Labeling and inherent nature - Svatantrika vs. Prasangika

[viniketa]

Okay... but there wasn't anyone championing the hinayana doctrine in Tibet at this time- from a mahayana perspective it was already, game, set, and match long ago.

True, but if I remember Hopkins correctly, in both Exposition of the Stages of the Path and Illumination of the Thought: Extensive Explanation of Chandrakirti's Supplement to Nagarjuna's "Treatise on the Middle", Tsongkhapa goes back to Yogācāra and Vasubhandu (and therefore, Sarvāstivāda/Sautrāntra) to put the nail in the coffin on "idealistic" readings of "Mind Only".

[Tom]

Okay... but there wasn't anyone championing the hinayana doctrine in Tibet at this time- from a mahayana perspective it was already, game, set, and match long ago.

True, but if I remember Hopkins correctly, in both Exposition of the Stages of the Path and Illumination of the Thought: Extensive Explanation of Chandrakirti's Supplement to Nagarjuna's "Treatise on the Middle", Tsongkhapa goes back to Yogācāra and Vasubhandu (and therefore, Sarvāstivāda/Sautrāntra) to put the nail in the coffin on "idealistic" readings of "Mind Only".

Yogācāra is a mahayana perspective on which Vasubhandhu wrote extensively... of course his bhaysa is from a sautrāntika position but not sure if that is relevant here...I'll have to check out what Hopkins says - no doubt he is spot on!

[5heaps]

So a book could be labeled a cat, car, or cloud. Why not? There's no inherent nature.
1. Is this understanding of the criticism correct?

i think a clearer example is the example of the king. if there were not characteristics on the side of the king which both identified that particular person as the king and excluded everyone else from being the king, then anyone could be a king as soon as you imputed the category 'king'. at the same time, this main defining characteristic of being a king is not separate nor identical to its parts, the collection of parts, nor to one particular part, etc, so the characteristic lacks true existence

prasangika responds by saying that the meaning of emptiness has not been realize--svatantrikas are still asserting traces of inherent existence, that there is some particular mark or characteristic from his side which illustrates his existence as king. right? that is how the argument began, if being a king was 100% mentally labelled then anyone could be king

[5heaps]

For something to be conventionally valid designation it must be:
1. not undermined by another mind that is conventionally valid (valid and mistaken)
2. not undermined by another mind that is ultimately valid (valid and unmistaken)
3. Accords with worldly convention
Calling a book a car fails this test and so is not conventionally valid designation.

the car is nevertheless valid. its only with respect to the conceived object that it is invalid

[Tom]

For something to be conventionally valid designation it must be:
1. not undermined by another mind that is conventionally valid (valid and mistaken)
2. not undermined by another mind that is ultimately valid (valid and unmistaken)
3. Accords with worldly convention
Calling a book a car fails this test and so is not conventionally valid designation.

the car is nevertheless valid. its only with respect to the conceived object that it is invalid

Please just re-read the post I was talking about "calling a book a car" not sure how there is anything valid about this "car"!

It seems we have very different understandings of dharma - so let's not do this!

[Tom]

For something to be conventionally valid designation it must be:
1. not undermined by another mind that is conventionally valid (valid and mistaken)
2. not undermined by another mind that is ultimately valid (valid and unmistaken)
3. Accords with worldly convention
Calling a book a car fails this test and so is not conventionally valid designation.

the car is nevertheless valid. its only with respect to the conceived object that it is invalid

by the way, just to make it clear, it is the [img]mind[/img] that is described as being valid with respect to the appearing object (even when is a wrong consciousness) - not "car"!

[5heaps]

For something to be conventionally valid designation it must be:
1. not undermined by another mind that is conventionally valid (valid and mistaken)
2. not undermined by another mind that is ultimately valid (valid and unmistaken)
3. Accords with worldly convention
Calling a book a car fails this test and so is not conventionally valid designation.

the car is nevertheless valid. its only with respect to the conceived object that it is invalid

by the way, just to make it clear, it is the [img]mind[/img] that is described as being valid with respect to the appearing object (even when is a wrong consciousness) - not "car"!

car is the appearing object, it is what is valid to the mind when it is imputed onto a book. this is more correct, contrary to your original position that there is nothing valid about car. thanks, keep up on those exposition texts

[muni]

Labeling in accordance with this label and in accordance with that label-viewpoint. Labeling as thought grasping, is believing apprended appearances are real solid and from these our story world is build up. Maybe this is not a Gelug approach. Apologizes.

