The so-called emptiness of objects

[tobes]

Another way of saying this ^:

It's easy enough to understand the nonexistence of entities due to the fact of their impermanence. The process of becoming and ceasing itself, however, is not an "existence."

There are no things.

There is also no process.

Dependent Origination does not exist.

Yes, true. Well said. But it is also not non-existent.

It is very difficult with the limitations of language to avoid either asserting existence or asserting non-existence, which is why the Madhyamakins are constantly walking a tightrope, and why the Prasangikas are careful to avoid asserting anything.

[tobes]

How can there be an origin to anything which is empty?

The apparent law of dependent origination is itself dependently originated. Therefore, it cannot have an origin.

You are too stuck on things within dependent origination. I'm speaking of the illusion of all this itself, not of the things appearing within this illusion.

It is not an illusion.

This is what the Vedantic and neo-Vedantic traditions assert: the world of Maya is (ontologically) an illusion.

What the Madhyamakins assert is that the middle stage of a given phenomena (that of abiding) is an illusory appearance or illusion like.

Like a dream, like an illusion,
Like a city of gandharvas,
So have arising, abiding,
And ceasing been explained.

This is a very critical point: it is a metaphorical statement, not an ontological one.

[tobes]

I have not asserted that things with a material basis are objective and existing: I am in no way espousing a realism here. If you find this to be the case, please demonstrate how.

You said rūpaskandha "only implies the material constituents of subjective existence", which was narrowed down from rūpa which you defined as "anything with a material basis".

So if rūpaskandha is a narrowed scope of only material constituents of subjective existence, then rūpa must include material constituents of objective existence as well.

Otherwise, I don't see the difference between the two that you are asserting here. So I'm asking you to provide an example of something which you call rūpa that is not a "material constituent of subjective existence", in other words something that must be a material constituent of objective existence.

I think Yeshe D's last post pretty well crushed that possibility, since all so-called "objective existence" is in fact subjective appearance of one's own consciousness, which therefore also does not withstand analysis, making the possibility for this being idealism- which you quickly called out- also impossible.

Again, idealism is what one prematurely labels this teaching when one does not have a full understanding of it. So far, you have not been able to step out of the illusion of dependent origination and see the forest for the trees.

Perhaps it is time for that famous metaphor about the lake and the six classes of beings.

So, there is a (provisionally signified) lake, and a hell being, a hungry ghost, an animal, a human, a demi-god and a god.

The hell being sees it as a lake of fire, the hungry ghost as a lake of pus, an animal as somewhere to bathe, the human as something to drink, the demi-god as (I forget how the demi-god sees it) and the god as a lake of bliss.

You are arguing that there is no basis for the senses of the various beings to apprehend the lake according to their dispositions. There is no form there at all, which is more or less a Yogacaran position. The "lake" is entirely a construction of the mind. Exponents of this position do not deny that they are espousing a straight up idealism.

I am arguing that there is an interdependence between the form of the lake and the senses of the various beings. There is both rupa (the basis) and the rupaskandha (the senses of the various beings) coming into simultaneous, interdependent contact, such that neither the subject nor the object can be established. The "lake" is empty, the senses of the various beings are empty, the significations are empty. But this does not mean that everything is a construction of the mind.

[Dexing]

What the Madhyamakins assert is that the middle stage of a given phenomena (that of abiding) is an illusory appearance or illusion like.

Like a dream, like an illusion,
Like a city of gandharvas,
So have arising, abiding,
And ceasing been explained.

First you say the middle stage (that of abiding), then provide a quote that says arising, abiding, and ceasing are explained likewise, not just abiding.

What does illusion-like, or dream-like mean? It means while there is some appearance which may seem very real, and while in the dream state you actually take it as real, in reality it is not there. When you wake up it vanishes.

The texts do not only say "like an illusion". In numerous places it is plainly stated "illusory".

This is a very critical point: it is a metaphorical statement, not an ontological one.

This is an apologetic avoidance of idealism. The texts say what they say very straightforwardly.

