What is the concept of "reality" in Buddhism?

[Andrew108]

Guys.....that sought after scholarship to Dewachen has the study of appearances as it's cause. Words obscure rather than clarify. The best philosophers realize this and just let 'it' go. When the base becomes the path there is no concept of reality.

[PadmaVonSamba]

I think the simple answer to this question Is the question:

What is the concept
of reality in Buddhism.

(because you have the conceptualization of "what", that is the reality of your experience.)
.
.
.

[cloudburst]

So the nature of appearances is the controversy, whether they are illusions, or if something is indeed produced via imputation which can be designated as "like an illusion".

Precisely. Consult Nagarjuna and Chandrakirti to discover whether or not there is production by imputation. Don't join the hotheads who read with a literal eye, look deeper!

....if you believe something is truly produced then I don't see how you can move past that self made limitation, if you feel you can then that is great, but in my eyes it is merely a barrier.

No-one ever said "Truly produced."
I invited you to consult Madhyamaka masters as to whether or not there is dependent or relative production, you clearly did not bother.
That's no problem, I will demonstrate how it is for the benefit of those who read carefully.

Buddha, Nagarjuna, Chandrakirti all affirm dependent production and reject essential or "true" production. Here are some quotations for those who want to know what the actual masters say...

Buddha says in the Anavatapta-nagaraja-pariprccha sutra...
Whatever is produced from conditions is not produced; it is not intrinsically produced.
Whatever depends upon conditions, I consider empty;
One who knows emptiness is diligent.

and in the Lankavatara...
Mahamati, thinking that they are not produced intrinsically, I said
that all phenomena are not produced

in his Sixty Stanzas, Nagarjuna says
The supreme knower of reality
Said that dependent production is not production

and commenting on that Chandrakirti says
When you see dependent arising, you do not see things as intrinsically existing. This is becasue the dependently produced is not intrinsically produced, like a reflection.

in the Avatara Chandrakirti says
Because things are not produced
Causelessly, or from causes such as a divine creator,
Or from self, other, or both self and other
They are produced dependently

So. That's done.
They are produced dependently.

I like having inconsistencies in my view drawn out... though that has yet to happen in my opinion.

Here is an inconsistency in your view- first of all, let's leave aside that if questioned, you will in all likelihood claim not to have a view, while at the same time talking about your view and its inconsistency or lack thereof.

You say that

'there is nothing to accept or reject' means to reject the appearance of relative laws and so on would be an unnecessary (and futile/foolish) activity.

which means you accept the appearance of relative laws. Even though you want to say that not rejecting does not mean accepting, this is just sophistry, as you do accept that the laws of gravity function. Granted, you accept it conventionally, but as you correctly say, there is no acceptance or rejection, and nothing to accept or reject ultimately, so that's as accepting as acceptance gets.

You want to get rid of the law of the excluded middle, but you still want to give reasons to back up your points and claim that

For the sake of communication we accept these conventionalities

while at the same time claiming

There is nothing to accept or reject.

So, how's that? There are your own words. "there is nothing to accept or reject" and ".... we accept..." you claim that there is nothing to accept, yet you accept many things. Does that really not seem inconsistent to you? If not, I guess I have to ask if you know what the word 'consistent' means.

By the way, earlier in this thread Malcolm claimed that Madhyamakas reject logic. I challenged that assertion and asked for citations.
None were provided. I suppose one of the freedoms that one enjoys while not accepting or rejecting is that one need not accept that a failure to back up one's claims makes those claims seem a matter of uninformed opinion.

For the sake of communication we accept these conventionalities, why you think I reject them I don't understand, you are reading my words and I am typing them, conventional language is obviously being employed to make a point.

it's more than just using words, to accept conventionalities, though, isn't it?
Valid conventionalities mean something. If you transgress that meaning, you are demonstrably wrong. The 'position of the world' that Buddha et al say they will stay with is not just any position that is propounded, but valid positions. For example, although most believe in a creator god, Madhyamikas reject this, they do not "go with the position of the world" on nonsense, do they? They only do so when the position is unassailable, and is contradicted by neither another worldly cognition or an ultimate one.

