Gorampa & Tsongkhapa

[WeiHan]

If you still don't get the differences, then how about this

Lama Tsong Khapa position: Buddha still retains some correct concept (such as LTKP final "correct" version of Prasangika Madhyamika)

Gorampa position: Buddha is free of all conceptualisation. He only appeared to have concepts and omniscient to an unenligtened being.

Are are many many more technical subtle differences but the above is the main gist and conclusion of each system.

[Tenzin Dorje]

If you still don't get the differences, then how about this

Lama Tsong Khapa position: Buddha still retains some correct concept (such as LTKP final "correct" version of Prasangika Madhyamika)

Gorampa position: Buddha is free of all conceptualisation. He only appeared to have concepts and omniscient to an unenligtened being.

As a matter of fact, I don't know of any Geluk who would hold that Je Tsonkhapa asserted Buddha still retains some correct concepts.

I think you misunderstand Tsongkhapa's assertion that "all conceptions are not the conception of true existence" or maybe you take it as a reason to posit that he asserted the omniscient mind of a Buddha is not free from conceptualization. Which he never does.

[Ayu]

In Je Tsongkhapas context the "correct concept" of a Buddha is to attain "freedom of conceptualisation", since LTKP does not object or disagree to Nagarjuna. He just explaines it the other way round.
This correct concept is not attained by a conceptual mind but by the means of shamata & vipassana. Rather than thinking in concepts the means is meditating.
And it is a means, not a goal.

[WeiHan]

In Je Tsongkhapas context the "correct concept" of a Buddha is to attain "freedom of conceptualisation", since LTKP does not object or disagree to Nagarjuna. He just explaines it the other way round.
This correct concept is not attained by a conceptual mind but by the means of shamata & vipassana. Rather than thinking in concepts the means is meditating.
And it is a means, not a goal.

That is relieving to know.

In that case, the differences in each system with regard to practice is just in the difference of stages in the path when one gives up conceptual meditation.

In Ati yoga, one gives up conceptual meditation right from the beginning or almost.
In Gorampa system, one gives up conceptual meditation after applying analysis of the tetralemma.
In LTKP system, one only gives up conceptual meditation right before attaining full Buddhahood.

[Tsongkhapafan]

In Ati yoga, one gives up conceptual meditation right from the beginning or almost.
In Gorampa system, one gives up conceptual meditation after applying analysis of the tetralemma.
In LTKP system, one only gives up conceptual meditation right before attaining full Buddhahood.

Actually, according to Tsongkhapa, one gives up conceptual meditation on emptiness when you attain the path of seeing (a direct realisation of emptiness) on the path of Sutra and when you attain the experience of the energy winds entering, abiding and dissolving within the central channel during completion stage of Tantra (the Tantric path of preparation). This is long before Buddhahood.

There is nothing wrong with conceptual minds, they are not the problem. The problem is wrong conceptions such as self-grasping and other ordinary conceptions. To practise Highest Yoga Tantra one needs conceptual minds. Love, compassion and bodhichitta are also conceptual minds that are necessary to cultivate in order to attain enlightenment. Conceptual minds per se have never been an obstacle during spiritual practice and there's no need to force yourself to abandon them, especially since there are necessary. Others may disagree but this is according to the teachings of Tsongkhapa and the teachings on valid cognition by Dharmakirti.

[WeiHan]

In Ati yoga, one gives up conceptual meditation right from the beginning or almost.
In Gorampa system, one gives up conceptual meditation after applying analysis of the tetralemma.
In LTKP system, one only gives up conceptual meditation right before attaining full Buddhahood.

Actually, according to Tsongkhapa, one gives up conceptual meditation on emptiness when you attain the path of seeing (a direct realisation of emptiness) on the path of Sutra and when you attain the experience of the energy winds entering, abiding and dissolving within the central channel during completion stage of Tantra (the Tantric path of preparation). This is long before Buddhahood.

There is nothing wrong with conceptual minds, they are not the problem. The problem is wrong conceptions such as self-grasping and other ordinary conceptions. To practise Highest Yoga Tantra one needs conceptual minds. Love, compassion and bodhichitta are also conceptual minds that are necessary to cultivate in order to attain enlightenment. Conceptual minds per se have never been an obstacle during spiritual practice and there's no need to force yourself to abandon them, especially since there are necessary. Others may disagree but this is according to the teachings of Tsongkhapa and the teachings on valid cognition by Dharmakirti.

