Just underlined the part of the quote that seemed to hit the nail on the head, to me.
Another link ( call me Ms. Links haha ) but this is a great one too to check out,
His Holiness gave a really great teaching - The Spirit of Manjushri: ( link to teaching below)
"What exactly are the criteria by which one can determine whether something is existent or not? Here one can discern three criteria. One is an object of consciousness or knowledge that its concept exists. The second is the convention known is not contradicted by another valid cognition. The third criterion used is such a convention is not negated by an ultimate analysis that probes into the real mode of being.
If one takes the example of the horn of a rabbit, one can have a concept of this. One can have an image of it and one can also use terms like rabbit’s horn. Although the concept can exist but one can not say the horn of a rabbit is real, as the perception of the non-existence of a rabbit’s horn will directly contradict the view that a rabbit has a horn. The third criterion is needed because certain philosophical postulates such as the alayavijnana, the store consciousness, and the notion of atman are concepts that are posited as a result of reasoned philosophical thinking. Therefore if these things are real they should be able to withstand ultimate analysis however which is not the case. It is on the basis of these three criteria that one can determine whether something exists or not.
Chandrakirti tried to come up with an understanding of the nature of existence whereby no belief in any kind of inherent existence is posited but at the same time one has the possibility of making a real substantial distinction between a false reality and a real entity. An example is the difference between a dream person and a real person. One must have a way of distinguishing between the two. This is the essence of Chandrakirti’s philosophy where a way of understanding existence is developed which would not involve forcing a belief in some kind of intrinsic reality of things and events.
Within Madhyamika thought one can see that because there is no explicit statement on the part of Nagarjuna as to the question of whether or not the external or physical world possess some kind of objective reality, there is a divergence of opinion. For example one of the earliest commentators on Nagarjuna, Bhavaviveka, has maintained that there is no need to reject the objective reality of the external world. Although one can maintain that all phenomena are in the final analysis empty of independent existence, there is no need to totally reject some degree of objective reality to the external world.
There are other Madhyamika thinkers like Santaraksita and Kamalasila who share many of the doctrines of the Cittamatrin school. Particularly they reject the objective reality of the external world while integrating that kind of insight within the overall Madhyamika position that in the final analysis that both subject and object are devoid of independent existence. There is quite a divergence even amongst the Madhyamika thinkers.
However there is a third line of interpretation of Nagarjuna’s thought represented by people like Buddhapalita, Chandrakirti and Shantideva, the three principal representatives of this line of thought, who depart quite a lot from the Cittamatra school and also from Bhavaviveka’s interpretation as well as Kamalasila’s and Santaraksita’s interpretations. They differ from the Cittamatra School as the Cittamatrins make discrimination between the non-reality of the physical, external world and the true existence of consciousness. Buddhapalita, Chandrakirti and so on reject this. They argue just as the Mind Only school, that when subjecting the notion of the external, physical world as being composed of atomic constituents in terms of the indivisibility and finite nature of the atom to a dissecting analysis that ultimately the very notion of physical reality tends to disappear. Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti argue that one can apply the same kind of deconstructive analysis to even mental events such as consciousness. This is done by subjecting these events to analysis in terms of their constituents, the temporal stages of the continuum of consciousness. When one subjects consciousness to this kind of analysis, one again begins to lose the very notion of what exactly is a mental event. They argue there is no need to discriminate between the external world and the consciousness as far as having inherent existence.
Similarly they differ from people like Bhavaviveka by arguing that he ultimately believes in some kind of intrinsic nature that can be validly established by consciousness. Whereas people like Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti reject this arguing that there is nothing in an ordinary perception that is not tainted by the perception of intrinsic reality. It is only when one attains the non-conceptual, intuitive realization of emptiness that one can gain a state of mind totally free of such contamination or delusion. Therefore Chandrakirti and Buddhapalita argue that just because a form of perception is deceptive does not necessarily mean that it is not valid. One can have a valid cognition of an object but at the same time the perceptual level can have a degree of deception or illusion.
The point Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti are making is that so long as one succumbs to the temptation to seek some sort of objective grounding for our perception, seeking an entity that enjoys an intrinsic reality “out there”, then one is still under the power of grasping, clinging to some type of true existence, some kind of independent existence. Therefore one should be able to have a worldview that is valid within the framework of conventional validity where one does not seek for some kind of ultimate grounding. One can make sense of one’s perceptions at the conventional level where cause and effect or subject and object can be accepted in relational terms."http://www.lamayeshe.com/index.php?sect=article&id=253&chid=510