[Tom]

car is the appearing object, it is what is valid to the mind when it is imputed onto a book. this is more correct, contrary to your original position that there is nothing valid about car. thanks, keep up on those exposition texts

The fact that you continue to refer to the appearing object rather that the mind which apprehends it as valid demonstrates that we are not communicating.

As I said wrong consciousness is said to be valid based on it realizing its appearing object (whether it be a car or rabbits horns), that's all - but it is still a wrong consciousness and mistaken .

Good luck, I will not be participating any further unless the tone changes.

[5heaps]

The fact that you continue to refer to the appearing object rather that the mind which apprehends it as valid demonstrates that we are not communicating.
As I said wrong consciousness is said to be valid based on it realizing its appearing object (whether it be a car or rabbits horns), that's all - but it is still a wrong consciousness and mistaken.

that an object is valid is a figure of speech, Tom. of course only a cognizer such as a mind or person can be either a valid or invalid cognizer. it is simpler to say that "dinner looks tasty" than it is to say that "my mind is currently establishing dinner as tasty"

calling a book a car is valid in prasangika, meaning "car" is valid with respect to being imputed in dependence on a book, or as Tom would prefer it, the imputing thought consciousness is valid with respect to its appearing object "car" and its focal object the book.

this is important because it is very easy to say what Tom originally said, "I was talking about "calling a book a car" not sure how there is anything valid about this "car""

[Tom]

The fact that you continue to refer to the appearing object rather that the mind which apprehends it as valid demonstrates that we are not communicating.
As I said wrong consciousness is said to be valid based on it realizing its appearing object (whether it be a car or rabbits horns), that's all - but it is still a wrong consciousness and mistaken.

that an object is valid is a figure of speech, Tom. of course only a cognizer such as a mind or person can be either a valid or invalid cognizer. it is simpler to say that "dinner looks tasty" than it is to say that "my mind is currently establishing dinner as tasty"

calling a book a car is valid in prasangika, meaning "car" is valid with respect to being imputed in dependence on a book, or as Tom would prefer it, the imputing thought consciousness is valid with respect to its appearing object "car" and its focal object the book.

this is important because it is very easy to say what Tom originally said, "I was talking about "calling a book a car" not sure how there is anything valid about this "car""

Sorry, but it is simply wrong to say that the car is valid in this scenario. I was relating this conversation to my teacher and when I mentioned that you were claiming that the "car" is valid because wrong consciousness is valid with respect to the appearing object Geshela started laughing.

[5heaps]

The fact that you continue to refer to the appearing object rather that the mind which apprehends it as valid demonstrates that we are not communicating.
As I said wrong consciousness is said to be valid based on it realizing its appearing object (whether it be a car or rabbits horns), that's all - but it is still a wrong consciousness and mistaken.

that an object is valid is a figure of speech, Tom. of course only a cognizer such as a mind or person can be either a valid or invalid cognizer. it is simpler to say that "dinner looks tasty" than it is to say that "my mind is currently establishing dinner as tasty"

calling a book a car is valid in prasangika, meaning "car" is valid with respect to being imputed in dependence on a book, or as Tom would prefer it, the imputing thought consciousness is valid with respect to its appearing object "car" and its focal object the book.

this is important because it is very easy to say what Tom originally said, "I was talking about "calling a book a car" not sure how there is anything valid about this "car""

Sorry, but it is simply wrong to say that the car is valid in this scenario. I was relating this conversation to my teacher and when I mentioned that you were claiming that the "car" is valid because wrong consciousness is valid with respect to the appearing object Geshela started laughing.

unlike sautrantika, in prasangika what makes a cognition mistaken is not that the appearing object lacks concordance with its focal object. this is very crucial to what it means to lack inherent existence
i was going to give my own response but i cant be bothered so i'll just quote others you accept, from berzin:

"Consider the distorted sensory nonconceptual cognition of seeing a unicorn in a meadow: [...] According to the Prasangika tenets, the mental aspect that resembles a unicorn is an existent phenomenon, although the unicorn is nonexistent. Moreover, the cognition of a hallucinated unicorn as a hallucinated unicorn is accurate. The distortion lies in considering the hallucinated unicorn to be an external, conventionally existent unicorn."

