gzhan stong and Great Madhyamaka

[Malcolm]

Also I'm collecting the arguments that show all Buddhism is cohesive and non contradictionary in the principle, whatever if sutra or tantra.

I see, so there is no contradiction between positing partless ultimate atoms and emptiness. Sure.

N

[Malcolm]

Excuse me, it was not mine:
"

You are missing the point. The point is that you took fragments of passages from different pages in this book, MIddle Beyond Extremes, mixed your own words into them, and did not clearly differentiate any of them. Further, your attempt at citation does not form an argument.

Finally, citing what two nineteenth century Tibetan authors write about a 5th century Indian text gives us no insight at all into what the 5th century Indians might have intended in their own words. This thread is not about what Mipham, Dolbupa, Shenga, Tsongkhapa, Gorampa, Mikyo Dorje, Rangjung Dorje, etc. thought about the issues of the relationship between alāyavijñāna and the dependent nature, it is about what Maitryanatha, Asanga and Vasubandhu and their Indian followers thought. Karl's B's essay I pointed you too does an excellent job of clarifying that in fact the early Yogacaras authors all use the type 1 model of the three natures, the very one gshan stong pas aka (neo) "Yogacara Madhyamakas" term the cittamatra presentation, which Karl B readily admits. This is indisputable. Of course, KB's paper intends to find sources for the gzhan stong view in Early Indian Yogacara, but he fails because it is not there.

N

[conebeckham]

I see the topic's been split, with this thread being removed from Academic Discussion.....I suppose it was inevitable.

Looks like this thread is, in fact, about what later Tibetan masters have said regarding the true meaning of Asanga/Maitreya, and the Yogacara, texts in general---as Shentong and so-called Great Madhyamika are Tibetan terms.

My personal understanding, at this point, subject to change, is that:
1. Yogacara texts do, in fact, assert an "existent."
2. The nature of that "existent" is the Perfect Nature.
3. The existent which is of the perfect nature is the substrate of all consciousnesses, including the ālayavijñāna, as well as all the other consciousnesses.
4. The ālayavijñāna is not the ultimate existent, as it is said to "cease." In the same way, all the other consciousness cease, so none of them can be said to be ultimate, though they are "of" the ultimate, in a sense.

5.That Ultimate is nonconceptual wisdom, the perfection of wisdom, and when stained is called the Tataghatha Heart, the Basic Element, and many other things. When free of stains, it is called the Dharmakaya, Buddhahood.

This Ultimate is beyond conceptual understanding, and therefore cannot be said to be "existent" in an ultimate sense, but it is referred to as empty, luminous, and unimpeded. In other words, Dharmakaya is empty. Yet it is not a mere "absence" in the way Madhyamika reaches the nonentity of self and phenomena, as it can be said to be "luminous." There are various interpretations of so-called Shentong. I suppose my understanding to be one of them--if one defines anyone who posits that a Perfect Wisdom "exists" and is seperate from phenomena which arise in it's substrate, but which are not exactly the same as it's substrate, in any sense at all as a Shentongpa. Karmapa Rangjung Dorje's position is the one I am still working to understand, but it seems very developed, and, more importantly, it seems to relate to experience and realization, rather than as a conceptual or intellectual framework. But that's just me..... One of the things that interested me, from that perspective, was Namdrol's feeling that early Indian Yogacara must be interpreted as positing the "reality" of the other-dependent. But I think we've lost that issue, so I'm bowing out of this one, and the academic discussion original, for now. Thanks, Namdrol, though, for taking the time to answer my questions. I continue to learn.

[Malcolm]

My personal understanding, at this point, subject to change, is that:
1. Yogacara texts do, in fact, assert an "existent."
2. The nature of that "existent" is the Perfect Nature.
3. The existent which is of the perfect nature is the substrate of all consciousnesses, including the ālayavijñāna, as well as all the other consciousnesses.
4. The ālayavijñāna is not the ultimate existent, as it is said to "cease." In the same way, all the other consciousness cease, so none of them can be said to be ultimate, though they are "of" the ultimate, in a sense.

The ālayavijñāna is the imagination of the unreal.

