Similar, not the same:Ikkyu wrote:I've often wondered if the Buddhist epistemic approach is similar to the Jain one...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catu%E1%B9%A3ko%E1%B9%ADi" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
Similar, not the same:Ikkyu wrote:I've often wondered if the Buddhist epistemic approach is similar to the Jain one...
They are simply "understood" as numbers, not perceived as...Huseng wrote:The symbols themselves are arrangements of pixels on a screen which if understood are perceived as numbers.
Semantics.viniketa wrote:They are simply "understood" as numbers, not perceived as...Huseng wrote:The symbols themselves are arrangements of pixels on a screen which if understood are perceived as numbers.
Epistemology is highly dependent on semantics...Huseng wrote:Semantics.
"It is perceived in the mind"Huseng wrote:1+1=2PadmaVonSamba wrote: how are those not perceived through the senses?
The symbols themselves are arrangements of pixels on a screen which if understood are perceived as numbers. The actual process of addition that is perceived is immaterial and not perceived through your senses. It is perceived in the mind.
It is a mental object perceived by the mental faculty (mana-indriya). It is not physical. My whole point is that perception or cognition of mathematics is immaterial and non-physical. It is not perceived through your physical sensory apparatus (sight, hearing, etc...).PadmaVonSamba wrote: "It is perceived in the mind"
are you saying that what is perceived in the mind is thus the activity of the mind?
then wouldn't that mean that no object of perception (i.e. addition) is needed?
and if no object of perception is needed, then of what use are examples?
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Oh, yeah. I'd go along with that.Huseng wrote: My whole point is that perception or cognition of mathematics is immaterial and non-physical. It is not perceived through your physical sensory apparatus (sight, hearing, etc...).
The Omniscient one has declared that all there is to know is the six senses and all those senses are just mind.Ikkyu wrote:Split from here:
http://www.dharmawheel.net/viewtopic.php?f=77&t=8856" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
@ Huseng and undefineable:
I can't help but feel that I'm reliving the creationists' spouting off "transcendent truths" and how they go beyond science because "science is only concerned with the material". This anti-science rhetoric you've got smacks of the normal religious person's argument when they're backed into a corner of facing irrational beliefs. Yes, in some way it is certainly possible that Buddhist metaphysical theories are true because, yeah, not everything is necessarily a part of the material world. But here's how I'm thinking about it, and just to sum it all up I'll reiterate and condense:
1. We can believe anything without evidence if we already have an underlying notion that anything is in a sense possible because our senses don't fully determine all of reality. ("brain in the vat", Descartes' dream world, etc.) Yes, there are perhaps realities beyond our five senses but in any case wouldn't it be prudent to assume, just for practical purposes at least, that our senses and thus the empirical observations we make with are the most probably the most accurate ways of determining reality that we know of, and thus can't we trust them more than abstract concepts thrown at us from antiquated religious texts? We experience things with our senses. The only reason we know about Buddhism is because we HEARD about it or READ (as in seeing) it somewhere or from someone. We use our SENSES in order to contemplate Buddhism. Buddha used his MATERIAL body in order to convey his ideas. People LISTENED to him using their sense of HEARING. In short, our senses are quite obviously the best way of determining reality and the reality we determine through them is probably, based on the evidence, a material, physical world. That's how we know that meditation-consciousnesses or jhanas take place in the brain, in our neural framework. That's how we know that when we feel empowered or spiritually enlightened by the Dharma it is dopamine being released in our brain causing us to feel happy. Everything we know comes from and is a part of the material, as far as we can directly tell. That isn't to say there may not be a spiritual world beyond the material. There may very well be universes outside of the material one that function in ways we cannot comprehend with our normal state of mind, but how can we infer this with absolute proof? Quantum physics provides some insight into this but to get as detailed as the Buddhist texts do about metaphysical realities seems like sort of a stretch, no?
2. Evidentialism would suggest that instead of believing in bodhisattvas, karma, rebirth, etc. and then working out the evidence as to why these things are true, that a more logical approach would be to learn and gather evidence and come to a conclusion based on that evidence. A priori knowledge clearly doesn't include bodhisattvas, rebirth, etc. We learn these things.
I would actually be very interested in reading about the Buddhist approach to epistemology since there doesn't seem to be a lot written on the subject.
