Early Buddhism and Mahayana

General forum on Mahayana.

Re: Early Buddhism and Mahayana

Postby daverupa » Wed Oct 02, 2013 2:23 am

futerko wrote:Well, the idea of authenticity does seem central to such considerations, and it would be a shame to see Buddhism take the path of many other institutions by prioritizing the dead letter over a living tradition.


The Buddhisms on offer all do this in various ways; certain texts are taken as authoritative, others are discarded or interpreted to align with the prior authority. Otherwise, differences are rendered altogether meaningless; distinguishing Buddhism does not occur in the first place and some sort of New Age amalgamation, etc., results. Dead letter, as you poetically describe this, is one half of "living tradition"; it is certainly to be embodied, but the response to "which dead letter?" is significant, and is the reason e.g. a Xian is not a Sikh.

Now, the OP seems to ask about these significant differences in a way which brackets Early Buddhism - a textual body ("dead letter" - ha ha, you joker) and asks which other Mahayana tex... erm, dead letters, as circumscribed by scholastic nomenclature (Theravadia, Zen, Vajrayana, Nichiren Buddhism, Pureland, etc.), are most closely in alignment with that.

Surely any question of interpretation (of understanding and alignment) is predicated on our current understanding?


Understanding of something, sure, and it's very important to demarcate what one is trying to understand. If trying to understand the Nikayas, reading those will impart a certain initial weltanschauung which can then be refined or discarded, etc. Or one reads other Buddhist texts... and if one did this, and noticed comparatively different things being said, there would be degrees of variance in terms of this or that point of view.

Whence the OP: given the Early Buddhism weltanschauung, which Mahayana traditions are most similar, and most different?

:broke:
    "And how is it, bhikkhus, that by protecting oneself one protects others? By the pursuit, development, and cultivation of the four establishments of mindfulness. It is in such a way that by protecting oneself one protects others.

    "And how is it, bhikkhus, that by protecting others one protects oneself? By patience, harmlessness, goodwill, and sympathy. It is in such a way that by protecting others one protects oneself.
- Sedaka Sutta [SN 47.19]
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Re: Early Buddhism and Mahayana

Postby Konchog1 » Wed Oct 02, 2013 2:54 am

Whence the OP: given the Early Buddhism weltanschauung, which Mahayana traditions are most similar, and most different?
What is Early Buddhism like?
Equanimity is the ground. Love is the moisture. Compassion is the seed. Bodhicitta is the result.

-Paraphrase of Khensur Rinpoche Lobsang Tsephel citing the Guhyasamaja Tantra

"All memories and thoughts are the union of emptiness and knowing, the Mind.
Without attachment, self-liberating, like a snake in a knot.
Through the qualities of meditating in that way,
Mental obscurations are purified and the dharmakaya is attained."

-Ra Lotsawa, All-pervading Melodious Drumbeats
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Re: Early Buddhism and Mahayana

Postby futerko » Wed Oct 02, 2013 3:48 am

daverupa wrote:("dead letter" - ha ha, you joker)


My counterpoint to Johannes Climacus :tongue:
we cannot get rid of God because we still believe in grammar - Nietzsche
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Re: Early Buddhism and Mahayana

Postby daverupa » Wed Oct 02, 2013 11:36 am

Konchog1 wrote:
Whence the OP: given the Early Buddhism weltanschauung, which Mahayana traditions are most similar, and most different?
What is Early Buddhism like?


Consider it to include the Digha, Majjhima, Samyutta, and Anguttara Nikayas as primary texts (or, take the Agamas), along with snippets from within the fifth Nikaya (Sutta Nipata, Udana, etc.). Vinaya gives the patimokkha (though some of the back-stories might be questionable) and there isn't any Abhidhamma yet (probably there was abhidhamma in terms of exegetical strategies, as well as matikas, but nothing like the Theravadan/Sarvastivadan/Dharmaguptaka/et al Abhidhamma Pitakas at first).

