Karma and Reincarnation

[Schrödinger’s Yidam]

And then there are certain blind people that can use echo location to see their environment. They can detect the size and shape of objects in front of them.

Obviously they were bats in their immediately previous life.

[Grigoris]

That is one model. Another model is neuronal/synaptic cross-wiring. Both seem to have supporting evidence. It's definitely a physical issue. But regardless of modern explanations, it's unclear how the classical model would explain the arising of sound consciousness from visual input. For example, the model for the arising of sound consciousness is:

• sound object --> sound organ --> auditory consciousness

As far as I know, the classical model would not accept the possibility of something like:

• visual object --> visual organ --> AND(visual consciousness, auditory consciousness)

This is an interesting discussion, but, unfortunately, it is taking us a bit far afield from this tread's topic. Maybe a new thread is in order...

Because all the five sensory consciouness have to pass through the mano vijnana, which is why I said that this is probably where the mix-up occurs. The mind puts the wrong label on the sensation. Of course the process can be seen at a material (neurobiological) level, but neurobiology doesn't really adequately explain consciousness. Maybe feelings can somewhat be explained by the presence of certain neurotransmitters acting at certain brain locii, but it is still a pretty rough map.

[anjali]

As far as I know, the classical model would not accept the possibility of something like:

• visual object --> visual organ --> AND(visual consciousness, auditory consciousness)

Because all the five sensory consciouness have to pass through the mano vijnana, which is why I said that this is probably where the mix-up occurs. The mind puts the wrong label on the sensation. Of course the process can be seen at a material (neurobiological) level, but neurobiology doesn't really adequately explain consciousness. Maybe feelings can somewhat be explained by the presence of certain neurotransmitters acting at certain brain locii, but it is still a pretty rough map.

At one level this certainly makes sense. After all, what we experience is mentally constructed experience. So, for example, if a touch sensation triggers both touch and taste consciousnesses, then it is the mind that is doing that. However, it does seem that our sensory experience can be far less rigidly partitioned that most of us realize.

[Malcolm]

Because all the five sensory consciouness have to pass through the mano vijnana, which is why I said that this is probably where the mix-up occurs.

All six sense consciousness are actually one [momentary*] consciousness operating through the five sense gates when those gates meet their objects. This consciousness moment is so brief as to lend the illusion that we are seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching and thinking at the same time. We don't, when consciousness functions as an eye consciousness it cannot function as a nose consciousness and so on.
M

The most fundamental unit of time in Abhidharma is the duration of a concept, approximately 7 nanoseconds.

[xabir]

Because all the five sensory consciouness have to pass through the mano vijnana, which is why I said that this is probably where the mix-up occurs.

All six sense consciousness are actually one [momentary*] consciousness operating through the five sense gates when those gates meet their objects. This consciousness moment is so brief as to lend the illusion that we are seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching and thinking at the same time. We don't, when consciousness functions as an eye consciousness it cannot function as a nose consciousness and so on.
M

The most fundamental unit of time in Abhidharma is the duration of a concept, approximately 7 nanoseconds.

Nice.

Are there any moments where consciousness is not seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching and thinking?

[Grigoris]

Yes, according to Theravada abhidhamma: during the bhavanga phase.

[Malcolm]

Because all the five sensory consciouness have to pass through the mano vijnana, which is why I said that this is probably where the mix-up occurs.

All six sense consciousness are actually one [momentary*] consciousness operating through the five sense gates when those gates meet their objects. This consciousness moment is so brief as to lend the illusion that we are seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching and thinking at the same time. We don't, when consciousness functions as an eye consciousness it cannot function as a nose consciousness and so on.
M

The most fundamental unit of time in Abhidharma is the duration of a concept, approximately 7 nanoseconds.

Nice.

Are there any moments where consciousness is not seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching and thinking?

In Madhyamaka, no. Shantideva states:

"When there neither an object or a non-object before the mind, at that time, since there is no other possibility, the mind is pacified"

[Virgo]

Yes, according to Theravada abhidhamma: during the bhavanga phase.

Theravada Abhidhamma while profound, is still very limited in scope. It is a hyper-realist hinayana stance.

Kevin

[Virgo]

And then there are certain blind people that can use echo location to see their environment. They can detect the size and shape of objects in front of them.

Obviously they were bats in their immediately previous life.

There is a story in the Theravada Abhidhamma that Sariputtas 500 disciples who received Abhidhamma teachings from him, were once all bats living in a cave where monks recited Abhidhamma, and at that time, although they could not understand it, they recognized it as profound and mentally paid respect.

Kevin

[Grigoris]

Yes, according to Theravada abhidhamma: during the bhavanga phase.