Chandrakirti says
Unskilled in ultimate and conventional truths you sometimes apply analytical standards inappropriately and destroy the conventional.
Because we are skilled in positing conventional truths, we stay with the world's position and we use it's conventional standards overturn the standards that you set so as to eliminate the category of conventionalities. Like the elders of the world we drive out only you deviate from the traditional standards of the world we do not drive out conventionalities

I don't need the clarity of my thinking to improve, it is like a child building a sand castle.

Unless you want to be taken seriously by thinking people. And you do want that, I can tell by your writing.

If you tuned up your investigation you would see that all is not equally illusory, becasue you would learn to understand and utilize the system of the Madhyamikas

Chandrkirti says
Some dependently arisen things- such as reflections and echoes -
are false and appear to be false even to be ignorant.
Some things -blue and other forms as well as minds, feelings etc.- appear to be true.
The final nature of things does not appear in any way to those who are ignorant.
Therefore that nature and whatever is false even conventionally are not conventional truths

so we can see that there are correct, or valid conventional truths (of course ultimately these are falsities, but conventionally, they are valid)
and some things that are just false. If you think carefully, you will see that this also refutes the notion that things are literally illusions, as Chandrakiti juxtaposes reflections and echoes (two of twelve similes that appear in the sutras including "like an illusion," see Samadhiraja sutra for more....) with forms, feelings, etc, clearly differentiating things that are false conventionally and conventional truths, (which are false from the point of view of the ultimate)

Mipham says
To engage the mind that ascertains without error
The nature of the two truths,
You should supremely establish the good eye
Of the two stainless valid cognitions

Cahndrakirti says
We therefore posit that the world knows objects with four valid cognitions

So you should know that Prasangikas do accept valid cogitions (and thus logic, of course!)
Let's look at some of these valid conventions.....

Chandrakriti's commmentary on Aryadeva's 400
Incorrect position :
Aryadeva means that compounded phenomena lack production because this analysis refutes all forms of production.
Reply: In that case the production of compounded phenomena would not be like a magicians illusion rather we would make it understood using examples such as the son of a barren woman. Wary of the absurd implication that dependent arisings would not exist we avoid such comparisons. Instead we compare the production of things to a magicians illusion and so forth, examples that do not contradict dependent arising

Here production is likened to a Magician's illusion. Chandrakirti "compares" the production of things to a magician's illusion. If everything actually were a magician's illusion, who is the magician? If you say "you are!" or "the mind!" then you make my point for me, as this is obviously metaphor.

Chandra's 400 commentary
What is the meaning of dependent arising? It means the absence of intrinsic existence; it means no intrinsically existent production; it means the arising of effects whose nature is similar to a magicians illusion, a mirage a reflection, a phantom city and emanation or a dream ; it means emptiness and selfless

"Whose nature is similar." Similar. Simile. It's a simile. Things are similar to a magician's illusion. The illusion is a simile.... things are like an illusion, like a water bubble, like a city of ghosts....
Your bed is not a city of ghosts. Your computer is not a water bubble. Your being schooled by Chandrakirti is not an illusion. It is like an illusion.....
You can understand quotations that say things are illusions in the same way, sometimes masters drop the qualifier when the meaning has been clearly established by context. Look into it. The Lanakavatara quotation above (...thinking that they are not produced intrinsically, I said that all phenomena are not produced.") is a fine example of this.

so striving for the clarity of thought is a futility married to an illusion...

I'm sure you, or at least others, can see how this attitude reflects itself in your thinking.
Why do you think Buddha gave thousands of discourses that were unbelievably precise?
Why did Nagarjuna takes such pains to refute objections?
Why did Chandrakirti comment on these so extensively?
Why did Longchenepa and Jamgon Kongtrul write thousands of pages of text full of intellectual rigor?
It was to clarify, and it is a beautiful thing.