This constellation is the rough shape of Early Buddhism.
    "And how is it, bhikkhus, that by protecting oneself one protects others? By the pursuit, development, and cultivation of the four establishments of mindfulness. It is in such a way that by protecting oneself one protects others.

    "And how is it, bhikkhus, that by protecting others one protects oneself? By patience, harmlessness, goodwill, and sympathy. It is in such a way that by protecting others one protects oneself.
- Sedaka Sutta [SN 47.19]
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Re: Early Buddhism and Mahayana

Postby Konchog1 » Thu Oct 03, 2013 12:32 am

daverupa wrote:
Konchog1 wrote:
Whence the OP: given the Early Buddhism weltanschauung, which Mahayana traditions are most similar, and most different?
What is Early Buddhism like?


Consider it to include the Digha, Majjhima, Samyutta, and Anguttara Nikayas as primary texts (or, take the Agamas), along with snippets from within the fifth Nikaya (Sutta Nipata, Udana, etc.). Vinaya gives the patimokkha (though some of the back-stories might be questionable) and there isn't any Abhidhamma yet (probably there was abhidhamma in terms of exegetical strategies, as well as matikas, but nothing like the Theravadan/Sarvastivadan/Dharmaguptaka/et al Abhidhamma Pitakas at first).

This constellation is the rough shape of Early Buddhism.
http://www.tricycle.com/feature/whose-buddhism-truest
Equanimity is the ground. Love is the moisture. Compassion is the seed. Bodhicitta is the result.

-Paraphrase of Khensur Rinpoche Lobsang Tsephel citing the Guhyasamaja Tantra

"All memories and thoughts are the union of emptiness and knowing, the Mind.
Without attachment, self-liberating, like a snake in a knot.
Through the qualities of meditating in that way,
Mental obscurations are purified and the dharmakaya is attained."

-Ra Lotsawa, All-pervading Melodious Drumbeats
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Re: Early Buddhism and Mahayana

Postby daverupa » Thu Oct 03, 2013 1:47 am

Yes, I've seen that, there was a whole thread over at the other DW many moons ago. Huifang made some pertinent comments here as well, as I recall.

:zzz:
    "And how is it, bhikkhus, that by protecting oneself one protects others? By the pursuit, development, and cultivation of the four establishments of mindfulness. It is in such a way that by protecting oneself one protects others.

    "And how is it, bhikkhus, that by protecting others one protects oneself? By patience, harmlessness, goodwill, and sympathy. It is in such a way that by protecting others one protects oneself.
- Sedaka Sutta [SN 47.19]
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Re: Early Buddhism and Mahayana

Postby Kim O'Hara » Thu Oct 03, 2013 7:18 am

daverupa wrote:Yes, I've seen that, there was a whole thread over at the other DW many moons ago. Huifang made some pertinent comments here as well, as I recall.

:zzz:

This thread, I think: http://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?f=29&t=10218
And this quotation came to mind when I was thinking about it:

25
Why, all the Saints and Sages who discuss'd
Of the Two Worlds so learnedly, are thrust
Like foolish Prophets forth; their Words to Scorn
Are scatter'd, and their Mouths are stopt with Dust.

26
Oh, come with old Khayyam, and leave the Wise
To talk; one thing is certain, that Life flies;
One thing is certain, and the Rest is Lies;
The Flower that once has blown for ever dies.

27
Myself when young did eagerly frequent
Doctor and Saint, and heard great Argument
About it and about: but evermore
Came out by the same Door as in I went.

28
With them the Seed of Wisdom did I sow,
And with my own hand labour'd it to grow:
And this was all the Harvest that I reap'd -
"I came like Water, and like Wind I go."


:namaste:
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Re: Early Buddhism and Mahayana

Postby Koji » Thu Oct 03, 2013 3:23 pm

Konchog1 wrote:
Whence the OP: given the Early Buddhism weltanschauung, which Mahayana traditions are most similar, and most different?
What is Early Buddhism like?