However, there is no reason to wish it away, because if you have a full understanding of it, it is actually not asserting idealism either... as I've been repeatedly restating.

Because you don't understand why something is said in a way that seems counter-intuitive to your regular Buddhist logic, does not mean you should label it a metaphor to skew its meaning back into your comfort zone.

[Dexing]

Perhaps it is time for that famous metaphor about the lake and the six classes of beings.

This metaphor is in Vasubandhu's 20 Verses, a Yogācāra text.

You are arguing that there is no basis for the senses of the various beings to apprehend the lake according to their dispositions. There is no form there at all, which is more or less a Yogacaran position. The "lake" is entirely a construction of the mind. Exponents of this position do not deny that they are espousing a straight up idealism.

Who are these exponents? Yogācāra doctrines in no manner espouse any form of idealism. They temporarily introduce a system of consciousness to show the illusory nature of the so-called external material realm. This doesn't sit well with people, much like yourself, so this temporary introduction becomes quite a focal point.

But ultimately Yogācāra doctrines do in fact get to the point of relinquishing this consciousness for its falseness as well. This leaves no room for idealism, since no "mind" is ultimately asserted.

Basically subject (consciousness) is introduced to show the illusory nature of object (material realm). Then once object is seen to be non-existent, then it must follow that there can in reality be no subject.

Of course your next step will be to jump on "nihilism!". It is only your nihilism if you assert something to be denied.

Yogācāra, as with all Mahāyāna schools, ultimately assert nothing.

I am arguing that there is an interdependence between the form of the lake and the senses of the various beings. There is both rupa (the basis) and the rupaskandha (the senses of the various beings) coming into simultaneous, interdependent contact, such that neither the subject nor the object can be established. The "lake" is empty, the senses of the various beings are empty, the significations are empty. But this does not mean that everything is a construction of the mind.

What is your reason to believe in some necessary external stimulant that sparks the apprehension of some appearance? Did not the Śūraṅgama Sūtra state:

"Whatever manifests does so in compliance with karma. Ignorant of that fact, people of the world are so deluded as to assign its origin to causes and conditions or to spontaneity. These mistakes, which arise from the discriminations and reasoning processes of the mind, are nothing but the play of empty and meaningless words."

Whatever manifests (whatever kind of lake) does so in compliance with karma (volition, mind).

Ignorant of that fact, people of the world are so deluded as to assign its origin to causes and conditions (example: "both rupa [the basis] and the rupaskandha [the senses of the various beings] coming into simultaneous, interdependent contact.").

These mistakes arise from the discriminations (example: "form of the lake, senses of various beings") and reasoning processes of the mind (example: "coming into simultaneous, interdependent contact, such that neither the subject nor the object can be established.").

[tobes]

What the Madhyamakins assert is that the middle stage of a given phenomena (that of abiding) is an illusory appearance or illusion like.

Like a dream, like an illusion,
Like a city of gandharvas,
So have arising, abiding,
And ceasing been explained.

First you say the middle stage (that of abiding), then provide a quote that says arising, abiding, and ceasing are explained likewise, not just abiding.

What does illusion-like, or dream-like mean? It means while there is some appearance which may seem very real, and while in the dream state you actually take it as real, in reality it is not there. When you wake up it vanishes.

The texts do not only say "like an illusion". In numerous places it is plainly stated "illusory".

This is a very critical point: it is a metaphorical statement, not an ontological one.

This is an apologetic avoidance of idealism. The texts say what they say very straightforwardly.

However, there is no reason to wish it away, because if you have a full understanding of it, it is actually not asserting idealism either... as I've been repeatedly restating.

Because you don't understand why something is said in a way that seems counter-intuitive to your regular Buddhist logic, does not mean you should label it a metaphor to skew its meaning back into your comfort zone.

Dexing it does not seem to occur to you that Madhyamakins such as Chandrakirti spend a great deal of time and effort refuting the Yogacaran position.

I think you could definitely raise the argument that he (and many others) does not do proper justice to that position, but it is quite absurd to suggest that all Mahayana schools are on agreement on these questions, and that what I'm doing here is falling back on some "regular Buddhist logic" which skews its meaning back to "my comfort zone."