"In imagining a unicorn in a meadow: The focal object is a meadow (which does exist) and the involved object is a unicorn there (which does not exist). There is no actual unicorn, however, as the focal condition casting its reflection on the consciousness.The mental aspect (which does exist) resembling a unicorn appears (arises) simply because of external and internal causes for distortion. The appearing object is a meaning/object category (which does exist) of unicorn, imputed on the mental aspect."

and then as kensur yeshey tupden explains:
"There is no valid direct perception in prasangika; there is only the valid cognition of the direct [because, except for cognizing emptiness, direct perception is always mistaken regarding appearances of inherent existence]."

[futerko]

i was going to give my own response but i cant be bothered so i'll just quote others you accept, from berzin:

"Consider the distorted sensory nonconceptual cognition of seeing a unicorn in a meadow: [...] According to the Prasangika tenets, the mental aspect that resembles a unicorn is an existent phenomenon, although the unicorn is nonexistent. Moreover, the cognition of a hallucinated unicorn as a hallucinated unicorn is accurate. The distortion lies in considering the hallucinated unicorn to be an external, conventionally existent unicorn."

"In imagining a unicorn in a meadow: The focal object is a meadow (which does exist) and the involved object is a unicorn there (which does not exist). There is no actual unicorn, however, as the focal condition casting its reflection on the consciousness.The mental aspect (which does exist) resembling a unicorn appears (arises) simply because of external and internal causes for distortion. The appearing object is a meaning/object category (which does exist) of unicorn, imputed on the mental aspect."

That section is prefaced with this line, (from http://www.berzinarchives.com/web/en/ar ... gelug.html)

"Nonexistent phenomena (med-pa), such as unicorns and mirages, can be objects of cognition, but not objects of valid cognition (tshad-ma). They are objects only of distorted cognition (log-shes)."

[5heaps]

i was going to give my own response but i cant be bothered so i'll just quote others you accept, from berzin:

"Consider the distorted sensory nonconceptual cognition of seeing a unicorn in a meadow: [...] According to the Prasangika tenets, the mental aspect that resembles a unicorn is an existent phenomenon, although the unicorn is nonexistent. Moreover, the cognition of a hallucinated unicorn as a hallucinated unicorn is accurate. The distortion lies in considering the hallucinated unicorn to be an external, conventionally existent unicorn."

"In imagining a unicorn in a meadow: The focal object is a meadow (which does exist) and the involved object is a unicorn there (which does not exist). There is no actual unicorn, however, as the focal condition casting its reflection on the consciousness.The mental aspect (which does exist) resembling a unicorn appears (arises) simply because of external and internal causes for distortion. The appearing object is a meaning/object category (which does exist) of unicorn, imputed on the mental aspect."

That section is prefaced with this line, (from http://www.berzinarchives.com/web/en/ar ... gelug.html)

"Nonexistent phenomena (med-pa), such as unicorns and mirages, can be objects of cognition, but not objects of valid cognition (tshad-ma). They are objects only of distorted cognition (log-shes)."

yes, but that is not what is being questioned ie. whether the cognition overall may be counted as valid or not
what is being questioned is whether "car" imputed onto a book, this part itself (the appearing object, not the involved object, or the conceived object which conceives the involved object to be valid), is valid or not. its very important because in prasangika we find that it is, whereas in sautrantika it is not at all valid to establish "car" with a book. this is extremely pivotal to prasangika's explanation of imputation, because it illustrates that there are no findable characteristics waiting around from which categories are derived at correctly or incorrectly--as long as something appears, it is valid. what makes something invalid is the conceived object (for a conceptual consciousness) and whether it withstands scrutiny in reality. inherent existence as an appearing object is valid, but the conceived object of inherent existence which this appearing object contributes to shaping is the very object of negation in realizing emptiness.

if one says that "car" here is in no way valid, then they are saying that there is some findable characteristic outside of mere imputation which at that time has set forth the boundaries as to what is or is not a valid mind

[Tom]

i was going to give my own response but i cant be bothered so i'll just quote others you accept, from berzin:

"Consider the distorted sensory nonconceptual cognition of seeing a unicorn in a meadow: [...] According to the Prasangika tenets, the mental aspect that resembles a unicorn is an existent phenomenon, although the unicorn is nonexistent. Moreover, the cognition of a hallucinated unicorn as a hallucinated unicorn is accurate. The distortion lies in considering the hallucinated unicorn to be an external, conventionally existent unicorn."

