Madhyamaka/Yogacara Confusion

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Re: Madhyamaka/Yogacara Confusion

Postby 5heaps » Sat Jul 31, 2010 12:55 am

Dexing wrote:Accepts them as what or in what way though? This is the critical issue.

Ālaya and its seeds must be accepted upon scripture and proper reasoning. But that is not to say that it is truly real. It too is abandoned in the state of arhat as anātman is realized.

yes, but much of middleway denies reflexive awareness and alaya outright. in other words there is no point considering whether it is truly real or dependent - it just simply doesnt exist. some of middleway would say that the need to assert an alaya to explain dependent arising is a sign of subtle grasping to true existence.

False imagination cannot be said to be nonexistent because that would deny that what Ordinary Beings know is delusion and accept all sorts of illusions as true, rather than false.

thats an old debate..
false imagination dont exist because those imaginations dont refer to anything - those objects dont exist. therefore we cannot say that these false imaginations exist. however from the point of view of the false imaginations themselves (ie. the internal images) they do exist as images.
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Re: Madhyamaka/Yogacara Confusion

Postby Dexing » Sat Jul 31, 2010 11:22 pm

5heaps wrote:yes, but much of middleway denies reflexive awareness and alaya outright. in other words there is no point considering whether it is truly real or dependent - it just simply doesnt exist. some of middleway would say that the need to assert an alaya to explain dependent arising is a sign of subtle grasping to true existence.


If by "reflexive awareness" you mean the process through which the mind becomes aware of its own operations, Yogācāra does not assert this either because Ordinary Beings cannot perceive their deluded minds. Such ignorance is that which accounts for their cyclic existence. But it cannot be denied at the level of Buddhahood, otherwise a Buddha would possess ignorance and lack wisdom.

The need to assert ālaya is not simply to explain dependent arising but to demonstrate the principles of consciousness-only, which will allow one to progress through the stages of countering previously held views with presently acquired views, which later dissolve of themselves.

Granted, the cause of ālaya is exactly the subtle grasping of the manas which — attaching to it as an inner self — continually perfumes it with seeds of mental energy which sustain it, mutually and perpetually along with manas and the rest of the evolving consciousnesses in turn.

However, in the manner that the ātman is admitted to be conventionally real, so too is ālaya. Mādhyamaka sources would concur, the conventional truth cannot be unaccepted. At the level of conventional truth, upon both scripture and proper reasoning, ālaya is not indemonstrable and cannot logically be denied.

What is called ālaya is not a truly real form of consciousness, but a mental construct utilized as a tool for instruction and practice. After all, Ordinary Beings are incapable of truly reflexive awareness. So Buddhas must make use of their Imagined objects to teach them in their language until they can become independent from it and completely transmute the basis for their current situation.

thats an old debate..
false imagination dont exist because those imaginations dont refer to anything - those objects dont exist. therefore we cannot say that these false imaginations exist. however from the point of view of the false imaginations themselves (ie. the internal images) they do exist as images.


The distinction is between Imagination and the Imagined.

If we say Imagination doesn't exist, then nothing can be Imagined. However, we know that is not true. There are a multitude of Imagined appearances arising in deluded beings, so there must be an Imagination. Where there is smoke there is fire. Even if the fire is not directly perceived, that much can be logically deduced.

However, having no Object there can be no Subject. So there is an emptiness of this Imagined duality. As is my point on the agreement of emptiness between Mādhyamaka and Yogācāra doctrines, spoken in Maitreya's verses:

FALSE IMAGINATION EXISTS;
THE DUALITY IN IT DOES NOT EXIST.
IN IT, THERE IS ONLY EMPTINESS;
IN THAT, THERE IS ALSO THIS IMAGINATION.

THEREFORE, I DECLARE THAT ALL DHARMAS
ARE NEITHER EMPTY NOR NOT EMPTY,
BECAUSE OF EXISTENCE, NONEXISTENCE, AND EXISTENCE;
THIS CONFORMS TO THE MIDDLE WAY.