Theravada Abhidhamma while profound, is still very limited in scope. It is a hyper-realist hinayana stance.

Kevin

And where exactly, pray tell, in this specific example is it "very limited" "hyper-realism"?

[Virgo]

Yes, according to Theravada abhidhamma: during the bhavanga phase.

Theravada Abhidhamma while profound, is still very limited in scope. It is a hyper-realist hinayana stance.

Kevin

And where exactly, pray tell, in this specific example is it "very limited" "hyper-realism"?

They are an outgrowth of the view of certain logicians that ascribed to a certain view. The purpose of their being described and reasoning for their being taught must be understood within the greater framework of the view of the work from which they come. Specifically, it is a work, dealing with the emptiness of persons, which drives home the same (never touching on the emptiness of all phenomena) by painstakingly describing in great detail, every phenomena which actually does arise and their causation, to show that things arise but people do not. In order to do this effectively and convincingly, it has to go into the utmost detail of the process of a mindstream, to show how none of it is a person, and yet there are mental and physical phenomena which arise.

It is realist in it's nature, not taking mental and physical phenomena as dreamlike, but as quite solid, and real.

Kevin

[Malcolm]

They are an outgrowth of the view of certain logicians that ascribed to a certain view. The purpose of their being described and reasoning for their being taught must be understood within the greater framework of the view of the work from which they come. Specifically, it is a work, dealing with the emptiness of persons, which drives home the same (never touching on the emptiness of all phenomena) by painstakingly describing in great detail, every phenomena which actually does arise and their causation, to show that things arise but people do not. In order to do this effectively and convincingly, it has to go into the utmost detail of the process of a mindstream, to show how none of it is a person, and yet there are mental and physical phenomena which arise.

It is realist in it's nature, not taking mental and physical phenomena as dreamlike, but as quite solid, and real.

Kevin

[Schrödinger’s Yidam]

It is realist in it's nature, not taking mental and physical phenomena as dreamlike, but as quite solid, and real.

I think that's a first here. I've never seen Malcolm give a "thumbs up" smiley as a response before.

*****************************

I don't think that they see physical phenomena as "solid and real". I believe they reduce physical reality down to what we would call "atoms" and say that those are real. But something like a table still has no intrinsic "tableness" to it. It's just that the parts that make up the table are real.

That's splitting hairs I know, but we do a lot of that around here.

[Grigoris]

It is realist in it's nature, not taking mental and physical phenomena as dreamlike, but as quite solid, and real.

I think that's a first here. I've never seen Malcolm give a "thumbs up" smiley as a response before.

*****************************

I don't think that they see physical phenomena as "solid and real". I believe they reduce physical reality down to what we would call "atoms" and say that those are real. But something like a table still has no intrinsic "tableness" to it. It's just that the parts that make up the table are real.

That's splitting hairs I know, but we do a lot of that around here.

Mahabhuta, to be exact.

[Grigoris]

They are an outgrowth of the view of certain logicians that ascribed to a certain view. The purpose of their being described and reasoning for their being taught must be understood within the greater framework of the view of the work from which they come. Specifically, it is a work, dealing with the emptiness of persons, which drives home the same (never touching on the emptiness of all phenomena) by painstakingly describing in great detail, every phenomena which actually does arise and their causation, to show that things arise but people do not. In order to do this effectively and convincingly, it has to go into the utmost detail of the process of a mindstream, to show how none of it is a person, and yet there are mental and physical phenomena which arise.

It is realist in it's nature, not taking mental and physical phenomena as dreamlike, but as quite solid, and real.

Kevin

And how is the bhavanga any more real than the alayavijnana? I would love to banter around generalities (well, actually I wouldn't, but anyway) but I specifically asked you to address the issue at hand.

[Virgo]

And how is the bhavanga any more real than the alayavijnana?

It's not (nor did I ever say otherwise). The alayavijnana though, is developed within a different framework, for a different purpose.

Bhavanga, as most people think, however, does not perform a similar function to the store-house consciousness. Bhavanga cittas, are simply moments of mentality that arise when there is no object, most notably between (or more properly as the beginning of and directly after) sense and/or mind-door processes in the Theravada Abhidhamma. They do not store or transfer anything any more than any other cittas do.

I would love to banter around generalities (well, actually I wouldn't, but anyway) but I specifically asked you to address the issue at hand.

The generalities here are important. Why is bhavanga even important? It isn't really without it's context. And the context here (ie the emptiness of persons, not the emptiness of all phenomena) is the only one in which it is in any way important as an explanation. That is why I wrote what I did.