I don't think anybody has problem with "good" concepts. But it will be hard to swallow and new if Buddha is still not free of all concepts whether good or bad. However, I am relief that that was not LTKP view but probably just a differing meaning for terminology such as "ultimate truth" etc...

LTKP's proponents did ask Gorampa : "How can the Buddha be void of concepts since he is omniscient?" or something in that line...so how does the LTKP system answer that question since they also agree that Buddha is suppose to be free from all concepts?

[Tenzin Dorje]

According to Tsongkhapa, one gives up conceptual meditation on emptiness when you attain the path of seeing[...]

Not really, since an Arya being in subsequent attainment realizes emptiness inferentially (i.e. with a conceptual consciousness, and together with the tree types of dualistic appearance).

[Ayu]

LTKP's proponents did ask Gorampa : "How can the Buddha be void of concepts since he is omniscient?" or something in that line...so how does the LTKP system answer that question since they also agree that Buddha is suppose to be free from all concepts?

This reminds me of a question, somebody asked in our Lamrim course: "What does a Buddha perceive, when he realized emptyness?"
The Lama anwered that the Buddha sees both layers at the same time: the void and the conventional layer.


So, regarding your question I don't see the same conclusion like you do. If a Buddha is free from concepts, it means his thinking is not bound to concepts. But it must not mean he is unable to think in concepts. He can use concepts for explanation. Don't you think so?

[Tsongkhapafan]

According to Tsongkhapa, one gives up conceptual meditation on emptiness when you attain the path of seeing[...]

Not really, since an Arya being in subsequent attainment realizes emptiness inferentially (i.e. with a conceptual consciousness, and together with the tree types of dualistic appearance).

An Arya in subsequent attainment still has a direct realisation of emptiness. It's true that the uncontaminated wisdom of emptiness doesn't appear to their mind outside meditation and they see appearances of inherent existence, but they never conceive them to be true.

[Tsongkhapafan]

LTKP's proponents did ask Gorampa : "How can the Buddha be void of concepts since he is omniscient?" or something in that line...so how does the LTKP system answer that question since they also agree that Buddha is suppose to be free from all concepts?

I'm not quite sure. My answer would be It's true that Buddhas are free from all concepts and that they also perceive all phenomena of the past, present and future directly. They experience the union of appearance and emptiness. Since these appearances are inseparable from emptiness and are ultimate truths, and they have a non-conceptual realisation of ultimate truth, they also have a non-conceptual realisation of appearances.

[Malcolm]

Since these appearances are inseparable from emptiness and are ultimate truths, and they have a non-conceptual realisation of ultimate truth, they also have a non-conceptual realisation of appearances.

Changing appearances are ultimate truths? Since when?

[WeiHan]

LTKP's proponents did ask Gorampa : "How can the Buddha be void of concepts since he is omniscient?" or something in that line...so how does the LTKP system answer that question since they also agree that Buddha is suppose to be free from all concepts?

This reminds me of a question, somebody asked in our Lamrim course: "What does a Buddha perceive, when he realized emptyness?"
The Lama anwered that the Buddha sees both layers at the same time: the void and the conventional layer.


So, regarding your question I don't see the same conclusion like you do. If a Buddha is free from concepts, it means his thinking is not bound to concepts. But it must not mean he is unable to think in concepts. He can use concepts for explanation. Don't you think so?

Are you now flipping back and forth your position? In the previous post, you said LTKP's position is still that Buddha is free of all conceptualisation. In this post, you are saying that Buddha still has concepts because he uses concept to explain.

Gorampa's position is also very clear in the book titled "The two Truths Debate:...." The Buddha is utterly void of concepts, he doesn't perceive anything, however, he knows the perspective of every single sentient beings and to sentient beings, he appeared to be omniscient. There are many quotes from Sutras and commentaries from Indian masters that Buddha is definitely free of all conceptualisation as Malcom has quoted one of them.

There is a hunch in me that there is something very valuable in LTKP's interpretation that I have not understood yet.

[Tenzin Dorje]

According to Tsongkhapa, one gives up conceptual meditation on emptiness when you attain the path of seeing[...]

Not really, since an Arya being in subsequent attainment realizes emptiness inferentially (i.e. with a conceptual consciousness, and together with the tree types of dualistic appearance).

