gzhan stong and Great Madhyamaka

[Tom]

Here it says that abhūta parikalpa is the dependent nature, not imagined nature which is said to correspond to the object.

Correct. The "imagination of the unreal" is a single entity. However it contains content i.e. the unreal.

Some people seem to think that that it ought to be translated as "unreal imagination", as if the imagination itself in question is unreal. I do not think this is correct. Unreal is not an adjective of the imagination.

This was my point so seems we agree.

[Mariusz]

Hey Cone,

First, this is the verse five from the MV in Tibetan and what I was using to justify my statement that "imagination of the unreal" (abhūta parikalpa) is related to dependent nature not imagined nature.

1:5
།བཏགས་པ་དང་ནི་གཞན་དབང་དང་།
།ཡོངས་སུ་གྲུབ་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱང་ངོ་།
།དོན་ཕྱིར་ཡང་དག་མིན་རྟོག་ཕྱིར།
།གཉིས་པོ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་བཤད་དོ།

This verse clearly makes a distinction between the imagined nature and the imagination of the unreal, stating that the imagined nature (here it is: བཏགས་པ | referring to parikalpita svabhāva) is taught for the sake of objects (དོན), whilst the dependent nature (གཞན་དབང) is taught for the sake of the imagination of the unreal (ཡང་དག་མིན་རྟོག | abhūta parikalpa).

But, what I really wanted to post and didn't have the Tibetan to hand until now were verses from the Trisvabhāvanirdeśa. In this text "imagination of the unreal (here ཡང་དག་མ་ཡིན་ཀུན་རྟོག) is mentioned only a couple of times, and I think each time it is problematic to read it literally as unreal imagination, describing the imagined nature, but rather it should be read as "imagination of the unreal" referring to the construction of the unreal, which is related to the dependent nature. For example,

༨
།ཡང་དག་མ་ཡིན་ཀུན་རྟོག་དེ།
།རྣམ་པར་སྨིན་དང་དེ་བཞིན་དུ།
།དར་འཛིན་གཞན་དུ་སྣང་བ་ཡི།
།དབྱེ་བས་རྣམ་པ་གསུམ་དུའང་འདོད།

Here, if I read imagination of the unreal (ཡང་དག་མིན་རྟོག), equated with imagined nature, then you are effectively equating the imaginary nature with all the eight consciousnesses.

My point is twofold, that the term ཡང་དག་མིན་རྟོག | abhūta parikalpa is not two different things but is one thing, and secondly that this one thing is equated with dependent nature not imagined nature.

I also thank you. So it supports my investigation based only on english translation here in my previous posts. Good to see it finally as not the Mind only (Cittamatara), but as Yogacara compatible with Madhyamaka as I wrote earlier

[Malcolm]

I also thank you. So it supports my investigation based only on english translation here in my previous posts. Good to see it finally as not the Mind only (Cittamatara), but as Yogacara compatible with Madhyamaka as I wrote earlier

That is not what Tom is saying. Tom is saying that imagination of the unreal exists. That is precisely the cittamatra POV. If one reads the MV objectively, there is no way to read it as Madhyamaka text. If you read it according to tortured late Tibetan exegesis [Mipham or Shakya Chogden], then you can try, but in doing so you have to basically assert that the perfected nature is never the dependent nature. But in fact in the MV it is made extremely clear that the perfected nature simple is the non-existence of the imagined nature in the dependent nature, and that non-existence exists. In summary, there really is no way to reconcile Maitreyanath's Madhyāntavibhanga and Dharmadharmatāvibhanga with Madhyamaka. They are all Yogacara (cittamatra) treatises meant to explicate the Yogacara tradition sutras such the Samdhinirmocana, the Lanka and so on. This applies also to the the Sutra-alaṃkara. This also applies to the Uttaratantra. Why? Because the Cittamatras also present a presentation of freedom from reference points i.e. the wisdom exists but it is free from reference points. The Abhisamaya-alaṃkara is also not free from fault in this respect because it really only discusses the structure of the path. The reason why the Yogacara commentaries of the AA are not widely studied in Tibet is because they are not compatible Madhyamaka view. Primarily Aryavimuktisena and Haribhadra are studied, both Madhyamaka scholars critical of the Yogacara point of view.

