Namdrol wrote: Why? Because the Cittamatras also present a presentation of freedom from reference points i.e. the wisdom exists but it is free from reference points.
This is the point also Karl seems to share according to http://wordpress.tsadra.org/?p=1215
as the common model:The three natures (parikalpita, paratantra, and pariniṣpanna). The common model (1) in Indian Yogācāra texts is that pariniṣpanna is described as paratantra’s being empty of parikalpita. In the “Maitreya Chapter,” the Buddha uses model (1), but says that both imaginary form (mere conventional designations such as “form”) and conceived form (the conditioned entities to which these designations are applied) do not exist ultimately, while only the dharmadhātu exists ultimately. When the latter is directly observed through nonconceptual wisdom, those entities are not observed. When they are observed, it is only through conception (vikalpa).
This is what I understand as the compatible with Madhyamaka too, and I don't know why do you not agree with it also:
the dependent nature is not totally faulty but the imaginary nature as the (conceptual) designations, because the perfect nature can be pointed-out using the dependent nature. The perfect nature is not the dependent nature let alone the imaginary nature, because is pointed-out beyond them: beyond the duality of the dependent nature, and beyond (conceptual) designations of the imaginary nature concerning this duality.
In other words, "the non-existence of the imagined nature in the dependent nature" makes possible to point-out the perfect nature and makes therefore the dependent nature useful or not totally faulty:
Namdrol wrote: But in fact in the MV it is made extremely clear that the perfected nature simple is the non-existence of the imagined nature in the dependent nature, and that non-existence exists.