The quote I gave from Nagarjuna is clearly a metaphor, because it states "Like....." not "it is." I don't think that can be disputed.

However, you're quite right that in other texts it is directly stated that a given phenomena is an illusory appearance. My point is that this does not mean that a given phenomena is an outright illusion, which is what Vedantic and neo-Vedantic schools assert.

[tobes]

Perhaps it is time for that famous metaphor about the lake and the six classes of beings.

This metaphor is in Vasubandhu's 20 Verses, a Yogācāra text.

You are arguing that there is no basis for the senses of the various beings to apprehend the lake according to their dispositions. There is no form there at all, which is more or less a Yogacaran position. The "lake" is entirely a construction of the mind. Exponents of this position do not deny that they are espousing a straight up idealism.

Who are these exponents? Yogācāra doctrines in no manner espouse any form of idealism. They temporarily introduce a system of consciousness to show the illusory nature of the so-called external material realm. This doesn't sit well with people, much like yourself, so this temporary introduction becomes quite a focal point.

But ultimately Yogācāra doctrines do in fact get to the point of relinquishing this consciousness for its falseness as well. This leaves no room for idealism, since no "mind" is ultimately asserted.

If no mind is ultimately asserted, then why is it called Yogacara/ cittamara (mind only school)?

The ultimate reality of the mind is plainly and explicitly asserted; it is what remains after the alaya-vijnana is purified.

[tobes]

What is your reason to believe in some necessary external stimulant that sparks the apprehension of some appearance? Did not the Śūraṅgama Sūtra state:

"Whatever manifests does so in compliance with karma. Ignorant of that fact, people of the world are so deluded as to assign its origin to causes and conditions or to spontaneity. These mistakes, which arise from the discriminations and reasoning processes of the mind, are nothing but the play of empty and meaningless words."

Whatever manifests (whatever kind of lake) does so in compliance with karma (volition, mind).

Ignorant of that fact, people of the world are so deluded as to assign its origin to causes and conditions (example: "both rupa [the basis] and the rupaskandha [the senses of the various beings] coming into simultaneous, interdependent contact.").

These mistakes arise from the discriminations (example: "form of the lake, senses of various beings") and reasoning processes of the mind (example: "coming into simultaneous, interdependent contact, such that neither the subject nor the object can be established.").

Okay, we're really talking in circles here. The Yogacaran position is that whatever kind of lake appears solely on the basis of karmic dispositions. If that's what you hold, then that's what you hold; I have no reason to attempt to persuade you otherwise.

I only intend here to point out that this is not the Madhyamakan position, and therefore, it does not represent the all encompassing Mahayana view.....but rather only one aspect of it.

[Jnana]

If no mind is ultimately asserted, then why is it called Yogacara/ cittamara (mind only school)?

The Indian Yogācāra authors such as Maitreyanātha, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu never referred to themselves as "Cittamātra."

The ultimate reality of the mind is plainly and explicitly asserted; it is what remains after the alaya-vijnana is purified.

Specifically, the revolved basis (āśrayaparāvṛtti) is gnosis (jñāna), not mind (citta).

The Yogacaran position is that whatever kind of lake appears solely on the basis of karmic dispositions.... I only intend here to point out that this is not the Madhyamakan position, and therefore, it does not represent the all encompassing Mahayana view.....but rather only one aspect of it.

Well, Indian mādhyamikas such as Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla accept the Yogācāra tenets as they pertain to the correct conventional truth. Also, both Yogācāra and Mādhyamaka greatly influenced the Indian Vajrayāna mahāsiddhas. Ideas such as svasaṃvedana occur frequently and are important in Vajrayāna teachings. As Dakpo Tashi Namgyal and others have pointed out, the Mādhyamaka of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla offers an excellent bridge for understanding the mahāmudrā instructions of Tilopa, et al.

All the best,

Geoff

[Rael]

Sunyata is the understanding that the true nature of existence is both nihilistic and inherent .

