cloudburst wrote: asunthatneversets wrote:It certainly seems to.
exactly.
Well no, your point was that it DOES appear, and I agreed that it certainly SEEMS to appear, but does it appear? I would argue that it does not.
cloudburst wrote: asunthatneversets wrote:
Again there seems to be an appearance, just as there seems to be the appearance of objects, just as there seems to be objects, all of which are misnomers. The seeming appearances(objects) are predicated on another seeming appearance(subject), an illusion predicated on an illusion does not truly produce an appearance,
see how you need to qualify here in order to make your point? It's because you know that you will have to admit that it does appear, albeit not
truly . Is your computer appearing to you right now? The fact that "it seems to" is precisely what appearance means. No one is saying there is actually a computer from it's own side DOING the appearing, all (here) agree there is not. But is there an appearance of a computer?
My point is that all of these designations are misnomers in the end, including appearance. So why do you dance on appearance and not dance on objects or sensory perception.. it's all ignorance all the way down, it all appears at once depending on what is imputed upon it, none of it truly is.
I'll have to admit it does appear? Anything can appear (to be) within the ignorance, there appears to be objects, there appears to be sensory modalities, there appears to be internal/external. NONE of it is true, none of it is real. A computer from it's own side? What sides? Within the realm of ignorance the projection of a computer may appear, but nothing has appeared other than ignorance, on "it's" own side, or on any other side.
For the sake of communication we accept these conventionalities, why you think I reject them I don't understand, you are reading my words and I am typing them, conventional language is obviously being employed to make a point.
cloudburst wrote: asunthatneversets wrote: it seems to appear just as there seemed to be a snake, however the snake never appeared it was illusory, likewise seeming appearances are illusions....
there seemed to be a snake means a snake appeared. There is no difference. There cannot seem to be a snake without the appearance of a snake. Is there a snake? no. does a snake appear do the deluded mind. Oh yes, otherwise, remembering that the snake here stands in for the non-existent objects of delusions, we simply would never get deluded. If an intrinsically tasty cake did not appear before the mind, how would we get attached?
If we simply
must, we could say "the snake appeared it was illusory" but we can never say as you do " the snake
never appeared it was illusory." If it is illusory, appear is
all it can do.
An illusion appears, no snake, does the illusion resemble a snake? Possibly. Is there a snake? No. Likewise does it seem to appear to a mind? Yes. Does it appear to a mind? No.
cloudburst wrote:asunthatneversets wrote: the conventional imputation produces nothing other than illusion, there are no subsequent conventional appearances which can be deemed "like" illusions, because nothing has been established in any way. It is the child of a barren woman, or hair on a tortoise, wholly unreal, a figment of imagination(and not even that). Illusion and only illusion.
you need to review Buddha's teachings. Examples like 'a child of a barren woman' and being 'like an illusion' are used to explain very different things. It seems making clear discriminations is something you need to improve, and until you do, your formulations will lack clarity. I'm sure your mother would be disappointed to discover that you can't tell the difference between her and an illusion of her. Did you see Tupac at Cochella? Did you see Snoop?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ajkSx_EnAhI&feature=related
My formulations will lack clarity in your opinion, yes, judging what I am saying against your reference point you take to be a truth, and I can accept that.

What'd you say bout my momma?!
Although causes, conditions, and dependent arising are explained,
And gradual entry is spoken of,
These are provisional teachings for the ignorant.
In this spontaneously present dharma,
What would it be to train gradually?
Within it's nature beyond limits,
How could composite conceptions be seen?
There is not even the slightest of assertions.
At that time, mind is the sky.
Buddha and the objects of one's experience are one.
- Ye shes snang ba rgyan
The gates to all the branches of enlightenment,
The accoutrements, when meditated on, are like a moon in water.
They arise unstained and unobstructed,
But when meditated on, they are like childish objects of experience.
- Nam mkha' checloudburst wrote: asunthatneversets wrote:
So the nature of appearances is the controversy, whether they are illusions, or if something is indeed produced via imputation which can be designated as "like an illusion".
Precisely. Consult Nagarjuna and Chandrakirti to discover whether or not there is production by imputation. Don't join the hotheads who read with a literal eye, look deeper!
You may be one of the hotheads my friend! Imputation produces ignorance, it is the seed which creates all duality, if you believe something is truly produced then I don't see how you can move past that self made limitation, if you feel you can then that is great, but in my eyes it is merely a barrier.
cloudburst wrote: asunthatneversets wrote:Which is what I will say when pressed regarding what?
see above.
you say "nothing to accept or reject.."