"In imagining a unicorn in a meadow: The focal object is a meadow (which does exist) and the involved object is a unicorn there (which does not exist). There is no actual unicorn, however, as the focal condition casting its reflection on the consciousness.The mental aspect (which does exist) resembling a unicorn appears (arises) simply because of external and internal causes for distortion. The appearing object is a meaning/object category (which does exist) of unicorn, imputed on the mental aspect."

That section is prefaced with this line, (from http://www.berzinarchives.com/web/en/ar ... gelug.html)

"Nonexistent phenomena (med-pa), such as unicorns and mirages, can be objects of cognition, but not objects of valid cognition (tshad-ma). They are objects only of distorted cognition (log-shes)."

yes, but that is not what is being questioned ie. whether the cognition overall may be counted as valid or not
what is being questioned is whether "car" imputed onto a book, this part itself (the appearing object, not the involved object, or the conceived object which conceives the involved object to be valid), is valid or not. its very important because in prasangika we find that it is, whereas in sautrantika it is not at all valid to establish "car" with a book. this is extremely pivotal to prasangika's explanation of imputation, because it illustrates that there are no findable characteristics waiting around from which categories are derived at correctly or incorrectly--as long as something appears, it is valid. what makes something invalid is the conceived object (for a conceptual consciousness) and whether it withstands scrutiny in reality. inherent existence as an appearing object is valid, but the conceived object of inherent existence which this appearing object contributes to shaping is the very object of negation in realizing emptiness.

if one says that "car" here is in no way valid, then they are saying that there is some findable characteristic outside of mere imputation which at that time has set forth the boundaries as to what is or is not a valid mind

5heaps you have already conceded that it is incorrect to term an appearing object as "valid". You originally said, "nevertheless the car is valid" this is what I objected to. I am not going to keep going back and forth but it seems you are conflating this claim of yours with prasangikas special presentation with regard real and unreal conventional truths.

Since Prasangika does not accept existence by way of their own character even conventionally, they do not posit real and unreal conventionalities (i.e. this as real, that as unreal) even conventionally. While for Svatantrika since for them conventionally phenomena exist by way of their own character, they can posit real and unreal conventionalities. There is however in Prasangika, a presentation of the division of conventional truth into real and unreal based on worldly ordinary consciousness.

In terms of the your quote referring to "direct" - I have written on the special presentation of "direct" in prasangika in another thread.

I'm not sure I have much else to say on this topic.

[futerko]

yes, but that is not what is being questioned ie. whether the cognition overall may be counted as valid or not
what is being questioned is whether "car" imputed onto a book, this part itself (the appearing object, not the involved object, or the conceived object which conceives the involved object to be valid), is valid or not. its very important because in prasangika we find that it is, whereas in sautrantika it is not at all valid to establish "car" with a book. this is extremely pivotal to prasangika's explanation of imputation, because it illustrates that there are no findable characteristics waiting around from which categories are derived at correctly or incorrectly--as long as something appears, it is valid. what makes something invalid is the conceived object (for a conceptual consciousness) and whether it withstands scrutiny in reality. inherent existence as an appearing object is valid, but the conceived object of inherent existence which this appearing object contributes to shaping is the very object of negation in realizing emptiness.

if one says that "car" here is in no way valid, then they are saying that there is some findable characteristic outside of mere imputation which at that time has set forth the boundaries as to what is or is not a valid mind

Surely if the appearing object is conventionally labelled as a "book" then it cannot also be valid to give it the conventional label "car".

