Emptiness

[Tsongkhapafan]

Then why doesn't Tsongkhapa emphasize Nonarising like Nagarjuna and Candrakirti did?

Nagarjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 7.33 says:

"Since arising, abiding, and disintegrating are not established, there are no conditioned phenomena.
Since conditioned phenomena are not established, how could unconditioned phenomena be established?" - translated by Karl Brunnholzl

The emptiness that is empty of the eight extremes is part of Je Tsongkhapa's tradition - the emptiness of inherent existence of production, disintegration, coming, going, permanence, impermanence, singularity and plurality; however, on the level of mere appearance, arising occurs.

Why do you slip in the word "inherent" everywhere?

Did you see the word "inherent" in any of my Indian textual quotes in this thread?

Because the emptiness that is the profound nature of reality is lack of inherent existence according to Tsongkhapa. It is the non-existence of inherently existent things which are the things that we normally see or perceive. These are all mistaken appearances. However, Tsongkhapa is not denying existence - things exist but as mere appearances to a valid mind.

Without inserting 'inherently' Nagarjuna reads like nihilism and would appear to be denying existence and non-existence per se. His words require interpretation which is why I said previously that wisdom degenerates over time and it requires another master to appear and re-establish the correct meaning, such as Chandrakirti and then Je Tsongkhapa.

If you cannot establish conditioned phenomena or unconditioned phenomena at all then nothing exists and everything is a hallucination. This may be the view of some schools (I don't know) but it is incorrect.

[Tirisilex]

Wow I got a lot of responses here.. This is gonna take some time to read and soak in.. So Svātantrika and Prasaṅgika are Gelugpa teachings? I would like to explore Madhyamaka a bit.. Do the other 3 Tibetan schools have their own take on Madhyamaka? If so what are their names of these aproaches? I'm really trying to dig in deep on Madhyamaka..

[Malcolm]

If you cannot establish conditioned phenomena or unconditioned phenomena...

Nāgarjuna proves neither can be established:

• Since arising, abiding and perishing cannot be established, the conditioned cannot be established.
  Since the condition can never be established, how can the unconditioned ever be established?
  

[Malcolm]

Svātantrika and Prasaṅgika

Are a Tibetan category, applied with considerable inaccuracy to Indian Madhyamaka.

[BuddhaFollower]

This may be the view of some schools (I don't know) but it is incorrect.

Illusionism is the position of your favorite Candrakirti, who says:

"resembling the moon in water and reflections in a mirror"

Have you heard of the Eight Examples of Illusion?

[Tsongkhapafan]

If you cannot establish conditioned phenomena or unconditioned phenomena...

Nāgarjuna proves neither can be established:

• Since arising, abiding and perishing cannot be established, the conditioned cannot be established.
  Since the condition can never be established, how can the unconditioned ever be established?
  

Neither can be established as existing from their own side, but they do exist.

[Tsongkhapafan]

This may be the view of some schools (I don't know) but it is incorrect.

Illusionism is the position of your favorite Candrakirti, who says:

"resembling the moon in water and reflections in a mirror"

Have you heard of the Eight Examples of Illusion?

Yes, I'm aware of them. Phenomena are illusion-like in that they share some characteristics (not existing as they appear to) but they still exist as mere name, mere appearance, as in the examples you gave. The reflection of the moon in water, for example, exists because it can perform functions - it can be photographed, for instance. This is different to a hallucination which is a mistaken awareness and doesn't exist at all.

[Malcolm]

If you cannot establish conditioned phenomena or unconditioned phenomena...

Nāgarjuna proves neither can be established:

• Since arising, abiding and perishing cannot be established, the conditioned cannot be established.
  Since the condition can never be established, how can the unconditioned ever be established?
  

Neither can be established as existing from their own side, but they do exist.

In what way?

[BuddhaFollower]

The reflection of the moon in water, for example, exists because it can perform functions - it can be photographed, for instance.

A chair in a dream also appears to function.

Back to Candrakirti. He says stuff is:

"illusions, mirages, reflections, cities of scent-eaters, magical creations, and dreams."
-translated by Joseph Loizzo

[Tirisilex]

I'm guessing this would be a decent book on the subject: "The Buddhist Philosophy of the Middle: Essays on Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka (Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism)"

[Tsongkhapafan]

Nāgarjuna proves neither can be established:

• Since arising, abiding and perishing cannot be established, the conditioned cannot be established.
  Since the condition can never be established, how can the unconditioned ever be established?
  

Neither can be established as existing from their own side, but they do exist.

In what way?

As mere appearance to mind, like in a dream. Dream things appear and function, which is different to things that do not exist at all and do not function, such as the water of a mirage.