Once you realize that you blend these two opposing views and come to the Middle of both you have it.

nothing is inherent, and nihilistic views are just too extreme.

but in modern day language blend the two if you can and VOILA :
MacArthur's Park is melting in the dark
All the sweet, green icing flowing down...
Someone left the cake out in the rain
I don't think that I can take it
'cause it took so long to bake it
And I'll never have that recipe again

[Dexing]

If no mind is ultimately asserted, then why is it called Yogacara/ cittamara (mind only school)?

Adding to Yeshe D's reply, anyway, "mind only" does not mean "there is only mind", but that what appears to be an external material realm is in fact "mind only".

In other words it is only consciousness evolving in such a way as to resemble an external realm. But it is merely consciousness in two parts, the seeing and the seen part.

But that is a subject-object situation, temporarily set up to show the falseness of the object (external phenomena), which it then must follow that since there is no object, there can be no subject (mind/consciousness).

Therefore this false "mind" that was temporarily set up, is eventually relinquished and ultimately not asserted as true mind at all.

The ultimate reality of the mind is plainly and explicitly asserted; it is what remains after the alaya-vijnana is purified.

Again, following Yeshe D's response, the true "mind" spoken of in numerous Mahāyāna sūtras is not such a "mind" anyway, and is not to be confused with the false mind described above.

"What remains after the ālayavijñāna is purified" is still just an object of the manovijñāna.

To quote the Śūraṅgama Sūtra again;

"Ananda said, 'The Tathagata is asking where the mind is located. Now that I use my mind to search for it thoroughly, I propose that precisely that which is able to investigate is my mind.'

"The Buddha exclaimed, 'Hey! Ananda, that is not your mind.' "

The Yogacaran position is that whatever kind of lake appears solely on the basis of karmic dispositions.

That quote actually came from the Śūraṅgama Sūtra, spoken by Śākyamuni Buddha, which is not a Yogācāra text.

I only intend here to point out that this is not the Madhyamakan position, and therefore, it does not represent the all encompassing Mahayana view.....but rather only one aspect of it.

You should check the thread on Yogācāra/Mādhyamaka Confusion.

Granted perhaps many people throughout history have debated the doctrines of the two schools, but I do not find in their core texts any place where they are at odds. If you do, then please present it.

[Mr. G]

That quote actually came from the Śūraṅgama Sūtra, spoken by Śākyamuni Buddha, which is not a Yogācāra text.

Ronald Epstein states the general doctrinal position of the Surangama Sutra has strong influences from Yogācāra, Tathāgatagarbha.

http://online.sfsu.edu/~rone/Buddhism/authenticity.htm

[tobes]

Well, Indian mādhyamikas such as Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla accept the Yogācāra tenets as they pertain to the correct conventional truth. Also, both Yogācāra and Mādhyamaka greatly influenced the Indian Vajrayāna mahāsiddhas. Ideas such as svasaṃvedana occur frequently and are important in Vajrayāna teachings. As Dakpo Tashi Namgyal and others have pointed out, the Mādhyamaka of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla offers an excellent bridge for understanding the mahāmudrā instructions of Tilopa, et al.

All the best,

Geoff

I don't dispute this for a moment.

I think I have said previously on this thread that Shantarakshita and Kamalashila are almost always classified as Madhyamakin-Yogacarans; and yes, it comes down to their understanding of conventional truth.

Shantarakshita asserts that conventional truth is summarised in 3 ways:
1/ not nothingness
2/ produced by causation
3/ having the nature of mind and mental states.

The third is clearly a Yogacaran tenet.

Kamalashila expands this into:

1/ mere verbal usage (shabda-vyavahara)
2/ dependent origination or causal efficiency

Where 1/ is false conventional truth and 2/ is true conventional truth.

Both interesting, insightful and influential masters, no doubt.

The influence of Yogacaran tenets on Mahamudra and the Vajrayana in general is very pronounced, and we have not even mentioned East Asian Mahayana traditions.....

But again, my point is not to dispute the influence of Yogacara, nor even to bring into question its tenets.

