Re: The Mahaparinirvana Sutra
Posted: Sun Nov 25, 2012 8:41 pm
This is what I've been saying !Malcolm wrote: we can consider that the original Tathagatagarbha theory was fully eternalist.
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This is what I've been saying !Malcolm wrote: we can consider that the original Tathagatagarbha theory was fully eternalist.
Malcolm wrote: I was discussing the fact that originally the MPNS introduced a eternalism into Buddhism.
M
Malcolm,Malcolm wrote:Will wrote:The view of "specialist scholars" is not relevant to the influence on the buddhadharma & generations of practitioners of the "standard" sutra.
The point is that part of the sutra under question, which "normalizes" the view of the MPNS does not seem to be present in any other recension. It certainly is not in the Tibetan version. Based in that, we can consider that the original Tathagatagarbha theory was fully eternalist.
But the Prajnaparamita does not say that there is one path and one goal...Astus wrote:Gregory,
How is the concept of One Vehicle an important one here? I mean, even the Prajnaparamita Sutra in 8000 Verses says right in the first chapter that prajnaparamita is required by both sravakas and bodhisattvas. So, we can say that there is actually only one path and one goal taught in different ways for different audiences.
True.Huifeng wrote:But the Prajnaparamita does not say that there is one path and one goal...
.As I see it, the teaching that is at the center of the Mahaparinirvana Sutra is the Ekayana, the One Vehicle
I agreeThe primary Ekayana Sutras are:
The Going Down to Lanka Sutra - Lankavatara Sutra
The Flower Garland Sutra - Avatamsaka Sutra
The White Lotus of the True Dharma Sutra - Saddharmapundarika Sutra
The Lion's Roar of Queen Srimala Sutra - Srimaladevi Simhanada Sutra
The Great Parinirvana Sutra - Mahayana Mahaparinirvana Sutra
The Shurangama Sutra - Śūraṅgama Sutra
The Great Dharma Drum Sutra - Mahābherīhāraka-parivarta Sutra
The Diamond Samadhi Sutra - Vajrasamadhi Sutra
I view the Lotus sutra and the Mahaparinirvana sutra as higher than the rest in importance(due to the sutras making these claims themselves)but I agree that no Ekayana sutra has the final word as the other Ekayana sutras do add their own depth perspective and teachings that cover on many topics of the Ekayana.None of these Sutras has the sole or final word on the One Vehicle, each and all of them add depth perspective to the One Vehicle.
I disagree,IMHO, it is a misconception to identify the One Buddha Vehicle with just tathagata-garbha thought because it is also called Dharmakaya, Buddha Nature, Emptiness, Alaya Vijnana, True Suchness, etc. The One Vehicle (Ekayana) as the teaching of manifesting Buddha Nature is the synthetic inclusion of all three Mahayana teachings of Madhyamaka, Yogacara, and Tathagatagarbha.
I agree and i will be sending you a message soonI follow Guifeng Zongmi in this.[As an aside, I've recently completed a first draft of my translation of Queen Srimala's Lion's Roar Sutra. If your sangha would like to look at it let me know the contact info.]Zongmi wrote:5. That Which Is The One Vehicle's (Ekayana) Teaching Of Manifesting Nature.
To clarify for everyone having sentience, everybody has the root enlightenment of true mind. Beginningless is how it comes, and it always abides clear and pure. Its luminosity does not darken and is completely and constantly aware.
_/|\_
Gregory
No its not,tathagatagarbha is not eternalism,when Buddha spoke of eternalists in was never in realation to enlightenemnt/Tathagatgarbha but was in relation to the false self not being eternal.JohnRammy wrote:This is what I've been saying !Malcolm wrote: we can consider that the original Tathagatagarbha theory was fully eternalist.