Open the Suttanipâta and check out the Khaggavisâna Sutta, Atthakavagga, and the Parayanavagga.
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Re: Early Buddhism and Mahayana

Postby daverupa » Thu Oct 03, 2013 3:29 pm

Kim O'Hara wrote:
daverupa wrote:Yes, I've seen that, there was a whole thread over at the other DW many moons ago. Huifang made some pertinent comments here as well, as I recall.

:zzz:

This thread, I think: http://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?f=29&t=10218


Yes indeed, beginning about halfway down the second page.

So, why not: here is Huifeng's comment:

There is no way that one can conclude from the Gandhari findings that to the question of "Whose Buddhism is truest?" the answer is "No one's and everyone's". It really only could conclude that if we were only comparing say Pali Theravada from Sri Lanka with Sarvastivada or Dharmagupta from Kasmir / Gandhara.
In fact in many ways, this article just further shows that the Mahayana in its various forms and later spin offs, is even more divergent from the common threads that existed in the mainstream traditions prior.


This last is quite pertinent here: if these forms and spin-offs are as substantively divergent as seems superficially apparent, then a response to the OP begins to take shape...
    "And how is it, bhikkhus, that by protecting oneself one protects others? By the pursuit, development, and cultivation of the four establishments of mindfulness. It is in such a way that by protecting oneself one protects others.

    "And how is it, bhikkhus, that by protecting others one protects oneself? By patience, harmlessness, goodwill, and sympathy. It is in such a way that by protecting others one protects oneself.
- Sedaka Sutta [SN 47.19]
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Re: Early Buddhism and Mahayana

Postby Dharmarakshita » Thu Oct 10, 2013 12:33 pm

Hi,
I am more interested to know about the development of the Lotus sect.I'm not sure whether it is also called to be Pundarika sect.Will anyone help me out to know or find out whether Pundarika was a epithet used for venerable Bodhisattavas.If Lotus sect venerated Bodhisattavas ,which were they ? If anyone has a better piece of information please share with me .

Thank you
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Re: Early Buddhism and Mahayana

Postby Jikan » Thu Oct 10, 2013 2:04 pm

Dharmarakshita wrote:Hi,
I am more interested to know about the development of the Lotus sect.I'm not sure whether it is also called to be Pundarika sect.Will anyone help me out to know or find out whether Pundarika was a epithet used for venerable Bodhisattavas.If Lotus sect venerated Bodhisattavas ,which were they ? If anyone has a better piece of information please share with me .

Thank you


Pundarika means lotus. I've seen it specified as white lotus. Someone with better linguistic training than mine will surely correct me if I'm in error.

I'm not entirely certain which lotus sect you're referring to, so I'll try to be helpful in general terms. The schools that descended from Zhiyi (TienTai) are often referred to as the Lotus schools. Here's a place to start:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhiyi

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiantai

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lotus_sutra
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Re: Early Buddhism and Mahayana

Postby cloudburst » Wed Nov 20, 2013 11:00 pm

Malcolm wrote: No, not exactly. But if you are interested in Dzogchen teachings [which I doubt], basically the point being underscored is that matter and intelligence are non-dual.


but since that is agreed upon, at least by tantric Gelugpas, you still have not cashed out your claim that Dzogchen has something unique to impart here.


malcolm wrote:
Cloudburst wrote: They are the nature of empty appearances to awareness.

This certainly only means dependently originated appearances of material and immaterial objects.


agree.

Malcolm wrote:
Cloudburst wrote:
Sautrantikas say alot of things. There is a time and a place for that to be very helpful to some.

Generally, we understand that Gelugpas follow Sautrantika presentations of conventional truth. You know, that course outer madhyamaka that the gzhan stong pas keep yammering on about.


Generally, yes. There is also a Prasangika appraoach.
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Re: A Note on "Substance"

Postby cloudburst » Wed Nov 20, 2013 11:01 pm

Malcolm wrote:
Cloudburst wrote:Nagarjuna only demolishes being in an ultimate sense, he and hs disciples continuously assert being, or existence, on the conventional level, albeit as mere imputation as you eloquently established elsewhere in this thread.