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Re: Madhyamaka/Yogacara Confusion

Postby 5heaps » Sun Aug 01, 2010 1:58 am

Dexing wrote:If by "reflexive awareness" you mean the process through which the mind becomes aware of its own operations, Yogācāra does not assert this either because Ordinary Beings cannot perceive their deluded minds. Such ignorance is that which accounts for their cyclic existence. But it cannot be denied at the level of Buddhahood, otherwise a Buddha would possess ignorance and lack wisdom.

i've never seen a Yogacara that doesn't accept reflexive awareness. the reason that you give for not accepting it seems very weak - after all, something can appear in the mind but be not ascertained.

this incapacity to ascertain is the true bondage that keeps beings out of nirvana, whereas for omniscience one would have to say that the bondage comes from the sheer negative state of the human mind itself (even if it is capable of ascertaining strongly)

However, in the manner that the ātman is admitted to be conventionally real, so too is ālaya. Mādhyamaka sources would concur

Goodness! Atman is completely nonexistent! even the lowest of the Vaibhashikas dont accept atman, what need is there to speak of Sautrantika onwards.

i can quote you 10 books offhand which say that in Madhyamika (most of them) alaya is not accepted as an existing entity. i would be amazed if you could find me a source which says that they are Prasangika and yet accept alaya.

However, having no Object there can be no Subject.

oh, right. thats a really nice topic but i dont think it draws a complete parallel between Yogacara and middleway. but its extremely cool.

the imagination is an unchanging mental image (an object category) and it is being held by the reflexive awareness. deluded minds mistake this negative being held by reflexive awareness as being an actual object - it is the imagined object taken to be real and which is not understood as being merely imputed in this way.

so the big discovery is that the imagined is the same entity as the mental consciousness, which middleway would largely have no problem with. it is however not emptiness, its selflessness. further problems arise when we move to more real things instead of unchanging images.. the more extreme middleway says even these more real things like pillars and water-jugs are completely imputed, in a similar way.
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Re: Madhyamaka/Yogacara Confusion

Postby Dexing » Sun Aug 01, 2010 3:14 am

5heaps wrote:i've never seen a Yogacara that doesn't accept reflexive awareness. the reason that you give for not accepting it seems very weak - after all, something can appear in the mind but be not ascertained.


It's basic Mahāyāna logic, that the mind of Ordinary Beings can only know objects of consciousness and can't turn around and know itself. This principle is called; "眼不能自见,心不能自识" — "The eye can't see itself, and the mind can't know itself".

If one really had reflexive awareness there could be no ignorance. One would never make mistakes because they would see clearly the operations of their mind.

What one is actually aware of is only the objects of consciousness, not consciousness itself. It is only fully seen in the state of perfect Buddhahood.

Goodness! Atman is completely nonexistent! even the lowest of the Vaibhashikas dont accept atman, what need is there to speak of Sautrantika onwards.

i can quote you 10 books offhand which say that in Madhyamika (most of them) alaya is not accepted as an existing entity. i would be amazed if you could find me a source which says that they are Prasangika and yet accept alaya.


I don't think I've said ātman is existent. Nor have I said ālaya truly is. They are both in a matter of speaking only, but cannot logically be denied. Unless you are not accepting conventional truth, in which case the entirety of the Buddhist path is denied.

so the big discovery is that the imagined is the same entity as the mental consciousness, which middleway would largely have no problem with. it is however not emptiness, its selflessness.


In what way does this differ from Yogācāra?

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Re: Madhyamaka/Yogacara Confusion

Postby 5heaps » Sun Aug 01, 2010 4:41 am

Dexing wrote:If one really had reflexive awareness there could be no ignorance. One would never make mistakes because they would see clearly the operations of their mind.

so we dont have common ground on what is reflexive awareness.

it's not true that reflexive awareness necessitates clearly seeing the operations of the mind. the job of reflexive awareness is to notice what is happening in a main consciousness. so if something appears in the main consciousness but it is not clearly ascertained (ie. the mind is weak and there are incomplete mental factors) then the reflexive awareness will see the same lack of ascertainment.