I think many of the things you say may be accepted (while of course not being accepted or rejected) on the dzogchen forum, but in discussions that are explicitly Buddhist, you will be challenged and refuted.
I personally think you have not put much time into studying classical Buddhism. There's not necessarily a fault in that, don't get me wrong, but it leaves your discussion limited.....

[Malcolm]

By the way, earlier in this thread Malcolm claimed that Madhyamakas reject logic. I challenged that assertion and asked for citations.
None were provided.

That is not true -- I provided you with the reference for the Vigrahavyavartani and suggested you read it. There is a very readable translation by E.H Johnston.

Candra rejects pramāṇa when it comes to emptiness, accepting consequences as sufficient to show emptiness. He does not reject pramāṇa in every case, however, when he accepts that we can infer first stage bodhisattas through their compassionate deeds.

When I said Madyamakas reject "logic", I meant that they reject pramāṇa as being a meaningful path to ultimate truth. That is all I meant. Pramāṇa is a useful worldly science -- but as Rongzom states in his Introduction To The Principles of Mahāyāna (which I have incidentally translated completely, but it is unedited), "If one could reach the ends of objects of knowledge with a single flawless reasoning, for what reason was it not demonstrated in all the transmissions of the victors to begin with?"

M

[cloudburst]

By the way, earlier in this thread Malcolm claimed that Madhyamakas reject logic. I challenged that assertion and asked for citations.
None were provided.

That is not true -- I provided you with the reference for the Vigrahavyavartani and suggested you read it. There is a very readable translation by E.H Johnston.

You are lowering your normally high standards of integrity.

I said that "Prasangikas never refute valid cognition"
you said that Nagārajuna "refutes valid cognition in the Vigrahavyavartani. Since he does not accept it, ergo, neither does Madhyamaka in general. "

You must accept that mentioning a work that you believe supports your position is lazy and adds little to the argument. Imagine if I said "Of course disintegration is a functioning thing." If you demanded a citation, you would hardly be impressed if I said "consult Tsongkapa's Ocean of Reasoning."

In any case, the notion of Vigrahavyavartani refuting valid cognition is a broad claim, so I asked for a citation. You manifestly failed to provide one.

Of course I have read it, otherwise I would not challenge you so directly on it's contents. I read Jan Westerhoff's more recent translation. I think he makes mistakes but that one can get the main picture largely free from gross errors. Anyway, even a cursory examination of the worst translation would yield an immediate conclusion that it does not reject logic as it is almost entirely a logical disputation based on accepting and rejecting opponent's reasons as incorrect or insufficient, and supplying alternative reasons the N obviously feels are conventionally valid. BTW, I bought the translation you recommended for five dollars on Amazon. Thank you.

In support of my general hobbyhorse, all this typing could have been avoided if you simply disclosed from the first that you meant that a particular kind of valid cognition was refuted, but that all types were not refuted, which you are now forced to admit when called out. I know you love to split hairs and then let people go on until you nail them with the big 'reveal,' but in the end I think this only obstructs the flow of discussion and clear communication.

Candra rejects pramāṇa when it comes to emptiness, accepting consequences as sufficient to show emptiness. He does not reject pramāṇa in every case, however, when he accepts that we can infer first stage bodhisattas through their compassionate deeds.

This is a more interesting argument. I would claim that Chandrakirti does not reject valid cognition of the ultimate, but does reject that conventional valid cognition, such as eye awareness, can know the ultimate. I do agree that Chandrakiti would reject that pramana as defined in Sautrantika texts (the main lens through which pramana is read in Gelug, for those unaware) can know the ultimate, as Sautrantikas have grasiping at self-nature implicit in their pramana. I'm interested in discussion on this if you or anyone else has arguments.

When I said Madyamakas reject "logic", I meant that they reject pramāṇa as being a meaningful path to ultimate truth. That is all I meant.