I am merely saying that it offers a manifestly different account of form and phenomena than Madhyamaka (especially its early to mid Indian forms), and that this different account has also been extremely influential in various Mahayana Buddhisms.

For some reason, there is a strong desire to deny this, when it is really an uncontroversial assertion

[tobes]

That quote actually came from the Śūraṅgama Sūtra, spoken by Śākyamuni Buddha, which is not a Yogācāra text.

Ronald Epstein states the general doctrinal position of the Surangama Sutra has strong influences from Yogācāra, Tathāgatagarbha.

http://online.sfsu.edu/~rone/Buddhism/authenticity.htm

Yes, this seems very explicit.

[tobes]

You should check the thread on Yogācāra/Mādhyamaka Confusion.

Granted perhaps many people throughout history have debated the doctrines of the two schools, but I do not find in their core texts any place where they are at odds. If you do, then please present it.

Well, if you interpret Madhyamakins such as Chandrakirti as commensurate with Yogacara, then nothing I can present on the matter is likely to change your mind.

I have given many statements already which outline my position; I am not offended that you do not agree.

Okay, one last effort!

From Chapter 6 of Chandrakirti's Madhyamakavarta:

(45) [Refutation of consciousness as an ultimate truth, Cognition in the absence of an external object]
[The Yogacaran asserts] Where no object exists, no subject can be found, and therefore the bodhisattva understands that the triple world is merely mind. Relying on wisdom, he further realises that reality itself is mind alone.
(47) "Dependent form" acts as the foundation of any designated entity [in the following ways]" 1/ it appears even in the absence of any apprehended object; 2/ it actually exists; and 3/ its intrinsic nature is not within the range of conceptual diffusion.
(48) [The Prasangika Madhyamakin responds] Is there anywhere such a thing as thought in the absence of an external object? If you intend to use the example of a dream, then consider the following: From our perspective, even in a dream there is no thought [in the absence of an object], and therefore, your example is unacceptable.
(49) If the existence of mind [in the dream is to be proven] through reference to memory of the dream during waking hours, then the existence of the external object [in the dream] is also established] by the same criterion; for just as you remember "I saw", so there is also a memory of the external object [seen].


We could have a long debate about this, but I post it here simply to demonstrate that Madhyamakins such as Chandrakirti actually establish their position by critiquing Yogacara, and therefore, there is something of a problem in holding them to be commensurate.

[Jnana]

I think I have said previously on this thread that Shantarakshita and Kamalashila are almost always classified as Madhyamakin-Yogacarans

This is a Tibetan classification, not an Indian one. And even with that, all Tibetan authors still consider Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla to be mādhyamikas, and most (except maybe the Gelugpas) consider their understanding of the non-nominal ultimate to be exactly the same as Candrakīrti or any other Indian mādhyamika.

The influence of Yogacaran tenets on Mahamudra and the Vajrayana in general is very pronounced, and we have not even mentioned East Asian Mahayana traditions.....

Well, all of the Tibetan schools are Vajrayāna. And while they all consider Mādhyamaka to be supreme, the non-Gelug schools have quite different ways of presenting Mādhyamaka than the Gelugpas do. And yes, all of the extant East Asian traditions are very much influenced by Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha thought.

For some reason, there is a strong desire to deny this, when it is really an uncontroversial assertion

The previous quotations from Atīśa's Satyadvayāvatāra fully accords with what I've been trying to get at: The union of the two truths does not entail affirming arising, abiding, and dissolution. And Atīśa, along with Maitrīpa, held Candrakīrti in highest regard. Again, Atīśa states:

3. We hold the correct conventional truth to be
The phenomenon which arises and perishes, and
Is capable of producing meaning, and
Is attractive only when (left) unexamined.

4. There is only one ultimate truth;
Although others hold it is of two kinds;
But if true-nature is not established anywhere,
Why would there be two, or three, or more?

5. One does use (conventional) words to show this,
Stating it is non-arising and non-perishing, etc.,
But in the mode of undifferentiated ultimate truth,
There is no phenomenality and no true-nature.