Unless you are not accepting conventional truth, in which case the entirety of the Buddhist path is denied.

yes, to be conventionally true is to be an existing thing. if atman does not exist and neither does alaya, then they are not conventionally true.

you said atman "is admitted to be conventionally real", therefore you are saying atman exists.

In what way does this differ from Yogācāra?

what i illustrated in the example is standard subtle selflessness in Sautrantika, Yogacara, and much of Middleway.

selflessness however is not emptiness. therefore on top of this lack of dualism, which is extremely important by itself anyway, comes an even more colossal lack of dualism which applies to all objects equally.

its such a colossal lack of dualism that historically Yogacara would attack middleway for being a pack of nihilists.
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Re: Madhyamaka/Yogacara Confusion

Postby Dexing » Sun Aug 01, 2010 5:06 am

5heaps wrote:so we dont have common ground on what is reflexive awareness.


Why didn't you say something a few posts back when I first tried to get your definition of "reflexive awareness"?

Unless you are not accepting conventional truth, in which case the entirety of the Buddhist path is denied.

yes, to be conventionally true is to be an existing thing. if atman does not exist and neither does alaya, then they are not conventionally true.

you said atman "is admitted to be conventionally real", therefore you are saying atman exists.


"To be conventionally true is to be an existing thing."

Not so at all.

Do you know what the term "conventional truth" means? The Buddha accepted it. Nagarjuna argued that it cannot be denied.

Accepting a conventional ātman does not admit such a thing is truly real, existing in ultimate truth. That should be very basic. Otherwise reading any scripture from any Buddhist tradition it will be very difficult to keep straight.

its such a colossal lack of dualism that historically Yogacara would attack middleway for being a pack of nihilists.


When you speak of "Yogacara" attacking the "middleway" historically, what exactly do you mean?

Sixth-century followers of the two schools engaged in academic controversy, but fighting for posts and recognition creates a lot of disagreement where there really isn't any, which is my point in starting this thread. I really don't see any place where they are actually at odds.

Let's stick with what the actual texts from the two schools, from Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu actually say.

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Re: Madhyamaka/Yogacara Confusion

Postby 5heaps » Sun Aug 01, 2010 5:28 am

Dexing wrote:Why didn't you say something a few posts back when I first tried to get your definition of "reflexive awareness"?

because defining anything technically is tedious and because i thought our definitions might have matched enough not to create confusion. but now i see that i mean something close but not quite the same as yours.

Accepting a conventional ātman does not admit such a thing is truly real, existing in ultimate truth. That should be very basic.

i did not say anything about truly real. i just said real. meaning existing.

if to be an ultimate truth means to be truly real, this does not negate ordinary conventional existence. and within such conventional existence, nonexisting things dont exist. therefore to say atman is either existing or truly existing, that it is either conventional or ultimate, is wrong, because it just doesnt exist at all.

When you speak of "Yogacara" attacking the "middleway" historically, what exactly do you mean?

i was thinking of Shantideva's text. within Middleway they attack Yogacara heavily for the sake of gaining insight and to establish their own position.

I really don't see any place where they are actually at odds.

depends what "at odds" means. probably they love each other. but theres no way that a non-Yogacara leaning Middleway scholar would accept the slightest Yogacara position.
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Re: Madhyamaka/Yogacara Confusion

Postby Dexing » Mon Aug 02, 2010 4:35 am

5heaps wrote:if to be an ultimate truth means to be truly real, this does not negate ordinary conventional existence. and within such conventional existence, nonexisting things dont exist. therefore to say atman is either existing or truly existing, that it is either conventional or ultimate, is wrong, because it just doesnt exist at all.


As I said, it is only in a matter of speaking, and with a certain intent or purpose, that what is actually nonexistent is temporarily accepted as real as an aid to liberation and insight (such as ālaya) or as a convenience in speech and reference to "individuals" (such as ātman). That is really just the definition of conventional truth.