I would argue that pramana is indispensable in the path of the ultimate. I know CNN would disagree, but I don't think the Madhyamaka masters, or even Nyingma Dzogchenpa like Longchenpa would do.

Anyway, to sum up: I am glad we can all agree that Pranagikas accept conventional valid cognition and logic as it pertains to the conventional. I consider that an indispensable understanding for Buddhists.

but as Rongzom states in his Introduction To The Principles of Mahāyāna (which I have incidentally translated completely, but it is unedited), "If one could reach the ends of objects of knowledge with a single flawless reasoning, for what reason was it not demonstrated in all the transmissions of the victors to begin with?"

No one is claiming that the ultimate can be directly realized through an inference, but as Chandrakirti posits, there are four types of valid cognition, one of which is direct valid cognition, in this case a yogic valid cognizer. As a result, Rongzom's comments here are amusing and correct, but irrelevant.

I'm always glad to hear you are translating away over there, I look forward to the day when you let the rest of us have access to your work. I imagine it will be a big contribution.
To whet our appetites, perhaps you might give a list of translations you have completed or are preparing for publication, so we could see the balance? How much of it is Indian Madhyamaka? How much Dzogchen? Abhidharma? What else? (these are my guesses based on what I have known you to be interested in over these years.....) I understand if you do not wish to reveal any of this, just an idle question from an interested party.

Then you must admit that valid objects exist. Then you must explain their existence. This can only be done of you accept independent existence.

Incorrect.
Chandrakirti, Prasanapada
[Valid cognitions and valid objects] are established through mutual dependence . When valid cognitions exist, then there are things that are objects of comprehension. When there are things that are objects of comprehension then they are valid cognitions. However neither valid cognitions nor objects of comprehension exist essentially

[Malcolm]

Chandrakirti, Prasanapada
[Valid cognitions and valid objects] are established through mutual dependence . When valid cognitions exist, then there are things that are objects of comprehension. When there are things that are objects of comprehension then they are valid cognitions. However neither valid cognitions nor objects of comprehension exist essentially

The point the Vigravahavyavartani makes is that they cannot be mutually established. If a pramāṇā is a pramāṇa, it does not need a prameya; and vice versa.

M

[cloudburst]

Chandrakirti, Prasanapada
[Valid cognitions and valid objects] are established through mutual dependence . When valid cognitions exist, then there are things that are objects of comprehension. When there are things that are objects of comprehension then they are valid cognitions. However neither valid cognitions nor objects of comprehension exist essentially

The point the Vigravahavyavartani makes is that they cannot be mutually established. If a pramāṇā is a pramāṇa, it does not need a prameya; and vice versa.

M

As always, one must examine the discussion in its own context. This point made by the Vigravahavyavartani is directed at Nyayika logicians who are attempting to show that an independent pramana, which had already been shown by Nagarjuna to be in impossibility, is mutually established with it's independent object. Nagarjuna shoots down this move and explains that these two cannot be mutually established since establishing something that is already established would make no sense.

As the quotation from Chandrakirti demonstrates, neither valid cognitions nor objects of comprehension exist independently, but they are established in mutual dependence.

Therefore your point

Then you must admit that valid objects exist. Then you must explain their existence. This can only be done of you accept independent existence.

is refuted and done.

[Malcolm]

Chandrakirti, Prasanapada
[Valid cognitions and valid objects] are established through mutual dependence . When valid cognitions exist, then there are things that are objects of comprehension. When there are things that are objects of comprehension then they are valid cognitions. However neither valid cognitions nor objects of comprehension exist essentially

The point the Vigravahavyavartani makes is that they cannot be mutually established. If a pramāṇā is a pramāṇa, it does not need a prameya; and vice versa.

M

As always, one must examine the discussion in its own context. This point made by the Vigravahavyavartani is directed at Nyayika logicians who are attempting to show that an independent pramana, which had already been shown by Nagarjuna to be in impossibility, is mutually established with it's independent object. Nagarjuna shoots down this move and explains that these two cannot be mutually established since establishing something that is already established would make no sense.