So we will break it down: the imagination [dependent nature] of the unreal [the imagined nature] exists; however in it duality does not exist [parinispanna].

So when the unreal is removed, what remains is the dependent nature. That is why it is said that the absence of the imagined in the dependent is the perfected.

[conebeckham]

You assume the lack of the false imagination, and specifically the lack of duality, in the dependent is the only thing that parinispanna signifies? That the perfect nature is merely the lack of false imagination?

This would seem to imply that the seeds, or some sort of "contents" of the alaya, would still be present....or do you find all the seeds, habits,etc., would be purified merely by virtue of the lack of false imagination?

[Mariusz]

You assume the lack of the false imagination, and specifically the lack of duality, in the dependent is the only thing that parinispanna signifies? That the perfect nature is merely the lack of false imagination?

This would seem to imply that the seeds, or some sort of "contents" of the alaya, would still be present....or do you find all the seeds, habits,etc., would be purified merely by virtue of the lack of false imagination?

Very good implications. So I'd rather stay with Karl:
"Thus, the three natures are not three different ontological “things.” It is not
that by subtracting one (the imaginary nature) from the other (the other-dependent
nature), one arrives at the third (the perfect nature). Rather, Yog›c›ra talks
about the other-dependent nature as the experiential ground for a dynamic
process of disillusioning and refining our perception, with the imaginary nature
and the perfect nature being the “extremes” of mistaken and pure perception
respectively. Thus, the other-dependent nature stands for the continuity of experience,
which is impure when imagined as the imaginary nature and pure or perfected
when this imaginary nature has been seen through. Since the realization
of the perfect nature is still an experience and not something abstract or just
nothing, it is said that the other-dependent nature in its pure aspect is the perfect
nature. In this way, “other-dependent nature” is just a term for the compound
meaning of the imaginary nature and the perfect nature, which points to
the underlying experiential continuity of a mind stream that becomes increasingly
aware of its own true nature."
This is what I meant "the seeeming is not totally faulty" but "point-out", the ontological, the soteriologically efficient, and what I found "compatible" with Madhyamaka.

Worldly beings as Animals, Humans, Pretas perceive differently. But there is the Path for them indeed. Because of this Path, sentient beings by subject-side perceive gross Nirmanakaya, bodhisattvas free from clinging perceive subtle Sambhogakaya, buddhas?.... because there is not any division at this level "they" can not continue to perceive but the Dharmakaya. The object of all of these is what? The division is where? For Centrists never was at the first place but only seems to.

Nevetheless, until it seems to be division is also the Path. This Path leads to the no division. When division between "Buddha" and "sentient being" is completely no more, it means the all qualities (Dharmakaya, Rupakaya). This means: All divisions belong to the seeming not to the buddhas.

[Mariusz]

Mr. G, why did you Split Topic: gzhan stong and Great Madhyamaka from http://www.dharmawheel.net/viewtopic.php?f=102&t=7096? As for me I'm not discussing shentong. Was it necessary to land here?

[Malcolm]

You assume the lack of the false imagination, and specifically the lack of duality, in the dependent is the only thing that parinispanna signifies? That the perfect nature is merely the lack of false imagination?

This would seem to imply that the seeds, or some sort of "contents" of the alaya, would still be present....or do you find all the seeds, habits,etc., would be purified merely by virtue of the lack of false imagination?

Recognizing the non-existence of the unreal is parinispanna, that is the classical Yogacara presentation of emptiness free from extremes.

How the paths and stages are meditated is a different story. I don't think we can say it is sufficient to merely recognize this fact and then we are finished. This is how the Yogacara scholars are presenting the view of emptiness, which is why for example, the Madhyāntavibhaga gives a presentation of the sixteen emptinesses. If this recognition were sufficient, there would be no purpose for the rest of the treatises which details the 37 bodhipakṣa dharmas and so on.

Anyway, in 1:3-4, Vasubandhu explains MV as follows:

As such, having described the characteristic of the existence and and characteristics of the non-existence of the imagination of the false, now the intrinsic characteristic will be described:

Consciousness appearing
as objects, sentient beings, self, and cognitions
arise, but its objects do not exist,
since they do not exist, it does not exist.