I press, pointing out that Madhyamikas reject essence continually.
You hurriedly point out that you mean
"ultimately nothing to accept or reject."
Of course, you can accept and reject things all day until you're blue in the face, and some acceptance and rejection is needed to traverse the path of course, again it exists all at once on all levels mirroring the perception of the one doing the imputing. There is nothing to accept or reject, whether that is ultimately true, or just plain true, will be self evident to whom it may concern when it is appropriate.
cloudburst wrote: asunthatneversets wrote: I'm not sure what the significance of my original statement including (or not including) "ultimately" is.
the significance is that if you say "ultimately, there is nothing to accept or reject," that is wisdom.
If you say there is nothing to accept or reject at all on any level, you are just lost. You MUST accept that gravity draws you to the earth, otherwise you will fall off something. Granted, it is just convention, and you might say that you only "seem" to fall off something, but that's good enough to land you in the hospital, isn't it?
I was discussing how acceptance and rejection pertain to correct view, not how acceptance and rejection pertain to gracefully falling off a building, 'there is nothing to accept or reject' means to reject the appearance of relative laws and so on would be an unnecessary (and futile/foolish) activity.
cloudburst wrote: asunthatneversets wrote:I'll say it again, accepting or rejecting anything (including the very act of acceptance and the very act of rejection themselves) is a product of delusion.
The thing you can really respect about Namdrol (this time, at least) or Andres Honore is that they say the discussion has no meaning for them and they think it is all delusion, and then they back it up by stopping. They walk their talk. If you think this is really all delusion, get out of here, go sit on you cushion and stare blankly off into space, refuse to accept anything do not reject anything, and make us all proud. When you attain the state of Samatabhadra, send help! (sun, I hope you understand I'm just playing, I know sometimes the tone of these things can seem a bit unfriendly...)
I enjoy the discussion, I like having inconsistencies in my view drawn out... though that has yet to happen in my opinion. I enjoy a challenge, I enjoy a little debate, I like to think and discuss things and engage with people. It's all in the name of fun. It is undoubtably all delusion, and why I or anyone would refuse to accept anything or reject anything makes no sense, you seem to misunderstand me. You aren't just playing, you wouldn't display or convey a tone of that manner if you didn't subtly or overtly mean it, don't patronize me. That being said, it is still a good time to me, no matter how you react in your own space, it is all well and good. It is a waste of time, but sometimes it's nice to waste time this way.
What this all comes down to is a fundamental difference in view. Just as Namdrol explained before:
Namdrol wrote:This is primarily a result of Tsongkhapa's over-intellectualization of Madhyamaka and his inability to differentiate between Candrakirti's POV and Bhavaviveka's, and his ideological commitment to the superiority of Candrakiriti's presentation.
The idea that Candra's presentation is superior to Bhava's is not unique, but what is unique is Tsongkhapa's simulataneous commitment to the language of logic as a tool to explain Madhyamaka, and as a result we see strange formulations such as "Prasangikas" do not refute valid cognizers and so on, when in fact they clearly do. In point of fact, that Prasangikas who do not reject valid cognizers are only the followers of Tsongkhapa. The rest, from Candrakirti, to Jayananda, and so on, do refute them.
Also, Buddhist logic never made significant inroads into Chinese philosophy, so much of this talk about valid cognition and so on would sound foreign to a Chinese Buddhist. But because of the trenchant polemics in India between Buddhists and non-Buddhists, there was much discussion of valid cognition and what entailed, since the whole field of pramana was adopted by the Buddhists defensively.
However, during the time of Nagarjuna there was no well developed school of Buddhist logic, and so we see in texts like Vigrahavyavartani a thorough rejection of the whole notion of valid cognizers since in the end the notion of a valid cognition depends on notions of inherency. So naturally the Chinese were not that interested.
However, in response to non-Buddhsits,Vasubandhu began to articulate the first epistemological responses to non-Buddhist criticism, his disciple,Dignaga, forumulized the foundations and Buddhist pramana, Dharmakirit elaborated it, and the rest is history. Pramana came to be regarded as one of the Panca Vidya, the five sciences with its understandable impact on Tibetan Buddhism.
Of course in Dzogchen, the principle is not the two truths, but simple vidyā and avidyā. By comparison, there is only one truth in Dzogchen teachings, vidyā. The rest, falling under the heading of avidyā (ignorance) is fundamentally false —— for example, in the same way that a jaundiced man sees everything as yellow, those who suffering from the jaundice of ignorance never see things as they truly are.