As the quotation from Chandrakirti demonstrates, neither valid cognitions nor objects of comprehension exist independently, but they are established in mutual dependence.

Therefore your point

Then you must admit that valid objects exist. Then you must explain their existence. This can only be done of you accept independent existence.

is refuted and done.

What you fail to recognize is that there was no system of Buddhist pramāṇa at this time. Bhavaviveka's intrested in syllogism is post-Dignaga etc.

Since there can be no ultimately established prameya, there can be no ultimately established pramāṇa, and if you argue they established mutually, they are relative and therefore, not ultimate.

[cloudburst]

As always, one must examine the discussion in its own context. This point made by the Vigravahavyavartani is directed at Nyayika logicians who are attempting to show that an independent pramana, which had already been shown by Nagarjuna to be in impossibility, is mutually established with it's independent object. Nagarjuna shoots down this move and explains that these two cannot be mutually established since establishing something that is already established would make no sense.

As the quotation from Chandrakirti demonstrates, neither valid cognitions nor objects of comprehension exist independently, but they are established in mutual dependence.

Therefore your point

Then you must admit that valid objects exist. Then you must explain their existence. This can only be done of you accept independent existence.

is refuted and done.

What you fail to recognize is that there was no system of Buddhist pramāṇa at this time. Bhavaviveka's intrested in syllogism is post-Dignaga etc.

This is not relevant to the discussion. It does not affect my point in the slightest.

Since there can be no ultimately established prameya, there can be no ultimately established pramāṇa,

correct.

and if you argue they established mutually, they are relative and therefore, not ultimate.

Following Chandrakirti, I do argue that they can be established mutually, and of course, the are relative not ultimate. this has been the discussion from the beginning. You seem confused.

[asunthatneversets]

No-one ever said "Truly produced."
I invited you to consult Madhyamaka masters as to whether or not there is dependent or relative production, you clearly did not bother.
That's no problem, I will demonstrate how it is for the benefit of those who read carefully.

Buddha, Nagarjuna, Chandrakirti all affirm dependent production and reject essential or "true" production. Here are some quotations for those who want to know what the actual masters say...

Ah yes, the actual masters... not that hodgepodge filth cited prior to this!

Buddha says in the Anavatapta-nagaraja-pariprccha sutra...
Whatever is produced from conditions is not produced; it is not intrinsically produced.
Whatever depends upon conditions, I consider empty;
One who knows emptiness is diligent.

and in the Lankavatara...
Mahamati, thinking that they are not produced intrinsically, I said
that all phenomena are not produced

in his Sixty Stanzas, Nagarjuna says
The supreme knower of reality
Said that dependent production is not production

and commenting on that Chandrakirti says
When you see dependent arising, you do not see things as intrinsically existing. This is becasue the dependently produced is not intrinsically produced, like a reflection.

in the Avatara Chandrakirti says
Because things are not produced
Causelessly, or from causes such as a divine creator,
Or from self, other, or both self and other
They are produced dependently

So. That's done.
They are produced dependently.

And as Nāgārjuna said above: dependent production is not production.

"The wonder of it! This marvelous, astounding event/reality (Dharma):
From that which involves no origination, everything originates;
and in that very origination, there is no origination!
The wonder of it!
In it's very enduring, there is no enduring!
The wonder of it!
In it's very cessation, there is no cessation!"
- Guhyagarbha Tantra

Here is an inconsistency in your view- first of all, let's leave aside that if questioned, you will in all likelihood claim not to have a view, while at the same time talking about your view and its inconsistency or lack thereof.

That is quite an odd thing to propose!

You say that

'there is nothing to accept or reject' means to reject the appearance of relative laws and so on would be an unnecessary (and futile/foolish) activity.

which means you accept the appearance of relative laws.

Certainly.