Well, they don't assert it, they accept it for the purposes of common discourse about appearances.


Actually, they DO assert it. Many many examples of this can be provided. For the purposes of this discussion we will accept your own translation above "Mādhyamikas are proponents of dependent origination." If you dont accept yourself as an authority, or for the benefit of those here who do not, please consider these two quotations from Chandrakriti's commmentary on Aryadeva's 400

Chandrakirti wrote:Incorrect position :
Aryadeva means that compounded phenomena lack production because this analysis refutes all forms of production.
Reply: In that case the production of compounded phenomena would not be like a magicians illusion rather we would make it understood using examples such as the son of a barren woman. Wary of the absurd implication that dependent arisings would not exist we avoid such comparisons. Instead we compare the production of things to a magicians illusion and so forth, examples that do not contradict dependent arising.


and again:

Chandrakirti wrote:We refute here that things exist essentially; we do not refute that eyes and such are products. and are dependently arisen results of karma. Therefore they exist. Hence, when eyes and so forth are explained only as resutls of karma, they do exist.
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Re: A Note on "Substance"

Postby cloudburst » Wed Nov 20, 2013 11:09 pm

Malcolm wrote:
cloudburst wrote:In clear words, Chandrakirti speaks of the difference in the views of ucchedavadins and Madhyamakas:
Clear Words wrote:Qualm: Even so, their views are similar in one way, becasue nihilists consider the absence of an essence in things to be non-existence.
Reply:This is not so. They are not similar because Madhyamikas assert that things without essence exist conventionally; these nihilists do not assert them at all.


You may reflect on how this quotation also neatly puts paid to your assertions that 1) madhaymikas do not make assertions, and 2) the Gelug view is that ultimate truth is a non-existent, as Je Tsongkhapa follows Chadrakirti precisely on this point and Chadrakirti here rejects that explicit assertion.


The rendering you are using is a somewhat inaccurate gloss.

The text says:
saṁvṛtyā mādhyamikairastitvenābhyupagamānna tulyatā
དབུ་མ་པ་དག་གིས་ནི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་ཡོད་པར་ཁས་བླངས་པའི་ཕྱིར

"Because Mādhyamikas agree to existence in the relative..."

The text does not say they "assert" ['dod pa], or established [sgrub pa], etc. It says ābhyupagamā, which means assent, agree, etc.


right, they agree to the existence in the relative (the only way anything could exist ....) of emptiness.


Malcolm wrote:However, this passage is a clarification about what exists relatively, not ultimately.


It would be more accurate to say that it clarifies the existence first of the conventional, then the ultimate.

First Chandrakirti explains that someone thinks madhayamikas are no different that nihilists becasue "They claim virtuous and non-virtuous actions, agents, results and all worlds are empty of inherent existence., and also atheists also claim those things do not exist. Therefore, mādhyamikas are no different" than nihilists. Chandrakirti says this is not correct, because Madhymikas propound depndent arising, which is to say he accepts that they are produced concventionally.

Having answered that, he does not say the same again, does he? This time, a new objection is posited.... madhyamikas and nihilists are the same in that
Chandrakirti wrote:they conceive the absence of existence in the intrinsic nature of things

that is, emptiness, "as non-existence." Chandrakirti rejects this because mādhyamikas "agree to existence in the relative" and because nihilists do not.
So, claiming emptiness is the same as non-existence is rejected. Emptiness exists conventionally as a designation.

In the Avatarabhasya, Chandrakirti says
Chandrakirti wrote:Is there nature has such qualifications as the master Nagarjuna claims? Yes, is the “reality” of which the Bhagavan spoke extensively, saying, “Whether the tatgagatas appear or not, the reality of phenomena remains.” What is this “reality “? Is the nature of things such as these eyes. And, what is the nature? Is that in them which is not a fabricated nor dependent upon something else; it is their identity as known by knowledge free from the impairment of ignorance. Does it exist or not? If it did not exist for what purpose would bodhisattvas cultivate the path of the perfections? Why would bodhisattvas undergo hundreds of hardships in order to know reality?