[Tirisilex]

Well.. I just spent an hour reading all the posts and I must say I wasnt expecting a response like this. I just wanted to know the differences between Inherent and Intrinsic existence. But I got an Arguement about Tsongkhapa.. I must say I did learn a bit from this thread.. It helped guide me further in my search to understand Emptiness. I went to amazon and ordered a few books on Madhyamaka.. Indian Madhyamaka Buddhist Philosophy After Nagarjuna a 2 volume set is some of the books I ordered. I also ordered some based on Tsongkhapa teachings. I'm hoping this will help point me in the right direction in understanding emptiness.

[conebeckham]

Neither can be established as existing from their own side, but they do exist.

In what way?

As mere appearance to mind, like in a dream. Dream things appear and function, which is different to things that do not exist at all and do not function, such as the water of a mirage.

Mere appearances do not need to exist, in any ontologically valid way, to appear to mind. Some of my dream things appear and function in ways that are contradictory to my waking experience--for example, my amazing flying skills, and the aliens outside my bedroom window who appeared in recurring dreams when I was young. These appearances, and their corresponding "functions," are equally illusory.

The water of a mirage, seen in waking life, is a mistaken appearance, yet it is "seen" due to causes and conditions, whereas appearing phenomena like sentient beings, cars, and tables, are mere appearances in the realm of convention, deemed valid at the level of no examination, and also due to causes and conditions. Yet both the mirage and the appearing phenomena of table, beings, and cars, are unreal--neither possesses any ontological status.

[Malcolm]

Neither can be established as existing from their own side, but they do exist.

In what way?

As mere appearance to mind, like in a dream. Dream things appear and function, which is different to things that do not exist at all and do not function, such as the water of a mirage.

Hallucinations are also mere appearances to a mind, like a dream; during a hallucination, things seem to function.

[Sprouticus]

Well.. I just spent an hour reading all the posts and I must say I wasnt expecting a response like this. I just wanted to know the differences between Inherent and Intrinsic existence. But I got an Arguement about Tsongkhapa.. I must say I did learn a bit from this thread.. It helped guide me further in my search to understand Emptiness. I went to amazon and ordered a few books on Madhyamaka.. Indian Madhyamaka Buddhist Philosophy After Nagarjuna a 2 volume set is some of the books I ordered. I also ordered some based on Tsongkhapa teachings. I'm hoping this will help point me in the right direction in understanding emptiness.

[Tsongkhapafan]

Yet both the mirage and the appearing phenomena of table, beings, and cars, are unreal--neither possesses any ontological status.

The water of a mirage does not exist because it is a mistaken appearance. Similarly, the things that we normally see (the appearing objects) also do not exist and are mistaken appearances. However, phenomena do exist as mere appearances to a valid mind. The mere I exists (the I that we normally see or perceive does not). The mere I of Buddha, imputed on the Dharmakaya, also exists. This kind of existence is very subtle - mere name, mere appearance being one with emptiness.

[Tsongkhapafan]

In what way?

As mere appearance to mind, like in a dream. Dream things appear and function, which is different to things that do not exist at all and do not function, such as the water of a mirage.

Hallucinations are also mere appearances to a mind, like a dream; during a hallucination, things seem to function.

Hallucinations are completely deceptive because their objects do not exist at all. Objects in dreams do not actually exist because they are mere appearances but they function. The water of a mirage, however, cannot function. There is this subtle distinction.

The objects of hallucinations are not mere appearances because they are non-existents.

[Tsongkhapafan]

I should also have said that the hallucination that is a mirage is a wrong awareness and not a mistaken awareness because its object, water, does not exist at all. The table that appears to a valid mind is a mistaken awareness because, although it exists (you can put a cup on it), it is mistakenly apprehended to exist outside the mind when it doesn't exist like this at all. The table that we see existing outside the mind doesn't exist at all, like the water of a mirage.

[Malcolm]

As mere appearance to mind, like in a dream. Dream things appear and function, which is different to things that do not exist at all and do not function, such as the water of a mirage.

Hallucinations are also mere appearances to a mind, like a dream; during a hallucination, things seem to function.

Hallucinations are completely deceptive because their objects do not exist at all. Objects in dreams do not actually exist because they are mere appearances but they function. The water of a mirage, however, cannot function. There is this subtle distinction.

The objects of hallucinations are not mere appearances because they are non-existents.

They exist as appearances, no different from any other appearance. You are heading into the rough when you start distinguishing appearances on the basis of correspondence to external objects which exist.

[Lukeinaz]

The mere I exists (the I that we normally see or perceive does not

How is the I that we normally see or perceive any different from the mere appearance?

I have learned things exist as names as conceptual designations. I walk around in a hallucination imputing labels and ideas on everything. This same conceptual process continues as we sleep and the hallucination continues as dreams.

Without investigating things seem to arise and function. As soon as we look into it not one scrap of existence or non-existence or anything else is to be found.