Again, it needs to be understood within the context that it has been presented, or else it cannot be fully understood. If you simply want to know what a bhavanga citta is, but are not concerned with in which way it exists, or how it relates to "you" in any real sense, then this contextual framework is unimportant.

Kevin

[Grigoris]

It's not (nor did I ever say otherwise).

It seems to me that that is what you were saying her:

It is realist in it's nature, not taking mental and physical phenomena as dreamlike, but as quite solid, and real.

But maybe I just misinterpreted what you were trying to say.

The alayavijnana though, is developed within a different framework, for a different purpose.

Bhavanga, as most people think, however, does not perform a similar function to the store-house consciousness. Bhavanga cittas, are simply moments of mentality that arise when there is no object, most notably between (or more properly as the beginning of and directly after) sense and/or mind-door processes in the Theravada Abhidhamma. They do not store or transfer anything any more than any other cittas do.

Very true.

Again, it needs to be understood within the context that it has been presented, or else it cannot be fully understood. If you simply want to know what a bhavanga citta is, but are not concerned with in which way it exists, or how it relates to "you" in any real sense, then this contextual framework is unimportant.

Kevin

Aagin this is very true, but it still provides no evidence regarding the "accusation" of hyper-realism in regards to the model of the functioning of mind. And, anyway, again, all that is happening is that you are displaying a preference for one conceptual framework over another. Unless, of course, you are saying that Theravada is not Buddhadharma, then we are getting into a whole different conversation.

[Malcolm]

Aagin this is very true, but it still provides no evidence regarding the "accusation" of hyper-realism in regards to the model of the functioning of mind. And, anyway, again, all that is happening is that you are displaying a preference for one conceptual framework over another. Unless, of course, you are saying that Theravada is not Buddhadharma, then we are getting into a whole different conversation.

What Kevin is saying is that for Theravadins Dharmas are real but persons are not. Perhaps "hyper" is a bit of an exaggeration, but their view is still realist, so far as it goes.

[Virgo]

It's not (nor did I ever say otherwise).

It seems to me that that is what you were saying her...

Neither one is any more real than the other, but their views differ.

Aagin this is very true, but it still provides no evidence regarding the "accusation" of hyper-realism in regards to the model of the functioning of mind. And, anyway, again, all that is happening is that you are displaying a preference for one conceptual framework over another. Unless, of course, you are saying that Theravada is not Buddhadharma, then we are getting into a whole different conversation.

What evidence do I really need? All you have to do is read a treatise like the Visuddhimagga to understand that the view is that of realism (or read other Commentaries).

Conceptualizations can, at best, only be approximations of ultimate reality. Therefore, neither system is truly correct in the realest sense. Therefore, I do not prefer either. Each one of these systems, however, can be a very useful tool in it's own right, under the right circumstances, for the right people, etc.
Therefore, I feel that both are profound and liberating, it's just that the Theravada Abhidhamma posits really arising dharmas, while yogacara is more penetrating in this matter. Both point outside of the loop.

Kevin

[cloudburst]

I am interested to see if you can give a coherent explanation of external object without positing or implying an essence. So far, I don't think you've done so.

Sure I have, external objects are composed of the inert five elements, arising from causes and conditions, lacking any intrinsic nature.

You still have the problem of how an inert object, or an object not somehow connected with consciousness, could exist without an essence. If something exists without depending upon mind, it will be inherent. You need to deal with this problem in a way other than just asserting your point.

In that case you can give an example of an object that is not and has never appeared to mind. If it is an object, it is an object of mind, or an appearance. What else?

note: still no example here.

Mental objects are one class of objects, material objects are another class of objects. You are conflating the two. A mental object (part of the dharmadhātu) is an object for the mano dhātu. A material object is an object for the other five dhātus, form for eye, etc.

sure, all objects, mental and material, are objects of consciousnesses, sense or otherwise. You get nowhere differentiating mental consciousness from sense consciousness as they are all consciousness, or mind. I appreciate your presentation of the 18 elements, please explain how an object exists independently of mind without implying an essence. Before a mind is generated, if an object exists, it must exist independent of mind. Vasubahandu's presentation is finally a realist one. I am assuming you want to do better than that.

It is not the intention of Madhyamaka to undermine this or that conventional presentation of the skandhas, dhātus and āyatanas, but merely to show that they are not paramārtha dharmas.

good.

Of course, as I said, if you prefer to follow the Yogacara presentation of conventional truth that's ok with me, but it was rejected by Candra.

Some elements of all lower schools are rejected by Madhayamikas, some are retained for their explanatory power. The realism of the Sautrantikas was also rejected by Chandra. I am interested to see if you can give an explanation of how a thunderstorm could exist that did not arise from karma, without employing a realist ontology.

So far, nothing.