So when you say "Tsongkhapa asserts the non-existence of inherent existence is the ultimate," you are correct, Je Tsongkhapa says that just as Buddhapalita Chandrakirti et al do.

Now you might argue that non-existence exists, as I am sure you will

and I have, following the examples of Chandrakirti, Aryadeva etc. So if Gelugpas are Nihilists, then so are Buddha and all the great Madhyamikas. I think it more likely that you are slightly eternalistic and haven't seen it yet.

Malcolm wrote:Finally, this passage does not defend your assertion that Tsongkhapa does not himself assert the ultimate is a non-existence, since we have already seen that you admit he does assert a non-existence as ultimate i.e. the non-existence of inherent existence in the ultimate.

Je Tsongkhapa explains, exactly as the indian masters do, the the ultimate is a mere absence of essence. That is not the same as non-existence, and this quotaion does precisely support that. Also, since even in your tranlation Chandrakiriti is "propounding " dependent origination, you can stop claiming madhyamakas don't make assertions.
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Re: A Note on "Substance"

Postby Malcolm » Thu Nov 21, 2013 1:10 am

cloudburst wrote:Actually, they DO assert it. Many many examples of this can be provided. For the purposes of this discussion we will accept your own translation above "Mādhyamikas are proponents of dependent origination."


That is not an assertion of existence.

Chandrakirti wrote:We refute here that things exist essentially; we do not refute that eyes and such are products. and are dependently arisen results of karma. Therefore they exist. Hence, when eyes and so forth are explained only as resutls of karma, they do exist.


This passage's translation is not correct.

།ཁོ་བོ་ཅག་ནི་འདིར་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་གྲུབ་པ་འགོག་གི་མིག་ལ་སོགས་པ་བྱས་ཤིང་རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་པར་འབྱུང་བའི་ལས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པར་སྨིན་པ་ཉིད་ནི་མི་འགོག་པའོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་དེ་ཡོད་པས་གང་ཞིག་རྣམ་པར་སྨིན་པ་ཉིད་དུ་བསྙད་པས་མིག་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དོ།

"We are here refuting that things are proven [grub] through their own entity [svarūpa], but products such as eyes and so on are not refuted, being a ripening of dependently originated actions. Therefore, that is so because that which has been explained as being a ripening are eyes and so on.

So I can't accept your reason here because the citation is not correctly translated as far as I am concerned. Further, the point of the citation is not to prove existence of eyes and so forth, but rather in the original text, the point of the citation is demonstrate that:

དེའི་ཕྱིར་མཁས་པས་འཇིག་རྟེན་པའི་དོན་ལ་ཇི་སྐད་བཤད་པའི་རྣམ་པར་དཔྱད་པ་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་མཐོང་བ་དང་རྗེས་སུ་མཐུན་པ་མ་བཅུག་པར་ལས་རྣམས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པར་སྨིན་པ་བསམ་གྱིས་མི་ཁྱབ་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ཁས་བླངས

"Therefore, the wise who investigate according to how it is explained in the mundane meaning accept the inconceivable ripening of actions without getting correspondingly involved with seeing reality [de ko na nydi, tattvaṃ]."


Thus, the citation does not say what you want it to say, nor does it match the point you wish to make.

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Re: A Note on "Substance"

Postby cloudburst » Thu Nov 21, 2013 4:31 pm

Malcolm wrote:
cloudburst wrote:Actually, they DO assert it. Many many examples of this can be provided. For the purposes of this discussion we will accept your own translation above "Mādhyamikas are proponents of dependent origination."


That is not an assertion of existence.


Of course it is. If one propounds something, it would be ridiculous to claim that he did not assert it. If something is dependently orginated, it exists as mere appearance. If it didn't exist in any way at all, only a fool would say it was arisien. You can't get out of it by quibbling.

Chandrakirti wrote:We refute here that things exist essentially; we do not refute that eyes and such are products. and are dependently arisen results of karma. Therefore they exist. Hence, when eyes and so forth are explained only as resutls of karma, they do exist.