This idea that there is a true eternal self beyond the five aggregates is exactly the atman of outsiders and the teaching refuted by the doctrine of the five aggregates itself. If the buddha-nature were like that it would be indeed nothing but false teachings.Son of Buddha wrote:No its not,tathagatagarbha is not eternalism,when Buddha spoke of eternalists in was never in realation to enlightenemnt/Tathagatgarbha but was in relation to the false self not being eternal.
nilhism and eternalism in Buddhist sutras are in realation to the tainted self(5 aggregates/Skandalas)
Buddhism teaches that nhilism is wrong view so Enlightenment doesnt cease(if it did cease then it would annhilate=nhilism
eternalism in Buddhism was in realation to the 5 Skandalas tainted self(as the Brahmas beleived the 5 Skandala self was eternal)the Buddha taught this eternalism was wrong view.
not true,the 5 aggregates refuted the Brahman idea of self which was based on the 5 Aggregates((The pre-Buddhist Upanishads link the Self to the feeling "I am."[40] The Chandogya Upanishad for example does, and it sees Self as underlying the whole world))), .While, older Upanishads such as the Brihadaranyaka, mention several times that the Self is described as Neti neti or ((((((not this - not this))))),[5] Upanishads post Buddhism, like the Maitri Upanishad, define Ātman as only the defiled individual self, rather than the universal self.Astus wrote:This idea that there is a true eternal self beyond the five aggregates is exactly the atman of outsiders and the teaching refuted by the doctrine of the five aggregates itself. If the buddha-nature were like that it would be indeed nothing but false teachings.Son of Buddha wrote:No its not,tathagatagarbha is not eternalism,when Buddha spoke of eternalists in was never in realation to enlightenemnt/Tathagatgarbha but was in relation to the false self not being eternal.
nilhism and eternalism in Buddhist sutras are in realation to the tainted self(5 aggregates/Skandalas)
Buddhism teaches that nhilism is wrong view so Enlightenment doesnt cease(if it did cease then it would annhilate=nhilism
eternalism in Buddhism was in realation to the 5 Skandalas tainted self(as the Brahmas beleived the 5 Skandala self was eternal)the Buddha taught this eternalism was wrong view.
as the sutras/suttas say the self is not the 5 aggregates,as you say "such a permenant self would already be realised" the self(mind) is already realised the "I" is the defilment that is on top of the mind(self)Astus wrote:If there were a self beyond the aggregates, one could not touch it, feel it, think of it, or experience it in any way, because those are all within the aggregates. Something beyond the aggregates is beyond perception, beyond reality, therefore unreal and only a mental fabrication, an idea only. Realisation of such a self would also be impossible, as such a permanent self would either be already realised or never realised, since realisation is change and experience. A self beyond the aggregates has no function, therefore no existence.
yes the aggregates are not the self they arise and decay,the "I" of the 5 aggregates is changing every nano second the True Self is Permenant.i]"If the aggregates were self, it would be possessed of arising and decaying. If it were other than the aggregates, it would not have the characteristics of the aggregates."[/i]
(Nagarjuna: MMK 18.1)
First of all Nirvana sutra "Depend Upon Sutras not upon persons" commentary does not trump sutras,also (no disrespect) but Zhonglun is incorrect Majjhima Nikaya Culamalunkya sutta 63 i429Commentary from the Zhonglun:
"If the soul existed apart from the five skandhas, the soul would not have the characteristics of the five skandhas. As it says in the verse: 'if the soul is different from the five skandhas, then it will not have the characteristics of the five skandhas'. Yet no other dharma exists apart from the five skandhas. If there were any such dharma apart from the five skandhas, by virtue of what characteristics, or what dharmas, would it exist?"
Commentary from the Prasannapada:
"And so, in the first place, the Self is not the aggregates; but it is also not reasonable for the Self to be different from the aggregates. For if the Self were something other than the aggregates, then the aggregates would not be its defining characteristics. For example, a horse, which is different from a cow, does not have a cow as its defining characteristic. In the same manner, the Self, when it is conceived as different from the aggregates, would not have the aggregates as its defining characteristics. Here, because they are conditioned (saṃskṛta), the aggregates arise from causes and conditions and their defining characteristics are occurrence, perdurance and decay. Therefore, if the Self does not have the aggregates as its defining characteristics, as you maintain, then the Self would not have occurrence, perdurance and decay as its defining characteristics. And in that case, the Self would either be like a sky flower, because it does not exist, or it would be like nirvāṇa, because it is unconditioned. As such, it would not be called the “Self,” nor would it be reasonable for it to be the object of the habitual sense of ‘I.’ Therefore, it is also not reasonable for the Self to be different from the aggregates.
