5heaps wrote: dependent arising does not establish things as they currently appear as being correct. the opposite, it establishes the things we see as appearing incorrectly.
"establish" is not a pertinent term here. This understanding is faulty.
It is precisely because of dependent arising that the appearance,
the reality of a cup in the relative sense, arises.
There is no universal, inherent "cupness" anywhere.
I think that one of the most common mistakes in the understanding of
impermanence, emtiness, dependent arising, and so on,
results from a sort of backwards approach to analyzing phenomena.
What often happens is, an object is established first, as existing,
and then its existence is refuted. So, "I am holding a cup, but it doesn't exist".
But that doesn't make logical sense.
The problem with this approach is that obviously something
is happeneing somehow
something that we all refer to as a cup,
otherwise there could be no discussion about 'it".
Buddhist analysis does not deny this.
It doesn't say, that unconditionally, "there is no cup", but rather,
nothing exists by which "cup" can be truly established.
There is a difference here.
It is not simply two ways of saying the same thing.
Here is the difference:
If you begin with the premise, "here is a cup"
you are in fact establishing some notion of permanence,
of independent arising, of inherent "cupness", rather than emptiness.
In terms of a cup, for example, that notion of permanence involves
the idsa that it will not dissolve when you pour liquids into it,
and if you put it into the cupboard tonight, it will be there tomorrow,
In the context of this thread, then, one asks,
"if the cup breaks, what happened to it?" meaning,
"what happened to its (sense of) permanence?"
"where did its essential cupness go?"
Because this appearance of essential cupness leaves when the cup breaks.
One of its defining characteristics, the ability to hold liquids, is gone.
Relatively speaking, yes, we can refer to something as a cup.
We can say a cup has a handle, holds liquids and so on.
But beyond the various ways we define a cup to our own satisfaction,
there is no thing that is essentially
and therefore nothing that essentially
or can cease being a cup.