Ikkyu wrote:I observe the world around me and understand that, while it may be a false one, it seems much more substantial, obersevable, experiential, testable and open to evaluation and consensus than the reality purported in often conflicting or contradictory antiquated religious texts, i.e. sutras, tantras and suttas.
So much of what those texts seem to be driving at is that the world you describe is neither false
nor substantial - Buddhism doesn't even accept that there can be 'another world' beyond logical cause-effect relations. 'Two truths' is about describing the same reality in different ways, and 'Relative' matches your first description, while 'Ultimate' relates to the fact that -as your scientific understanding should tell you- the physical world is not completely "observable, experiential, testable and open to evaluation and consensus" given the limits of the world's comprehensibility (although I take it you acknowledged this). Whether the world is
substantial depends of course on whether fundamental particles exist, and I take it that you included 'experiential' strictly in the context of empiricism. {P.s. 'sutta' is an alternative Pali pronunciation of the Sanskrit 'sutra', making it harder -though by no means impossible- to mock
.}
Ikkyu wrote:in Buddhism no view (well, "commonsese" vs. "ultimate" views, sticking to the two truths doctrine) is outside the realm of mental conditioning (compare "mental formation" as it is traslated from the Heart Sutra, if you will), and therefore all views, and I imagine thus beliefs, are guided by the passions, and are in that sense false.
The trouble with the two truths doctrine is that it shows up the limits of
all ways of understanding reality - Suppose the Higgs-Boson is found to exist? What, then, is it made of? If you say 'energy', what is energy? If you then say 'the capacity to do work', then isn't that just a circular tautology that signifies nothing? Even before we get that far, how is the material of the 'Higgs' configured in spacetime if it's supposed to be some kind of impermeable 'real-ness', and what function is served by this somehow un-patterned pattern? Do you see where I'm driving here?
Ikkyu wrote:I like the Buddhist emphasis on the experiential, but whose experience is correct? The Muslim's, the Buddhist's, the Jain's or the Hindu's? Don't these conflict, as they purport that their respective experience come from a great spiritual power endemic to their own religions, which all state that theirs is the ultimate truth about reality, vis a vis the other guy's experiences can't be true?
Of course, technically no experience can be either 'correct' or 'incorrect', but as far as I understand, the difference with Buddhism is that not only is experience more central, but it is left
as it is as 'a priori' evidence, rather than extraordinary claims and 'leaps of faith' being made about what it might signify beyond itself. That isn't to say that experience isn't deepened - Buddhists
do 'believe', but only in the experience of those who've walked stretches of the Path they've yet to walk themselves. Hence your quote on
both James and Alston:
"James' central argument in "The Will to Believe" hinges on the idea that access to the evidence for whether or not certain beliefs are true depends crucially upon first adopting those beliefs without evidence." This stands in stark contrast to [particularly Alston's] evidentialism, which suggests that we begin with evidence and then work our way up to an idea or truth, eventually.
Ikkyu wrote:Evidentialism. Rationalism. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. I suggest you all take a look at Eleanore Stump's "Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions". While it doesn't really cover Eastern religions, it thoroughly tackles the use of empirical evidence in a metaphysical argument.
'A priori' evidence may not win an argument, since the rules of 'argument' in the west have been set down by intellectual and scientific tradition, but the nature of such evidence is that it proves itself. On a good day, even non-meditators can win atleast one a prior argument ('There is consciousness'), as the counter-argument simply sounds too absurd to
genuinely convince anyone. {P.p.s. Making single words into sentences makes you sound preachy and so is unlikely to impress non-Christians.}
Back to your fav topics:
Ikkyu wrote:Madhyamaka _ _ really influenced the Mahayana... the school which has such a diverse pantheon of Bodhisattvas to believe in. Aren't they non-existent in an ultimate sense? Can't we look at them, along with Buddhist cosmology and other Buddhist beliefs about karma, rebirth, enlightenment, merit, etc. as an analogy then? Just like we are? An abstraction from the truth? Why then does Buddhism hinge on a literal interpretation of many these beliefs?
You're confusing 'two truths' with metaphor - Literally speaking, a metaphor is completely untrue, whereas relative truth appears to most of us as matter-of-fact objects and events, which for most Buddhists includes the concepts you mentioned. I think Buddhist teachings sometimes describe the same thing from different angles in a way that can
verge on the metaphorical -as well as creating many of the apparent contradictions you mentioned earlier (witness the yogacara v. madhyamaka debate)- but where all teachings appear to agree, maybe it's safe to take it at face value that the doctrine is meant to be taken literally to some extent. As to the 'skilful means' argument (in this case that Buddha taught rebirth so as not to upset anyone with the truth of annihilation), I can't see how the Three Seals that make teachings 'Buddhist' are compatible with a
permanent nonexistence and freedom from the experience of both suffering and 'not-self' after death.
Rounding off now:
Ikkyu wrote:I'm consistently amused that people who claim not to cling to anger become just so vaguely annoyed and defensive when their ideologies are questioned. That keeps me going. I think it makes sense to "repeat oneself" in different ways until someone gives me a viable answer, or rather actually understands my question and responds in a way that really addresses what I'm saying. A couple people have done this, but I just don't feel that arguing that I'm a materialist is really a rebuttal of my argument. Granted, I haven't sifted through ALL the responses on this or other threads yet. It's a work in progress and takes me a while as, frankly, I'm otherwise pretty busy.
I think the word is
exasperated, though I have to say I'm finding you less entertaining now you've admitted to simply repeating yourself rather than reading and responding to replies, as I was starting to think you were the vanguard of a new generation of web-bots or something
Still, every few days you come back and try to convert everyone to New Atheism with fixed viewpoints which -with respect- you never needed to give much thought beyond the level of understanding needed to accept them as ideas (rather than just words), since they're so obviously 'the official line' in the west vis-a-vis 'the metaphysical'. You seem to be seeking scientific proof
and assuming that forum members count themselves as scientists, and I'm going to step out of line here and say that it makes no sense to expect mental phenomena to present scientific proof of their existence, or to expect
anyone here to play by scientific rules.
Ikkyu wrote:If I reason that enlightenment or [insert other Buddhist supernatural claims here] isn't/aren't real then, can I still attain it according to Buddha?
You'd be reversing the placebo effect _ _
Ikkyu wrote:But is working a doctrine to tear apart other views before they can even come to the forefront a real effort at understanding reality, or rather obscuring it further?
Conversely, is the assumption that a single, simple doctrine can give you the views with which to understand
everything a real effort at understanding reality for an intelligent adult like yourself? If I apply your recommended distrust of suppositional reasoning to philosophical dogmatism materialism, where does that leave you?