Alternatively, here is another meaning of the statement, “If the Self were different from the aggregates, the aggregates would not be its defining characteristics.” These are the defining characteristics of the five aggregates: (1) malleability, (2) experience, (3) the apprehension of an object’s sign, (4) conditioning, and (5) representation of an object. If, just as consciousness is asserted to be different from material form, the Self were asserted to be different from the aggregates, then the Self would be established with a distinct defining characteristic. As such, it would be apprehended as being established with a distinct defining characteristic, just as consciousness is apprehended as established with a defining characteristic distinct from material form. The Self is not, however, apprehended in that fashion; hence, there is no Self distinct from the aggregates.
guess I will have to refute Nagarjuna then....Someone objects, «The Tīrthikas know of a Self separate from the aggregates, and they thus speak of its defining characteristics. Hence, this way of refuting the Self does not refute them. And the way that the Tīrthikas speak of a separate defining characteristic for the Self is stated in the following verse from Encountering Madhyamaka:
The Tīrthikas conceive of a Self that is by nature eternal; it is an experiencer without being an agent; it is devoid of qualities and inactive. The Tīrthikas’ system has come to be further divided in terms of this or that distinction in the qualities predicated of the Self.» (MAV 6.142)
We respond as follows. It is true that the Tīrthikas state a defining characteristic of the Self separate from the aggregates, but they do not state its defining characteristic after having perceived the Self in its actuality. Rather, through not properly understanding dependent designation, they do not realize, due to their fear, that the Self is merely nominal. Not realizing this, they depart even from conventional reality, and due to their false concepts, they become confused by what is merely spurious inference. Thus confused, they conceptually construct a Self due to their confusion, and they then state its defining characteristic. In the “Analysis of Factors in Action and their Object” (MMK 8), Nāgārjuna says that the Self and its substratum are established in mutual dependence on each other; and by saying this, he refutes the above notion of Self in even conventional terms."
cdpatton wrote: One of the interesting things, too, about the later materials is that they are, in fact, loaded with Agama materials. Wholesale reproduction of well-known Agamas, albeit with Mahayanist motifs added. There is a large section detailing the Four Noble Truths, and so forth.
We should get Connie Willis to write a novel for Buddhologists, as far as the rest goes!
Charlie.
*Wholesome reproduction of well-known Agamas* does not occur in all Mahayana Sutras, nor the Lotus Sutra. That was my point, Buddhaputra, sir. I can't think of any others, off the top of my head. Sure, you see alot of basic doctrines and metaphors taken from the Agamas, but not entire Sutras taken, given a Mahayana face lift, and then spliced into a Mahayana Sutra.Son of Buddha wrote:cdpatton wrote: One of the interesting things, too, about the later materials is that they are, in fact, loaded with Agama materials. Wholesale reproduction of well-known Agamas, albeit with Mahayanist motifs added. There is a large section detailing the Four Noble Truths, and so forth.
We should get Connie Willis to write a novel for Buddhologists, as far as the rest goes!
Charlie.
All mahayana Sutras are loaded with Agama(Pali canon) materials do you know most of the Lotus sutra can be found in the Pali canon also?so im not seeing the point you are trying to make?
It's a very weak argument to claim that the old tradition (Nikaya/Agama) Buddha merely said that the five skandhas were not "the" self, but he never said there was no self; therefore, that Buddha did not refute an atman. If the Buddha in those texts had believed there was a self beyond the five aggregates *he would have said so*. This entire "Oh, he was telling riddles that the Mahayanists solved" line is a transparent apology for introducing new doctrines and interpretations, but attempting to appear orthodox, all the same. It's basically trying to break with the old traditions but continue to remain within them at the same time. (No one wants to be called a heretic.) A necessary evil in the religious world, where one must always try to show his ideas are orthodox - but it gets pretty obvious at a certain point when you've moved on and created a new tradition or sect. One might as well just be honest about it at that point. Mind you, I have nothing against this process. I think, like other human endeavors, religious traditions usually improve over time through refinement. This whole "we must have the original teaching because that one was the perfect one" line of thought religions get into is self-frustrating. Either you disallow any improvements over the initial teaching or you play these intellectual camouflage games as you introduce new ideas.Son of Buddha wrote:as the sutras/suttas say the self is not the 5 aggregates,as you say "such a permenant self would already be realised" ...Astus wrote:If there were a self beyond the aggregates, one could not touch it, feel it, think of it, or experience it in any way, because those are all within the aggregates. Something beyond the aggregates is beyond perception, beyond reality, therefore unreal and only a mental fabrication, an idea only. Realisation of such a self would also be impossible, as such a permanent self would either be already realised or never realised, since realisation is change and experience. A self beyond the aggregates has no function, therefore no existence.