Even though you want to say that not rejecting does not mean accepting,

Not rejecting would naturally imply acceptance.

this is just sophistry, as you do accept that the laws of gravity function. Granted, you accept it conventionally, but as you correctly say, there is no acceptance or rejection, and nothing to accept or reject ultimately, so that's as accepting as acceptance gets.

I can accept that!

You want to get rid of the law of the excluded middle, but you still want to give reasons to back up your points and claim that

For the sake of communication we accept these conventionalities

while at the same time claiming

There is nothing to accept or reject.

I have no interest in getting rid of the law of the excluded middle, it serves it's purpose where it's applicable (which is most cases). And yes, this subject matter can appear quite paradoxical at times.

So, how's that? There are your own words. "there is nothing to accept or reject" and ".... we accept..." you claim that there is nothing to accept, yet you accept many things.

Yes it is quite extraordinary! The mind creates countless designations which give rise to countless aspects of experience, yet these aspects are inseparable from the root concepts which create them. When experience is filtered this way it actually appears to take on those attributes, and if we're not privy to the game we will actually think these characteristics are really there. It can no doubt seem confusing and paradoxical. I do not deny that I appear to accept and reject.

Does that really not seem inconsistent to you? If not, I guess I have to ask if you know what the word 'consistent' means.

It certainly appears inconsistent. There is nothing to accept and reject, yet acceptance and rejection appear to happen. Acceptance and rejection are the cornerstone of ignorance and a product of delusion. I still stand by my initial statement.

By the way, earlier in this thread Malcolm claimed that Madhyamakas reject logic. I challenged that assertion and asked for citations.
None were provided. I suppose one of the freedoms that one enjoys while not accepting or rejecting is that one need not accept that a failure to back up one's claims makes those claims seem a matter of uninformed opinion.

Seems you two are in the process of working that out right now.

it's more than just using words, to accept conventionalities, though, isn't it? Valid conventionalities mean something. If you transgress that meaning, you are demonstrably wrong.

The words are the conventionalities aren't they? Yes they imply a meaning, point to ideations, notions, etc... not sure if they themselves mean something, although they are commonly accepted to mean something and therefore by default I suppose one would appear to be demonstrably wrong by transgressing said meaning.

The 'position of the world' that Buddha et al say they will stay with is not just any position that is propounded, but valid positions. For example, although most believe in a creator god, Madhyamikas reject this, they do not "go with the position of the world" on nonsense, do they? They only do so when the position is unassailable, and is contradicted by neither another worldly cognition or an ultimate one.

Right.

Chandrakirti says
Unskilled in ultimate and conventional truths you sometimes apply analytical standards inappropriately and destroy the conventional.
Because we are skilled in positing conventional truths, we stay with the world's position and we use it's conventional standards overturn the standards that you set so as to eliminate the category of conventionalities. Like the elders of the world we drive out only you deviate from the traditional standards of the world we do not drive out conventionalities

"By examining relative truth, establish absolute truth;
Within absolute truth, see how relative truth arises.
Where the two truths are inseparable, beyond intellect,
is the state of simplicity."
- Dilgo Khyenste Rinpoche

Unless you want to be taken seriously by thinking people. And you do want that, I can tell by your writing.

I do... so very badly. It's a burning desire like the fires of hell.

If you tuned up your investigation you would see that all is not equally illusory, becasue you would learn to understand and utilize the system of the Madhyamikas

Chandrkirti says
Some dependently arisen things- such as reflections and echoes -
are false and appear to be false even to be ignorant.
Some things -blue and other forms as well as minds, feelings etc.- appear to be true.
The final nature of things does not appear in any way to those who are ignorant.
Therefore that nature and whatever is false even conventionally are not conventional truths

Yes, that would indeed be common sense, there certainly appears to be levels and gradients of illusion, rights and wrongs and all sorts of designations within avidyā.

so we can see that there are correct, or valid conventional truths (of course ultimately these are falsities, but conventionally, they are valid)
and some things that are just false. If you think carefully, you will see that this also refutes the notion that things are literally illusions, as Chandrakiti juxtaposes reflections and echoes (two of twelve similes that appear in the sutras including "like an illusion," see Samadhiraja sutra for more....) with forms, feelings, etc, clearly differentiating things that are false conventionally and conventional truths, (which are false from the point of view of the ultimate)

"Like mistakenly seeing a rope as a snake,
with these varied appearances
we perceive them as what they are not,
giving rise to the duality of externality and internality,
i.e. the material environments and life forms therein.