Now then, appearing as objects means whatever appears as a thing such such as form and so on; appearing as sentient beings what appears to the five sense organs appearing in the continuums of self and others; appearing as a self is the afflicted mind because the concomitance of confusion and so about a self; appearing as a cognition is the six consciousnesses. "It's objects do not exist means" the appearances as objects, and sentient beings do exist; self and cognitions means mistaken appearances. Since the objects do not exist, also that apprehending consciousness does not exist.

That imagination of the unreal
is established because of that,
is not as it seems, is not a total non-existent.

As such, however appearances are produced, they are not as they seem; because of the production of mere delusion, are also not totally non-existent.

If it is asked why its total non-existence is not asserted:

Having exhausted that, liberation is asserted.

If it were otherwise, bondage and freedom would not be established, and definitely the afflictive state and complete purification would be repudiated.

There are three points here:

1) The imagination is the dependent.
2) It is held to exist, but its content does not exist.
3) If it is held to be totally non-existent, both samsara and nirvana are impossible because there would be no basis for delusion.

[Mariusz]

How the paths and stages are meditated is a different story. I don't think we can say it is sufficient to merely recognize this fact and then we are finished.

The mere recognition such fact as: "until it seems to be division is also the Path. This Path leads to the no division. When division between "Buddha" and "sentient being" is completely no more, it means the all qualities (Dharmakaya, Rupakaya)" shows how our "division" is horrible right now

[muni]

You are wrong because you: (2.With respect to the dependent nature, it is empty in the sense that this lack of entity is itself a non-entity, but) for you while nothing exists as imagined, it is the case that wakefulness does not exist.

Your response is a complete and total non-sequitar. In other words, it does not make any sense.

Also this thread is going wildly off topic due in part to the inability of all respondents to communicate with sufficient discipline.

Therefore, unless it returns to a proper course, I am finished with it.

Sorry, I forgot. For You the conventional is always totally faulty.

You show me this tread. So i read a bit, not all.

One question, how is conventional truth when conventional and absolute are in fact essentially "one truth"?

(When conventional is how all dependencies appear and absolute how the nature of all is.)

Separation: clouds maybe have no cloudness in their appaerance to put apart in a box. ( then to classify by fault or right)

[Mariusz]

One question, how is conventional truth when conventional and absolute are in fact essentially "one truth"?

(When conventional is how all dependencies appear and absolute how the nature of all is.)

Separation: clouds maybe have no cloudness in their appaerance to put apart in a box. ( then to classify by fault or right)

Yes, finally there is total collapse of all divisions (such the two truths), so called "unblurred unimpaired vision" (the freedom beyond all reference points including this very freedom itself). However, If you now, as a worldly being, use it to create new reference point again and called it the "one truth", it will be no longer the "antidote" (the method) for you "worldly being" given by realized madhyamikas, but the "poison" of eternalism.

(Chandrakirti)The conventional truth is the method;
The ultimate truth is what arises from the method.
Those who do not know the distinctions between these two
Will, due to wrong thinking, follow inferior paths. (6.80)

(IX Karmapa Wangchung Dorje comments:) This verse explains the reasons why falling from the two truths will make attaining liberation impossible. The conventional truth refers to the inter dependent phenomena aggregates, constituents, and sources taught by the perfect Buddha as methods for realizing the ultimate truth. The teaching on the ultimate truth is what arises from such methods. The ultimate truth is taught in dependence upon the conventional truth. And through comprehending the ultimate truth, one attains the ultimate, that is, nirvāṇa.

[muni]

One question, how is conventional truth when conventional and absolute are in fact essentially "one truth"?

(When conventional is how all dependencies appear and absolute how the nature of all is.)

Separation: clouds maybe have no cloudness in their appaerance to put apart in a box. ( then to classify by fault or right)

Yes, finally there is total collapse of all divisions (such the two truths), so called "unblurred unimpaired vision" (the freedom beyond all reference points including this very freedom itself). However, If you now, as a worldly being, use it to create new reference point again and called it the "one truth", it will be no longer the "antidote" (the method) for you "worldly being" given by realized madhyamikas, but the "poison" of eternalism.