Within such conventional truth it is illogical to deny ālaya, and impractical to deny ātman.

i was thinking of Shantideva's text. within Middleway they attack Yogacara heavily for the sake of gaining insight and to establish their own position.


That's what I'm talking about. Later followers come along and engage in academic debate and create differences in order to establish their positions. Unlike in the way Vasubandhu treats various schools who's doctrines are obviously different and flawed, the differences posited between Mādhyamaka and Yogācāra are not so clear and convincing, as I have been able to look back at the root texts and explain them away.

If we stick to the original texts of the traditions, for example like those of founders Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu, I only find that they are in complete agreement.

So what I'm trying to ascertain from this thread is what in the foundational doctrines of the Mādhyamaka and Yogācāra is seen as opposing to those who perceive a difference between the two traditions.

Many speak of differences by simply making (unconvincing to me) statements, but not through a comparative analysis of the original texts, which is what I'd like to see.

but theres no way that a non-Yogacara leaning Middleway scholar would accept the slightest Yogacara position.


My above explained intention with this thread is excluding works of later scholars who came along and engaged in academic controversy, unless apart from their own ideas and purposes they can accurately demonstrate a difference between what is actually stated in the original works of Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu, etc..

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Re: Madhyamaka/Yogacara Confusion

Postby 5heaps » Fri Aug 06, 2010 12:05 pm

Dexing wrote:My above explained intention with this thread is excluding works of later scholars who came along and engaged in academic controversy, unless apart from their own ideas and purposes they can accurately demonstrate a difference between what is actually stated in the original works of Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu, etc..

Scholar-yogis don't invent their analysis out of thin air. They make subtle distinctions based on many texts. These subtle distinctions are extremely useful for people who are trying to deepen insight, because they illustrate degrees of grasping to inherent existence and from many angles. Going over them and understanding them means going over and understanding subtler and subtler objects of negation.

So what I'm trying to ascertain from this thread is what in the foundational doctrines of the Mādhyamaka and Yogācāra is seen as opposing to those who perceive a difference between the two traditions.

This is all explained in detail in the commentaries. This is precisely the point of commentaries, which you keep denigrating.

but not through a comparative analysis of the original texts, which is what I'd like to see.

books:
Tsong-Kha-Pa's Final Exposition on Emptiness (Jeffrey Hopkins)
Emptiness in the Mind-only School of Buddhism (Jeffrey Hopkins) (volume 1 of 3 on Mind-Only)
Meditation on Emptiness (Jeffrey Hopkins)
Path to the Middle (Anne Klein)
A Dose of Emptiness (Cabezon)

as a convenience in speech and reference to "individuals" (such as ātman).

Are you confusing atman with pudgala? Every buddhist accepts pudgala but denies atman.
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Re: Madhyamaka/Yogacara Confusion

Postby Karma Dondrup Tashi » Fri Aug 06, 2010 4:45 pm

Good thread. Sheesh the entire history of ESangha was Yogacara v Madhyamaka.
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Re: Madhyamaka/Yogacara Confusion

Postby Dexing » Wed Aug 11, 2010 3:58 am

5heaps-

What I'm asking for is some responses from forum users who see a difference in the two schools, demonstrating where in their respective texts they disagree, so we might discuss them.

Every distinction I've read up to this point has been easily put to rest just by looking at the actual core texts of the two schools, but I cannot speak to a book.

I'm more interested in dialogue than ISBNs if you'd like to oblige.

5heaps wrote:Are you confusing atman with pudgala? Every buddhist accepts pudgala but denies atman.


Pudgala theories have been strongly refuted by many, even by Theravādins, as replacements for ātman as explanations for karma, transmigration, etc. as the "individual" necessary to experience them, which amounts to it just being another vain attempt.

Neither pudgala nor ātman theories of "individuals" are accepted in an ultimate sense, but simply in a manner of speaking.

So when you say "Every buddhist accepts pudgala but denies atman" I'm not quite sure what you mean. Pudgalavāda died out long ago and came under harsh criticism by the likes of Vasubandhu and others. So I would not say such a distinction and statement is well founded.