An Arya in subsequent attainment still has a direct realisation of emptiness. It's true that the uncontaminated wisdom of emptiness doesn't appear to their mind outside meditation and they see appearances of inherent existence, but they never conceive them to be true.

An Arya in subsequent attainment does not have a direct realization of emptiness.

You're right to say they see appearances of inherent existence (this is because of knowledge obscuration) and that 'they never conceive them to be true' but such is an inferential realization. Such is described in the section on the correct meaning of 'illusory-like appearances'. This is because a direct realization in the mind of a sentient being is always free from all three types of dualistic appearances (again due to knowledge obscuration), and as you just accepted, an Arya in subsequent attainment is not.

It's a fundamental Prasangika tenet that a sentient being can not directly realize both conventional and ultimate truth simultaneously.

Another argument is the following: conventional Bodhicitta is a conceptual mind. Therefore, an Arya having abandoned conceptual consciousnesses would entail that there would be no Arya Bodhisattva.

[Ayu]

LTKP's proponents did ask Gorampa : "How can the Buddha be void of concepts since he is omniscient?" or something in that line...so how does the LTKP system answer that question since they also agree that Buddha is suppose to be free from all concepts?

This reminds me of a question, somebody asked in our Lamrim course: "What does a Buddha perceive, when he realized emptyness?"
The Lama anwered that the Buddha sees both layers at the same time: the void and the conventional layer.


So, regarding your question I don't see the same conclusion like you do. If a Buddha is free from concepts, it means his thinking is not bound to concepts. But it must not mean he is unable to think in concepts. He can use concepts for explanation. Don't you think so?

Are you now flipping back and forth your position? In the previous post, you said LTKP's position is still that Buddha is free of all conceptualisation. In this post, you are saying that Buddha still has concepts because he uses concept to explain.

Gorampa's position is also very clear in the book titled "The two Truths Debate:...." The Buddha is utterly void of concepts, he doesn't perceive anything, however, he knows the perspective of every single sentient beings and to sentient beings, he appeared to be omniscient. There are many quotes from Sutras and commentaries from Indian masters that Buddha is definitely free of all conceptualisation as Malcom has quoted one of them.

There is a hunch in me that there is something very valuable in LTKP's interpretation that I have not understood yet.

I'm not sure - if I was, I must have experienced the Buddha's perception at least once - but:
how should a Buddha not perceive anything? My teacher told, a buddha perceives differently than we ordinary people do. He said, a buddha perceives it all at once.

So I suppose, if we agree that we don't know the real meaning and consequences of "to be utterly void of concepts", then there is no need for a long discussion anymore.
How could a Buddha give any lecture if he wasn't able to use concepts as a measure?
He must not be bound by concepts to do so.

[Tenzin Dorje]

How could a Buddha give any lecture if he wasn't able to use concepts as a measure?
He must not be bound by concepts to do so.

We tend to say that a Buddha apprehends concepts directly, by directly realizing their appearance in the mind of sentient beings. Even the appearance of inherent existence such as it is realized by the afflictive ignorance of an a being before the 8th Bhumi is directly realized by a Buddha.

(Again, what I say is exclusively Prasangika, it's a unique tenet of the Middle Way Consequence school)

[Malcolm]

(Again, what I say is exclusively Prasangika, it's a unique tenet of the Middle Way Consequence school)

Correction, it is a unique tenet of Tsonkhapa's interpretation of Prasangika.

Since Goramapa lists more than 150 points of contention with Tsongkhapa's presentation of Prasangika Madhyamaka, it is really much better if you qualify your presentation with Tsonkhapa's interpretation since many of his unique interpretations are unknown to Indians as well as Tibetans. I understand that devotees of Tsongkhapa consider this to be a feature, whereas detractors of Tsongkhapa consider these innovations to be bugs in his view.

I myself am not expert enough in Tsongkhapa's writings to say much about them with certainty, but in general, I have personally found Goramapa's criticisms of Tsongkhapa's views regarding sūtra and tantra well founded. On the other hand, I generally accept Tsongkhapa's criticisms of Jonang view as having merit.