(Chandrakirti)The conventional truth is the method;
The ultimate truth is what arises from the method.
Those who do not know the distinctions between these two
Will, due to wrong thinking, follow inferior paths. (6.80)

(IX Karmapa Wangchung Dorje comments:) This verse explains the reasons why falling from the two truths will make attaining liberation impossible. The conventional truth refers to the inter dependent phenomena aggregates, constituents, and sources taught by the perfect Buddha as methods for realizing the ultimate truth. The teaching on the ultimate truth is what arises from such methods. The ultimate truth is taught in dependence upon the conventional truth. And through comprehending the ultimate truth, one attains the ultimate, that is, nirvāṇa.

Thanks.

When there is clinging to notion of subject-object then appaerances truly exist, then reference points get birth.
"Then the chain is rolling by their characteristics, by the stories of these". Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche.
Since the totally absence of identity, all labeling of truly existences is as results from habitual tendencies.


Or Saraha:To cling to a concrete reality is to be as foolish as cattle.
But clinging to emptiness is even more foolish.

Practice is so so crucial, as whatever i say, what sense it makes without practice.

[Tom]

You assume the lack of the false imagination, and specifically the lack of duality, in the dependent is the only thing that parinispanna signifies? That the perfect nature is merely the lack of false imagination?

This would seem to imply that the seeds, or some sort of "contents" of the alaya, would still be present....or do you find all the seeds, habits,etc., would be purified merely by virtue of the lack of false imagination?

Recognizing the non-existence of the unreal is parinispanna, that is the classical Yogacara presentation of emptiness free from extremes.

How the paths and stages are meditated is a different story. I don't think we can say it is sufficient to merely recognize this fact and then we are finished. This is how the Yogacara scholars are presenting the view of emptiness, which is why for example, the Madhyāntavibhaga gives a presentation of the sixteen emptinesses. If this recognition were sufficient, there would be no purpose for the rest of the treatises which details the 37 bodhipakṣa dharmas and so on.

Anyway, in 1:3-4, Vasubandhu explains MV as follows:

As such, having described the characteristic of the existence and and characteristics of the non-existence of the imagination of the false, now the intrinsic characteristic will be described:

Consciousness appearing
as objects, sentient beings, self, and cognitions
arise, but its objects do not exist,
since they do not exist, it does not exist.

Now then, appearing as objects means whatever appears as a thing such such as form and so on; appearing as sentient beings what appears to the five sense organs appearing in the continuums of self and others; appearing as a self is the afflicted mind because the concomitance of confusion and so about a self; appearing as a cognition is the six consciousnesses. "It's objects do not exist means" the appearances as objects, and sentient beings do exist; self and cognitions means mistaken appearances. Since the objects do not exist, also that apprehending consciousness does not exist.

That imagination of the unreal
is established because of that,
is not as it seems, is not a total non-existent.

As such, however appearances are produced, they are not as they seem; because of the production of mere delusion, are also not totally non-existent.

If it is asked why its total non-existence is not asserted:

Having exhausted that, liberation is asserted.

If it were otherwise, bondage and freedom would not be established, and definitely the afflictive state and complete purification would be repudiated.

There are three points here:

1) The imagination is the dependent.
2) It is held to exist, but its content does not exist.
3) If it is held to be totally non-existent, both samsara and nirvana are impossible because there would be no basis for delusion.

Namdrol,

Just to be clear in "1) The imagination is the dependent." you mean imagination of the unreal "abhūta parikalpa," not imagination "parikalpita svābhava", yes?
I only ask because of the context of the next verse (1:5).

Also, given verse 1:9 how do you conclude that the ālayavijñāna is equated with the imagination of the unreal? The imagination of the unreal is defined in terms of function in relation to all the eight consciousness. Or, do you come to this conclusion based on other sources.

Are you translating from the Tibetan? or are you using someone else's translation?

Cheers.

[Malcolm]

Just to be clear in "1) The imagination is the dependent." you mean imagination of the unreal "abhūta parikalpa," not imagination "parikalpita svābhava", yes?