The model in the earlier discussion mind-body dualism where there is the physical senses and then there is the mental sphere.deepbluehum wrote: The Omniscient one has declared that all there is to know is the six senses and all those senses are just mind.
The issue of qualia is constantly problematic diehard materialists.gregkavarnos wrote:Feeling emotions would be another example of non-material perception. Though granted that some can also have bodily sensations associated with them.
..and for once I completely agree with Huseng. Does this mean we're drinkin' buddies now?Huseng wrote:The issue of qualia is constantly problematic diehard materialists.gregkavarnos wrote:Feeling emotions would be another example of non-material perception. Though granted that some can also have bodily sensations associated with them.
These non-physical processes have causal potency and efficacy, thus rendering theories that the physical world is a "closed system" refuted.
If you mean tea or coffee, sure.catmoon wrote: ..and for once I completely agree with Huseng. Does this mean we're drinkin' buddies now?
Maybe this explains much of Buddhism's apparent reduction of everything to Mind - If our senses are functional, then ALL our conscious perceptions are abstractions, but only if our senses are dysfuctional do we have to begin our mental activities with such abstractions, since trains of unconscious activities normally precede them. It's a commonplace to point out that what we sense is not some condensed essence of the sensed matter or energy itself, but a commodification of its dynamics within our world, mediated by our bodies such as to be intelligible to our minds. The more input we receive, though, the more we "know what's going on" - Consider the enormous number of sensed details needed to give one a well-founded 'bad feeling' about someone. On the other hand, where we have no sensory input at all, there's nothing for our brains to abstract from, so no abstractions form in our minds that appear as a result of this vacuum.viniketa wrote:In what way are they perceived by what sense? These are abstractions. For example, the sounds of language may be perceived by ears, the marks by eyes, but 'language' is intelligible only via the intellect (bodhi).PadmaVonSamba wrote:how are those not perceived through the senses?Huseng wrote: Logic, patterns, numbers, language, jhana...
Surely the cognition of an abstraction constitutes its existence - ?!? Padma, I take your point about sensing the workings of the brain, but language gets sketchy here, as I'm sure you'll agree!catmoon wrote:Aren't they? If they are not sensed how do you know they exist?viniketa wrote:However, abstractions are not sensations.gregkavarnos wrote:When it comes down to it, all samsaric sensations are perceived by the sense organ of mind.
Here, hopefully we return to more conventional examples of abstraction, such as number, which is a good example of what I (atleast) understand by that word - It's 'tied' to sensation, as I argued, since when we first learn numbers, they're always numbers of something we might perceive through our senses _ _viniketa wrote:In Buddhist epistemology, abstractions are kalpanā (invention, imgination), not parikalpita (incorrectly apprehended).
Above sounds as if you are describing saṃjñā:undefineable wrote:Here, hopefully we return to more conventional examples of abstraction, such as number, which is a good example of what I (atleast) understand by that word - It's 'tied' to sensation, as I argued, since when we first learn numbers, they're always numbers of something we might perceive through our senses _ _
From a source on Vasubhandu's Abhidharmakośa (p. 31).saṃjñā - (ideation, cognitions, discernment, discrimination, idea, notion, perception, conception, associative-thinking, conceptualization)
This is the aggregate of ideas, namely the apprehension (determination) of "marks" (nimitta) such as blue or yellow, long or short, female or male, friend or enemy, and so on. I.14. Samjna is…that which grasps the marks (male, female, etc.) of an object (ii.34b-d). II.24 [AVA: ―This is that which comprehends, by combining conceptually the appearance (nimitta), name (nama) and the signified (artha) [of a dharma]…It is the cause of reasoning (vitarka) and investigation (vicara).
* Another source: A Survey of Buddhist Thought“The two mental states, sensation and ideas, are defined as distinct skandhas because they are the causes of the roots of dispute, because they are the causes of transmigration, and also by reason of the causes which justify the order of skandhas.” This question arises because the 2nd and 3rd skandhas are actually samskaras (see for example the panca-vastuka scheme) and could have been subsumed under the 4th skandha. They are taught as distinct skandhas because of the key functions they carry out as conditions for cyclic suffering. This point is also expressed in teachings regarding the order of the skandhas which exemplify the special importance of vedana [feeling] and samjna.
(p. 24).