Tom wrote: 5heaps wrote:
Tom wrote:The fact that you continue to refer to the appearing object rather that the mind which apprehends it as valid demonstrates that we are not communicating.
As I said wrong consciousness is said to be valid based on it realizing its appearing object (whether it be a car or rabbits horns), that's all - but it is still a wrong consciousness and mistaken.
that an object is valid is a figure of speech, Tom. of course only a cognizer such as a mind or person can be either a valid or invalid cognizer. it is simpler to say that "dinner looks tasty" than it is to say that "my mind is currently establishing dinner as tasty"
calling a book a car is valid in prasangika, meaning "car" is valid with respect to being imputed in dependence on a book, or as Tom would prefer it, the imputing thought consciousness is valid with respect to its appearing object "car" and its focal object the book.
this is important because it is very easy to say what Tom originally said, "I was talking about "calling a book a car" not sure how there is anything valid about this "car""
Sorry, but it is simply wrong to say that the car is valid in this scenario. I was relating this conversation to my teacher and when I mentioned that you were claiming that the "car" is valid because wrong consciousness is valid with respect to the appearing object Geshela started laughing.
unlike sautrantika, in prasangika what makes a cognition mistaken is not that the appearing object lacks concordance with its focal object. this is very crucial to what it means to lack inherent existence
i was going to give my own response but i cant be bothered so i'll just quote others you accept, from berzin:
"Consider the distorted sensory nonconceptual cognition of seeing a unicorn in a meadow: [...] According to the Prasangika tenets, the mental aspect that resembles a unicorn is an existent phenomenon, although the unicorn is nonexistent. Moreover, the cognition of a hallucinated unicorn as a hallucinated unicorn is accurate. The distortion lies in considering the hallucinated unicorn to be an external, conventionally existent unicorn.
"In imagining a unicorn in a meadow: The focal object is a meadow (which does exist) and the involved object is a unicorn there (which does not exist). There is no actual unicorn, however, as the focal condition casting its reflection on the consciousness.The mental aspect (which does exist) resembling a unicorn appears (arises) simply because of external and internal causes for distortion. The appearing object is a meaning/object category (which does exist) of unicorn, imputed on the mental aspect.
and then as kensur yeshey tupden explains:
"There is no valid direct perception in prasangika; there is only the valid cognition of the direct [because, except for cognizing emptiness, direct perception is always mistaken regarding appearances of inherent existence]."