Malcolm wrote:So I can't accept your reason here because the citation is not correctly translated as far as I am concerned.


The translators are using inferences to translate the meaning, not just the words. So when they say "therefore they do exist" (which you render as "this is so"), they do so in order to demonstrate that eyes are dependently arisen results of karma. This means that they exist convnetionally, so there is no problem in saying so in order to convey the meaning of the citation.

Your translation is awkward and confusing. Perhaps slightly more accurate in a literal sense, but it obfuscates the actual meaning. The fact that you did it so quickly is surely impressive, but that means little in the final analysis. Maybe you even had it lying around? In my imagination, your house is full of partially and fully translated wonders, and you lie about luxuriating, Smaug-like, on a mountain of them, occasionally emitting a sulfurous cloud of rhetoric on these boards.

Malcolm wrote:Further, the point of the citation is not to prove existence of eyes and so forth, but rather in the original text, the point of the citation is demonstrate that:
"Therefore, the wise who investigate according to how it is explained in the mundane meaning accept the inconceivable ripening of actions without getting correspondingly involved with seeing reality [de ko na nydi, tattvaṃ]."


It precisely intends to show that eyes are products but do not exist essentially. Chandrakirti is definietly 'asserting' this in every usual sense of the word. Things that are produced exist as mere inputations, though they lack essence.
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Re: Where is Mount Sumeru?

Postby Malcolm » Thu Nov 21, 2013 4:59 pm

cloudburst wrote:
Malcolm wrote:
cloudburst wrote:Actually, they DO assert it. Many many examples of this can be provided. For the purposes of this discussion we will accept your own translation above "Mādhyamikas are proponents of dependent origination."


That is not an assertion of existence.


Of course it is.


No, it isn't. It is for this reason that Nāgārjuna asks the question (having already defined parabhāva as a species of svabhāva) "Where is there a bhāva which is not included in svabhāva or parabhāva?" Since there is no such thing, to call "dependent origination" a proposition of bhāva is incredibly wrong-headed.This is why Nāgārjuna also wrote: "An existent [bhāva] does not arise from an existent, an existent does not arise from a nonexistent; a nonexistent does not arise from an existent; a nonexistent does not arise from a nonexistent. How can there be arising?"

The translators are using inferences to translate the meaning, not just the words. So when they say "therefore they do exist" (which you render as "this is so"), they do so in order to demonstrate that eyes are dependently arisen results of karma. This means that they exist convnetionally, so there is no problem in saying so in order to convey the meaning of the citation.


The clause "therefore, since that is so...", only intends go affirm that sense organs and so on are products of the ripening of action, as previously stated, in conformity with worldly convention -- but it is not a statement of commitment on Candrakirit's part that worldly convention is truthful, which is why he remarks that one should not get involved with how it actually is.

The translation (in this instance) is not successful and does not convey the meaning Candrakirti intends. Therefore, when you use it as a citation in support of a reason, the reason also fails. No, I did not have it lying around. Since the translation seemed a bit too pat to me, I examined the source of the citation and found it was slightly off when compared to the Tibetan. The term yod pa can be a translation of several different terms, ranging from asti to sat:

yod pa - saṃ√vid:saṃvidyamāna
yod pa - saṃniveśa
yod pa - sat
yod pa - sadbhāva
yod pa - sāṃnidhya
yod pa - a-vaikalya
yod pa - /as:asti
yod pa - astitā
yod pa - /vid:vidyate
yod pa - vidyamānatā
yod pa - vidyamāna
yod pa - upa√labh:upalabhyante
yod pa - /bhū:bhavati

Since we do not have the sanskrit original of this commentary, it is a little hard to say what the proper rendering of yod pa is here in "de phyir, de yod pas", it could just as easily be "since that exists" as "since that is so". However, given that context, and given the fact that "de yod pas" bears the instrumental "s" on the yod pa, it is unlikely that to mean :"Therefore, they do exist", especially when there is no plural corresponding to "they" such as "de dag" (eṣām).