[Mariusz]

I also thank you. So it supports my investigation based only on english translation here in my previous posts. Good to see it finally as not the Mind only (Cittamatara), but as Yogacara compatible with Madhyamaka as I wrote earlier

That is not what Tom is saying. Tom is saying that imagination of the unreal exists. That is precisely the cittamatra POV. If one reads the MV objectively, there is no way to read it as Madhyamaka text. If you read it according to tortured late Tibetan exegesis [Mipham or Shakya Chogden], then you can try, but in doing so you have to basically assert that the perfected nature is never the dependent nature. But in fact in the MV it is made extremely clear that the perfected nature simple is the non-existence of the imagined nature in the dependent nature, and that non-existence exists. In summary, there really is no way to reconcile Maitreyanath's Madhyāntavibhanga and Dharmadharmatāvibhanga with Madhyamaka. They are all Yogacara (cittamatra) treatises meant to explicate the Yogacara tradition sutras such the Samdhinirmocana, the Lanka and so on. This applies also to the the Sutra-alaṃkara. This also applies to the Uttaratantra. Why? Because the Cittamatras also present a presentation of freedom from reference points i.e. the wisdom exists but it is free from reference points. The Abhisamaya-alaṃkara is also not free from fault in this respect because it really only discusses the structure of the path. The reason why the Yogacara commentaries of the AA are not widely studied in Tibet is because they are not compatible Madhyamaka view. Primarily Aryavimuktisena and Haribhadra are studied, both Madhyamaka scholars critical of the Yogacara point of view.

With all respect I did not see it in your quotes. Perhaps try with another one please. All I see is the dependent nature as never existed in the first place althought is seems to be, so also it is not totally faulty.

[Malcolm]

With all respect I did not see it in your quotes. Perhaps prove it with another one please. All I see is the dependent nature as never existed in the first place althought is seems to be, so also not totally faulty.

You need to read the Mahayāna Samgraha by Asanga then it will be more clear to you.

N

[Mariusz]

With all respect I did not see it in your quotes. Perhaps prove it with another one please. All I see is the dependent nature as never existed in the first place althought is seems to be, so also not totally faulty.

You need to read the Mahayāna Samgraha by Asanga then it will be more clear to you.

N

Thanx. Do you know suitable english book on it?

[Malcolm]

With all respect I did not see it in your quotes. Perhaps prove it with another one please. All I see is the dependent nature as never existed in the first place althought is seems to be, so also not totally faulty.

You need to read the Mahayāna Samgraha by Asanga then it will be more clear to you.

N

Thanx. Do you know suitable english book on it?

Yes, it is in translation.

[Mariusz]

Why? Because the Cittamatras also present a presentation of freedom from reference points i.e. the wisdom exists but it is free from reference points.

This is the point also Karl seems to share according to http://wordpress.tsadra.org/?p=1215 as the common model:

The three natures (parikalpita, paratantra, and pariniṣpanna). The common model (1) in Indian Yogācāra texts is that pariniṣpanna is described as paratantra’s being empty of parikalpita. In the “Maitreya Chapter,” the Buddha uses model (1), but says that both imaginary form (mere conventional designations such as “form”) and conceived form (the conditioned entities to which these designations are applied) do not exist ultimately, while only the dharmadhātu exists ultimately. When the latter is directly observed through nonconceptual wisdom, those entities are not observed. When they are observed, it is only through conception (vikalpa).

This is what I understand as the compatible with Madhyamaka too, and I don't know why do you not agree with it also:

the dependent nature is not totally faulty but the imaginary nature as the (conceptual) designations, because the perfect nature can be pointed-out using the dependent nature. The perfect nature is not the dependent nature let alone the imaginary nature, because is pointed-out beyond them: beyond the duality of the dependent nature, and beyond (conceptual) designations of the imaginary nature concerning this duality.

In other words, "the non-existence of the imagined nature in the dependent nature" makes possible to point-out the perfect nature and makes therefore the dependent nature useful or not totally faulty:

But in fact in the MV it is made extremely clear that the perfected nature simple is the non-existence of the imagined nature in the dependent nature, and that non-existence exists.