[Tenzin Dorje]

I accept your correction. I'm not expert enough in Prasangika views that are not Tsongkhapa's. I found Dölpopa's commentaries, as well as Ju Mipham's commentary to Chandrakirti's Madhyamakavatara quiet confusing and decided to establish a firmer understanding of Tsongkhapa before going any further. (Tsongkhapa has always sounded most logical to me)

Still, to come back to our topic, Je Tsongkhapa asserts that a wrong consciousness realizes its own appearing object. For instance, ignorance realizes not inherent existence (because it is a non-existent and a non-existent can not be realized) but the appearance of inherent. The appearance of inherent existence is the appearing object of ignorance (a wrong consciousness and a conceptual consciousness). As to whether ignorance has a conceived object, it is not clear, but if it has so, it is a terminological division of 'conceived object' because it is non-existent.

According to Tsongkhapa, and that's where it becomes interesting, others schools (including Svatantrika-Madhyamikas) can not properly answer the question "what does ignorance realize ?" because it can not realize a non-existent such as inherent existence, where he answers "it realizes its own appearing object, the appearance of inherent existence". It is indeed Tsongkhapa's understanding that a unique tenet of Prasangika is that 'a wrong consciousness realizes its own appearing object, and is valid in regard to it'.

In this way also, the omniscient mind of a Buddha directly realizes the appearance of inherent existence that is in the continuum of sentient beings. This shows it directly realizes mental images that are the appearing objects of conceptual consciousnesses in the continuum of sentient beings. Now, as you pointed out, I don't know whether Prasangika appart from Tsongkhapa would hold this. I leave that up to you, and it'll make the 'debate' interesting

[Malcolm]

Still, to come back to our topic, Je Tsongkhapa asserts that a wrong consciousness realizes its own appearing object. For instance, ignorance realizes not inherent existence (because it is a non-existent and a non-existent can not be realized) but the appearance of inherent. The appearance of inherent existence is the appearing object of ignorance (a wrong consciousness and a conceptual consciousness). As to whether ignorance has a conceived object, it is not clear, but if it has so, it is a terminological division of 'conceived object' because it is non-existent.

According to Tsongkhapa, and that's where it becomes interesting, others schools (including Svatantrika-Madhyamikas) can not properly answer the question "what does ignorance realize ?" because it can not realize a non-existent such as inherent existence, where he answers "it realizes its own appearing object, the appearance of inherent existence". It is indeed Tsongkhapa's understanding that a unique tenet of Prasangika is that 'a wrong consciousness realizes its own appearing object, and is valid in regard to it'.

Not sure what Tibetan term you mean by "realize", so your point is rather obscure to me because of it.

In this way also, the omniscient mind of a Buddha directly realizes the appearance of inherent existence that is in the continuum of sentient beings. This shows it directly realizes mental images that are the appearing objects of conceptual consciousnesses in the continuum of sentient beings. Now, as you pointed out, I don't know whether Prasangika appart from Tsongkhapa would hold this. I leave that up to you, and it'll make the 'debate' interesting

In general, the response is that sentient beings do not differentiate between existence and inherent existence. Because this is so, while it is true that Candrakīrit indeed identifies a subtle object of negation, inherent existence, the actual object of negation is the course object of negation, existence, because that is what sentient beings actually perceive and are actually deluded by.

Also, the problem with Tsongkhapa's hermeneutics here involve the fact that he is basically stating that while buddhas have no conceptual apprehension of their own, they apprehend the conceptual apprehensions of sentient beings, and that seems like a very strange position. The general position of Candrakirti seems to be:

• The peaceful kāya manifests like a wishfulfilling tree,
  is nonconceptual like a wishfulfilling gem,
  always existing for the benefit of the world until migrating beings are liberated,
  this [kāya] appears free of proliferation

Meaning it is not necessary for buddhas to apprehend the concepts of sentient beings since they act effortlessly without concepts on the behalf of sentient beings like wishfulfilling gems and so on.

[Tenzin Dorje]

Still, to come back to our topic, Je Tsongkhapa asserts that a wrong consciousness realizes its own appearing object. For instance, ignorance realizes not inherent existence (because it is a non-existent and a non-existent can not be realized) but the appearance of inherent. The appearance of inherent existence is the appearing object of ignorance (a wrong consciousness and a conceptual consciousness). As to whether ignorance has a conceived object, it is not clear, but if it has so, it is a terminological division of 'conceived object' because it is non-existent.

According to Tsongkhapa, and that's where it becomes interesting, others schools (including Svatantrika-Madhyamikas) can not properly answer the question "what does ignorance realize ?" because it can not realize a non-existent such as inherent existence, where he answers "it realizes its own appearing object, the appearance of inherent existence". It is indeed Tsongkhapa's understanding that a unique tenet of Prasangika is that 'a wrong consciousness realizes its own appearing object, and is valid in regard to it'.