Yes.

I only ask because of the context of the next verse (1:5).

Also, given verse 1:9 how do you conclude that the ālayavijñāna is equated with the imagination of the unreal?

Verse nine describes the imagination (the alāyavijñāna) of the unreal (the other seven consciousness).

You seem to think that all eight are the unreal. This is not the intention of 1:8-9.

Are you translating from the Tibetan? or are you using someone else's translation?

I generally translate directly from Tibetan, if not I give citation of source.

[Tom]

Just to be clear in "1) The imagination is the dependent." you mean imagination of the unreal "abhūta parikalpa," not imagination "parikalpita svābhava", yes?

Yes.

I only ask because of the context of the next verse (1:5).

Also, given verse 1:9 how do you conclude that the ālayavijñāna is equated with the imagination of the unreal?

Verse nine describes the imagination (the alāyavijñāna) of the unreal (the other seven consciousness).

You seem to think that all eight are the unreal. This is not the intention of 1:8-9.

Are you translating from the Tibetan? or are you using someone else's translation?

I generally translate directly from Tibetan, if not I give citation of source.

I want to check if you disagree with my parse of verse 8 and 9. They go something like this:

Verse 8:
the imagination of the unreal (abhūta parikalpa) is defined in terms of its subdivision which are the mind and mental factors (caitasa). It is then defined in terms of its synonyms conciosness (vijñapti) and mental factors (caitasa). These are then given their usual definitions ...

Verse 9:
This verse Is about the functioning of the imagination of the unreal (abhūta parikalpa)and divides it into two 1) the store consciousness (alāyavijñāna), which is the conditioning consciousness, and 2) the functioning consciousness (meaning all the other conciousnesses) and they relate to experience. They are summed (Vasabhandu explains) up as meaning feeling, conceptualization and disposition.

Why do you divide these two components into the real and unreal? I can't see this in the text.

[Malcolm]

Why do you divide these two components into the real and unreal? I can't see this in the text.

The imagination of the unreal exists.

[Tom]

Why do you divide these two components into the real and unreal? I can't see this in the text.

The imagination of the unreal exists.

Agreed. What is confusing to me is that you said, "the imagination [dependent nature] of the unreal [the imagined nature] exists;" then you also said, "Verse nine describes the imagination (the alāyavijñāna) of the unreal (the other seven consciousness)."

What I am having trouble understanding is why you say the unreal (abhūta) is both "the imagined nature" (parikalpita svabhāva) and "the other seven consciousnesses". As I understand it the "imagined nature" (parikalpita svabhāva) refers to the object (1:5), and further "the other seven consciousnesses" and also the alāyavijñāna are dependent nature (paratantra svabhāva).

I don't see where abhūta parikalpa is divided out as:
abhūta (unreal) = the imagined nature / the other seven consciousness
parikalpa (imagination) = dependent nature / alāyavijñāna

It seems to contradict verse 1:5.

[muni]

Why do you divide these two components into the real and unreal? I can't see this in the text.

The imagination of the unreal exists.

Thank you for this expression.

[Malcolm]

It seems to contradict verse 1:5.

I don't see how.

[Mariusz]

I also can not see where it is divided. The following quote:

Now then, appearing as objects means whatever appears as a thing such such as form and so on; appearing as sentient beings what appears to the five sense organs appearing in the continuums of self and others; appearing as a self is the afflicted mind because the concomitance of confusion and so about a self; appearing as a cognition is the six consciousnesses. "It's objects do not exist means" the appearances as objects, and sentient beings do exist; self and cognitions means mistaken appearances. Since the objects do not exist, also that apprehending consciousness does not exist.

That imagination of the unreal
is established because of that,
is not as it seems, is not a total non-existent.

As such, however appearances are produced, they are not as they seem; because of the production of mere delusion, are also not totally non-existent.

is for me all about the dependent nature only, and this quote simply means the dependent nature (in all of its aspects) is not totally non-existent as seems to be. In other words it is not totally faulty as I explained earlier. It is not cittamatra (the Mind only; the self-aware and self-illuminating consciousness empty of duality between perceiver and perceived).