Re: rangtong vs. zhentong
Posted: Tue Feb 05, 2013 10:39 pm
Very interesting thread for me as well.
A Buddhist discussion forum on Mahayana and Vajrayana Buddhism
https://www.dharmawheel.net:443/
thats like saying a brown cow and a white cow arent both cows, because theyre different cows.Son of Buddha wrote:I suppose if Enlightenment is one then all Buddhas are perfectly one with one Full Enlightenment,unless Enlightenment is different for all Buddhas.
Can you elaborate on this for me, how does Shentong solve this?5heaps wrote:thats like saying a brown cow and a white cow arent both cows, because theyre different cows.Son of Buddha wrote:I suppose if Enlightenment is one then all Buddhas are perfectly one with one Full Enlightenment,unless Enlightenment is different for all Buddhas.
(the enlightened Shakyamuni and the enlightened Maitreya arent both enlightened, because theyre different enlightenments)
shentong isnt monism because it knows how to resolve this question using imputation, whereas nonbuddhists systems do not
all nonbuddhists fall into the two extremes meaning they either deny too many existing things or assert that they are qualified by way of essential naturesJohnny Dangerous wrote:Can you elaborate on this for me, how does Shentong solve this?5heaps wrote:thats like saying a brown cow and a white cow arent both cows, because theyre different cows.Son of Buddha wrote:I suppose if Enlightenment is one then all Buddhas are perfectly one with one Full Enlightenment,unless Enlightenment is different for all Buddhas.
(the enlightened Shakyamuni and the enlightened Maitreya arent both enlightened, because theyre different enlightenments)
shentong isnt monism because it knows how to resolve this question using imputation, whereas nonbuddhists systems do not
Hi 5heaps,5heaps wrote:prasangika=analytically findable on the side of the object aka inherent existence, etcetc)
You misread it, so did I the first 7 times!wayland wrote:Perhaps you meant this and I misread it.
That is an excellent way to express it, do you have any references for where we might find some elaboration on this?5heaps wrote:...in other words cow is not one with its instances, nor is it separate to them.
5heaps wrote:thats like saying a brown cow and a white cow arent both cows, because theyre different cows.Son of Buddha wrote:I suppose if Enlightenment is one then all Buddhas are perfectly one with one Full Enlightenment,unless Enlightenment is different for all Buddhas.
(the enlightened Shakyamuni and the enlightened Maitreya arent both enlightened, because theyre different enlightenments)
shentong isnt monism because it knows how to resolve this question using imputation, whereas nonbuddhists systems do not
no he didnt misread it he clearly states "prasangika=analytically findable on the side of the object AKA(also known as) Inherent existance""futerko"]You misread it, so did I the first 7 times!wayland wrote:Perhaps you meant this and I misread it.
"definitions of what it means to exist essentially... prasangika=analytically findable on the side of the object"
too funny!Son of Buddha wrote:no he didnt misread it he clearly states "prasangika=analytically findable on the side of the object AKA(also known as) Inherent existance""futerko"]You misread it, so did I the first 7 times!wayland wrote:Perhaps you meant this and I misread it.
"definitions of what it means to exist essentially... prasangika=analytically findable on the side of the object"
he clearly states it is AKA also known as inherent existance.
This is how Zhentong views existance/non existance"5heaps"
all nonbuddhists fall into the two extremes meaning they either deny too many existing things or assert that they are qualified by way of essential natures
(the different buddhist tenet systems have different definitions of what it means to exist essentially--vaibhashika=unchanging, monolithic, and independent from its parts, sautrantika=substantially knowable, prasangika=analytically findable on the side of the object aka inherent existence, etcetc)
so, shentong arent a form of monism because they at least accept the vaibhashika, sautrantika, and mindonly positions, which all deny coarse forms of existence by way of essential natures. if one is not sensitive to these positions then yes shentong can sound like monism, even prasangika can
to answer the specific question: shentong accepts what sautrantika accepts about 'cow'. it lacks being substantially knowable, it is only knowable by way of imputation. in other words cow is not one with its instances, nor is it separate to them. most people will complain mightily about this, and as eseentially all thinkers from all cultures throughout all history have done, they insist that cow has to be either nonexistent, or one with its instances, or independent of its instances. somehow cow MUST cover all of its instances, otherwise theres no way to explain that we should see cow when we look at such and such creature.
hi, like futerko said i gave that in the context of talking about what it means to exist essentially. sorry for the lack of claritywayland wrote:As far as I know, the opposite is asserted by the Prasangika. The object is "un-findable" upon investigation, as it is neither the same as (nor other than) its parts. It is mere designation.
thats standard sautrantikafuterko wrote:That is an excellent way to express it, do you have any references for where we might find some elaboration on this?
none of it supports your position at all. its best not to form positions based on your own understanding of sutras, since the logic you use to come up with such positions are countered elsewhereSon of Buddha wrote:you can read Lankavatara sutra Chapter 3 LX on this matter.