[5heaps]

5heaps you have already conceded that it is incorrect to term an appearing object as "valid". You originally said, "nevertheless the car is valid" this is what I objected to. I am not going to keep going back and forth but it seems you are conflating this claim of yours with prasangikas special presentation with regard real and unreal conventional truths.

actually as berzin said the appearance is valid. car itself is valid, even the nonconceptual cognition of a unicorn as an appearance is valid, this is entirely the point. NONE OF THESE THINGS is what qualifies that a perception is invalid. there are no valid perceptions at all (except for emptiness), there are only perceptions of the direct (and a nonconceptual cognition of a unicorn or a book called a car are perceptions of the direct ie. direct appearances). you say imputing car on a book is invalid because books dont fit into the the category car, but this is completely mistaken in prasangika and fails to understand it. how prasangika changes the meaning of direct and indirect greatly simplifies things actually

Surely if the appearing object is conventionally labelled as a "book" then it cannot also be valid to give it the conventional label "car".

the appearing object of a conceptual consciousness is the mental image/category that is imputed. the book is the external object car is the appearing object...according to sautrantika what makes this an invalid/mistaken perception is that the appearing object and the mind which 'generated' it was so far away from correctly realizing the appearing characteristics of the book that it necessarily produced an invalid appearance of for example a car (could have been anything else, depending on the person, karma, etc). in other words the only way that a person could think "car" with respect to the self-existently appearing characteristics of the book is to misperceive those characteristics in the first place (whether it is dim lighting, confusion, doubt, etc, the mind is blocked from stably ascertaining what is really out there).

[Tom]

actually as berzin said the appearance is valid.

No he didn't.

you say imputing car on a book is invalid because books dont fit into the the category car

No, I said that "car" is not a correct designation for three reasons and then I said that you were incorrect when you said the "car" is valid.

The problem is you are stuck in a wrong paradigm. Even it you flip your position from arguing for the car being valid to arguing (as you are doing now) against an imaginary opponent asserting that this appearance to the mind is invalid. You have applied the terms valid and invalid to the object and this implies it is being referenced to something else which is the very thing you are arguing against and opposite to the point you are trying to make. Geshe Lobsang Gyatso wrote a brilliant text on all this and I think it is the only specifically Prasangkika presentation - unfortunately it is only in Tibetan at present.

[5heaps]

actually as berzin said the appearance is valid.

No he didn't.

"the cognition of a hallucinated unicorn as a hallucinated unicorn is accurate"

No, I said that "car" is not a correct designation for three reasons and then I said that you were incorrect when you said the "car" is valid.

no, you didnt. you said you didnt know any way in which "car" is valid. it has already been explained to you that the appearing object car when imputed onto a book is valid/accurate appearance. a hallucinated unicorn as the appearing object of a nonconceptual eye consciousness is also a valid appearance. that the unicorn as an object of operation or a car as the conceived object is not valid is what it means when Chandrakirti explains that it must "accords with worldly convention". it does not mean that 'car' is not valid

[Tom]

actually as berzin said the appearance is valid.

No he didn't.

"the cognition of a hallucinated unicorn as a hallucinated unicorn is accurate"

This is quite different to what you were asserting. The equivalent to your claim would be "the unicorn is valid". In any case as Futerko pointed out Berzin was clear from the start that unicorns are not objects of valid cognitions. Your assertions and Berzin's explanations are worlds apart.

Here Berzin is clearly talking about a cognition, and further he also qualifies the object as a hallucinated unicorn. In any case our subject was not a mind that knows a hallucination, it was not even a mind mistaken with regard to a hallucination, nor was it a misapprehension of rope as snake but someone being silly and calling a book a "car."

no, you didnt. you said you didnt know any way in which "car" is valid. it has already been explained to you that the appearing object car when imputed onto a book is valid/accurate appearance. a hallucinated unicorn as the appearing object of a nonconceptual eye consciousness is also a valid appearance.

Actually if you re-read the posts I was the one to explain that for prasangika all minds are valid with regard to their appearing objects even for wrong consciousness but as I mentioned back then this does not support your odd claim that the "car" is valid (see the point re: Berzin above).

that the unicorn as an object of operation or a car as the conceived object is not valid is what it means when Chandrakirti explains that it must "accords with worldly convention". it does not mean that 'car' is not valid

[/quote]

Actually, in fact what Candrakirti is doing with such statements is ripping the rug from underneath such dharmakirtian epistemology!