6. Differentiation in emptiness itself
Has not the slightest possibility of existing;
And when one realizes this non-conceptually,
It is described as “seeing emptiness.”

7. The most profound sūtras say that
It is seeing the unseen itself, and
In it there is no seeing and no seer;
It is beginningless and endless calm.

8. Substance and non-substance are rejected,
There is no conceptualization, no basis for it;
There is no abiding and nothing to abide;
No going, no coming, and no analogy for it.

9. It is inexpressible and unseeable;
It is changeless and unconditioned.
If a yogin realizes this, he is rid of
The obscuration of his afflictions and of his knowledge.

18. The teacher Candrakīrti says this:
“Relative truth acts as the means,
From the means arises the ultimate truth.
Whoever does not know the difference between the two,
And understands them wrongly, falls to bad destinies.”

19. “Without trusting in (this) difference
There will be no realization of the ultimate.
To endeavor to reach the upper story
Of the palace of correctness
Without the stairs of correct relative (truths),
Is impossible for a learned man.”

20. If one investigates with logical examination
What this relative truth appears to be,
The very finding of nothing (there) is the ultimate (truth):
The true-nature that abides from eternity.

All the best,

Geoff

[Sherab]

That quote actually came from the Śūraṅgama Sūtra, spoken by Śākyamuni Buddha, which is not a Yogācāra text.

Ronald Epstein states the general doctrinal position of the Surangama Sutra has strong influences from Yogācāra, Tathāgatagarbha.
http://online.sfsu.edu/~rone/Buddhism/authenticity.htm

Yes, this seems very explicit.

Here's what the author actually said:
(1) "Generally speaking, the Sutra has a tantric/tathagatagarbha flavor with a dash of yogacara."
(2) "The Sutra's general doctrinal position, which is tantric/tathagatagarbha, corresponds to what we know about what was going on at Nalanda during the period in question."
To then conclude from these statements that the general doctrinal position of the sutra has strong influences from Yogācāra, Tathāgatagarbha is therefore not accurate and not logical.

[Mr. G]

[
Here's what the author actually said:
(1) "Generally speaking, the Sutra has a tantric/tathagatagarbha flavor with a dash of yogacara."
(2) "The Sutra's general doctrinal position, which is tantric/tathagatagarbha, corresponds to what we know about what was going on at Nalanda during the period in question."
To then conclude from these statements that the general doctrinal position of the sutra has strong influences from Yogācāra, Tathāgatagarbha is therefore not accurate and not logical.

Actually, I think the inference is reasonable:

(1) "Generally speaking, the Sutra has a tantric/tathagatagarbha flavor with a dash of yogacara."

The fourfold negation is present in the Surangama Sutra, but the author does not say "Generally speaking, the sutra has a Madhyamaka flavor with a dash of Yogacara".

As noted, the sutra comes from a time at Nalanda when Yogācāra, Tathāgatagarbha was given more emphasis.

[Sherab]

It is not accurate nor logical because who is to say that the sutra was not one of those that contributed to Yogācāra/Tathāgatagarbha viewpoint?

[tobes]

The influence of Yogacaran tenets on Mahamudra and the Vajrayana in general is very pronounced, and we have not even mentioned East Asian Mahayana traditions.....

Well, all of the Tibetan schools are Vajrayāna. And while they all consider Mādhyamaka to be supreme, the non-Gelug schools have quite different ways of presenting Mādhyamaka than the Gelugpas do. And yes, all of the extant East Asian traditions are very much influenced by Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha thought.

Geoff

Indeed, and I think it is worth really contemplating the interpretation of Madhyamaka via the framework of the Vajrayana.

Nagarjuna does not assert a primordial Buddha, the dharmakaya, an inherent Buddha nature and so forth.

These are latter doctrines held to be in perfect accord with Nagarjuna.....but are they??

There are all sorts of hermeneutical devices to support this accord, for example, reading at the 'sutra level' and reading at the 'tantric level'. Nagarjuna is held by the Vajrayana tradition to be a tantrika.....but was he?

How do we read him? It is not such an easy question to answer.