Where you see appearances and so on and so forth cloudburst, i see avidyā, to give it any more rope than that would be to reify and impute further when it isn't necessary. That doesn't mean I don't eat cake, or walk down the street, but I don't reify these activities the same way you seem to.
cloudburst wrote: asunthatneversets wrote:Acceptance and rejection presuppose a subject existing in relation to objects which can indeed be accepted or rejected, it is not so,
it certainly
is so! I am reading this, are you not writing it? If you disagree, this is nothing but a object of ridicule for clear-thinking people. Yes, yes, conventionally, seeming..... of course, but that's the only subject and object
there can be. Just read your Chandrakirti, accept the conventional as advised and watch the clarity of your thinking improve exponentially.
I've never rejected the conventional, I just don't see the use of rolling around in it, creating and reifying constructs which are in truth misnomers. Reifying these designations too thoroughly gives power to the illusion (which in turn binds one to delusion). I don't need the clarity of my thinking to improve, it is like a child building a sand castle. The thinking belongs to no one for I am thought itself, projected onto that which I am not, and apart from the projection there is no me to be found(nor thought to be found)... so striving for the clarity of thought is a futility married to an illusion... the clarity belongs to something else altogether.
....Therefore, from the first instant (ksana) of [the continuum of] mind (citta), the subjective Being (atma-bhava) and all phenomena (sarva-dharma) are present.
From the cathectic-functioning of mentation (cinta) there proceeds the appearance of origination.
Yet no phenomena exists for either ordinary people or for enlightened Saints other than the continuum (santana) of their own mind (citta).
The whole diversity (vicitrata) that exists for the six types [of sentient beings] is just their own internal-contemplation (samadhi).
The mental-continuum (citta-santana) is without boundaries or extension; it is not one thing, nor supported by anything.
Since it has no boundaries, therefore every one of all the infinite realms of existence are one's own body (deha).
In that the infinite realms and the organic creatures [inhabiting those realms] appears as one's body,
it is impossible to define mind and the imprints (vasana) as either one or many.
Everything arises and disappears according to the law of [causally] interdependent co-creation (pratityasamutpada).
And yet, as with a burnt seed, since nothing can arise from nothing, cause and effect cannot actually exist.
Cause and effect, which is fundamental to "Existence" (bhava), is a conceptual discrimination occurring within the essence of Mind-itself, which appears as [both] cause and effect; and yet, since the two [i.e., cause and effect] do not exist as such, creation and destruction [which are dependent on cause and effect] cannot exist either.
Since creation and destruction do not exist, self and other cannot exist; [from whence it follows] since there is no termination (samkrama), [the two extremes of] eternalism and nihilism do not exist either.
Therefore, it is established that the deceptive dualism of Samsara and Nirvana is actually a fiction.
Time (ksana, moment) and locality (sthana, the space or place of phenomena) are indeterminate; temporal duration is a uniquely simultaneous event (sama, unicity), and where the one [i.e., phenomena occupying space] does not occur, the other [i.e., time] does not occur.
Since they are a virtual production (upahita) and not actual (samyak), the vestigial-imprints (vasana) also do not factually exist, and since there then does not exist a sensum (caryavisaya), there can be no substratum (alaya) and no conscious perceiving (vijnapti).
Because there are no boundaries, a focus-of-attention (prabhana) and a locality (sthana), cannot exist. How then can conscious perceiving [i.e., the 'act' of consciousness] arise?
Therefore mind is separate from the alternatives of existence and nonexistence, and is neither one nor many.
In that the Enlightened state of the Blissful Ones is not [objectifiable], the deceit of appearance (abhasa) is like a magical apparition.
In the same way [as Enlightenment is not objectifiable], so also, immaculate Gnosis, and the pure continuum of goodness (kusala) that is the Source of Reality (dharmadhatu), are misconstrued as having an existence, and hence as being objectifiable [i.e., an object separate from consciousness].
But, since there is no such thing as an "absolute place" (Vajra-sthana) the nature of "locality" is all-the-same (sama, a perfect unicity).
And since the Supreme Vajra [i.e., ultimate Being, non-dual Gnosis] per se, [abiding in] the Dimension of Reality, is without boundaries, there can be no "time-moments" (ksana) whatsoever.
With all positive good-qualities (kusala), as the root (mula), no more existent than a reflection, then for certain, worldly knowledge (Jagadjnana) [as the branches] has no reality!....
- Mañjuśrīmitra