[Mariusz]

according to tortured late Tibetan exegesis [Mipham or Shakya Chogden]

I don't think so it is so. As you see above, I take it by simply using the subject-side perspective instead of object-side perspective. So for me nothing is "out there" existent, non-existent, so on and so fort.

[Malcolm]

according to tortured late Tibetan exegesis [Mipham or Shakya Chogden]

I don't think so it is so. As you see above, I take it by simply using the subject-side perspective instead of object-side perspective. So for me nothing is "out there" existent, non-existent, so on and so fort.

Right, your view is cittamatra, since you accept the existence of the subjective side ultimately.

N

[Mariusz]

according to tortured late Tibetan exegesis [Mipham or Shakya Chogden]

I don't think so it is so. As you see above, I take it by simply using the subject-side perspective instead of object-side perspective. So for me nothing is "out there" existent, non-existent, so on and so fort.

Right, your view is cittamatra, since you accept the existence of the subjective side ultimately.

N

Where I accept something for me? If a realized Madhyamika use statement "there is possible to attain Buddhahood, the perfect nature", it use so as pedagogical tool, the antidote to lead worldly beings through valid/logic cognitions. However, such establishment through valid cognition as well as something appearing in common for Centrists and their realist opponents is denied in detail by Candrakırti....

To point-out only the moon using a finger, is not the same as to make the statement "there is the finger out there".

[Malcolm]

Where I accept something for me? .

If you accept the perfected nature, your view is not Madhyamaka. This is why Candrakirti in detail refutes the three natures scheme.

[Mariusz]

Where I accept something for me? .

If you accept the perfected nature, your view is not Madhyamaka. This is why Candrakirti in detail refutes the three natures scheme.

For me? You have already read my points. So please don't generalize me as Mind only eternalist and write why and where exactly you read it?

[Mariusz]

Moreover, I pointed-out you the seeming is not totally faulty here again, after I wrote your statement "the relative truth is totally faulty" in Academic Discussion forum when we discussed Madhyamaka. So it is only for you, not for me. As long as for you "the relative truth is always faulty" I recognize your view as nihilistic So I use here the dependent nature of Yogacara as one another antidote for your statement.

[Malcolm]

Moreover, I pointed-out you the seeming is not totally faulty here again, after I wrote your statement "the relative truth is totally faulty" in Academic Discussion forum when we discussed Madhyamaka. So it is only for you, not for me. As long as for you "the relative truth is always faulty" I recognize your view as nihilistic So I use here the dependent nature of Yogacara as one another antidote for your statement.

What I actully said that was "relative truth is the object of a mistaken cognition", "ultimate truth is the object of an unmistaken cognition". These are Candrakirti's definitions and not mine.

Further, Candra devotes a number of verses to refuting the dependent nature -- read them.

N

[Mariusz]

Moreover, I pointed-out you the seeming is not totally faulty here again, after I wrote your statement "the relative truth is totally faulty" in Academic Discussion forum when we discussed Madhyamaka. So it is only for you, not for me. As long as for you "the relative truth is always faulty" I recognize your view as nihilistic So I use here the dependent nature of Yogacara as one another antidote for your statement.

What I actully said that was "relative truth is the object of a mistaken cognition", "ultimate truth is the object of an unmistaken cognition". These are Candrakirti's definitions and not mine.

Further, Candra devotes a number of verses to refuting the dependent nature -- read them.

N

Can you explain how "the object of a mistaken cognition" point-out the ultimate truth until Buddhahood with all qualities (3 Kayas)?

[Mariusz]

according to tortured late Tibetan exegesis [Mipham or Shakya Chogden]

I don't think so it is so. As you see above, I take it by simply using the subject-side perspective instead of object-side perspective. So for me nothing is "out there" existent, non-existent, so on and so fort.

Right, your view is cittamatra, since you accept the existence of the subjective side ultimately.

N

If you want to use the object side-perspective you should separate the Two truths: relative is not how a object is but how it seems to be, ultimate is not how object seems to be but how it is.

In other words conventional is the dependent arisen and ultimate is the lack of independent arisen. You will never know precisely dependently arisen "object" since beginningless time from infinitive causes/conditions but ultimately only buddhas suppose to be able to do it since "they" are omniscient.

So the object-side perspective is not soteriologically efficient. This is why I use the subject-side perspective here, not because I'm a some kind of cittamatrin.