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Re: Madhyamaka/Yogacara Confusion

Postby Sherab » Wed Aug 11, 2010 6:05 am

I am inclined to go along with Dexing's view that originally, there was really no difference between Nagarjuna's and Asanga's/Vasubhandu's position.

Here's a short text of Vasubandhu called "Trisvabhavanirdesa":

1. The imagined, the other-dependent and
The consummate.
These are the three natures
Which should be deeply understood.

2. Arising through dependence on conditions and
Existing through being imagined,
It is therefore called other-dependent
And is said to be merely imaginary.

3. The external non-existence
Of what appears in the way it appears,
Since it is never otherwise,
Is known as the nature of the consummate.

4. If anything appears, it is imagined.
The way it appears is as duality.
What is the consequence of its non-existence?
The fact of non-duality!

5. What is the imagination of the non-existent?
Since what is imagined absolutely never
Exists in the way it is imagined,
It is mind that constructs that illusion.

6. Because it is a cause and an effect,
The mind has two aspects.
As the foundation consciousness it creates thought;
Known as the emerged consciousness it has seven aspects.

7. The first, because it collects the seeds
Of suffering is called `mind'.
The second, because of the constant emergence
Of the various aspects of things is so called.

8. One should think of the illusory non-existent
As threefold:
Completely ripened, grasped as other,
And as appearance.

9. The first, because it itself ripens,
Is the root consciousness.
The others are emergent consciousness,
Having emerged from the conceptualization of seer and seen.

10. Existence and non-existence, duality and unity;
Freedom from affliction and afflicted;
Through characteristics, and through distinctions,
These natures are known to be profound.

11. Since it appears as existent
Though it is non-existent,
The imagined nature
Is said to have the characteristics of existence and non-existence.

12. Since it exists as an illusory entity
And is non-existent in the way it appears
The other-dependent nature
Is said to have the characteristics of existence and non-existence.

13. Since it is the non-existence of duality
And exists as non-duality
The consummate nature
Is said to have the characteristics of existence and non-existence.

14. Moreover, since as imagined there are two aspects,
But existence and non-existence are unitary,
The nature imagined by the ignorant
Is said to be both dual and unitary.

15. Since as an object of thought it is dual,
But as a mere appearance it is unitary,
The other-dependent nature
Is said to be both dual and unitary.

16. Since it is the essence of dual entities
And is a unitary non-duality,
The consummate nature
Is said to be both dual and unitary.

17. The imagined and the other-dependent
Are said to be characterized by misery (due to ignorant craving).
The consummate is free of
The characteristic of desire.

18. Since the former has the nature of a false duality
And the latter is the non-existence of that nature,
The imagined and the consummate
Are said not to be different in characteristic.

19. Since the former has the nature of non-duality,
And the latter has the nature of non-existent duality,
The consummate and the imagined
Are said not to be different in characteristic.

20. Since the former is deceptive in the way it appears,
And the latter has the nature of its not being that way,
The other-dependent and the consummate
Are said not to be different in characteristic.

21. Since the former has the nature of a non-existent duality,
And the latter is its non-existence in the way it appears,
The other-dependent and the consummate
Are said not to be different in characteristic.

22. But conventionally,
The natures are explained in order and
Based on that one enters them
In a particular order, it is said.

23. The imagined is entirely conventional.
The other-dependent is attached to convention.
The consummate, cutting convention,
Is said to be of a different nature.

24. Having first entered into the non-existence of duality
Which is the dependent, one understands
The non-existent duality
Which is the imagined.

25. Then one enters the consummate.
Its nature is the non-existence of duality.
Therefore it is explained
To be both existent and non-existent.

26. These three natures
Have the characteristics of being non-cognizable and non-dual.
One is completely non-existent; the second is therefore
non-existent.
The third has the nature of that non-existence.

27. Like an elephant that appears
Through the power of a magician's mantra --
Only the percept appears,
The elephant is completely non-existent.