From the Pali Nikayas we learn that the Buddha rejected each khandha as being attâ. Why did he do this? In all probability because there were those who asserted that each or some aggregates were the attâ which, incidentally, is the eternalist position. This is where Ockham's Razor comes in handy (the principle of simplicity). If we posit some theory or view that the Buddha unambigiously denied the self, which in Pali is natthatta (which our dear scholars have missed), we move to Ockham's spatula with it nothing but confusion. It is difficult to read the Khandhasamyutta, for example, and not see it other than a teaching which is correcting the belief that the khandhas are the attâ. In addition, the implicit referent is always the actual attâ which transcends any capture by the khandhas which are fundamentally—let's admit it—evil.cdpatton wrote:It's a very weak argument to claim that the old tradition (Nikaya/Agama) Buddha merely said that the five skandhas were not "the" self, but he never said there was no self; therefore, that Buddha did not refute an atman.Son of Buddha wrote:as the sutras/suttas say the self is not the 5 aggregates,as you say "such a permenant self would already be realised" ...Astus wrote:If there were a self beyond the aggregates, one could not touch it, feel it, think of it, or experience it in any way, because those are all within the aggregates. Something beyond the aggregates is beyond perception, beyond reality, therefore unreal and only a mental fabrication, an idea only. Realisation of such a self would also be impossible, as such a permanent self would either be already realised or never realised, since realisation is change and experience. A self beyond the aggregates has no function, therefore no existence.
cdpatton wrote:
It's a very weak argument to claim that the old tradition (Nikaya/Agama) Buddha merely said that the five skandhas were not "the" self, but he never said there was no self; therefore, that Buddha did not refute an atman. If the Buddha in those texts had believed there was a self beyond the five aggregates *he would have said so*.
.This entire "Oh, he was telling riddles that the Mahayanists solved" line is a transparent apology for introducing new doctrines and interpretations, but attempting to appear orthodox, all the same
It's basically trying to break with the old traditions but continue to remain within them at the same time.
the key word is your opinion of what the old tradtion says,not what is actually written in the 5 Nikayas*But that's the opinion of an old man who's read too much already.*
notice how nowhere in that does it say there is no self,and I agree our self(MN 22) is not the 5 skandhasIt's a reality that the early traditions held that 1) atman is not one of the five skandhas and 2) there isn't a sixth skandha. There's no point (other than deception of oneself and others) in trying to rationalize that away.
[/quote]And, anyway, the issue here to me (re: the Nirvana Sutra) is the assertion of a (or, *the*) *Buddha* who is the self. That is what the Nirvana Sutra says continuously from Chapter 3 on. It doesn't say the sattvas have selves. Rather, it says that the sattva's possession of the tathagata-garbha is the meaning of "self" in that context. This is somewhat different than saying, for instance, that each sattva has a soul that will re-join Brahma, etc. It is, rather, saying that the potential of becoming a Buddha always resides in sattvas. They just need to actualize the causes and conditions to become Buddhas themselves. The meaning of self, as used in this schema, is degraded to me, into a mere label. A strict Nagarjunist, I suppose, will always balk at saying anything at all (except, "that's not so" - it must such a burden), but the rest of us can probably live with having a goal in mind.
You're not following any tradition or living lineage in your rambling musings on the Pāli Nikāyas. You're just following your own whims. Here is what the Pāli tradition says about the self and nirvāṇa. The Paṭisambhidāmagga Aṭṭhakathā:Son of Buddha wrote:the key word is your opinion of what the old tradtion says,not what is actually written in the 5 Nikayas
Jnana wrote:You're not following any tradition or living lineage in your rambling musings on the Pāli Nikāyas. You're just following your own whims. Here is what the Pāli tradition says about the self and nirvāṇa. The Paṭisambhidāmagga Aṭṭhakathā:Son of Buddha wrote:the key word is your opinion of what the old tradtion says,not what is actually written in the 5 NikayasThere are numerous Mahāyāna sūtras that make very similar statements.