However, upon scrutiny only the rope itself is found -
These environments and life forms are primordially empty,
as the ultimate only seems to have such concrete form
within the dissimulating process of the conventional.

The perception of a snake is phenomenologically true in terms of our seeing it as so,
but seeing the rope instead is authentically true;
analogically, it is like the appearance of a bird on a promontory:
The nature of these two truths is that
this transitory world is merely conventional dissimulation,
which the authentic reality has no relationship to -
In the expanse of emptiness
everything is free within it's essence."
- Garland of Precious Pearls Tantra

Mipham says
To engage the mind that ascertains without error
The nature of the two truths,
You should supremely establish the good eye
Of the two stainless valid cognitions

Cahndrakirti says
We therefore posit that the world knows objects with four valid cognitions

So you should know that Prasangikas do accept valid cogitions (and thus logic, of course!)
Let's look at some of these valid conventions.....

Chandrakriti's commmentary on Aryadeva's 400
Incorrect position :
Aryadeva means that compounded phenomena lack production because this analysis refutes all forms of production.
Reply: In that case the production of compounded phenomena would not be like a magicians illusion rather we would make it understood using examples such as the son of a barren woman. Wary of the absurd implication that dependent arisings would not exist we avoid such comparisons. Instead we compare the production of things to a magicians illusion and so forth, examples that do not contradict dependent arising

Here production is likened to a Magician's illusion. Chandrakirti "compares" the production of things to a magician's illusion. If everything actually were a magician's illusion, who is the magician? If you say "you are!" or "the mind!" then you make my point for me, as this is obviously metaphor.

Chandra's 400 commentary
What is the meaning of dependent arising? It means the absence of intrinsic existence; it means no intrinsically existent production; it means the arising of effects whose nature is similar to a magicians illusion, a mirage a reflection, a phantom city and emanation or a dream ; it means emptiness and selfless

"Whose nature is similar." Similar. Simile. It's a simile. Things are similar to a magician's illusion. The illusion is a simile.... things are like an illusion, like a water bubble, like a city of ghosts....
Your bed is not a city of ghosts. Your computer is not a water bubble. Your being schooled by Chandrakirti is not an illusion. It is like an illusion.....
You can understand quotations that say things are illusions in the same way, sometimes masters drop the qualifier when the meaning has been clearly established by context. Look into it. The Lanakavatara quotation above (...thinking that they are not produced intrinsically, I said that all phenomena are not produced.") is a fine example of this.

So what are we disagreeing on again?

so striving for the clarity of thought is a futility married to an illusion...

I'm sure you, or at least others, can see how this attitude reflects itself in your thinking.
Why do you think Buddha gave thousands of discourses that were unbelievably precise?
Why did Nagarjuna takes such pains to refute objections?
Why did Chandrakirti comment on these so extensively?
Why did Longchenepa and Jamgon Kongtrul write thousands of pages of text full of intellectual rigor?
It was to clarify, and it is a beautiful thing.

It certainly is a beautiful thing.

I think many of the things you say may be accepted (while of course not being accepted or rejected) on the dzogchen forum,

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LKpnZ7cwWuY

but in discussions that are explicitly Buddhist, you will be challenged and refuted.

And refuted!

I personally think you have not put much time into studying classical Buddhism. There's not necessarily a fault in that, don't get me wrong, but it leaves your discussion limited.....

Ok I'll take it into consideration! Valiant effort in your response by the way!