28. The imagined nature is the elephant;
The other-dependent nature is the visual percept;
The non-existence of the elephant therein
Is explained to be the consummate.

29. Through the root consciousness
The nonexistent duality appears.
But since the duality is completely non-existent,
There is only a percept.

30. The root consciousness is like the mantra.
Reality can be compared to the wood.
Imagination is like the perception of the elephant.
Duality can be seen as the elephant.

31. When one understands how things are,
Perfect knowledge, abandonment,
And accomplishment --
These three characteristics are simultaneously achieved.

32. Knowledge is non-perception;
Abandonment is non-appearance;
Attainment is accomplished through non-dual perception.
That is direct manifestation.

33. Through the non-perception of the elephant,
The vanishing of its percept occurs;
And so does the perception of the piece of wood.
This is how it is in the magic show.

34. In the same way through the non-perception of duality
There is the vanishing of duality.
When it vanishes completely,
Non-dual awareness arises.

35. Through perceiving correctly,
Through seeing the non-referentiality of mental states,
Through following the three wisdoms,
One will effortlessly attain liberation.

36. Through the perception of mind-only
One achieves the non-perception of objects;
Through the non-perception of objects
There is also the non-perception of mind.

37. Through the non-duality of perception,
Arises the perception of the fundamental nature of reality.
Through the perception of the fundamental nature of reality
Arises the perception of the radiant.

38. Through the perception of the radiant,
And through achieving the three supreme Buddha-bodies,
And through possessing bodhi:
Having achieved this, the sage will benefit him/herself and others.
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Re: Madhyamaka/Yogacara Confusion

Postby Sherab » Thu Aug 12, 2010 1:39 am

Vimśatikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhi
From Wikipedia

Vimśatikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhi (IAST; Sanskrit Devanagari: विम्शतिकाविज्ञप्तिमात्रतासिद्धि) has been rendered into English as "Twenty Verses on Consciousness Only" is an important work within Buddhadharma discourse. The work was composed by Vasubandhu (fl. 4th c.) and is notable within the discourse of Yogachara and has influenced subsequent Buddhadharma discourse of other schools.

Anacker (1984: p.159) in making reference to the works of Dharmapala and Hsuan-tsang, holds that:

Perhaps no work of Vasubandhu's has been more consistently misunderstood than The Twenty Verses. It has frequently been used as an authoritative source for opinions that are in fact not even there. The main point here is not that consciousness unilaterally creates all forms in the [U]niverse, as has been supposed by Dharmapala and Hsuan-tsang, but rather than an object-of-consciousness is "internal", and the "external" stimuli are only inferrable. What is observed directly are always only perceptions, colored by particular consciousness- "seeds". The very fact that these "seeds" are spoken of at all indicates a double influence. On one hand, every consciousness-moment deposts a "seed": on the other, each "seed" influences every subsequent consciousness-moment, until a "revolution at the basis" of consciousness is achieved.[1]

Lusthaus (undated: unpaginated) holds that:

Vasubandhu's most original and philosophically interesting treatise is his Twenty Verses (Vi.m`satikaa). In it he defends Yogaacaara from objections by Realists. Yogaacaara claims that what we think are external objects are nothing more than mental projections. This has been mistaken for an Idealist position because interpreters focus on the word 'object' instead of 'external.' Vasubandhu does not deny that cognitive objects (vi.saya, aalambana, etc.) exist; what he denies is that they appear anywhere else than in the very act of consciousness which apprehends them. He denies that such cognitive objects have external referents (bahya-artha). What Vasubandhu means is that cognition never takes place anywhere except in consciousness. Everything we know we have acquired through sensory experience (in Buddhism the mind is considered a special type of sense). We are fooled by consciousness into believing that those things which we perceive and appropriate within consciousness are actually 'outside' our cognitive sphere. Put another way, we mistake our interpretations of things for the things themselves. Consciousness is driven by karmic intentionalities (the habitual tendencies produced by past actions), and how we perceive is shaped by that conditioning. The goal of Yogaacaara is to break out of this cognitive narcissism and finally wake up to things as they are, devoid of erroneous conceptual projections.[2]
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Re: Madhyamaka/Yogacara Confusion