An endemic problem in online discussions is the use of citations people haven't the skill to investigate themselves in either a Sanskrit original or in a secondary language such as Tibetan. In order to have a meaningful discussion, we must have first translations we actually agree upon. If we cannot achieve that much, it is difficult to have a meaningful exchange. This is also compounded with the fact that most of these discussions are not predicated on detailed discussions of the source texts, but rather post 12th century Tibetans involved in polemics with agendas often quite removed from the context in which these texts were composed. It is for this reason I generally abstain from discussions about Tibetan Madhyamaka any more, other than to observe that Tibetans after the 12th century, such as Dolbuba, Tsongkhapa, Gorampa (who in fact does not faithfully portray the early Sakya view) and so on began to introduce novelties to Madhyamaka discussion. Khenpo Zhenga tried to remedy this by restoring study of original commentaries and texts, but thus far western disciples of Tibetans still remain committed to whatever sectarian division they were initially trained in.

On the other hand I am certainly happy to talk about Indian Madhyamaka as long as it is understood that citations from Tibetans are excluded from the discussion, since I decided long ago that Tibetan Madhyamaka was a waste of time.

M
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འ༔ ཨ༔ ཧ༔ ཤ༔ ས༔ མ༔

" The one who teaches the benefits of peace,
he is said to be a ṛṣī; the others are the opposite of him."

-- Uttaratantra
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Re: Where is Mount Sumeru?

Postby dzogchungpa » Thu Nov 21, 2013 9:12 pm

Malcolm wrote:... I decided long ago that Tibetan Madhyamaka was a waste of time.

This is interesting to me. Why did you come to that decision?
ཨོཾ་མ་ཧཱ་ཤུནྱ་ཏཱ་ཛྙཱ་ན་བཛྲ་སྭཱ་བྷཱ་བ་ཨཱཏྨ་ཀོ་྅ཧཾ༔

The thousands of lines of the Prajnaparamita can be summed up in the following two sentences:
1) One should become a Bodhisattva (or, Buddha-to-be), i.e. one who is content with nothing less than all-knowledge attained through the perfection of wisdom for the sake of all beings.
2) There is no such thing as a Bodhisattva, or as all-knowledge, or as a ‘being’, or as the perfection of wisdom, or as an attainment.
To accept both these contradictory facts is to be perfect.
- Conze
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Re: Early Buddhism and Mahayana

Postby smcj » Thu Nov 21, 2013 9:38 pm

This is why Nāgārjuna also wrote: "An existent [bhāva] does not arise from an existent, an existent does not arise from a nonexistent; a nonexistent does not arise from an existent; a nonexistent does not arise from a nonexistent. How can there be arising?"

Nagarjuna would have hated quantum mechanics, where things pop into and out of existence for no good reason.

Hey, doesn't that negate all his philosophy? :stirthepot:
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Re: Early Buddhism and Mahayana

Postby Malcolm » Thu Nov 21, 2013 11:24 pm

smcj wrote:
This is why Nāgārjuna also wrote: "An existent [bhāva] does not arise from an existent, an existent does not arise from a nonexistent; a nonexistent does not arise from an existent; a nonexistent does not arise from a nonexistent. How can there be arising?"

Nagarjuna would have hated quantum mechanics, where things pop into and out of existence for no good reason.

Hey, doesn't that negate all his philosophy? :stirthepot:


It simply means we don't have the math to understand the causality of a given phenomena, it doesn't entail the consequence that Nāgārjuna's opening statement in the MMK is incorrect:

"At no time and in no place does anything arise from itself, from other than itself, from both, or in absence of a cause."
http://www.bhaisajya.net
http://atikosha.org
འ༔ ཨ༔ ཧ༔ ཤ༔ ས༔ མ༔

" The one who teaches the benefits of peace,
he is said to be a ṛṣī; the others are the opposite of him."

-- Uttaratantra
Malcolm
 
Posts: 10217
Joined: Thu Nov 11, 2010 2:19 am

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