Perhaps I am imputing a little too much - but it seems to me you were
deploying a logic of utility in your original statement. Intuitively it makes a great deal of sense, but I think that is simply because we have all been living in a market system for so long that what is constructed seems natural and just.
Of course I agree that translators need material support. But the question is of intellectual property, and whether the material support they gain ought to be derived
from the rights they gain over their work. If we are speaking practically, there are three good ways in which material support can be given without the claim for copyright - tenured academics supported by their institution and grants, monastics and privately funded translation projects such as the 84,000 project.
I agree that anyone with the means ought to support all three causes. What I question is that dharma practitioners who make use of translated sutras have some moral obligation
to support those three causes, by virtue of using the material. That would be, as I mentioned, to reduce ethics into exchange relations - an implicit expression of the morality of the market. Danaparamita is not that - giving is only perfect when it does not even consider
My main point is that it is in dharma practitioners' own interest to support translators.
There was a hint of ought in my original statement, but not as you described it. I also don't think you can equate the benefits of the work of translators to merely some aesthetic value. Buddhists seem to like medical analogies, so consider the following thought experiment:
Imagine a doctor who spends his/her entire life researching cures for illnesses and then, based on the prevailing idea of the time that medicine should be independent of market dynamics, gives them away for free. Now, this person has no other source of income and the research and development of the medicine comes at considerable cost, not to mention the expenses piled up from his training. The medicine/cures should be free, but without support, not only will this doctor be destitute, but their work will stop and people will suffer.
In this scenario I contend that there is a moral obligation to support the doctor. I could concoct some consequentialist argument to support this intuition, but I think you get where I'm coming from. Moreover, I think the moral obligation falls more heavily on those who have already benefited from the cures. Although, I suspect that this intuition would be harder to defend. Perhaps the obligation falls more heavily on those that might benefit in the future. In any case, I think there is a similar moral obligation to support translators independent of the translators' intentions (which may be consistent with danaparamita), and perhaps more importantly, it is in the dharma practitioners' own best interest to do so.