Postby 5heaps » Thu Aug 12, 2010 11:39 pm

Dexing wrote:Every distinction I've read up to this point has been easily put to rest just by looking at the actual core texts of the two schools, but I cannot speak to a book.

we would disagree that what Arya Nagarjuna/Heart Sutra/etc are referring to when they use the word "nirvana" is the concept of nirvana. what they are talking about is nirvana itself. for example when Arya Nagarjuna talks about the eye consciousness and its object he is not talking about the ideas of these things but rather is providing a proof on emptiness, namely the emptiness of those objects themselves, thrpugh relying on references of the objects themselves.

we would also disagree that such things as storehouse consciousness, reflexive awareness, no external objects, etc have even the slightest existence (ie. they don't exist even conventionally)

Sherab wrote:The goal of Yogaacaara is to break out of this cognitive narcissism and finally wake up to things as they are, devoid of erroneous conceptual projections

then you make my case, because according to a lot of middleway this emptiness is quite coarse. Jeffrey Hopkins remarks how its still about 60% or 70% grasping to objects as being inherently existing (- i cant remember which one he said, 60 or 70)
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Re: Madhyamaka/Yogacara Confusion

Postby Dexing » Thu Aug 12, 2010 11:44 pm

Sherab wrote:"Perhaps no work of Vasubandhu's has been more consistently misunderstood than The Twenty Verses. It has frequently been used as an authoritative source for opinions that are in fact not even there."


Interestingly, the opinions these scholars hold are also not even in the texts.

It's funny how Vasubandhu was such a dominate debater and wrote so many texts but appears to have had problems with linguistic expression according to these guys. And Dharmapala and Xuanzang have "misunderstood" and "supposed" things as well.

Yet these guys can explain something so succinctly in just a few sentences!

What nerve.

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Re: Madhyamaka/Yogacara Confusion

Postby Dexing » Thu Aug 12, 2010 11:50 pm

5heaps wrote:we would disagree that...

we would also disagree that...


Who do you mean by "we"? You and me, or are you speaking for Nāgārjuna?

I think you should speak for yourself unless you are quoting and comparing the texts.

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Re: Madhyamaka/Yogacara Confusion

Postby 5heaps » Fri Aug 13, 2010 12:13 am

Dexing wrote:Who do you mean by "we"?
i meant middleway (or most of it)
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Re: Madhyamaka/Yogacara Confusion

Postby Sherab » Fri Aug 13, 2010 12:46 am

5heaps wrote:
Sherab wrote:The goal of Yogaacaara is to break out of this cognitive narcissism and finally wake up to things as they are, devoid of erroneous conceptual projections

then you make my case, because according to a lot of middleway this emptiness is quite coarse. Jeffrey Hopkins remarks how its still about 60% or 70% grasping to objects as being inherently existing (- i cant remember which one he said, 60 or 70)

Hard to accept without further elaboration on why it makes your case.
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Re: Madhyamaka/Yogacara Confusion

Postby Sherab » Fri Aug 13, 2010 12:50 am

5heaps wrote:
Dexing wrote:Who do you mean by "we"?
i meant middleway (or most of it)

Different schools interprets the meaning of middleway differently. The question is which interpretation of middleway is correct.
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Re: Madhyamaka/Yogacara Confusion

Postby 5heaps » Fri Aug 13, 2010 1:53 am

Sherab wrote:Hard to accept without further elaboration on why it makes your case.

by quoting that coarse object of negation as the yogacara position youre illustrating that there is a basic difference because early on people such as buddhapalita, aryadeva, shantideva, etc were identifying subtler objects of negation in nagarjuna

Different schools interprets the meaning of middleway differently. The question is which interpretation of middleway is correct.

yes every school thinks theyre the real middle way between the two extremes but here middleway refers to the school named middleway (Madhyamika)
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