- The dhamma called 'Nibbāna' is empty of self only on account of the non-existence of self [i.e., not on account of impermanence, etc.]. Secondly, conditioned dhammas, both mundane and supramundane, are all empty of a living being on account of the non-existence of a living being of any sort whatever. The unconditioned, the dhamma called 'Nibbāna', is empty of formations on account of the absence [there] of formations. Lastly, all dhammas, conditioned and unconditioned, are empty of self on account of the non-existence of any person who could be classed as 'a self'.
Speaking in this way, teaching in this way, I have been erroneously, vainly, falsely, unfactually misrepresented by some brahmans and contemplatives [who say], ‘Gotama the contemplative is one who misleads. He declares the annihilation, destruction, extermination of the existing being.’ But as I am not that, as I do not say that, so I have been erroneously, vainly, falsely, unfactually misrepresented by those venerable brahmans and contemplatives [who say], ‘Gotama the contemplative is one who misleads. He declares the annihilation, destruction, extermination of the existing being.’ (MN 22, trans. Thanissaro, 2004)The Paṭisambhidāmagga Aṭṭhakathā
are all empty of a living being on account of the non-existence of a living being of any sort whatever
are empty of self on account of the non-existence of any person who could be classed as 'a self'.
are you sure about that?You're not following any tradition or living lineage in your rambling musings on the Pāli Nikāyas. You're just following your own whims. Here is what the Pāli tradition says about the self and nirvāṇa. The Paṭisambhidāmagga Aṭṭhakathā
This is because "all dhammas, conditioned and unconditioned, are empty of self on account of the non-existence of any person who could be classed as 'a self'." Therefore, there is no existing being to be annihilated.Son of Buddha wrote:Speaking in this way, teaching in this way, I have been erroneously, vainly, falsely, unfactually misrepresented by some brahmans and contemplatives [who say], ‘Gotama the contemplative is one who misleads. He declares the annihilation, destruction, extermination of the existing being.’ But as I am not that, as I do not say that, so I have been erroneously, vainly, falsely, unfactually misrepresented by those venerable brahmans and contemplatives [who say], ‘Gotama the contemplative is one who misleads. He declares the annihilation, destruction, extermination of the existing being.’ (MN 22, trans. Thanissaro, 2004)
These "translations" are bogus.Son of Buddha wrote:are you sure about that?
“The great light of the self (attâ/atma) is the great-self (mahâtman) which is an illumination beyond the physical (rûpa). The great-self is similar to the solar sphere as the source of the sphere’s brightness, as such, the radiant power.”— Vimanavatthu Atthakatha No. 268
“The Tathâgata is the true reality of the self (attâ).” — Majjhimapannasa Atthakatha 3.379
The true nature (bhâva) of the Tathâgata is the self (attano). — Itivuttaka Atthakatha 2.187
“The Blessed One (bhagavat) is the origin of his lineage, [which is] the great perfection (mahâsammâ).” — Mahâvagga Atthakatha 2.677
“What is external (parato) is empty (suññato), is inanimate (anatta), is the mark of the inanimate (anattalakkana).” — Majjhimapannsapali Atthakatha 3.146
“The vision of perfection of the path of the self (maggatta).” — Patisambhidamagga Atthakatha 3.608
“The self’s perfection (sammattâ) is the Noble Eightfold Path.” — Nettippakarana Atthakatha No.184
“The self is deathless (amara) and is identical with one’s true nature (sabhâva).” — Jataka Atthakatha No. 6 6.370
“The Tathagata is the Buddha, and the self.” — Itivuttaka Atthakatha 2.187
“Samsara is samsara as non-immortal faring. Awareness of the immortal supreme self is the faring of the immortal supreme self.” — Therigatha Atthakatha 289
“Just so it is that the self (attâ) is none of the five aggregates (Skt., skandha).” — Udana Atthakatha No. 376
“The one self, the one true reality (ekabhâva), is without emptiness (asuññata).” — Uparipannasapali Atthkatha 4.151