in which the entire dust of characteristics has vanished is like the very center of the sky that is lit up by the autumn sun. In it, dwell as long as possible.

So do you hold that causality (which in the Madhyamakan account is dependent origination), is a conventional truth which is ultimately erroneous?

Again, conventions are ultimately unestablished and are only satisfactory when left unexamined. Atīśa's Satyadvayāvatāra:

3. We hold the correct conventional truth to be
The phenomenon which arises and perishes, and
Is capable of producing meaning, and
Is attractive only when (left) unexamined.

4. There is only one ultimate truth;
Although others hold it is of two kinds;
But if true-nature is not established anywhere,
Why would there be two, or three, or more?

5. One does use (conventional) words to show this,
Stating it is non-arising and non-perishing, etc.,
But in the mode of undifferentiated ultimate truth,
There is no phenomenality and no true-nature.

6. Differentiation in emptiness itself
Has not the slightest possibility of existing;
And when one realizes this non-conceptually,
It is described as “seeing emptiness.”

7. The most profound sūtras say that
It is seeing the unseen itself, and
In it there is no seeing and no seer;
It is beginningless and endless calm.

8. Substance and non-substance are rejected,
There is no conceptualization, no basis for it;
There is no abiding and nothing to abide;
No going, no coming, and no analogy for it.

9. It is inexpressible and unseeable;
It is changeless and unconditioned.
If a yogin realizes this, he is rid of
The obscuration of his afflictions and of his knowledge.

18. The teacher Candrakīrti says this:
“Relative truth acts as the means,
From the means arises the ultimate truth.
Whoever does not know the difference between the two,
And understands them wrongly, falls to bad destinies.”

19. “Without trusting in (this) difference
There will be no realization of the ultimate.
To endeavor to reach the upper story
Of the palace of correctness
Without the stairs of correct relative (truths),
Is impossible for a learned man.”

20. If one investigates with logical examination
What this relative truth appears to be,
The very finding of nothing (there) is the ultimate (truth):
The true-nature that abides from eternity.

All the best,

Geoff

[tobes]

Rupa implies anything with a material basis

The Mādhyamaka reasoning of "neither one nor many" also demonstrates that phenomena with form as well as formless phenomena do not withstand analysis and are ultimately false.

Yes, but no one is asserting the ultimate reality of rupa.

All I'm asserting is that conventionally, rupa does not solely imply the constituents of subjective existence (i.e. rupaskandha).

[tobes]

You're basically asserting a first cause here, which is exactly the antithesis of the logic of dependent origination, in any Buddhist tradition. The basic premise of dependent origination is that it does not have an origin. Each point presupposes a previous point, whether we are talking about internal phenomena or external.

I'm not such a beginner that I don't know the basic premise of dependent origination...

I'm not talking about a first cause within dependent origination (where you keep getting stuck), as such a cause obviously cannot be found, but the very origin of the illusory appearance of all this, including the apparent law of dependent origination itself.

You cannot find the origin of this great illusion if you still take it as real.

How can there be an origin to anything which is empty?

The apparent law of dependent origination is itself dependently originated. Therefore, it cannot have an origin.

Do you mean avidya?

What exactly am I taking to be real?

[tobes]

Rupa implies anything with a material basis

Rupaskandha only implies the material constituents of subjective existence

Oh, and what kind of things with a material basis might be constituents of objective existence, apparently what you call "rupa", and how exactly are they objective and existing?

I have not asserted that things with a material basis are objective and existing: I am in no way espousing a realism here. If you find this to be the case, please demonstrate how.

[Astus]

"How can there be an origin to anything which is empty?"

Emptiness means impermanence, impermanence is arising, remaining and disappearing. Only empty things can have an origin and an end. But exactly because there is an origin there is no real (eternal and independent) origin, because there is cause there is no real cause.

[Dexing]

How can there be an origin to anything which is empty?

The apparent law of dependent origination is itself dependently originated. Therefore, it cannot have an origin.

You are too stuck on things within dependent origination. I'm speaking of the illusion of all this itself, not of the things appearing within this illusion.

Do you mean avidya?

What exactly am I taking to be real?

Avidyā is still talking within the illusion of dependent origination, which is what you are taking to be real. You're not seeing the forest for the trees.

I have not asserted that things with a material basis are objective and existing: I am in no way espousing a realism here. If you find this to be the case, please demonstrate how.

You said rūpaskandha "only implies the material constituents of subjective existence", which was narrowed down from rūpa which you defined as "anything with a material basis".

So if rūpaskandha is a narrowed scope of only material constituents of subjective existence, then rūpa must include material constituents of objective existence as well.

Otherwise, I don't see the difference between the two that you are asserting here. So I'm asking you to provide an example of something which you call rūpa that is not a "material constituent of subjective existence", in other words something that must be a material constituent of objective existence.

I think Yeshe D's last post pretty well crushed that possibility, since all so-called "objective existence" is in fact subjective appearance of one's own consciousness, which therefore also does not withstand analysis, making the possibility for this being idealism- which you quickly called out- also impossible.

Again, idealism is what one prematurely labels this teaching when one does not have a full understanding of it. So far, you have not been able to step out of the illusion of dependent origination and see the forest for the trees.

[conebeckham]

Another way of saying this ^:

It's easy enough to understand the nonexistence of entities due to the fact of their impermanence. The process of becoming and ceasing itself, however, is not an "existence."

There are no things.

There is also no process.

Dependent Origination does not exist.