Not sure what Tibetan term you mean by "realize", so your point is rather obscure to me because of it.

rtogs often translated as realize, cognize, know, understand, ascertain, found, or distinguish (such as it appears in the definition of a 'conventional truth' as 'an object that is found by conventional valid cognizer distinguishing conventionalities, with regard to[...]').

Sautrantikas present realizing consciousnesses and non-realizing consciousnesses (like, for instance, 'inattentive awareness' which is 'an awareness to which an object appears but is not ascertained'). A wrong consciousness, such as the consciousness apprehending a blue snow mountain, would be a non-realizing consciousness. According to Tsongkhapa, all consciousnesses realize their appearing object. The reason is that we can remember an appearing object of a wrong consciousness, and if there was no realization in the 1st place, one wouldn't be able to remember having seen such and such.

In general, the response is that sentient beings do not differentiate between existence and inherent existence. Because this is so, while it is true that Candrakīrit indeed identifies a subtle object of negation, inherent existence, the actual object of negation is the course object of negation, existence, because that is what sentient beings actually perceive and are actually deluded by.

'Inherent existence' refers to a mode of existence. An ordinary being is mistaken with regard to the mode of existence of the objects (that is their lack of inherent existence) not with regard to their entity (that is their being this or that conventional object).

Or I simply didn't get why you meant by 'existence'. Please, explain, because geluk usually posit the quality of being 'self sufficient substantially existent' as the coarse object of negation.

Also, the problem with Tsongkhapa's hermeneutics here involve the fact that he is basically stating that while buddhas have no conceptual apprehension of their own, they apprehend the conceptual apprehensions of sentient beings, and that seems like a very strange position.

On the contrary, not saying so would imply that a Buddha doesn't realize all objects of knowledge, all existent. As the object of a conceptual consciousness is an existent, then it must be known by a Buddha. As a Buddha is free from conceptualization, then it must be known directly by the omniscient mind of a Buddha.

Do you assert that a Buddha doesn't know all objects of knowledge ?[/quote]

[Malcolm]

rtogs

rtogs pa - pratividdhā
rtogs pa - prativedha
rtogs pa - pratyavagama
rtogs pa - avagamana
rtogs pa - avabodha
rtogs pa - vijñāta
rtogs pa - viditvā
rtogs pa - upaparīkṣaṇā
rtogs pa - upaparīkṣā
rtogs pa - upalakṣyatva

rtogs pa - avabodha This is usually the term rtogs renders in order to communicate "realize."

Otherwise, comprehend is better here compare for example:

Sautrantikas present realizing consciousnesses and non-realizing consciousnesses. A wrong consciousness, such as the consciousness apprehending a blue snow mountain, would be a non-realizing consciousness. According to Tsongkhapa, all consciousnesses realize their appearing object. The reason is that we can remember an appearing object of a wrong consciousness, and if there was no realization in the 1st place, one wouldn't be able to remember having seen such and such.

against

Sautrantikas present comprehending consciousnesses and non-comprehending consciousnesses. A wrong consciousness, such as the consciousness apprehending a blue snow mountain, would be a non-comprehendingg consciousness. According to Tsongkhapa, all consciousnesses comprehend their appearing object. The reason is that we can remember an appearing object of a wrong consciousness, and if there was no comprehension in the 1st place, one wouldn't be able to remember having seen such and such.

Or I simply didn't get why you meant by 'existence'. Please, explain, because geluk usually posit the quality of being 'self sufficient substantially existent' as the coarse object of negation.

A self-sufficient substantial entity would be an inherent existence, from our POV. But Tsongkhapa argues that is not the basis of negation, instead it is the inherent existence which is different than existence. From our point of view, existence is the coarse object of negation, and that is what is negated in Madhyamaka analysis generally, it, non-existence, both and neither in that order, unless one is an ārya, then one can dispense with the turn by turn negation of the four extremes. The purpose of negating the third extreme is not made irrelevant because it is double negation, as Tsongkhapa argues, but simply because there are those such as Jains and so on who maintain that there are things that are both existence and non-existent.

Do you assert that a Buddha doesn't know all objects of knowledge ?

[/quote]

While there are significant differences in the way the question of a Buddha's omniscience is handled in Sakya and Gelug. I am not qualified to discuss it, having never studied it in any detail.

M