Thanks.5heaps wrote:thats standard sautrantikafuterko wrote:That is an excellent way to express it, do you have any references for where we might find some elaboration on this?
Knowing, Naming And Negation: A Sourcebook On Tibetan Sautrantika by Anne Carolyn Klein
Knowledge And Liberation: Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology In Support Of Transformative Religious Experience by Anne Carolyn Klein
Mind In Tibetan Buddhism by Lati Rinbochay & Elizabeth Napper
but these are pretty difficult..theres no way i would be reading them fluently now had i not studied the aci courses and berinarchives for a good long while
monism necessarily asserts that to be an existing thing is to be a substantially knowable thing. since shentong has sautrantika and mindonly built into it, it can never be monismJohnny Dangerous wrote: Basically, it would be monism without Sautrantika notions of labeling..is that right? Basically it would only be monism if solely compared with Prasangika refusal (IIRC) to make assertions about labeling, or when presented as exclusive?
Awesome, looks like I need to spend some more time on Berzin's site.5heaps wrote:monism necessarily asserts that to be an existing thing is to be a substantially knowable thing. since shentong has sautrantika and mindonly built into it, it can never be monismJohnny Dangerous wrote: Basically, it would be monism without Sautrantika notions of labeling..is that right? Basically it would only be monism if solely compared with Prasangika refusal (IIRC) to make assertions about labeling, or when presented as exclusive?
thats easy to say but difficult to understand the specifics of. after all, only aryas have dispelled the innate tendency to view things as self-sufficiently/substantially knowable, even though in actuality they are only knowable through imputation
The Distinction between Self-sufficiently Knowable and Imputedly Knowable Phenomena
http://www.dharmawheel.net/viewtopic.ph ... 1&start=20
Malcolm: The actual mode of meditation in rang stong and gzhan stong are not different at all. The difference lay primarily in how they conceptualize the view in post-meditation.....The basis in gzhan stong is still emptiness, albeit is an emptiness qualified by the presence of ultimate buddha qualities, where samsaric phenomena are considere extraneous. Why? Because these ultimate qualities are only held to appear to exist in post-equipoise, but their appearance of existence disappear when in equipoise.
The equipoise in both rang stong and gzhan stong is characterized as an equipoise free from extremes. In the case of commoners, this freedom from extremes is arrived through analysis that negate the four extremes in turn. This is necessary even in gshan stong because attachment to the luminosity described by the PP sutras will result in an extreme view, just as grasping to emptiness results in an extreme view.
As I said, the most salient difference between R and S is in their post-equipoise formulation. In terms of how adherents of the so called R and S views actually meditate, there is no ultimate difference.
The pitfall of both approaches is the same -- failure to eradicate all extremes results in the former grasping to non-existence as emptiness, and the latter grasping to existence as emptiness.
The purpose of Madhyamaka analysis is not to come to some imagined "correct" generic image of the ultimate, but rather to exhaust the mind's capacity to reify phenomena according to any extreme so that one's experience of conventional truth upon reaching the path of seeing in post-equipoise is that all phenomena are seen to be illusions, dreams and so on i.e. unreal and yet apparent due to the force of traces.
So by you view Shakyamuni Buddha and Amitabha Buddha have different individual personalities,which seperates then into 2 different individual beings/selves?5heaps wrote:
for example its understood that the enlightenment of shakyamuni and amitabha are different because they are different instances of enlightenment, regardless of the fact that these instances do not differ in capacity. nondifference in capacity does not necessarily entail that they are singular"
yes they are different steams of enlightened mindsSon of Buddha wrote:So by you view Shakyamuni Buddha and Amitabha Buddha have different individual personalities,which seperates then into 2 different individual beings/selves?5heaps wrote:
for example its understood that the enlightenment of shakyamuni and amitabha are different because they are different instances of enlightenment, regardless of the fact that these instances do not differ in capacity. nondifference in capacity does not necessarily entail that they are singular"
So for me to prove that Buddhas are Singular,I would have to find a sutra that says Shakyamuni Buddha is also called Amitabha Buddha or Shakyamuni buddha is also called Vairocana Buddha,implying that both Buddhas are actually one in the same Buddha correct?